

DigiCert Europe CP/CPS

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Introductory Note About this Document

This document is the Certificate Policy/Certification Practice Statement (CP/CPS) of DigiCert Europe (previously known as QuoVadis), part of DigiCert, Inc. The DigiCert Europe CP/CPS is administered by the DigiCert Europe Policy Management Authority, a subset of the DigiCert Policy Authority (DCPA).

This version of the CP/CPS has been approved for use by the DigiCert Policy Authority (DCPA) and is subject to amendment and change in accordance with the policies and guidelines adopted, from time to time, by the DCPA and as otherwise set out herein. The date on which this version of the CP/CPS becomes effective is indicated on this CP/CPS. The most recent effective copy of this CP/CPS supersedes all previous versions. No provision is made for different versions of this CP/CPS to remain in effect at the same time.

This document covers aspects of the DigiCert Europe PKI. Services for PKIoverheid operate under a separate CP/CPS document which can be found in the Legal Repository: <https://www.digicert.com/legal-repository/europe>.

There are a number of instances where the legal and regulatory frameworks for Qualified Certificates under the Swiss or EU Digital Signature regimes impose additional requirements. In these instances, this Document shows these differences either by indicating in the body of the text “For Qualified Certificates” or with the inclusion of a Text Box as shown below.

CH	Provision relating to Qualified or Regulated Certificates issued in accordance with Swiss regulations.
EU	Provision relating to Qualified Certificates issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) No. 910/2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market (the eIDAS Regulation).

Contact Information

- Belgium: DigiCert Europe Belgium BV (previously QuoVadis Trustlink BVBA), Schaliënhoevedreef 20T, 2800 Mechelen, Belgium. Phone: +32 15-79-65-21
- Netherlands: DigiCert Europe Netherlands BV (previously QuoVadis Trustlink BV), Nevelgaarde 56 noord, 3436 ZZ Nieuwegein, Netherlands. Phone: +31 (0) 30 232-4320
- Switzerland: DigiCert Switzerland AG (previously QuoVadis Trustlink Schweiz AG), Poststrasse 17, Postfach, 9001 St. Gallen, Switzerland. Phone: +41 71-228-98-00

Website: <https://www.digicert.com>

Electronic mail: policy@digicert.com

Problem reporting: <https://problemreport.digicert.com/>

Customer complaints: qvcomplaints@digicert.com

Version Control

Author	Date	Version	Comment
QuoVadis PMA	22 November, 2023	5.00	Consolidation of previous CP/CPS documents (CP/CPS for Root CA and Root CA3 v4.43 and CP/CPS for Root CA2 v2.21) into a combined document. Prior version changes are tracked in those previous documents. Transition to EU Cert Central, with minor editorial updates. Deprecation of HydrantID OID. Updates to Section 1.6.3 References, 4.12 escrow, 5.5 records archival, 6.3.1 public key archival, 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 computer security, 7.1.2 extensions, and Appendix A Standard profile OID options.
QuoVadis PMA	15 December, 2023	5.1	Clarification of other policy documents in 1.2, clarification of escrow in 4.12, addition of G4 roots in 7.4.2, deprecation of GRID Certificates and clarification of TSA Device Certificates in Appendix A, and minor editorial changes.
QuoVadis PMA	1 March, 2024	5.2	Clarification of procedures for Certificates issued to self in 3.2, revocation request options in 3.4, last CRL in 4.9.7, clarity on offsite backup 5.4.5, security of CA Private Key copies in 6.2.4. Updates to Swiss Qualified and Regulated profiles in Appendix A. Correction of OID for id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax. Minor editorial updates.
DCPA	15 September, 2024	6.00	Update CAA for S/MIME, weak key revocation requirements, clarify logging requirements, include linting process, update name from Quovadis to DigiCert Europe and update Swiss Qualified profiles.

Author	Date	Version	Comment
DCPA	24 December, 2024	6.01	Update Section 7.2 to make it cleaner and to clarify CRL reasonCode usage across all Certificate type, update corporate entity names and update Section 4.9.10 to clarify conformity to OCSP requirements.
DCPA	8 January, 2025	6.02	Fix typos
DCPA	27 February, 2025	6.03	Fix typos. Add MPIC requirement and changes to manual domain validation in Section 3.
DCPA	14 May, 2025	6.04	Add DigiCert Ombudsman contact information, add MPIC and Linting for S/MIME, add remediation timelines for vulnerabilities, add S/MIME OIDs for Multipurpose and Strict, clarified attributes in certificate profiles, and minor editorial changes.
DCPA	9 June, 2025	6.05	Clarified CA system checks and clarified subject attributes in profiles.
DCPA	23 June, 2025	6.06	Clarified subject attributes in profiles.
DCPA	21 July, 2025	6.07	Clarified subject attributes in profiles.
DCPA	24 October, 2025	6.08	Restructured subsections to align with TLS BRs where applicable, removed superfluous language and outdated references, added DNSSEC requirements, added reduced TLS certificate validity schedule and reduced domain re-use.

1. Introduction

1.1. OVERVIEW

This Certificate Policy/Certification Practice Statement (CP/CPS) sets out the certification processes that DigiCert Europe (previously known as QuoVadis) uses in the generation, issue, use, and management of Certificates and serves to notify Subscribers and Relying Parties of their roles and responsibilities concerning Certificates.

DigiCert Europe ensures the integrity of its Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) operational hierarchy by binding Participants to contractual agreements. This CP/CPS is not intended to create a contractual relationship between DigiCert Europe and any Participant in the DigiCert Europe PKI. Any person seeking to rely on Certificates or participate within the DigiCert Europe PKI must do so pursuant to definitive contractual documentation.

DigiCert Europe Netherlands BV (Previously known as QuoVadis Trustlink BV) is a Qualified Trust Service Provider (TSP) listed on the Trusted List for the Netherlands, DigiCert Europe Belgium BV (previously QuoVadis Trustlink BVBA) for Belgium, and DigiCert Switzerland AG (previously QuoVadis Schweiz AG) for Switzerland.

DigiCert Europe Certificates comply with Internet standards (x509 v.3) as set out in RFC 5280. This CP/CPS follows the IETF PKIX RFC 3647 framework with 9 Sections that cover practices and procedures for identifying Certificate applicants; issuing and revoking Certificates; and the security controls related to managing the physical, personnel, technical, and operational components of the CA infrastructure. To preserve the outline specified by RFC 3647, some Sections will have the statement "Not applicable" or "No Stipulation."

In addition a PKI Disclosure Statement, which summarises information about the DigiCert Europe PKI, may be found in the DigiCert Europe Repository.

CH	With the exception of CAs issuing Qualified Certificates in accordance with the European eIDAS Regulation, or Swiss Qualified/Regulated Certificates in accordance with Swiss Regulations, at DigiCert Europe's discretion, trustworthy parties may be permitted to operate Issuing CA and RA services within the DigiCert Europe PKI.
EU	Trust service components for EU Qualified Certificates or Swiss Qualified/Regulated Certificates may only be performed by DigiCert Europe-approved entities that have the relevant certifications. When trust service components are provided by another party DigiCert Europe maintains overall responsibility and undertakes procedures to ensure that the security and functionality of the trust service meet the appropriate requirements.

1.2. DOCUMENT NAME AND IDENTIFICATION

This document is the DigiCert Europe CP/CPS which was adopted by the DigiCert Policy Authority (DCPA). The Object Identifiers (OID) assigned to this CP/CPS are defined in Appendix A.

Separate policy documents in the DigiCert Europe Repository apply to the following DigiCert

Europe Certificates:

- Netherlands PKIoverheid
- QuoVadis Private PKI / Trust Anchor Root CA (1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.4)
- BEKB - BCBE (1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.3.700.0)
- HIN Health Info Net (1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.3.800.0)

DigiCert Europe also operates Time-stamping Authority (TSA) services under a separate DigiCert Europe Time-Stamp Policy/Practice Statement (OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.2000.6).

DigiCert Europe may include other OIDs as appropriate. OIDs in this list and in DigiCert Europe Certificates belong to their respective owners.

1.3. PKI PARTICIPANTS

1.3.1. Certification Authorities

DigiCert Europe operates certification authorities (CAs) that issue Digital Certificates. As the operator of CAs, DigiCert Europe performs functions associated with Public Key operations, including receiving Certificate requests, issuing, revoking, rekeying, and renewing a digital Certificate, and maintaining, issuing, and publishing CRLs and OCSP responses.

Issuing CAs may be operated by DigiCert Europe or by other Organisations that have been authorised by DigiCert Europe to participate within the DigiCert Europe PKI. Issuing CAs are required to ensure that the services they perform within the DigiCert Europe PKI are in compliance at all times with their respective Issuing CA Agreements and this CP/CPS.

EU	For Qualified Certificates issued out of the itsme Sign Issuing CA, the Registration Service and Subject Device Provisioning Service are not performed by DigiCert Europe. These services are performed entirely by Belgian Mobile ID, which undergoes its own audit. In addition, some services are shared between DigiCert Europe and Belgian Mobile ID. DigiCert Europe retains overall responsibility toward relying parties for all Certificates issued from the itsme Sign Issuing CA.
EU	<p>In the case of Qualified Certificates, where DigiCert Europe manages Key Pairs on behalf of the Subscriber, DigiCert Europe shall ensure:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Where the policy requires the use of a QSCD then the signatures are only created by the QSCD;• In the case of natural persons, the Subscribers' Private Key is maintained and used under their sole control and used only for Electronic Signatures; and• In the case of legal persons, the Subscribers' Private Key is maintained and used under their control and used only for Electronic Seals.

An Issuing CA may, but shall not be obliged to, detail its specific practices and other requirements in a policy or practices statement adopted by it following approval by the DCPA. Issuing CAs are required to conduct regular compliance audits of their RAs to ensure that they are complying with

their respective RA Agreements and this CP/CPS.

Issuing CAs must not be used for Man in the Middle (MITM) purposes or for the traffic management of domain names or IP addresses that the entity does not own or control.

External Issuing CAs chaining to a publicly-trusted DigiCert Europe Root must either be technically constrained, or undergo an independent audit and be publicly disclosed in the DigiCert Europe Repository.

See also Section 9.6.1.

1.3.2. Registration Authorities

A Registration Authority (RA) is an entity that performs Identification and Authentication of Certificate Applicants, and initiates, passes along revocation requests for end user Subscriber Certificates, and approves applications for renewal or re-keying Certificates on behalf of an Issuing CA. DigiCert Europe and Issuing CAs may act as RAs for Certificates they issue.

RAs may be authorised by DigiCert Europe to delegate the performance of certain functions to third party validators if it meets the requirements of the DigiCert Europe CP/CPS. DigiCert Europe contractually obligates each RA and delegated third party to abide by the policies and industry standards that are applicable to their responsibilities. Where required by a Certificate Class, DigiCert Europe only allows the use of identity validation methods that have been approved by the relevant Supervisory Authority. Validation of Domains, IP Addresses and email addresses included in Certificate Subject fields cannot be delegated.

1.3.2.1. Enterprise Registration Authorities

Third parties, who enter into a contractual relationship with DigiCert Europe, may act as Enterprise RAs (ERAs) and authorise the issuance of Certificates for Organisations and Domains that have been pre- authenticated. ERAs must abide by all the requirements of this CP/CPS, Section 1.3.2.1 of the S/MIME BR, and the terms of their services agreement.

See also Section 9.6.2.

1.3.3. Subscribers

Subscribers use DigiCert Europe's services and PKI to support transactions and communications. Subscribers under this CP/CPS include all end users (including entities) of Certificates issued by an Issuer CA. A Subscriber is the entity named as the end-user Subscriber of a Certificate. End-user Subscribers may be individuals, organisations or, infrastructure components such as firewalls, routers, trusted servers or other devices used to secure communications within an organisation.

Subscribers are not always the party identified in a Certificate. The Subject of a Certificate is the party named in the Certificate. A Subscriber, as used herein, may refer to the Subject of the Certificate and the entity that contracted with DigiCert Europe for the Certificate's issuance, or the individual responsible for requesting and a Certificate on a trusted system. Prior to verification of identity and issuance of a Certificate, a Subscriber is an Applicant.

In some situations, the CA acts as an Applicant or Subscriber, for instance, when it generates and

protects a Private Key, requests a Certificate, demonstrates control of a Domain, or obtains a Certificate for its own use.

Subscribers are required to act in accordance with this CP/CPS and Subscriber Agreement. See also Section 9.6.3.

1.3.4. Relying Parties

Relying Parties are entities that act in Reasonable Reliance on a Certificate and/or Digital Signature. A Relying Party may, or may not, also be a Subscriber of the DigiCert Europe PKI. Relying parties must check the appropriate CRL or OCSP response prior to relying on information featured in a Certificate. The location of the Certificate Status service is detailed within the Certificate.

Relying Parties are required to act in accordance with this CP/CPS and the Relying Party Agreement. See also Section 9.6.4.

1.3.5. Other Participants

Other Participants in the DigiCert Europe PKI are required to act in accordance with this CP/CPS and/or applicable agreements. Other participants include Accreditation Authorities such as Policy Management Authorities, Application Software Vendors, and applicable Community-of-Interest sponsors. Accreditation Authorities are granted an unlimited right to re-distribute DigiCert Europe's Certificates and related information in connection with the accreditation.

1.4. CERTIFICATE USAGE

At all times, participants in the DigiCert Europe PKI are required to utilise Certificates in accordance with this CP/CPS and all applicable laws and regulations.

1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses

Certificates issued pursuant to this CP/CPS may be used for all legal authentication, encryption, access control, and Digital Signature purposes, as designated by the key usage and extended key usage fields found within the Certificate. However, the sensitivity of the information processed or protected by a Certificate varies greatly, and each Relying Party must evaluate the application environment and associated risks before deciding on whether to use a Certificate issued under this CP/CPS.

1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses

Certificates do not guarantee that the Subject is trustworthy, honest, reputable in its business dealings, safe to do business with, or compliant with any laws. A Certificate only establishes that the information in the Certificate was verified in accordance with this CP/CPS when the Certificate was issued.

Code signing Certificates do not indicate that the signed code is safe to install or free from malware, bugs, or vulnerabilities.

DigiCert Europe Certificates shall be used only to the extent the use is consistent with applicable

law or regulation, and in particular shall be used only to the extent permitted by applicable export or import laws. CA Certificates subject to the Mozilla Root Store Policy will not be used for any functions except CA functions. In addition, end-user Subscriber Certificates cannot be used as CA Certificates.

DigiCert Europe may periodically re-key Intermediate CAs. Third party applications or platforms that have an Intermediate CA embedded as a root certificate may not operate as designed after the Intermediate CA has been rekeyed.

Key pinning is strongly discouraged and does not consider it a sufficient reason to delay revocation. Customers should also take care in not mixing Certificates trusted for the web with non-web PKI.

Any Certificates trusted by Application Software Vendors must comply with all requirements of all applicable root distribution policies, including revocation periods described in Section 4.9.

1.5. POLICY ADMINISTRATION

1.5.1. Organisation Administering the Document

This CP/CPS and related agreements and security policy documents referenced within this document are administered by the DigiCert Policy Authority (DCPA).

1.5.2. Contact Person

Enquiries or other communications about this CP/CPS should be addressed to:

Attention DCPA
DigiCert Europe Netherlands BV
Nevelgaarde 56 noord
3436 ZZ Nieuwegein
Netherlands

Website: <https://www.digicert.com>
Electronic mail: policy@digicert.com
Customer complaints: qvcomplaints@digicert.com

1.5.2.1. Revocation Reporting Contact Person

For anyone listed in Section 4.9.2 of this CPS and the TLS BR that requires assistance with revocation or investigative reports, DigiCert Europe provides this page for reporting and submitting requests with all of the necessary information as outlined in Section 4.9: <https://problemreport.digicert.com/>

If the problem reporting page is unavailable, there is a system outage, or you believe our findings are incorrect please contact revoke@digicert.com. During office hours (CET), problem reports and revocation requests can also be made using the DigiCert Europe RA and support line +31 (0) 30 232 4320. Outside of office hours CET the emergency revocation hotline can be used at +1 651 229 3456. Typically, the following information is required:

- Common Name
 - Certificate serial number
 - E-mail address of the Subject

Entities submitting Certificate revocation requests must explain the reason for requesting revocation. DigiCert Europe or an RA will authenticate and log each revocation request according to Section 4.9 of this CP/CPS. DigiCert Europe will always revoke a Certificate if the request is authenticated as originating from the Subscriber or an authorised representative of the Organisation listed in the Certificate.

If revocation is requested by someone other than an authorised representative of the Subscriber or Affiliated Organisation, DigiCert Europe or an RA will investigate the alleged basis for the revocation request prior to taking action. See also Section 4.9.1 and 4.9.3.

1.5.2.2 DigiCert Ombudsman

The Ombudsman addresses DigiCert's conduct within the Bugzilla community relating to fairness and transparency matters. The Ombudsman can be contacted via email: transparency@digicert.com

1.5.3. Person Determining CP/CPS Suitability for the Policy

The DCPA determines the suitability and applicability of this CP/CPS based on the results and recommendations received from an independent auditor. The DCPA is also responsible for evaluating and acting upon the results of compliance audits.

1.5.4. CP/CPS Approval Procedures

Approval of this CP/CPS and any amendments hereto is by the DCPA. Amendments may be made by updating this entire document or by addendum. The DCPA, at its sole discretion, determines whether changes to this CP/CPS require notice or any change in the OID of a Certificate issued pursuant to this CP/CPS. See also Section 9.10 and Section 9.12.

1.6. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS

1.6.1. Definitions

Term	Definition
Advanced Electronic Signature	An Electronic Signature which meets the requirements set out in Article 26 of the eIDAS Regulation.
Applicant	The Applicant is an entity applying for a Certificate.
Applicant Representative	A Natural Person or human sponsor who is either the Applicant, employed by the Applicant, or an authorised agent who has express authority to represent the Applicant; who signs and submits, or approves a Certificate Request on behalf of the Applicant; who signs and submits a Subscriber Agreement on behalf of the Applicant; and/or who acknowledges the Terms of Use on behalf of the Applicant when the Applicant is an Affiliate of the CA or is the CA.
Application Software Supplier	A software developer whose software displays or uses DigiCert Europe Certificates and distributes DigiCert Europe's Root Certificates.
Attestation	A letter attesting that Subject Information is correct written by an accountant, lawyer, government official, or other reliable third party customarily relied upon for such information.
Authorisation Number	A unique identifier of a Payment Service Provider acting as the Subscriber for PSD2 Certificates. The Authorisation Number is used and recognised by the NCA.
Authorisation Domain Name	<p>The FQDN used to obtain authorisation for a given FQDN to be included in a Certificate. The Issuer CA may use the FQDN returned from a DNS CNAME lookup as the FQDN for the purposes of domain validation. If a Wildcard Domain Name is to be included in a Certificate, then the Issuer CA must remove “*” from the left-most portion of the Wildcard Domain Name to yield the corresponding FQDN.</p> <p>The Issuer CA may prune zero or more Domain Labels of the FQDN from left to right until encountering a Base Domain Name and may use any one of the values that were yielded by pruning (including the Base Domain Name itself) for the purpose of domain validation.</p>
CAA	Certification Authority Authorisation as defined in RFC 8659.
Certificate Application	Any of several forms completed by Applicant or DigiCert Europe and used to process the request for an EV Certificate, including but not limited to agreements signed by Contract Signers and online forms submitted by Certificate Requesters.

Term	Definition
Certificate Approver	A Certificate Approver is a natural person who is employed by the Applicant, or an authorised agent who has express authority to represent the Applicant to: (i) act as a Certificate Requester and to authorise other employees or third parties to act as a Certificate Requesters, and (ii) to approve Certificate requests submitted by other Certificate Requesters.
Certificate Requester	A Certificate Requester is a natural person who is employed by the Applicant, or an authorised agent who has express authority to represent the Applicant or a third party (such as an ISP or hosting company), and who completes and submits a Certificate request on behalf of the Applicant.
Certification Authority Authorisation or CAA	<p>From RFC 9495: "The Certification Authority Authorisation (CAA) DNS resource record (RR) provides a mechanism for domains to express the allowed set of Certification Authorities that are authorised to issue certificates for the domain."</p> <p>CAA Resource Records allow a public CA to implement additional controls to reduce the risk of unintended certificate mis-issue.</p>
Confirming Person	A Confirming Person is a natural person who must be a senior officer of the Applicant (e.g., Secretary, President, CEO, CFO, COO, CIO, CSO, Director, etc.) who has express authority to sign the Authority Letter on behalf of the Applicant.
Contract Signer	A Contract Signer is a natural person who is employed by the Applicant and who has express authority to sign Subscriber Agreements on behalf of the Applicant.
Cryptographic Module	Secure software, device or utility that (1) generates Key Pairs; (2) stores cryptographic information; and/or (3) performs cryptographic functions.
DigiCert Policy Authority	The DigiCert Europe body responsible for overseeing and approving CP/CPS amendments and general management.
Digital Certificate	A digital identifier within the DigiCert Europe PKI that: (1) identifies the Issuing CA; (2) identifies the Holder; (3) contains the Holder's Public and Private Keys; (4) specifies the Certificate's Operational Term; (5) is digitally signed by the Issuing CA; and (6) has prescribed Key Usages and Reliance Factor that governs its issuance and use whether expressly included or incorporated by reference to this CP/CPS.
Domain Name	An ordered list of one or more Domain Labels assigned to a node in the Domain Name System.
eIDAS Regulation or eIDAS	Regulation (EU) No. 910/2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market.
Fully Qualified Domain Name	A Domain Name that includes the Domain Labels of all superior nodes in the Internet Domain Name System.
Internal Server Name	A Server Name (which may or may not include an Unregistered Domain Name) that is not resolvable using the public DNS.

Term	Definition
Key Pair	A Private Key and associated Public Key.
Linting	A process in which the content of digitally signed data such as a Precertificate [RFC 6962], Certificate, Certificate Revocation List, or OCSP response, or data-to-be-signed object such as a tbsCertificate (as described in RFC 5280, Section 4.1.1.1) is checked for conformance with the profiles and requirements defined in these Requirements.
Mailbox Address	An Email Address as specified in Section 4.1.2 of RFC 5321 and amended by Section 3.2 of RFC 6532, with no additional padding or structure.
Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration	A process by which the determinations made during domain validation and CAA checking by the Primary Network Perspective are corroborated by other Network Perspectives before Certificate issuance.
Network Perspective	<p>Related to Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration. A system (e.g., a cloud-hosted server instance) or collection of network components (e.g., a VPN and corresponding infrastructure) for sending outbound Internet traffic associated with a domain control validation method and/or CAA check.</p> <p>The location of a Network Perspective is determined by the point where unencapsulated outbound Internet traffic is typically first handed off to the network infrastructure providing Internet connectivity to that perspective.</p>
National Competent Authority	A national authority responsible for payment services. The NCA approves or rejects authorisations for Payment Service Providers in its country.
Personal Name	A name of an Individual Subject. The Personal Name may be in a format preferred by the Subject, the CA, or Enterprise RA as long as it remains a meaningful representation of the Subject's verified name.
Private Key	The key of a Key Pair that is kept secret by the holder of the Key Pair, and that is used to create digital signatures and/or to decrypt electronic records or files that were encrypted with the corresponding Public Key.
Public Key	The key of a Key Pair that may be publicly disclosed by the holder of the corresponding Private Key and that is used by a Relying Party to verify digital signatures created with the holder's corresponding Private Key and/or to encrypt messages so that they can be decrypted only with the holder's corresponding Private Key.
Qualified Certificate	A Digital Certificate whose primary purpose is to identify a person with a high level of assurance, where the Certificate meets the qualification requirements defined by the applicable legal framework of the eIDAS Regulation. A Qualified Website Authentication Certificate is a TLS Certificate.
Qualified Certificate for Electronic Signature	A Certificate for Electronic Signatures, that is issued by a QTSP and meets the requirements laid down in Annex I of the eIDAS Regulation.

Term	Definition
Qualified Certificate for Electronic Seal	A Certificate issued to a Legal Person (company) by a QTSP and is used to secure authenticity, integrity and confidentiality in electronic communication of messages and documents.
Qualified Electronic Signature	An Advanced Electronic Signature that is created by a QSCD and which is based on a Qualified Certificate for Electronic Signatures.
Qualified Electronic Signature/Seal Creation Device (QSCD)	An Electronic Signature/seal creation device that meets the requirements laid down in Annex II of eIDAS.
Qualified Trust Service Provider (QTSP)	A trust service provider which is granted Qualified status by the relevant Supervisory Authority of an EU country under the eIDAS Regulation. A Qualified TSP's Approved Qualified services are shown on an EU Trusted List.
Regulated Electronic Signature	An Advanced Electronic Signature which has been created using a secure signature creation unit as referred to in Article 6 of ZertES and is based on a Regulated Certificate issued to a natural person and valid at the time the Electronic Signature is generated.
Reliable Data Source	An identification document or source of data used to verify Subject Identity Information that is generally recognized among commercial enterprises and governments as reliable, and which was created by a third party for a purpose other than the Applicant obtaining a Certificate.
Reliable Method of Communication	A method of communication, such as a postal/courier delivery address, telephone number, or email address, that was verified using a source other than the Applicant Representative.
Relying Party	An Individual or Organisation that has entered into a Relying Party Agreement authorising that person or Organisation to exercise Reasonable Reliance on Certificates, subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the applicable Relying Party Agreement.
Relying Party Agreement	The Relying Party Agreement is an agreement which must be read and accepted by a Relying Party prior to validating, relying on or using a Certificate or accessing or using the DigiCert Europe Repository.
Reserved IP Address	An IPv4 or IPv6 address that the IANA has marked as reserved.
Short-lived Subscriber Certificate	For Certificates issued on or after 15 March 2024 and prior to 15 March 2026, a Subscriber Certificate with a Validity Period less than or equal to 10 days (864,000 seconds). For Certificates issued on or after 15 March 2026, a Subscriber Certificate with a Validity Period less than or equal to 7 days (604,800 seconds).
Subordinate CA	A Certification Authority whose Certificate is signed by the Root CA, or another Subordinate CA. Also known as Issuing CA.
Subscriber Agreement	An agreement that governs the issuance and use of a Certificate that the Applicant must read and accept before receiving a Certificate.

Term	Definition
Subscriber	The entity identified as the Subject in the Certificate. A natural person or Legal Entity to whom a Certificate is issued and who is legally bound by a Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use.
Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate	A Subordinate CA Certificate which uses a combination of Extended Key Usage settings and Name Constraint settings to limit the scope within which the Subordinate CA Certificate may issue Subscriber or additional Subordinate CA Certificates.
Terms and Conditions	<p>The Master Services Agreement, Certificate Terms of Use (or the Qualified Certificate Terms of Use), Privacy Policy, and relevant DigiCert Europe CP/CPS.</p> <p>The Master Services Agreement references and makes the Certificate Terms of Use, Privacy Policy and relevant DigiCert Europe CP/CPS part of the Terms and Conditions. The Issuing CA provides its own Terms and Conditions.</p>

1.6.2. Acronyms

Term	Definition
ADN	Authorisation Domain Name
ALPN	TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Extension [RFC7301] as defined in RFC 8737
CA	Certificate Authority or Certification Authority
CAA	Certificate Authority Authorisation
CP/CPS	Certificate Policy & Certification Practice Statement
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CSR	Certificate Signing Request
CT	Certificate Transparency
DCPA	DigiCert Policy Authority
eIDAS	Regulation (EU) N°910/2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market
ERA	Enterprise Registration Authority
ETSI	European Telecommunications Standards Initiative
EUTL	EU Trusted List
EV	Extended Validation
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
FQDN	Fully Qualified Domain Name
ICANN	Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
LRA	Local Registration Authority
MPIC	Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration
NCA	National Competent Authority
OID	Object Identifier
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
PKCS	Public Key Cryptography Standard
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PKIX	IETF Working Group on Public Key Infrastructure
Portal	Certificate Management System
PSD2	Payment Services Directive - Directive (EU) 2015/2366
PSP	Payment Service Provider
QSCD	Qualified Electronic Signature/Seal Creation Device

Term	Definition
QWAC	Qualified Website Authentication Certificate
RA	Registration Authority
S/MIME	Secure MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions)
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
SSCD	Signature/Seal Creation Device
TLS	Transportation Layer Security
UTC	Coordinated Universal Time
X.509	The ITU-T standard for Certificates and their corresponding authentication framework

1.6.3. References

This CP/CPS describes the practices used to comply with the current versions of the following policies, standards, and requirements as relevant.

Standards / Law	Details
CA/Browser Forum	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates (“TLS Baseline Requirements” or “TLS BR”), and Network and Certificate System Security Requirements published at http://www.cabforum.org• Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates (“EV Guidelines”)• Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted S/MIME Certificates (“S/MIME Baseline Requirements” or “S/MIME BR”)• Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates (“CS Baseline Requirements”)
WebTrust	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities• WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – SSL Baseline with Network Security• WebTrust for Certification Authorities – Extended Validation SSL• WebTrust for Certification Authorities – Publicly Trusted Code Signing Certificates• WebTrust for Certification Authorities – S/MIME Certificates
SR 943.03 [ZertES]	Bundesgesetz über Zertifizierungsdienste im Bereich der elektronischen Signatur und anderer Anwendungen digitaler Zertifikate (Bundesgesetz über die elektronische Signatur, ZertES) vom 18. März 2016
SR 943.032 [VZertES]	Verordnung über Zertifizierungsdienste im Bereich der elektronischen Signatur und anderer Anwendungen digitaler Zertifikate (Verordnung über die elektronische Signatur, VZertES) vom 23. November 2016
SR 943.032.1 [TAV]	R 943.032.1 / Anhang: Technische und administrative Vorschriften über Zertifizierungsdienste im Bereich der elektronischen Signatur und anderer Anwendungen digitaler Zertifikate Ausgabe 1: 23.11.2016 Inkrafttreten: 1.1.2017
ETSI EN 319 401	General Policy Requirements for Trust Service Providers
ETSI EN 319 411-1	Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 1: General Requirements

Standards / Law	Details
ETSI EN 319 411-2	Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 2: Requirements for trust service providers issuing EU qualified certificates
ETSI EN 319 411-6	Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 6: Requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing publicly trusted S/MIME certificates
ETSI EN 319 421	Policy and Security Requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing Electronic Time-Stamps
ETSI EN 319 412-1	Certificate Profiles; Part 1: Overview and common data structures
ETSI EN 319 412-2	Certificate Profiles; Part 2: Certificate profile for certificates issued to natural persons
ETSI EN 319 412-3	Certificate Profiles; Part 3: Certificate profile for certificates issued to legal persons
ETSI EN 319 412-4	Certificate Profiles; Part 4: Certificate profile for web site certificates
ETSI EN 319 412-5	Certificate Profiles; Part 5: QCStatements
ETSI EN 319 422	Time stamping protocol and electronic time-stamp profiles
ETSI TS 119 431-1	Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers; Part 1: TSP service components operating a remote QSCD / SCDev
ETSI TS 119 461	Policy and security requirements for trust service components providing identity proofing of trust service subjects
ETSI TS 119 495	Sector Specific Requirements; Qualified Certificate Profiles and TSP Policy Requirements under the payment services Directive (EU) 2015/2366
CEN EN 419 241-1	Trustworthy Systems Supporting Server Signing - Part 1: General System Security Requirements
CEN TS 419 261	Security requirements for trustworthy systems managing certificates and time-stamps
PKIoverheid	Accredited Certification Service Provider under PKIoverheid. PKIoverheid is the name for the PKI designed for trustworthy communication within and with the Dutch Government
Bermuda Authorised Certificate Service Provider	As defined in Bermuda's Electronic Transactions Act 1999
Application Software Vendor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adobe Approved Trust List Technical Requirements • Apple Root Store Program • Microsoft Trusted Root Store (Program Requirements) • Mozilla Root Store Policy • Chrome Root Program Policy

In the event of any inconsistency between this CP/CPS and the normative provisions of the foregoing Applicable Requirements, then those Applicable Requirements take precedence over this document.

1.6.4. Conventions

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this CP/CPS shall be interpreted in accordance with RFC 2119.

2. PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1. REPOSITORIES

DigiCert Europe provides public repositories for its CA Certificates, revocation data for issued Certificates, CP/CPS, Terms and Conditions, and other important policy documents.

The DigiCert Europe Repository is located at <https://www.digicert.com/legal-repository/europe>.

DigiCert Europe develops, implements, enforces, and updates this CPS at least every 365 days to meet the compliance standards of the documents listed in Sections 1.1 and 1.6.3.

As standards are updated, DigiCert Europe reviews the changes to determine their impact on these practices. Each section impacted by the standards will be updated and provided to the DCPA for approval and implementation.

DigiCert Europe may register TLS Certificates with publicly accessible Certificate Transparency (CT) Logs. Once submitted, Certificate information cannot be removed from a CT Log.

DigiCert Europe's CA Certificates, CRLs and OCSP responses are regularly accessible online with systems described in Section 5.

2.2. PUBLICATION OF CERTIFICATION INFORMATION

DigiCert Europe publishes a Repository that lists all Certificates that have been issued or revoked. Where a Certificate including an email address is issued, the Subscriber consents for the Certificate to be published in the Repository available for Relying Parties to download.

The location of the Repository and OCSP responders are given in the individual Certificate Profiles more fully disclosed in Appendix A to this CP/CPS.

2.3. TIME OR FREQUENCY OF PUBLICATION

DigiCert Europe publishes CRL and OCSP resources to allow Relying Parties to determine the validity of a DigiCert Europe Certificate.

Certificate information is published promptly following generation and issue and immediately following the completion of the revocation process.

DigiCert Europe updates this CP/CPS at least annually to describe how DigiCert Europe meets the requirements of standards referred to in Sections 1.1 and 1.6.3, including the TLS BR and S/MIME BR. Those updates indicate conformance by incrementing the version number and adding a dated changelog entry, even if no other changes are made to the document as specified in Section 1.2 of this CP/CPS.

New or modified versions of the CP/CPS and other policies are typically published within seven

days after their approval.

2.4. ACCESS CONTROLS ON REPOSITORIES

Read-only access to the Repository is unrestricted and is available 24 x 7. Logical and physical controls prevent unauthorised write access to Repositories.

In the event that the Repository is unavailable then DigiCert Europe aims to restore availability within 24 hours.

3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

The Identification and Authentication procedures used by DigiCert Europe depend on the Class of Certificate being issued. See Appendices for Certificate Profiles and the relevant verification requirements.

3.1. NAMING

3.1.1. Types of Names

All Subscribers require a distinguished name that complies with the ITU X.500 standard for Distinguished Names (DN). The DCPA approves naming conventions for the creation of distinguished names for Issuing CA applicants. Different naming conventions may be used by different Issuing CAs.

Names consisting of multiple words are permitted. Subjects may choose name order in accordance with national preference.

Each User must have a unique and readily identifiable Subject DN. Alternatively, DNs may be based on domain name components, e.g. CN=John Smith, DC=DigiCert Europe, DC=BM. The Common Name may contain the applicant's first and last name (surname).

For Certificates issued under the TLS BR, the use of Internal Server Names and Reserved IP Addresses is prohibited, and the FQDN or authenticated domain name is placed in the Common Name (CN) attribute of the Subject field and/or the Subject Alternative Name extension. Wildcard TLS Certificates have a wildcard asterisk character for the server name in the Subject field. Wildcard EV Certificates may not be issued under the EV Guidelines.

The Distinguished Names of a Code Signing Certificate must identify the legal entity that intends to have control over the use of the Private Key when signing code.

3.1.2. Need For Names to Be Meaningful

DigiCert Europe uses Distinguished Names that identify both the entity (i.e. person, organisation, device, or object) that is the Subject of the Certificate and the entity that is the issuer of the Certificate. DigiCert Europe only allows directory information trees that accurately reflect organisation structures. Personal Names included in Certificates issued to Individuals shall be a meaningful representation of the authenticated common name of the Subscriber.

3.1.3. Anonymity Or Pseudonymity Of Subscribers

DigiCert Europe may issue pseudonymous end entity Certificates if they are not prohibited by policy and if applicable name space uniqueness requirements are met. DigiCert Europe requires identification of the real identity of the Applicant in accordance with Section 3.2.3. The pseudonym shall be either a unique identifier selected by DigiCert Europe for the Subject of the Certificate, or an identifier selected by an Enterprise RA which uniquely identifies the Subject of the Certificate within the organisation.

3.1.4. Rules For Interpreting Various Name Forms

Distinguished Names in Certificates are interpreted using X.500 standards and ASN.1 syntax.

3.1.4.1 Non-ASCII Character Substitution

DigiCert Europe may allow the conversion of Identity information usually rendered in non-ASCII characters (for example é and à may be represented by e or a, and umlauts such as ö or ü may be represented by oe or ue, o or u respectively). DigiCert Europe may use language variants (such as Munich or München) for geographic names. For Personal Names, DigiCert Europe includes an ASCII character name that is not a direct Conversion of the Applicant's registered name provided that it is verified in a Reliable Data Source or suitable Attestation.

3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names

The Subject Name of each Certificate issued by an Issuing CA shall be unique within each class of Certificate issued by that Issuing CA over the lifetime of that Issuing CA and shall conform to applicable X.500 standards for the uniqueness of names.

The Issuing CA may, if necessary, insert additional numbers or letters to the Subscriber's Subject Common Name, or other attribute such as Subject serialNumber, in order to distinguish between two Certificates that would otherwise have the same Subject Name. Name uniqueness is not violated when multiple Certificates are issued to the same entity.

3.1.6. Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks

Unless otherwise specifically stated in this CP/CPS, DigiCert Europe does not verify an Applicant's right to use a trademark and does not resolve trademark disputes. DigiCert Europe may reject any application or require revocation of any Certificate that is part of a trademark dispute.

3.2. INITIAL IDENTITY VALIDATION

DigiCert Europe may use any legal means of communication or investigation to ascertain the identity of an organisational or individual Applicant in compliance with this CP/CPS. DigiCert Europe may refuse to issue a Certificate in its sole discretion. Certificates issued to DigiCert Europe (or its affiliates) or their personnel as Subjects will be requested, validated, and managed in accordance with this CP/CPS.

3.2.1. Method To Prove Possession of Private Key

Issuing CAs shall establish that each Applicant for a Certificate is in possession and control of the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key contained in the request for a Certificate.

The Issuing CA shall do so in accordance with an appropriate secure protocol, such as the IETF PKIX Certificate Management Protocol, including PKCS#10. This requirement does not apply where a Key Pair is generated on behalf of a Subscriber.

3.2.2. Authentication of Organisation Identity

3.2.2.1. Identity

The Identity of an Organisation (legal person) is required to be authenticated with respect to each Certificate that asserts (i) the identity of an Organisation; or (ii) an Individual, system, device, or other organisational entity's affiliation with an Organisation. Without limitation to the generality of the foregoing, the Identity of any Organisation that seeks to act as a RA for its employees and/or employees of its respective Subsidiaries, Holding Companies or Counterparties is required to be authenticated.

In order to authenticate the Identity of an Organisation, evidence shall be provided of:

- Full name of the legal person;
- Reference to a nationally recognised registration or other attributes which may be used to, as far as possible, distinguish the legal person from others with the same name; and
- When applicable, the association between the legal person and any other organisational entity identified in association with this legal person that would appear in the Organisation attribute of the Certificate, consistent with the national or other applicable identification practices.

At a minimum, confirmation is required that: (1) the Organisation legally exists in the name that will appear in the DN of any Certificates issued under its name, or is legally recognised as doing business under an alternative proposed by the Organisation; and (2) all other information contained in the Certificate application is accurate.

Registration information provided by an Organisation may be validated by reference to official government records and/or information provided by a reputable vendor of corporate information services. Additional information is provided in Acceptable Sources for DigiCert Europe Authentication of Identity in the DigiCert Europe Repository. The accuracy and currency of such information may be validated by conducting checks with financial institution references, credit reporting agencies, trade associations, and other entities that have continuous and ongoing relationships with the Organisation under review. In addition, the telephone number provided by the Organisation as the telephone number of its principal place of business may be called to ensure that the number is active and answered by the Organisation.

Where an Issuing CA or RA has a separate and pre-existing commercial relationship with the Organisation under review, the Issuing CA or RA may authenticate the Identity of the Organisation by reference to records kept in the ordinary course of business that, at a minimum, satisfy the requirements of this Section. In all such cases, the Issuing CA or RA shall record the specific records upon which it relied for this purpose.

For Certificates issued to a natural person representing a legal person, address information included in the DN may be that of the sponsoring Organisation.

With respect to TLS Certificates, authentication of Organisation identity is conducted in compliance with this CP/CPS and the TLS BR.

With respect to S/MIME Certificates, authentication of Organisation identity is conducted in compliance with this CP/CPS and the S/MIME BR.

When a `subject:organizationIdentifier` is included in Qualified or Regulated Certificates, the `organizationIdentifier` is formatted in accordance with Section 5.1.4 of ETSI EN 319 412-1 for Qualified or Regulated Certificates and in accordance with the S/MIME BR for S/MIME Certificates.

DigiCert Europe uses a documented internal process to check the accuracy of information sources and databases to ensure the data is acceptable, including reviewing the database provider's terms of use. A list of the approved sources/Trusted Registers is published in a file linked at <https://github.com/digicert/reports/tree/master/validation-sources>.

DigiCert Europe may include the Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) numbers in Certificates after verification through appropriate mechanisms, such as provided by Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation (GLEIF), that the LEI is associated with the Subject. LEI lookups are not relied upon by DigiCert Europe as a primary source of information for verification and this information is treated as additional correlation of identity information found in the Certificate.

3.2.2.2. DBA/Tradename

See Section 10.9.1 of this CP/CPS.

3.2.2.3. Verification of Country

If the Applicant requests a publicly-trusted TLS Certificate that will contain the `countryName` field and other Subject Identity Information, then DigiCert Europe verifies the identity of the Applicant, and the authenticity of the Applicant Representative's Certificate request using a verification process meeting the requirements of Section 3.2.2.1 in the TLS BR and this Section. DigiCert Europe inspects any document relied upon for alteration or falsification.

3.2.2.4. Validation of Domain Authorisation Control

For TLS, all domains listed in the certificate are verified using one of the following methods. For S/MIME, DigiCert Europe either verifies the domain component of each email address listed in the certificate using one of the following methods or verifies control of the email address using a challenge/response process.

Unless described otherwise, Random Values referred to below shall be unique in each email, fax, SMS or postal mail. The Random Value shall remain valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

Effective 15 March 2026: DNSSEC validation back to the IANA DNSSEC root trust anchor must be performed on all DNS queries associated with the validation of domain authorisation or control by the Primary Network Perspective. The DNS resolver used for all DNS queries associated with the validation of domain authorisation or control by the Primary Network Perspective must:

- Perform DNSSEC validation using the algorithm defined in RFC 4035 Section 5; and
- Support NSEC3 as defined in RFC 5155; and
- Support SHA-2 as defined in RFC 4509 and RFC 5702; and
- Properly handle the security concerns enumerated in RFC 6840 Section 4.

Effective 15 March 2026: DigiCert Europe must not use local policy to disable DNSSEC validation on

any DNS query associated with the validation of domain authorisation or control.

3.2.2.4.1. Validating the Applicant as a Domain Contact

This method is no longer allowed and DigiCert Europe does not do this.

3.2.2.4.2. Email, Fax, SMS, or Postal Mail to Domain Contact

This method is no longer allowed and DigiCert Europe does not do this.

3.2.2.4.3. Phone Contact with Domain Contact

This method is no longer allowed and DigiCert Europe does not do this.

3.2.2.4.4. Constructed Email to Domain Contact

Confirm the Applicant's control over the FQDN by:

1. Sending an email to one or more addresses created by using 'admin', 'administrator', 'webmaster', 'hostmaster', or 'postmaster' as the local part, followed by the at-sign ("@"), followed by an Authorisation Domain Name; and
2. including a Random Value in the email; and
3. receiving a confirming response utilizing the Random Value.

Each email may confirm control of multiple FQDNs, provided the Authorisation Domain Name used in the email is an Authorisation Domain Name for each FQDN being confirmed.

The Random Value shall be unique in each email. The email may be re-sent in its entirety, including the re-use of the Random Value, provided that its entire contents and recipient shall remain unchanged.

The Random Value shall remain valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

Note: Once the FQDN has been validated using this method, then DigiCert may also issue Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the domain labels of the validated FQDN. This method is suitable for validating Wildcard Domain Names.

3.2.2.4.5. Domain Authorisation Document

This method is no longer allowed and DigiCert Europe does not do this.

3.2.2.4.6. Agreed-Upon Change to Website

This method is no longer allowed and DigiCert Europe does not do this.

3.2.2.4.7. DNS Change

Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by confirming the presence of a Random Value or Request Token in a DNS CNAME, TXT or CAA record for either:

1. an Authorisation Domain Name; or

2. an Authorisation Domain Name that is prefixed with a domain label that begins with an underscore character.

If a Random Value is used, DigiCert shall provide a Random Value unique to the Certificate request and shall not use the Random Value after 30 days.

When DigiCert Europe performs validation using this method, it implements Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration as specified in Section 3.2.2.9. To count as corroborating, a Network Perspective must observe the same challenge information (i.e. Random Value or Request Token) as the Primary Network Perspective.

Note: Once the FQDN has been validated using this method, then DigiCert Europe may also issue Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the domain labels of the validated FQDN. This method is suitable for validating Wildcard Domain Names.

3.2.2.4.8. IP Address

DigiCert Europe does not do this.

3.2.2.4.9. Test Certificate

This method is no longer allowed and DigiCert Europe does not do this.

3.2.2.4.10. TLS Using a Random Value

This method is no longer allowed and DigiCert Europe does not do this.

3.2.2.4.11. Any Other Method

This method is no longer allowed and DigiCert Europe does not do this.

3.2.2.4.12. Validating Applicant as a Domain Contact

DigiCert Europe does not do this.

3.2.2.4.13. Email to DNS CAA Contact

Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by sending a Random Value via email and then receiving a confirming response utilizing the Random Value. The Random Value must be sent to a DNS CAA email contact. The relevant CAA Resource Record Set must be found using the search algorithm defined in RFC 8659, Section 3.

Each email may confirm control of multiple FQDNs, provided that each email address is a DNS CAA Email Contact for each Authorisation Domain Name being validated. The same email may be sent to multiple recipients as long as all recipients are DNS CAA Email Contacts for each Authorisation Domain Name being validated.

The Random Value shall be unique in each email. The email may be re-sent in its entirety, including the re-use of the Random Value, provided that its entire contents and recipient(s) remain unchanged. The Random Value shall remain valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

When DigiCert Europe performs validation using this method, it implements Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration as specified in Section 3.2.2.9. To count as corroborating, a Network Perspective must observe the same selected contact address used for domain validation as the Primary Network Perspective.

Note: Once the FQDN has been validated using this method, then DigiCert Europe may also issue Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the domain labels of the validated FQDN. This method is suitable for validating Wildcard Domain Names.

3.2.2.4.14. Email to DNS TXT Contact

Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by sending a Random Value via email and then receiving a confirming response utilizing the Random Value. The Random Value must be sent to a DNS TXT Record Email Contact for the Authorisation Domain Name selected to validate the FQDN.

Each email may confirm control of multiple FQDNs, provided that each email address is DNS TXT Record Email Contact for each Authorisation Domain Name being validated. The same email MAY be sent to multiple recipients if all recipients are DNS TXT Record Email Contacts for each Authorisation Domain Name being validated.

When DigiCert Europe performs validation using this method, it implements Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration as specified in Section 3.2.2.9. To count as corroborating, a Network Perspective must observe the same selected contact address used for domain validation as the Primary Network Perspective.

Note: Once the FQDN has been validated using this method, the DigiCert Europe may also issue Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the domain labels of the validated FQDN. This method is suitable for validating Wildcard Domain Names.

3.2.2.4.15. Phone Contact with Domain Contact

This method is no longer allowed and DigiCert Europe does not do this.

3.2.2.4.16. Phone Contact with DNS TXT Record Phone Contact

DigiCert Europe does not use this method.

3.2.2.4.17. Phone Contact with DNS CAA Phone Contact

DigiCert Europe does not use this method.

3.2.2.4.18. Agreed-Upon Change to Website v2

Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by verifying that the Request Token or Random Value is contained in the contents of a file.

1. The entire Request Token or Random Value must not appear in the request used to retrieve the file, and
2. DigiCert Europe must receive a successful HTTP response from the request (meaning a 2xx HTTP status code must be received).

The file containing the Request Token or Random Value:

1. Must be located on the Authorisation Domain Name, and
2. Must be located under the “/.well-known/pki-validation” directory, and
3. Must be retrieved via either the “http” or “https” scheme, and
4. Must be accessed over an Authorized Port.

If DigiCert Europe follows redirects, the following apply:

1. Redirects must be initiated at the HTTP protocol layer. Redirects must be the result of a 301, 302, or 307 HTTP status code response, as defined in RFC 7231, Section 6.4, or a 308 HTTP status code response, as defined in RFC 7538, Section 3. Redirects must be to the final value of the location HTTP response header, as defined in RFC 7231, Section 7.1.2.
2. Redirects must be to resource URLs with either the “http” or “https” scheme.
3. Redirects must be to resource URLs accessed via Authorized Ports.

If a Random Value is used, then:

1. DigiCert Europe must provide a Random Value unique to the certificate request.
2. The Random Value must remain valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

DigiCert Europe implements Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration as specified in Section 3.2.2.9. To count as corroborating, a Network Perspective must observe the same challenge information (i.e. Random Value or Request Token) as the Primary Network Perspective.

Note: This method is not suitable for validating Wildcard Domain Names.

3.2.2.4.19. Agreed-Upon Change to Website - ACME

Confirming the Applicant’s control over a FQDN by validating domain control of the FQDN using the ACME HTTP Challenge method defined in Section 8.3 of RFC 8555. The following are additive requirements to RFC 8555.

DigiCert Europe receives a successful HTTP response from the request (meaning a 2xx HTTP status code must be received).

The token (as defined in RFC 8555, Section 8.3) must not be used for more than 30 days from its creation.

If DigiCert Europe follows redirects, the following apply:

1. Redirects must be initiated at the HTTP protocol layer. Redirects must be the result of a 301, 302, or 307 HTTP status code response, as defined in RFC 7231, Section 6.4, or a 308 HTTP status code response, as defined in RFC 7538, Section 3. Redirects must be to the final value of the location HTTP response header, as defined in RFC 7231, Section 7.1.2.
2. Redirects must be to resource URLs with either the “http” or “https” scheme.
3. Redirects must be to resource URLs accessed via Authorized Ports.

4. DigiCert Europe must implement Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration as specified in Section 3.2.2.9. To count as corroborating, a Network Perspective must observe the same challenge information (i.e. Random Value or Request Token) as the Primary Network Perspective.

Note: This method is not suitable for validating Wildcard Domain Names.

3.2.2.4.20. TLS Using ALPN

DigiCert Europe does not use this method.

3.2.2.4.21. DNS Labeled with Account ID - ACME

DigiCert Europe does not use this method.

3.2.2.4.22. Email Challenge Response Procedure

If the domain component of an email address is not verified, DigiCert Europe verifies the requester's control over the email address.

Control of an email address included in a Certificate may be verified by sending a random value via email and then receiving a confirming response utilizing the random value. The random value is valid for no more than 24 hours and is reset whenever the email is resent.

3.2.2.5. Authentication for an IP Address

This section defines the permitted processes and procedures for validating the Applicant's ownership or control of an IP Address listed in a Certificate.

Prior to issuance, DigiCert Europe has validated each IP Address listed in the Certificate using at least one of the methods specified in this section.

3.2.2.5.1. Agreed-Upon Change to Website

Confirming the Applicant's control over the requested IP Address by confirming the presence of a Request Token or Random Value contained in the content of a file or webpage in the form of a meta tag under the `"/.well-known/pki-validation"` directory, or another path registered with IANA for the purpose of validating control of IP Addresses, on the IP Address that is accessible by DigiCert Europe via HTTP/HTTPS over an Authorized Port. The Request Token or Random Value must not appear in the request.

If a Random Value is used, the DigiCert Europe shall provide a Random Value unique to the certificate request and shall not use the Random Value after 30 days.

When DigiCert Europe performs validation using this method, it implements Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration as specified in Section 3.2.2.9. To count as corroborating, a Network Perspective must observe the same challenge information (i.e. Random Value or Request Token) as the Primary Network Perspective.

3.2.2.5.2. Email, Fax, SMS, or Postal Mail to IP Address Contact

DigiCert Europe does not use this method.

3.2.2.5.3. Reverse Address Lookup

DigiCert Europe does not use this method.

3.2.2.5.4. Any Other Method

This method is no longer allowed and DigiCert Europe does not do this.

3.2.2.5.5. Phone Contact with IP Address Contact

Confirming the Applicant's control over the IP Address by calling the IP Address Contact's phone number and obtaining a response confirming the Applicant's request for validation of the IP Address. DigiCert Europe must place the call to a phone number identified by the IP Address Registration Authority as the IP Address Contact. Each phone call shall be made to a single number.

If someone other than an IP Address Contact is reached, DigiCert Europe may request to be transferred to the IP Address Contact. In the event of reaching voicemail, DigiCert Europe may leave the Random Value and the IP Address(es) being validated. The Random Value must be returned to DigiCert Europe to approve the request.

The Random Value shall remain valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

3.2.2.5.6. ACME "http-01" method for IP Addresses

Confirming the Applicant's control over the IP Address by performing the procedure documented for an "http-01" challenge in RFC 8738.

When DigiCert Europe performs validation using this method, it implements Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration as specified in Section 3.2.2.9. To count as corroborating, a Network Perspective must observe the same challenge information (i.e. Random Value or Request Token) as the Primary Network Perspective.

3.2.2.5.7. ACME "tls-alpn-01" method for IP Addresses

DigiCert Europe does not use this method.

3.2.2.6. Wildcard Domain Validation

Before issuing a Wildcard Certificate, DigiCert Europe must establish and follow a documented procedure that determines if the FQDN portion of any Wildcard Domain Name in the Certificate is "registry-controlled" or is a "public suffix" (e.g. "*.com", "*.co.uk", see RFC 6454 Section 8.2 for further explanation).

If the FQDN portion of any Wildcard Domain Name is "registry-controlled" or is a "public suffix", DigiCert Europe must refuse issuance unless the Applicant proves its rightful control of the entire Domain Namespace.

3.2.2.7. Data Source Accuracy

For EV and S/MIME, data sources are evaluated on:

- The age of the information provided,
- The frequency of updates to the information source,
- The data provider and purpose of the data collection,
- The public accessibility of the data availability, and
- The relative difficulty in falsifying or altering the data.

3.2.2.8. CAA Records

As part of the Certificate issuance process, DigiCert Europe must retrieve and process CAA records in accordance with RFC 8659 for each `dNSName` in the `subjectAltName` extension that does not contain an Onion Domain Name. See Section 4.2 for more information.

3.2.2.8.1. DNSSEC Validation of CAA Records

Effective March 15th, 2026: DNSSEC validation back to the IANA DNSSEC root trust anchor must be performed on all DNS queries associated with CAA record lookups performed by the Primary Network Perspective. The DNS resolver used for all DNS queries associated with CAA record lookups performed by the Primary Network Perspective must:

- Perform DNSSEC validation using the algorithm defined in RFC 4035 Section 5; and
- Support NSEC3 as defined in RFC 5155; and
- Support SHA-2 as defined in RFC 4509 and RFC 5702; and
- Properly handle the security concerns enumerated in RFC 6840 Section 4.

Effective March 15th, 2026: DigiCert Europe must not use local policy to disable DNSSEC validation on any DNS query associated CAA record lookups.

Effective March 15th, 2026: DNSSEC-validation errors observed by the Primary Network Perspective (e.g., `SERVFAIL`) must not be treated as permission to issue.

DNSSEC validation back to the IANA DNSSEC root trust anchor may be performed on all DNS queries associated with CAA record lookups performed by Remote Network Perspectives as part of Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration.

DNSSEC validation back to the IANA DNSSEC root trust anchor is considered outside the scope of self-audits performed to fulfil the requirements in Section 8.7.

3.2.2.9. Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration

Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration attempts to corroborate the determinations (i.e., domain validation pass/fail, CAA permission/prohibition) made by the Primary Network Perspective from multiple remote Network Perspectives before Certificate issuance.

DigiCert uses either the same set, or different sets of Network Perspectives when performing Multi-

Perspective Issuance Corroboration for the required:

1. Domain Authorisation or Control and
2. CAA Record checks

The set of responses from the relied upon Network Perspectives provides DigiCert Europe with the necessary information to allow it to affirmatively assess:

- The presence of the expected:
 - Random Value;
 - Request Token;
 - IP Address; or
 - Contact Address, as required by the relied upon validation method specified in Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5 of this CP/CPS; and
- DigiCert Europe's authority to issue to the requested domain(s), as specified in Section 4.2.1.1.

Results or information obtained from one Network Perspective will not be reused or cached when performing validation through subsequent Network Perspectives (e.g., different Network Perspectives cannot rely on a shared DNS cache to prevent an adversary with control of traffic from one Network Perspective from poisoning the DNS cache used by other Network Perspectives). The network infrastructure providing Internet connectivity to a Network Perspective MAY be administered by the same organization providing the computational services required to operate the Network Perspective. All communications between a remote Network Perspective and DigiCert will take place over an authenticated and encrypted channel relying on modern protocols (e.g., over HTTPS).

A Network Perspective can use a recursive DNS resolver that is not co-located with the Network Perspective. However, the DNS resolver used by the Network Perspective will fall within the same Regional Internet Registry service region as the Network Perspective relying upon it. Furthermore, for any pair of DNS resolvers used on a Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration attempt, the straight-line distance between the two DNS resolvers will be at least 500 km. The location of a DNS resolver is determined by the point where unencapsulated outbound DNS queries are typically first handed off to the network infrastructure providing Internet connectivity to that DNS resolver.

DigiCert Europe may immediately retry Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration using the same validation method or an alternative method (e.g., DigiCert Europe can immediately retry validation using "Email to DNS TXT Contact" if "Agreed-Upon Change to Website - ACME" does not corroborate the outcome of Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration). When retrying Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, DigiCert Europe must not rely on corroborations from previous attempts. There is no stipulation regarding the maximum number of validation attempts that may be performed in any period of time.

The "Quorum Requirements" Table describes quorum requirements related to Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration. If DigiCert Europe does not rely on the same set of Network Perspectives for both Domain Authorisation or Control and CAA Record checks, the quorum requirements will be met for both sets of Network Perspectives (i.e., the Domain Authorisation or Control set and the CAA record check set). Network Perspectives are considered distinct when the straight-line distance

between them is at least 500 km. Network Perspectives are considered "remote" when they are distinct from the Primary Network Perspective and the other Network Perspectives represented in a quorum.

DigiCert Europe may reuse corroborating evidence for CAA record quorum compliance for a maximum of 398 days. After issuing a Certificate to a domain, remote Network Perspectives may omit retrieving and processing CAA records for the same domain or its subdomains in subsequent Certificate requests from the same Applicant for up to a maximum of 398 days.

Quorum Requirements Table

# of Distinct Remote Network Perspectives Used	# of Allowed non-Corroborations
2-5	1
6+	2

Remote Network Perspectives performing Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration must rely upon networks (e.g., Internet Service Providers or Cloud Provider Networks) implementing measures to mitigate BGP routing incidents in the global Internet routing system for providing internet connectivity to the Network Perspective.

For TLS and S/MIME Certificates, DigiCert Europe will require Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration using at least two (2) remote Network Perspectives. **DigiCert Europe must ensure that the requirements defined in Quorum Requirements Table are satisfied. If the requirements are not satisfied, then the Certificate cannot be issued.**

3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity

An Individual's Identity is to be authenticated in accordance with this CP/CPS and the Certificate Class together with the relevant application data and documentation. DigiCert Europe TLS Certificates are only issued to Organisations and not natural persons. By requesting a DigiCert Europe Certificate, an Applicant accepts to undertake one of the following identity proofing methods and the related terms and conditions.

DigiCert Europe authenticates an Individual's Identity and, if applicable, any specific attributes using the following methods:

- Physical presence;
- Remote identity verification means which provide equivalent assurance in terms of reliability to the physical presence;
- Reliance on an Electronic Signature; and/or
- Video verification.

See Appendix A for additional information on the authentication methods that are available for each Certificate Class. DigiCert Europe only allows the use of identity validation methods that have been approved by the relevant Supervisory Authority.

If the Subject is a natural person, evidence shall be provided to deliver unique identification of the

Applicant, including:

- Full name (including surname and given names consistent with applicable law and national identification practices); and
- Date and place of birth, or reference to at least one nationally recognised identity document, or other attributes which may be used to, as far as possible, distinguish the person from others with the same name.

If the Subject is a natural person identified in association with an organisational entity (legal person), additional evidence shall be provided of:

- Full name and legal status of the associated organisational entity;
- Any relevant existing registration information (e.g. company registration) of the organisational entity; and
- Evidence that the Subject is affiliated with the organisational entity which may include reference to an attestation or a Trusted Register.

Attestations may be made by directors, executives, board members, or a natural person with authorisation duly delegated from another natural person in an authorised role.

Enterprise RA records may be used to verify Individual Identity attributes, including pseudonyms, included in Sponsor-validated Certificates issued within the ERA's Organisation in accordance with the S/MIME BR.

The current validity must be established of any Attestation or document regarding a natural person's relationship to a legal person. The role and authorisation of the natural person providing such Attestation or document shall be recorded.

At least one digital or physical identity document shall be used as authoritative evidence. Identity documents must be valid at the time of proofing. Identity proofing evidence may be used and reused for certificate issuance until the expiry date of the referenced identity document. Acceptable identity documents must contain a face photo and/or other information that can be compared with the Applicant's physical attributes. If physical identity documents are used as evidence, the documents shall be presented in their original form by the Subject of the identity proofing. If digital identity documents are used as evidence, only eMRTD (Electronic Machine Readable Travel Documents) according to ICAO 9303 part 10 and other digital documents that offer comparable reliability of the identity shall be accepted.

The Trusted Registers and identity documents (such as passports and national identity cards) accepted in DigiCert Europe verification procedures are identified in Acceptable Sources for DigiCert Europe Authentication of Identity in the DigiCert Europe Repository.

Identity proofing may use additional digital or physical identity documents, Trusted Registers, proof of access, or other documents and Attestations as supplementary evidence. Only official national or nationally approved registers are accepted as Trusted Registers.

By loading or using identity proofing software provided by DigiCert Europe, Applicants agree that such use will be subject to the terms and conditions of the Master Services Agreement. Use of the software may also be subject to additional terms between the Applicant and the identity proofing

software provider.

3.2.3.1. Physical Presence

In-person (manual) verification requires the physical presence of the Applicant in order to conduct the identity proofing, to validate the identity document, and to bind the identity to the Applicant. The Applicant is not required to be present for all steps of the verification, which may include manual procedures, the use of automated procedures (including identity proofing software), or a hybrid approach using manual and automated procedures.

Entities that can perform this verification include the CA or RA, a Public Official or third-party validator approved by DigiCert Europe, or a registered Notary. In some cases, a delegated RA such as an Enterprise RA may confirm attributes where Certificates may assert the Individual's affiliation with an Organisation or rely upon previously conducted procedures, accepted Know Your Customer (KYC) standards, or a contractual relationship with the RA.

3.2.3.2. Remote Identity Verification

Remote Identity Verification allows the Applicant to use identity proofing software to assist in automating the proofing and validation of either physical or digital identity documents and the binding to the Applicant.

Depending on the requirements of the Certificate Class, Remote Identity Verification may include fully automated procedures or a hybrid approach using manual and automated procedures.

Where required by a Certificate Class, DigiCert Europe only accepts Remote Identity Verification following review and acceptance of the method by the relevant Conformity Assessment Body and/or Supervisory Authority. In such cases, the Remote Identity Verification method used by DigiCert Europe has an assurance level of 'Substantial' or 'High' as set out in Article 8 of the eIDAS Regulation.

DigiCert Europe supports four levels of Remote Identity Verification:

Level	Description
RIV1	Base RIV plus manual review in defined cases (e.g, fraud risk, changes made by RA)
RIV2	Base RIV plus manual review in all cases
RIV3	Base RIV plus NFC Authentication with manual review in defined cases (e.g, fraud risk, changes made by RA)
RIV4	Base RIV plus NFC Authentication with manual review in all cases

Base RIV includes OCR reading of identity documents, video capture, biometric comparison, liveness checks, and other document security checks. NFC options include read of eMRTD data, Passive Authentication, and Active Authentication. Information collected and verified may include:

First name	ID number	ID issuance date	Last name
ID valid until	Issuing authority	Phone number	Scan of ID Document
Image of face	Email	Place of birth	Street

Date of birth	Nationality	Zipcode	ID type
Issuing country	City	Title	

Entities that can perform this verification include the CA, RA, or third-party validators approved by DigiCert Europe.

3.2.3.3. Reliance On Electronic Signature

DigiCert Europe may rely upon an existing digital signature with a supporting Certificate as evidence. The digital signature can be applied by a natural person (electronic signature as defined by eIDAS), a legal person (electronic seal as defined by eIDAS), or a natural person representing a legal person.

For Qualified Certificates, DigiCert Europe shall rely upon a Qualified Electronic Signature created as part of the identity proofing process in order to verify an Applicant's identity and additional attributes if the currently valid Certificate was issued by DigiCert Europe, or by another Issuing CA, following validation of the Certificate using the relevant Trusted List.

Entities that can perform this verification include the CA or RA.

3.2.3.4. Video Verification

DigiCert Europe may also use video-based verification procedures where the Applicant interacts with an RA via a web video session or identity proofing software. Depending on the requirements of the Certificate Class, video identification may include manual or automated procedures, or a hybrid of both including video capture, biometric comparison, scanning of identity documents, liveness checks, and other tools. Where required by a Certificate Class, DigiCert Europe only accepts remote video verification following review and acceptance of the method by the relevant Conformity Assessment Body and/or Supervisory Authority. Entities that can perform this verification include the CA, RA, or third-party validators approved by DigiCert Europe.

3.2.4. Non-Verified Subscriber Information

DigiCert Europe does not verify information contained in the Organisation Unit (OU) field in Certificates. Other information may be designated as non-verified according to the Certificate Profile or relevant industry standards. As of August 31, 2020 DigiCert Europe does not include OU fields in TLS Certificates.

3.2.5. Validation of Authority

Where an Applicant's Name is to be associated with an Organisational Name to indicate his or her status as a Counterparty, Employee or specifies an Authorisation level to act on behalf of an Organisation, the RA will validate the Applicant's Authority by reference to business records maintained by the RA, its Subsidiaries, Holding Companies or Affiliates. Validation of authority is conducted in compliance with this CP/CPS and the Certificate Profiles detailed in Appendix A. Validity of authority of Applicant Representatives and Agents is verified against contractual documentation and Reliable Data Sources.

An Organisation may limit who is authorised to request Certificates by sending a request to DigiCert

Europe. A request to limit authorised individuals is not effective until approved by DigiCert Europe. DigiCert Europe will respond to an Organisation's verified request for DigiCert Europe's list of its authorised requesters.

For Certificates issued at the request of an Applicant's Agent, both the Agent and the Subscriber shall jointly and severally indemnify and hold harmless DigiCert Europe, and its parent companies, subsidiaries, directors, officers, and employees. The Applicant shall control and be responsible for the data that an Applicant Representative or Agent supplies to DigiCert Europe. The Applicant must promptly notify DigiCert Europe of any misrepresentations and omissions made by an Applicant Representative or Agent.

3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation

DigiCert Europe may provide interoperation services to certify a non-DigiCert Europe CA, allowing it to interoperate with the DigiCert Europe PKI. In order for such interoperation services to be provided the following criteria must be met:

- DigiCert Europe will perform due diligence on the CA;
- A formal contract must be entered into with DigiCert Europe, which includes a 'right to audit' clause; and
- The CA must operate under a CPS that meets DigiCert Europe requirements.

3.2.7. Onion Domain Validation

The Domain Name must contain at least two Domain Labels, where the rightmost Domain Label is "onion", and the Domain Label immediately preceding the rightmost "onion" Domain Label is a valid Version 3 Onion Address.

DigiCert Europe verifies the Applicant's control over the .onion service by having the Applicant provide a Certificate Request signed using the .onion service's private key if the Attributes section of the certification RequestInfo contains:

- A caSigningNonce attribute that contains a Random Value that is generated by the CA; and
- An applicantSigningNonce attribute that contains a single value. DigiCert Europe will recommend to Applicants that the applicantSigningNonce value should contain at least 64 bits of entropy.

3.3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR RE-KEY REQUESTS

3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-Key

Subscribers may request re-key of a Certificate prior to a Certificate's expiration. After receiving a request for re-key, DigiCert Europe creates a new Certificate with the same Certificate contents except for a new Public Key and, optionally, an extended validity period. If the Certificate has an extended validity period, DigiCert Europe may perform some revalidation of the Applicant but may also rely on information previously provided or obtained. DigiCert Europe does not re-key a Certificate without additional Identification and Authentication if doing so would allow the Subscriber to use the Certificate beyond the limits specified for the applicable Certificate Profile.

3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for Re-Key After Revocation

DigiCert Europe does not allow re-key after revocation. To re-key a revoked Certificate, the Subscriber must undergo the initial Identification and Authentication process prior to re-keying the Certificate.

3.4. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR REVOCATION REQUESTS

See Section 4.9 for information about Certificate Revocation procedures. All revocation requests are authenticated by DigiCert Europe or the RA responsible for issuing the Certificate. DigiCert Europe authenticate revocation requests by referencing the Certificate's Public Key, regardless of whether the associated Private Key is compromised. A Subscriber may request that their Certificate be revoked by:

- Authenticating to a DigiCert Europe Portal and requesting revocation via that system;
- Applying in person to the RA, Issuing CA or DigiCert Europe supplying either original proof of identification in the form of a valid Passport or National ID; or
- Telephonic communication using a pre-existing shared secret, password or other information associated with Subscriber's account with the CA following appropriate Identification.
- Applying by writing in an email, or letter, to a DigiCert Europe or DigiCert office in Europe, with details of the Certificate and a masked copy of a valid Passport or National ID for the Subscriber.

4. CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

4.1. CERTIFICATE APPLICATION

4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application

Either the Applicant or an individual authorised to request Certificates on behalf of the Applicant may submit Certificate requests. Applicants are responsible for any data that the Applicant or an agent of the Applicant supplies to DigiCert Europe.

DigiCert Europe does not issue Certificates to entities on a government denied list maintained by the United States or that are located in a country with which the laws of the United States prohibit doing business.

The Applicant is responsible to provide correct and up-to-date data, as required for the generation and issuance of Certificates as well as the correct usage of the Certificates. By agreeing to the Master Services Agreement, Terms of Use, and the Privacy Notice and signing the contracts, the Applicant also agrees to all underlying documents (the CP/CPS and others). If any of the required information for the issuance of Certificates is missing, incomplete or produces a negative outcome, DigiCert Europe will reject the application for a Certificate.

DigiCert Europe maintains an internal database of previously revoked Certificates and previously rejected Certificate requests. DigiCert Europe uses this information to identify subsequent suspicious Certificate requests.

4.1.2. Enrolment Process and Responsibilities

Certificate requests must be in a form prescribed by the Issuing CA and typically include: 1. An application form including all registration information as described by this CP/CPS, 2. Secure generation of KeyPair and delivery of the Public Key to DigiCert Europe, (a CSR may not be required), 3. Acceptance of the relevant Subscriber Agreement or other Terms of Use upon which the Certificate is to be issued, 4. Payment of fees.

All applications are subject to review, approval, and acceptance by the Issuing CA in its discretion.

A Certificate request may be used for multiple Certificates to be issued to the same Applicant, (subject to the updating requirement in Section 4.2.1 of the TLS BR). The Certificate request contains a request from, or on behalf of, the Applicant for the issuance of a Certificate, and a certification by, or on behalf of, the Applicant that all of the information contained therein is correct.

All agreements concerning the use of, or reliance upon, Certificates issued within the DigiCert Europe PKI must incorporate by reference the requirements of this DigiCert Europe CP/CPS as it may be amended from time to time.

4.2. CERTIFICATE APPLICATION PROCESSING

4.2.1. Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

After receiving a certificate application, DigiCert Europe or an RA follows a documented procedure to verify the application and other information in accordance with the Identification and Authentication requirements for each Certificate Profile. See also Appendix A.

In cases where the Certificate request does not contain all the necessary information about the Applicant, DigiCert Europe or the RA obtains the remaining information from the Applicant or, having obtained it from a reliable, independent third-party data source, confirms it with the Applicant.

For publicly-trusted TLS Certificates, Applicant information is required to include at least one FQDN or IP address to be included in the Certificate's subjectAltName extension. For validation of Domain Names and IP Addresses according to Section 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5 any reused data, document, or completed validation must be obtained no more than 398 days prior to issuing the Certificate. DigiCert Europe implements documented procedures that require additional verifications as reasonably necessary for High Risk Certificate requests prior to the Certificate's approval.

DigiCert Europe considers a source's availability, purpose, and reputation when determining whether a third-party data source is reasonably reliable. For TLS Certificates, DigiCert Europe does not consider a database, source, or form of identification reasonably reliable if DigiCert Europe or the RA is the sole source of the information.

4.2.1.1. CAA Checking

Prior to issuing a TLS Certificate, Issuer CAs check the DNS for the existence of a CAA record for each DNSName in the subjectAltName extension of the Certificate to be issued. DigiCert Europe processes the "issue" and "issuewild" property tags.

Prior to issuing an S/MIME Certificate, Issuer CAs check the DNS for the existence of a CAA record in accordance with RFC 9495 for each Mailbox Address in the subjectAltName extension of the S/MIME Certificate to be issued. DigiCert Europe processes the "issuemail" property tag.

Certificates passing the CAA check are issued within the Time to Live (TTL) of the CAA record, or 8 hours, whichever is greater. DigiCert Europe logs actions taken based on CAA records, and documents issuance prevented by CAA for feedback to the CA/B Forum. DigiCert Europe may not dispatch reports of issuance requests to the contact(s) listed in an "iodef" property tag. CAA checking is optional for Certificates issued by a Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate.

DigiCert Europe may treat a record lookup failure as permission to issue if:

- The failure is outside the DigiCert's infrastructure; and
- The lookup has been retried at least once; and
- The domain's zone does not have a DNSSEC validation chain to the ICANN root.

The CA identifiers that DigiCert Europe recognizes are:

- digicert.com
- digicert.ne.jp
- cybertrust.ne.jp
- symantec.com
- thawte.com
- geotrust.com
- quovadisglobal.com
- rapidssl.com
- digitalcertvalidation.com
- volusion.digitalcertvalidation.com
- stratossll.digitalcertvalidation.com
- intermediatecertificate.digitalcertvalidation.com
- 1and1.digitalcertvalidation.com
- amazon.com
- amazontrust.com
- awstrust.com
- amazonaws.com
- www.digicert.com
- pkioverheid.nl

4.2.1.2. EV TLS and Code Signing

Once verification is complete, the Issuer CA evaluates the corpus of information and decides whether or not to issue the certificate.

4.2.1.3. S/MIME

Validation of mailbox control according to Section 3.2.2.4 must be completed within 30 days of certificate issuance. Validation of mailbox authorisation or control in accordance with Section 3.2.2.4.22 must be completed within 398 days of certificate issuance. Authentication of organizational entity or Individual Identity must be completed within 825 days prior to certificate issuance.

4.2.1.4. Requirements for Re-use of Existing Documentation

Except for reissuance of an EV TLS or EV Code Signing Certificate for existing Subscribers, the age of all data used to support issuance (before revalidation is required) shall not exceed the limits described below. The period specified shall begin to run on the date the information was collected.

Organization Validation, S/MIME and Document Signing

1. Legal existence and identity – 825 days;

2. Assumed name – 825 days;
3. Address of Place of Business – 825 days;
4. Verified Method of Communication – 825 days;
5. Face to face verification - 825 days.

Note: TLS Certificates issued on or after March 15th, 2026 may not rely on subject identity validation older than 398 days.

Extended Validation

1. Legal existence and identity – 398 days;
2. Assumed name – 398 days;
3. Address of Place of Business – 398 days;
4. Verified Method of Communication – 398 days;
5. Operational existence – 398 days;
6. Name, Title, Agency, and Authority – 398 days, unless a contract between the CA and the Applicant specifies a different term, in which case, the term specified in such contract controls. For example, the contract may include the perpetual assignment of EV roles until revoked by the Applicant or CA, or until the contract expires or is terminated.

DigiCert Europe may reuse a previously submitted EV Request, Subscriber Agreement, or Terms of Use, including use of a single EV Certificate Request in support of multiple EV Certificates containing the same Subject to the extent permitted under the relevant agreement.

If an Applicant has a currently valid EV Certificate issued by DigiCert Europe, DigiCert Europe may rely on its prior authentication and verification of:

1. The Principal Individual, if the individual is the same person as verified in connection with the Applicant's previously issued and currently valid EV Certificate;
2. The Applicant's Place of Business;
3. The Applicant's Verified Method of Communication but must still confirm the Verified Method of Communication by using it to obtain an affirmative response sufficient to enable a reasonable person to conclude that the Applicant, or a Parent/Subsidiary or Affiliate of Applicant, can be contacted reliably by using the Verified Method of Communication.
4. The Applicant's Operational Existence;
5. The Name, Title, Agency and Authority of the Contract Signer, and Certificate Approver.

DigiCert Europe may rely on a previously verified certificate request to issue a replacement certificate, so long as the certificate being referenced was not revoked due to fraud or other illegal conduct, if:

1. The expiration date of the replacement certificate is the same as the expiration date of the EV Certificate that is being replaced, and
2. The Subject Information of the Certificate is the same as the Subject in the EV Certificate that is being replaced.

Domain Validation Domain validation may be re-used for 398 days unless otherwise specified in Section 3.2.2.4. TLS Certificates issued on or after March 15th, 2026 may not rely on existing domain validation older than 200 days. TLS Certificates issued on or after March 15th, 2027 may not rely on existing domain validation older than 100 days. TLS Certificates issued on or after March 15th, 2029 may not rely on existing domain validation older than 10 days.

4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications

After receiving a Certificate Application, DigiCert Europe or an RA verifies the application information and other information in accordance with this CP/CPS.

If an RA (including an Enterprise RA) assists in the verification, the RA must create and maintain records sufficient to establish that it has performed its required verification tasks and communicate the completion of such performance to DigiCert Europe. After verification is complete, DigiCert Europe Validation Specialists evaluate the corpus of information and decide whether or not to approve issuance.

DigiCert Europe does not issue Certificates containing a new gTLD under consideration by ICANN until the gTLD has been approved. DigiCert Europe may also reject a Certificate Application if DigiCert Europe believes that issuing the Certificate could damage or diminish DigiCert Europe's reputation or business. DigiCert Europe does not issue publicly trusted TLS Certificates containing unregistered TLDs or when domain control cannot be verified.

Approval for EV requires two DigiCert Europe Validation Specialists. The second validation specialist cannot be the same individual who collected the documentation and originally approved the EV Certificate.

DigiCert Europe, in its sole discretion, may refuse to issue a Certificate, without incurring any liability for loss or damages arising out of such refusal. DigiCert Europe reserves the right not to disclose reasons for such a refusal.

Rejected Applicants may re-apply. Subscribers are required to check the Certificate's contents for accuracy prior to using the Certificate.

4.2.3. Time To Process Certificate Applications

DigiCert Europe makes reasonable efforts to confirm Certificate Application information and issue a Certificate within a reasonable time frame, which is dependent on the Applicant providing the necessary details and documentation in a timely manner, as well as the availability of Trusted Registers and Attestations. Upon the receipt of the necessary details and documentation, DigiCert Europe aims to complete the validation process and issue or reject a Certificate Application within three working days. Events outside of the control of DigiCert Europe may delay the issuance process.

4.3. CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE

4.3.1. CA Actions During Certificate Issuance

Certificate issuance is governed by the practices described in and any requirements imposed by this CP/CPS. DigiCert Europe does not issue end entity TLS Certificates directly from its Root Certificates.

4.3.1.1. Manual authorisation of certificate issuance for Root CAs

Certificate issuance by a Root CA requires at least two individuals authorised by DigiCert Europe (i.e. the CA system operator, system officer, or PKI administrator), one of whom deliberately commands the Root CA to perform a Certificate signing operation. Databases and CA processes occurring during Certificate issuance are protected from unauthorised modification.

4.3.1.2. Linting of to-be-signed Certificate content

TLS and S/MIME Certificates follow a Linting process to test the technical conformity of each to-be-signed artifact prior to signing it. Other certificate types may also follow a Linting process, at DigiCert Europe's discretion.

4.3.1.3. Linting of issued Certificates

DigiCert Europe may use a Linting process to test each issued Certificate.

4.3.2. Notification To Subscriber by the CA of Issuance Of Certificate

DigiCert Europe may deliver Certificates in any secure manner within a reasonable time after issuance. DigiCert Europe delivers instructions via email to the Mailbox Address designated by the Certificate Requester during the application process. DigiCert Europe may use other methods deemed at least equally secure.

4.3.3. Notification to NCA for PSD2 Certificates

DigiCert Europe maintains a register of NCA contact information. When a PSD2 Certificate is issued, DigiCert Europe will send a notification email to the NCA identified in the Certificate using the pre-registered contact information.

4.4. CERTIFICATE ACCEPTANCE

4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance

The Certificate Requester is responsible for installing the issued Certificate on the Subscriber's computer or cryptographic module according to the Subscriber's system specifications. A Subscriber is deemed to have accepted a Certificate when:

- The Subscriber downloads, installs, or otherwise takes delivery of the Certificate; or
- 30 days pass since issuance of the Certificate.

BY ACCEPTING A CERTIFICATE, THE SUBSCRIBER ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THEY AGREE TO THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS CONTAINED IN THIS CP/CPS AND THE APPLICABLE SUBSCRIBER AGREEMENT. BY ACCEPTING A CERTIFICATE, THE SUBSCRIBER ASSUMES A DUTY TO RETAIN

CONTROL OF THE CERTIFICATE'S PRIVATE KEY, TO USE A TRUSTWORTHY SYSTEM AND TO TAKE REASONABLE PRECAUTIONS TO PREVENT ITS LOSS, EXCLUSION, MODIFICATION OR UNAUTHORISED USE.

4.4.2. Publication Of The Certificate By The CA

DigiCert Europe publishes all CA Certificates in its Repository. DigiCert Europe publishes end-entity Certificates by delivering them to the Subscriber.

4.4.3. Notification Of Certificate Issuance By The CA To Other Entities

Issuing CAs and RAs within the DigiCert Europe PKI may choose to notify other entities of Certificate issuance.

4.5. KEY PAIR AND CERTIFICATE USAGE

4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key And Certificate Usage

The Certificate shall be used lawfully in accordance with the DigiCert Europe CP/CPS and Subscriber Agreement.

Subscribers are obligated to protect their Private Keys from unauthorised use or disclosure, discontinue using a Private Key after expiration or revocation of the associated Certificate, and use Certificates in accordance with their intended purpose.

4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage

A Party seeking to rely on a Certificate issued within the DigiCert Europe PKI agrees to and accepts the Relying Party Agreement. Relying Parties may only use software that is compliant with X.509, IETF RFCs, and other applicable standards. DigiCert Europe does not warrant that any third party software will support or enforce the controls and requirements found herein.

A Relying Party should use discretion when relying on a Certificate and should consider the totality of the circumstances and risk of loss prior to relying on a Certificate. If the circumstances indicate that additional assurances are required, the Relying Party must obtain such assurances before using the Certificate. Any warranties provided by DigiCert Europe are only valid if a Relying Party's reliance was reasonable and if the Relying Party adhered to the Relying Party Agreement set forth in the DigiCert Europe Repository.

A Relying Party should rely on a Digital Signature or TLS handshake only if:

- The Digital Signature or TLS session was created during the operational period of a valid Certificate and can be verified by referencing a valid Certificate,
- The Certificate is not revoked and the Relying Party checked the revocation status of the Certificate prior to the Certificate's use by referring to the relevant CRLs or OCSP responses, and
- The Certificate is being used for its intended purpose and in accordance with this CP/CPS.

4.6. CERTIFICATE RENEWAL

4.6.1. Circumstance For Certificate Renewal

Renewal means the issuance of a new Certificate to the Subscriber without changing the Subscriber or other participant's Public Key or any other information in the Certificate. DigiCert Europe may renew a Certificate if:

1. The associated Public Key has not reached the end of its validity period;
2. The Subscriber and attributes are consistent; and
3. The associated Private Key remains uncompromised.

DigiCert Europe may also renew a Certificate if a CA Certificate is re-keyed or as otherwise necessary to provide services to a customer. DigiCert Europe may notify Subscribers prior to a Certificate's expiration date. DigiCert Europe renewal requires payment of additional fees. DigiCert Europe may renew a Certificate after expiration if the relevant industry permits such practices.

4.6.2. Who May Request Renewal

Only the Certificate Subject or an authorised representative of the Certificate Subject may request renewal of the Subscriber's Certificates.

4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests

Renewal application requirements and procedures are generally the same as those used during the Certificate's original issuance, but DigiCert Europe may use previously collected information that is still considered fresh under applicable industry standards. DigiCert Europe will revalidate any information that is older than the periods specified in applicable standards for the Certificate Policy. DigiCert Europe may refuse to renew a Certificate if it cannot verify any rechecked information.

4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

DigiCert Europe may deliver the Certificate in any secure fashion, such as using a DigiCert Europe Portal.

4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate

Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewed Certificate is in accordance with Section 4.4.1. Issued Certificates are considered accepted 30 days after the Certificate is renewed, or earlier upon use of the Certificate when evidence exists that the Subscriber used the Certificate.

4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA

DigiCert Europe publishes a renewed Certificate by delivering it to the Subscriber. All renewed CA Certificates are published in DigiCert Europe's Repository.

4.6.7. Notification Of Certificate Issuance By The CA To Other Entities

RAs may receive notification of a Certificate's renewal if the RA was involved in the issuance process.

4.7. CERTIFICATE RE-KEY

Re-keying means creating a new Certificate with a new Public Key and serial number while keeping the Subject information the same.

4.7.1. Circumstance For Certificate Re-Key

Certificates may be re-keyed upon request. After re-keying a Certificate, DigiCert Europe may revoke the old Certificate but may not further re-key, renew, or modify the previous Certificate. Subscribers requesting re-key should identify and authenticate themselves as permitted by Section 3.3.1.

4.7.2. Who May Request Certification Of A New Public Key

DigiCert Europe will accept re-key requests from the Subject of the Certificate, an authorised representative for an Organisational Certificate, or the nominating RA. DigiCert Europe may initiate a Certificate re-key at the request of the Certificate Subject or at DigiCert Europe's own discretion.

4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests

If the Private Key and any identity and domain information in a Certificate have not changed, then DigiCert Europe may issue a replacement Certificate using a previously issued Certificate or previously provided CSR. DigiCert Europe may re-use existing verification and authentication information in accordance with Section 3.3 unless DigiCert Europe believes that the information has become inaccurate.

4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

DigiCert Europe may deliver the Certificate in any secure fashion, such as using a DigiCert Europe Portal.

4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Key Certificate

Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed Certificate is in accordance with Section 4.4.1. Issued Certificates are considered accepted 30 days after the Certificate is re-keyed, or earlier upon use of the Certificate when evidence exists that the Subscriber used the Certificate.

4.7.6. Publication Of The Re-Key Certificate By The CA

DigiCert Europe publishes a re-keyed Certificate by delivering it to the Subscriber.

4.7.7. Notification Of Certificate Issuance By The CA To Other Entities

RAs may receive notification of a Certificate's renewal if the RA was involved in the issuance process.

4.8. CERTIFICATE MODIFICATION

4.8.1. Circumstances For Certificate Modification

Modifying a Certificate means creating a new Certificate for the same Subject with authenticated information that differs slightly from the old Certificate (e.g., changes to Mailbox Address or non-essential parts of names or attributes) provided that the modification otherwise complies with this CP/CPS. The new Certificate may have the same or a different subject Public Key. Modified information must undergo the same Identification and Authentication procedures as for a new Certificate.

4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification

DigiCert Europe modifies Certificates at the request of certain Certificate Subjects or in its own discretion. DigiCert Europe does not make Certificate modification services available to all Subscribers.

4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests

After receiving a request for modification, DigiCert Europe verifies any information that will change in the modified Certificate. DigiCert Europe will only issue the modified Certificate after completing the verification process on all modified information. RAs are required to perform Identification and Authentication of all modified Subscriber information in accordance with the requirements of the applicable Certificate Profile.

4.8.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

DigiCert Europe may deliver the Certificate in any secure fashion, such as using a DigiCert Europe Portal.

4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate

Conduct constituting acceptance of a modified Certificate is in accordance with Section 4.4.1. Modified Certificates are considered accepted 30 days after the Certificate is modified, or earlier upon use of the Certificate when evidence exists that the Subscriber used the Certificate.

4.8.6. Publication of The Modified Certificate by the CA

DigiCert Europe publishes modified Certificates by delivering them to Subscribers.

4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

RAs may receive notification of a Certificate's modification if the RA was involved in the issuance

process.

4.9. CERTIFICATE REVOCATION AND SUSPENSION

Revocation of a Certificate permanently ends the operational period of the Certificate prior to the Certificate reaching the end of its stated validity period. Prior to revoking a Certificate, DigiCert Europe and Issuing CAs verify that a revocation request was initiated by Subscribers, an RA, an Issuing CA, and other entities listed in Section 4.9.2 of this CP/CPS. Other parties may submit Certificate Problem Reports to DigiCert Europe to report reasonable cause to revoke the Certificate. Issuing CAs are required to provide evidence of the revocation authorisation to DigiCert Europe upon request.

4.9.1. Circumstances For Revocation

4.9.1.1. Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate

Circumstances for revocation within 24 hours

Apart from Short-lived Subscriber Certificates, DigiCert Europe will revoke a Certificate within 24 hours after receipt and for TLS use the corresponding CRLReason in accordance with Section 7.2, confirming one or more of the following occurred:

1. The Subscriber requests in writing that DigiCert Europe revoke the Certificate but does not specify a reason (CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL);
2. The Subscriber notifies DigiCert Europe that the original Certificate request was not authorised and does not retroactively grant authorisation (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
3. DigiCert Europe obtains evidence that the Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise (CRLReason #1, keyCompromise);
4. DigiCert Europe obtains evidence that the validation of domain authorisation or control for any FDQN or IP address or mailbox control for any Mailbox Address in the Certificate should not be relied upon (CRLReason #4, superseded);
5. DigiCert Europe is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can easily compute the Subscriber's Private Key based on the Public Key in the Certificate (including but not limited to those identified in Section 6.1.1.1) (CRLReason #1, keyCompromise);
6. The NCA requests revocation for a PSD2 Certificate where the Subscriber (PSP) has lost its authorisation to act as a PSP or any PSP role in the Certificate has been removed (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn); or
7. DigiCert Europe has reasonable assurance that a Certificate was used to sign suspect code.

In the absence of exceptional circumstances confirmed with the relevant Supervisory Authority, DigiCert Europe will revoke a Certificate within 24 hours when DigiCert Europe becomes aware that a QSCD used for QCP-n-qscd or QCP-l-qscd loses its certification status.

Circumstances for revocation within 5 days

Apart from Short-lived Subscriber Certificates, DigiCert Europe may revoke a Certificate within 24 hours and will revoke a Certificate within 5 days after receipt and for TLS use the corresponding CRL Reason confirming that one or more of the following occurred:

1. DigiCert Europe obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused and/or used outside the intended purpose as indicated by the relevant agreement (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
2. The Subscriber breached a material obligation under the CP/CPS or the relevant agreement (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
3. DigiCert Europe confirms any circumstance indicating that use of a FQDN, IP address, or Mailbox Address in the Certificate is no longer legally permitted (e.g. a court or arbitrator has revoked a Domain Name registrant's right to use the Domain Name, a relevant licensing or services agreement between the Domain Name registrant and the Applicant has terminated, or the Domain Name registrant has failed to renew the Domain Name) (CRLReason #5, cessationOfOperation);
4. For code signing, the Application Software Vendor requests revocation and DigiCert Europe does not intend to pursue an alternative course of action;
5. For code signing, the Certificate is being used to sign Suspect Code;
6. DigiCert Europe confirms that a Wildcard Certificate has been used to authenticate a fraudulently misleading subordinate FQDN (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
7. DigiCert Europe confirms a material change in the information contained in the Certificate (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
8. DigiCert Europe confirms that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with the CA/Browser Forum requirements or relevant browser policy (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
9. DigiCert Europe determines or confirms that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
10. DigiCert Europe right to issue Certificates under the CA/Browser Forum requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless DigiCert Europe has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository for a reason that is not otherwise required to be specified by this Section 4.9.1 (CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL;
11. Revocation is required by the DigiCert Europe CP/CPS for a reason that is not otherwise required to be specified by this Section 4.9.1 (CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL;
12. DigiCert Europe confirms a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Subscriber's Private Key to compromise, or if there is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed (CRLReason #1, keyCompromise);
13. Where the Subscriber becomes unsuitable or unauthorised to hold a Certificate on behalf of an employer or its respective Subsidiaries, Holding Companies or Counterparties (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn); or
14. The Certificate no longer complies with the requirements of Section 6.1.5 and Section 6.1.6 of the Codesigning Baseline Requirements.
15. For Codesigning Certificates, Application Software Suppliers may request the Issuer CA delays

revocation where immediate revocation has a potentially large negative impact to the ecosystem

Other Revocation Considerations

DigiCert Europe may revoke any Certificate in its sole discretion, including if DigiCert Europe believes that:

1. Either the Subscriber or DigiCert Europe obligations under the CP/CPS are delayed or prevented by circumstances beyond the party's reasonable control, including computer or communication failure, and, as a result, another entity's information is materially threatened or compromised;
2. DigiCert Europe received a lawful and binding order from a government or regulatory body to revoke the Certificate;
3. The Subscriber is confirmed to be bankrupt, in liquidation, or deceased;
4. DigiCert Europe ceased operations and did not arrange for another CA to provide revocation support for the Certificates;
5. The technical content or format of the Certificate presents an unacceptable risk to Application Software Suppliers, Relying Parties, or others;
6. The Subscriber was added as a denied party or prohibited person to a blocklist or is operating from a destination prohibited under the laws of the United States;
7. For Adobe Signing Certificates, Adobe has requested revocation; or
8. For code-signing Certificates, the Certificate was used to sign, publish, or distribute malware, code that is downloaded without user consent, or other harmful content.
9. DigiCert Europe receives notice or otherwise becomes aware that there has been some other modification of the information pertaining to the Subscriber that is contained within the Certificate;
10. The Subscriber fails or refuses to comply, or to promptly correct inaccurate, false or misleading information after being made aware of such inaccuracy, misrepresentation or falsity;

DigiCert Europe always revokes a Certificate if the binding between the Subject and the Subject's Public Key in the Certificate is no longer valid or if an associated Private Key is compromised.

4.9.1.2. Reasons for Revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate

DigiCert Europe will revoke an Issuing CA Certificate within seven (7) days after receipt and confirming one or more of the following occurred:

1. The Issuing CA requests revocation in writing;
2. The Issuing CA notifies DigiCert Europe that the original Certificate request was not authorised and does not retroactively grant authorisation;
3. DigiCert Europe obtains evidence that the Issuing CA's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a key compromise or no longer complies with the requirements of Sections 6.1.5 and 6.1.6 of the applicable Baseline Requirements or any Section of the Mozilla Root Store policy;
4. DigiCert Europe obtains evidence that the CA Certificate was misused and/or used outside the

intended purpose as indicated by the relevant agreement;

5. DigiCert Europe confirms that the CA Certificate was not issued in accordance with or that Issuing CA has not complied with the CP/CPS;
6. DigiCert Europe determines that any of the information appearing in the CA Certificate is inaccurate or misleading;
7. DigiCert Europe or the Issuing CA ceases operations for any reason and has not made arrangements for another CA to provide revocation support for the CA Certificate;
8. DigiCert Europe's or the Issuing CA's right to issue Certificates expires or is revoked or terminated, unless DigiCert Europe has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository;
9. Revocation is required by the DigiCert Europe CP/CPS; or
10. The technical content or format of the CA Certificate presents an unacceptable risk to Application Software Vendors or Relying Parties.

In the event that an Issuing CA determines that its Certificates or the DigiCert Europe PKI could become compromised and that revocation of Certificates is in the interests of the PKI, following remedial action, DigiCert Europe may authorise the reissue of Certificates to Subscribers at no charge, unless the actions of the Subscribers were in breach of the DigiCert Europe CP/CPS or other contractual documents.

4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation

Any appropriately authorised party may request revocation of a Certificate. This may include a recognised representative of a Subscriber or the RA, the party that purchased the Certificate on behalf of a Subscriber, and the party that manages the Portal account to which the Certificate is tied.

DigiCert Europe may revoke a Certificate without receiving a request and without reason. Third parties may request Certificate revocation for problems related to fraud, misuse, or compromise. Certificate revocation requests must identify the entity requesting revocation and specify the reason for revocation.

DigiCert Europe provides Anti-Malware Organisations, Subscribers, Relying Parties, Application Software Vendors, and other third parties (such as a National Competent Authority that issued the Authorisation Number in a PSD2 Certificate) with clear instructions on how they can report suspected Private Key compromise, Certificate misuse, Certificates used to sign Suspect Code, Takeover Attacks, or other types of possible fraud, compromise, misuse, inappropriate conduct, or any other matter related to Certificates at <https://problemreport.digicert.com/> and other resources listed in Section 1.5.2.1.

4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request

DigiCert Europe processes a revocation request as follows:

1. DigiCert Europe logs the request or problem report and the reason for requesting revocation based on the list in Section 4.9.1, including contact information for the requestor. DigiCert

Europe may also include its own reasons for revocation in the log.

2. DigiCert Europe may request confirmation of the revocation from a known administrator, where applicable, via out-of-band communication (e.g., telephone, fax, etc.).
3. If the request is authenticated as originating from the Subscriber or an authorised party, DigiCert Europe revokes the Certificate based on the timeframes listed in 4.9.1 as listed for the reason for revocation.
4. For requests from third parties, DigiCert Europe personnel begin investigating the request within 24 hours after receipt and decide whether revocation is appropriate based on the following criteria:
 - the nature of the alleged problem;
 - the number of reports received about a particular Certificate or website;
 - the identity of the complainants (for example, complaints from a law enforcement official that a web site is engaged in illegal activities have more weight than a complaint from a consumer alleging they never received the goods they ordered); and
 - relevant legislation.
5. If DigiCert Europe determines that revocation is appropriate, DigiCert Europe personnel revoke the Certificate and update the Certificate Status. If DigiCert Europe deems appropriate, DigiCert Europe may forward the revocation reports to law enforcement.

In the case of a PSD2 Certificate, the NCA identified in the Certificate may request revocation by contacting psd2@quovadisglobal.nl. NCA revocation requests are authenticated using either a previously communicated shared secret, or use of a Digital Signature supported by Qualified Certificate issued to the NCA.

DigiCert Europe maintains a continuous 24x7 ability to internally respond to high priority revocation requests and Certificate problem reports at <https://problemreport.digicert.com/> and other resources listed in Section 1.5.2.1. Subscribers may also revoke their Certificates via the DigiCert Europe Portal.

For Certificates issued from an itsme sign Issuing CA all revocation requests must be directed to the itsme first-line helpdesk.

4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period

Subscribers are required to request revocation within one day after detecting the loss or compromise of the Private Key. No grace period is permitted once a revocation request has been verified. DigiCert Europe will revoke Certificates as soon as reasonably practical following verification of a revocation request.

4.9.5. Time Within Which CA Must Process the Revocation Request

DigiCert Europe will revoke a CA Certificate within one hour after receiving clear instructions from the DCPA.

Within 24 hours after receiving a Certificate problem report or revocation request, DigiCert Europe investigates the facts and circumstances involved with the report and will provide a preliminary

report on its findings to both the Subscriber and the entity who filed the Certificate problem report.

After reviewing the facts and circumstances, DigiCert Europe works with the Subscriber and any entity reporting the Certificate problem report or other revocation-related notice to establish whether or not the Certificate will be revoked, and if so, a date which DigiCert Europe will revoke the Certificate. The period from receipt of the Certificate problem report or revocation-related notice to published revocation must not exceed the time frame set forth in Section 4.9.1. The date selected by DigiCert Europe will consider the following criteria:

1. The nature of the alleged problem (scope, context, severity, magnitude, risk of harm);
2. The consequences of revocation (direct and collateral impacts to Subscribers and Relying Parties);
3. The number of Certificate problem reports received about a particular Certificate or Subscriber;
4. The entity making the complaint (for example, a complaint from a law enforcement official that a Web site is engaged in illegal activities should carry more weight than a complaint from a consumer alleging that she didn't receive the goods she ordered); and
5. Relevant legislation.

The time used for the provision of revocation services is synchronised with UTC at least every 24 hours. Under normal operating circumstances, DigiCert Europe will revoke Certificates as quickly as practical after validating the revocation request following the guidelines of this Section and Section 4.9.1. For Certificates containing the ETSI OIDs defined in Section 10.1.1 the maximum delay between the receipt of the revocation request and the update of the Certificate Status information is at most 24 hours.

For Certificates issued from the itsme sign Issuing CA, this 24 hour time period starts with the receipt of the revocation request at the itsme first-line helpdesk.

DigiCert Europe follows the revocation timeframes specified for malware in the Code Signing Baseline Requirements.

4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties

Prior to relying on information listed in a Certificate, a Relying Party must confirm the validity of each Certificate in the Certificate path in accordance with IETF PKIX standards, including checking for Certificate validity, issuer-to-subject name chaining, policy and key use constraints, and revocation status through CRLs or OCSP responders identified in each Certificate in the chain.

4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency

Subscriber Certificates

Updated CRLs are issued at least once every seven days, and the value of the nextUpdate field is not more than ten days beyond the value of the thisUpdate field. A new CRL is published within 24 hours of revoking a Certificate.

Subordinate CA and Timestamp

DigiCert Europe updates and reissues CRLs at least once every twelve months and within 24 hours after revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate, and the value of the nextUpdate field is not more than twelve months beyond the value of the thisUpdate field.

Certificates Subject to ETSI Requirements

CRLs for Subscriber Certificates are issued at least every 24 hours.

Before revoking a Qualified Issuing CA Certificate a last CRL is generated with a “nextUpdate” field value of "99991231235959Z". The last CRL is available in accordance with Section 5.5.2. DigiCert Europe does not issue a last CRL until all Certificates in the scope of the CRL are either expired or revoked.

After the expiry date of an Issuing CA the most recent CRL will be published for at least 24 hours. DigiCert Europe does not use the ExpiredCertsOnCRL extension.

4.9.8. Maximum Latency For CRL

CRLs for Certificates issued to end entity Subscribers are posted automatically to the online Repository within a commercially reasonable time after generation, usually within 10 minutes of generation. Regularly scheduled CRLs are posted prior to the nextUpdate field in the previously issued CRL of the same scope.

4.9.9. On-Line Revocation/Status Checking Availability

Certificate status information via OCSP is provided in accordance with RFC 6960. The OCSP service is updated within a commercially reasonable time. Where applicable, the URL for the OCSP responder may be found within the Authority Information Access (AIA) extension of the Certificate.

Upon expiry of the Issuing CA, the associated OCSP Responder service is discontinued. For Qualified Certificates, DigiCert Europe uses the OCSP ArchiveCutoff extension. DigiCert Europe does not compute a last OCSP answer for issued Certificates with the nextUpdate field set to "99991231235959Z".

OCSP responses are signed by either:

- The Private Key for the CA which issued the Certificate for which the status is requested; or
- The Private Key of an OCSP Signing Certificate for an OCSP responder designated by DigiCert Europe;

In the latter case, the OCSP-Signing Certificate is also provided with the extension id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck which is not marked as "critical" and has the value "NULL" (see RFC6960).

4.9.10. On-line Revocation Checking Requirements

A Relying Party must confirm the validity of a Certificate in accordance with Section 4.9.6 prior to relying on the Certificate. The validity interval of an OCSP response is the difference in time between the thisUpdate and nextUpdate field, inclusive. For purposes of computing differences, a difference of 3,600 seconds shall be equal to one hour, and a difference of 86,400 seconds shall be

equal to one day, ignoring leap-seconds.

OCSP is supported using the GET method.

Subscriber Certificates

- An authoritative OCSP response must be available (i.e. the responder must not respond with the “unknown” status) starting no more than 15 minutes after the Certificate or Precertificate is first published or otherwise made available.
- OCSP responses have a validity interval greater than or equal to eight hours;
- OCSP responses have a validity interval less than or equal to ten days;
- For OCSP responses with validity intervals less than sixteen hours, then DigiCert updates the information provided via an Online Certificate Status Protocol prior to one-half of the validity period before the nextUpdate; and
- For OCSP responses with validity intervals greater than or equal to sixteen hours, then DigiCert Europe updates the information provided via an Online Certificate Status Protocol at least eight hours prior to the nextUpdate, and no later than four days after the thisUpdate.

Code Signing Certificates

1. OCSP responses are updated at least every four days with a maximum validity of ten days.
2. OCSP responses for code signing and timestamp certificates may be available for up to 10 years after the expiration of the certificate.

Subordinate CA, Intermediate CA and Timestamp Certificates

OCSP information for Intermediates CAs are updated:

1. At least every twelve months;
2. Within 24 hours after revoking the Certificate.

A certificate serial number within an OCSP request is one of the following three options:

1. “assigned” if a certificate with that serial number has been issued by the Issuing CA, using any current or previous key associated with that CA subject; or
2. “reserved” if a Precertificate [RFC6962] with that serial number has been issued by (a) the Issuing CA; or (b) a Precertificate Signing Certificate [RFC6962] associated with the Issuing CA; or
3. “unused” if neither of the previous conditions are met. For “unused” serial numbers, the OCSP responder will not provide a “good” response.

4.9.11. Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available

Not applicable.

4.9.12. Special Requirements Re Key Compromise

DigiCert Europe uses commercially reasonable efforts to notify potential Relying Parties if it discovers or suspects the compromise of a Private Key. Reports to DigiCert Europe of key compromise must include:

- Proof of key compromise in either of the following formats:
 - A CSR signed by the compromised Private Key with the Common Name “Proof of Key Compromise for DigiCert”; or
 - The Private Key itself
- If a CSR is provided, DigiCert Europe will only accept proof of key compromise, if one of the following algorithms are used to sign the CSR:
 - SHA256WithRSA
 - SHA384WithRSA
 - SHA512WithRSA
 - ECDSAWithSHA256
 - ECDSAWithSHA384
 - ECDSAWithSHA512
 - SHA256WithRSAPSS
 - SHA384WithRSAPSS
 - SHA512WithRSAPSS
 - PureEd25519
- A valid Mailbox Address so that you can receive confirmation of your problem report and associated Certificate revocations

DigiCert Europe will select the CRLReason code “keyCompromise” (value 1) upon discovery of such reason or as required by an applicable CP/CPS. Should a CA Private Key become compromised, the CA and all Certificates issued by that CA shall be revoked. DigiCert Europe provides additional instructions and support for keyCompromise at <https://problemreport.digicert.com/> and other resources as indicated in Section 1.5.2.1 of this CP/CPS.

If the entity requesting revocation for keyCompromise can demonstrate possession of the certificate’s private key, then DigiCert will revoke all instances of that key across all subscribers.

If the entity requesting revocation cannot demonstrate possession of the certificate’s private key, then DigiCert may revoke all certificates associated with that subscriber that contain that public key.

4.9.13. Circumstances for Suspension

The DigiCert Europe PKI does not support suspension of Certificates.

4.9.14. Who Can Request Suspension

The DigiCert Europe PKI does not support suspension of Certificates.

4.9.15. Procedure For Suspension Request

The DigiCert Europe PKI does not support suspension of Certificates.

4.9.16. Limits On Suspension Period

The DigiCert Europe PKI does not support suspension of Certificates.

4.10. CERTIFICATE STATUS SERVICES

4.10.1. Operational Characteristics

Certificate status information is available via CRL and OCSP responder. Revocation entries for publicly trusted Certificates on a CRL or OCSP response must not be removed until after the expiry date of the revoked Certificate. The serial number of a revoked Certificate remains on the CRL until one additional CRL is published after the end of the Certificate's validity period, except for revoked Code Signing Certificates, which remain on the CRL for at least 10 years following the Certificate's validity period.

4.10.2. Service Availability

Certificate status services are available 24x7. DigiCert Europe operates and maintains its CRL and OCSP capability with resources sufficient to provide a response time of ten seconds or less under normal operating conditions.

DigiCert Europe also maintains a continuous 24x7 ability to respond internally to a high-priority Certificate Problem Report, and where appropriate, forward such a complaint to law enforcement authorities, and/or revoke a Certificate that is the subject of such a complaint.

4.10.3. Optional Features

No stipulation.

4.11. END OF SUBSCRIPTION

A Subscriber's subscription service ends if its Certificate expires or is revoked or if the applicable Subscriber Agreement expires without renewal.

4.12. KEY ESCROW AND RECOVERY

DigiCert Europe provides optional Private Key Escrow services for certain Certificate Profiles (see Appendix A, Section 10.1.2) under this CP/CPS. Private Key Escrow is only available if the Enterprise RA Administrator directs at the Account level. Private Key Escrow is prohibited for the following Certificate types:

- CA Certificates
- Advanced+ Certificates
- eIDAS Qualified Certificates
- ZertES Qualified or Regulated Certificates
- Any Certificate whose Private Key Usage is dedicated to Signing or Authentication
- TLS Certificates
- Codesigning Certificates

Private Key Escrow shall not be allowed when the nonRepudiation keyUsage is present in a Certificate as of version 4.32 of this CP/CPS.

4.12.1. Key Escrow And Recovery Policy And Practices

Issuing CAs shall not escrow CA Private Keys.

Issuing CAs may escrow Subscriber key management keys to provide key recovery services. Issuing CAs shall encrypt and store escrowed Private Keys with at least the level of security used to generate and deliver the Private Key. Issuing CAs shall protect Private Keys from unauthorised disclosure.

Enterprise customers utilising key escrow services provided by DigiCert Europe may escrow keys within their infrastructure. Enterprise customers must notify Subscribers when keys are escrowed.

Subscribers and other authorised entities may request recovery of an escrowed (decryption) Private Key. Keys are recovered at the request of the Subscriber, contracting entity, or as required by law.

Entities escrowing Private Keys shall have personnel controls in place that prevent unauthorised access to Private Keys.

4.12.2. Session Key Encapsulation And Recovery Policy And Practices

Not applicable.

5. FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS

This Section of the CP/CPS provides a high-level description of the security policy, physical and logical access control mechanisms, service levels, and personnel policies used by DigiCert Europe to provide trustworthy and reliable CA operations.

DigiCert Europe maintains a security program to:

1. Protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data and business process;
2. Protect against anticipated threats or hazards to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data and business process;
3. Protect against unauthorised or unlawful access, use, disclosure, alteration, or destruction of data and business process;
4. Protect against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to data and business processes; and
5. Comply with all other security requirements applicable to the CA by law and industry best practices.

DigiCert Europe performs an annual risk assessment to identify internal and external threats and assess likelihood and potential impact of these threats to data and business processes.

5.1. PHYSICAL CONTROLS

DigiCert Europe manages and implements appropriate physical security controls to restrict access to the hardware and software used in connection with CA operations.

5.1.1. Site Location and Construction

DigiCert Europe performs its CA and TSA operations from secure datacentres located in the Netherlands, and Switzerland. The datacentres are equipped with logical and physical controls that make DigiCert Europe's CA and TSA operations inaccessible to non-trusted personnel. DigiCert Europe operates under a security policy designed to detect, deter, and prevent unauthorised access to DigiCert Europe's operations.

5.1.2. Physical Access

DigiCert Europe permits entry to its secure datacentres only to security-cleared and authorised personnel, whose movements within the facility are logged and audited. A police background check forms part of the security clearance authorisation process.

Physical access is controlled by dual-factor authentication using a combination of physical access cards and biometric readers.

5.1.3. Power And Air-Conditioning

Datacentres have primary and secondary power supplies that ensure continuous and uninterrupted access to electric power. Uninterrupted power supplies (UPS) and generators provide redundant backup power.

5.1.4. Water Exposures

The cabinets housing DigiCert Europe's CA and TSA systems are designed to prevent and protect against water exposure.

5.1.5. Fire Prevention And Protection

DigiCert Europe datacentres are equipped with fire suppression mechanisms.

5.1.6. Media Storage

DigiCert Europe protects its media from accidental damage, environmental hazards, unauthorised physical access, and from obsolescence/deterioration during the period that records are required to be retained. Backup files are created on a daily basis. DigiCert Europe backup files are maintained at either within the DigiCert Europe service operations area or in a secure off-site storage area.

5.1.7. Waste Disposal

All unnecessary copies of printed sensitive information are shredded on-site before disposal. All electronic media are physically destroyed or are overwritten multiple times to prevent the recovery of the data.

5.1.8. Off-Site Backup

An off-site location is used for the storage and retention of backup software and data. The off-site storage is available to authorised personnel 24x7 for the purpose of retrieving software and data; and has appropriate levels of physical security in place (i.e., software and data are stored in fire-rated safes and containers which are located behind access-controlled doors in areas accessible only by authorised personnel).

5.2. PROCEDURAL CONTROLS

Administrative processes are described in detail in the various documents used within and supporting the DigiCert Europe PKI. Administrative procedures related to personnel and procedural requirements, as well as physical and technological security mechanisms, are maintained in accordance with this CP/CPS and other relevant operational documents.

Except for certain RA functions described in this CP/CPS, DigiCert Europe does not outsource operations associated with Root CA2.

5.2.1. Trusted Roles

Personnel acting in trusted roles include CA, TSA, and RA system administration personnel, and personnel involved with identity vetting and the issuance and revocation of Certificates. The functions and duties performed by persons in trusted roles are distributed so that one person alone cannot circumvent security measures or subvert the security and trustworthiness of the PKI or TSA operations. A list of personnel appointed to trusted roles is maintained and reviewed annually.

5.2.1.1. CA Administrators

The CA Administrator installs and configures the CA software, including key generation, key backup, and key management. The CA Administrator performs and securely stores regular system backups of the CA system. Administrators do not issue Certificates to Subscribers.

5.2.1.2. Registration Officers – CMS, RA, Validation and Vetting Personnel

The Registration Officer role is responsible for issuing and revoking Certificates.

5.2.1.3. System Administrators/ System Engineers (Operator)

The System Administrator/System Engineer installs and configures system hardware, including servers, routers, firewalls, and network configurations. The System Administrator/System Engineer also keeps critical systems updated with software patches and other maintenance needed for system stability and recoverability.

5.2.1.4. Internal Auditors

Internal Auditors are responsible for reviewing, maintaining, and archiving audit logs and performing or overseeing internal compliance audits to determine if DigiCert Europe, an Issuing CA, or RA is operating in accordance with this CP/CPS or approved registration procedures.

5.2.1.5. RA Administrators

RA Administrators are responsible for the RA certificate management systems.

5.2.1.6. Security Officers

The Security Officer is responsible for administering and implementing security practices.

5.2.2. Number Of Persons Required Per Task

DigiCert Europe requires that at least two people acting in a trusted role take action for the most sensitive tasks, such as activating DigiCert Europe's Private Keys, generating a CA Key Pair, or backing up a DigiCert Europe Private Key.

The Internal Auditor may serve to fulfil the requirement of multiparty control for physical access to the CA system but not logical access.

5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for Each Role

Persons filling trusted roles must undergo an appropriate security screening procedure commensurate to their role and access privileges are configured using the “least privileges” principle for the role. All personnel are required to authenticate themselves to CA, TSA, and RA systems before they are allowed access to systems necessary to perform their trusted roles.

5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties

Trusted roles requiring a separation of duties include those performing:

- Authorisation functions such as the verification of information in Certificate requests and certain approvals of Certificate applications and revocation requests,
- Backups, recording, and record keeping functions;
- Audit, review, oversight, or reconciliation functions; and
- Duties related to CA/TSA key management or CA/TSA administration.

To accomplish this separation of duties, DigiCert Europe specifically designates individuals to the trusted roles defined in Section 5.2.1 above. Individuals designated as Registration Officer or Administrator may perform Operator duties, but an Internal Auditor may not assume any other role.

DigiCert Europe systems identify and authenticate individuals acting in trusted roles and restrict an individual from assuming multiple roles at the same time.

5.3. PERSONNEL CONTROLS

5.3.1. Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements

The DCPA is responsible and accountable for DigiCert Europe PKI operations and ensures compliance with this CP/CPS. Prior to the engagement of any person in the Certificate management process, DigiCert Europe verifies the identity and trustworthiness of such person. DigiCert Europe determines that all individuals assigned to trusted roles perform their prospective job responsibilities competently and satisfactorily as required.

Without limitation, DigiCert Europe shall not be liable for employee conduct that is outside of their duties and for which DigiCert Europe has no control including, without limitation, acts of espionage, sabotage, criminal conduct, or malicious interference.

5.3.2. Background Check Procedures

DigiCert Europe verifies the identity of each individual appointed to a trusted role and performs a background check prior to allowing such person to act in a trusted role. DigiCert Europe’s human resources department verifies the individual’s identity using government-issued photo identification (e.g., passports and/or driver’s licenses reviewed pursuant to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, or comparable procedure for the jurisdiction in which the individual’s identity is being verified).

Background checks may include a combination of the following as required; verification of individual identity, employment history, education, character references, social security number, previous residences, driving records, professional references, and criminal background.

These procedures are subject to any limitations on background checks imposed by local law. To the extent one of the requirements imposed by this Section cannot be met by DigiCert Europe due to a prohibition or limitation in local law, DigiCert Europe utilises a substitute investigative technique permitted by law that provides substantially similar information, including but not limited to obtaining a background check performed by the applicable governmental agency.

5.3.3. Training Requirements

DigiCert Europe provides relevant skills training in DigiCert Europe's PKI and TSA operations for the personnel performing information verification duties including:

- Basic PKI knowledge;
- Software versions used by DigiCert Europe;
- Authentication and verification policies and procedures;
- DigiCert Europe security principles and mechanisms;
- Disaster recovery and business continuity procedures;
- Common threats to the validation process, including phishing and other social engineering tactics; and
- CA/Browser Forum Guidelines and other applicable industry and government guidelines.

DigiCert Europe maintains records of who received training. Registration Officers must have the minimum skills necessary to satisfactorily perform validation duties before being granted validation privileges. All Registration Officers are required to pass an internal examination on relevant standards including the EV Guidelines, the TLS BR and the S/MIME BR prior to validating and approving the issuance of such Certificates.

5.3.4. Retraining Frequency and Requirements

Employees must maintain skill levels that are consistent with DigiCert Europe's industry-relevant training and performance programs in order to continue acting in trusted roles. DigiCert Europe makes employees acting in trusted roles aware of any changes to DigiCert Europe's operations as necessary for them to perform their role.

If DigiCert Europe's operations change, DigiCert Europe will provide documented training, in accordance with an executed training plan, to all employees acting in relevant trusted roles to those changes.

5.3.5. Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence

Not applicable.

5.3.6. Sanctions for Unauthorised Actions

DigiCert Europe employees and agents failing to comply with this CP/CPS, whether through negligence or malicious intent, are subject to internally maintained processes specifying guidance on administrative or disciplinary actions, up to and including termination of employment or agency and criminal sanctions.

5.3.7. Independent Contractor Requirements

Independent contractors who are assigned to perform trusted roles are subject to the duties and requirements specified for such roles in this Section 5.3 and are subject to sanctions stated above in Section 5.3.6.

5.3.8. Documentation Supplied to Personnel

Personnel in trusted roles are provided with the documentation necessary to perform their duties.

5.4. AUDIT LOGGING PROCEDURES

5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded

DigiCert Europe records details of the actions taken to process a Certificate request and to issue a Certificate, including all information generated and documentation received in connection with the Certificate request. DigiCert Europe logs the following events:

- CA Certificate and key lifecycle management events;
 - Certificate requests, renewal, and re-key requests, and revocation;
 - Approval and rejection of Certificate requests;
 - Cryptographic device lifecycle management events;
 - Generation of CRLs and OCSP entries; and
 - Certificate Profiles management.
- Subscriber Certificate lifecycle management events, including:
 - Certificate requests, renewal, and re-key requests, and revocation;
 - Verification activities;
 - Approval and rejection of Certificate requests;
 - Issuance of Certificates; and
 - Generation of CRLs and OCSP entries.
 - Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration attempts from each Network Perspective, minimally recording the following information:
 - an identifier that uniquely identifies the Network Perspective used;
 - the attempted domain name and/or IP address; and
 - the result of the attempt (e.g., “domain validation pass/fail”, “CAA

permission/prohibition”).

- Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration quorum results for each attempted domain name or IP address represented in a Certificate request (i.e., “3/4” which should be interpreted as “Three (3) out of four (4) attempted Network Perspectives corroborated the determinations made by the Primary Network Perspective).
- Security events, including
 - Successful and unsuccessful PKI system access attempts;
 - PKI and security system actions performed;
 - Security profile changes;
 - Installation, update and removal of software on a PKI System;
 - System crashes, hardware failures, and other anomalies;
 - Relevant firewall and router activities; and
 - Entries to and exits from the CA facility.
- DigiCert Europe event logs include at least the following:
 - Date and time of the record;
 - Identity of the entity making the journal record (when applicable); and
 - Details of the record.

5.4.1.1. Router and Firewall Activities Logs

Logging of router and firewall activities necessary to meet the requirements of Section 5.4.1, must at a minimum include:

1. Successful and unsuccessful login attempts to routers and firewalls; and
2. Logging of all administrative actions performed on routers and firewalls, including configuration changes, firmware updates, and access control modifications; and
3. Logging of all changes made to firewall rules, including additions, modifications, and deletions; and
4. Logging of all system events and errors, including hardware failures, software crashes, and system restarts.

5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log

As required, generally within at least once every two months, a DigiCert Europe administrator reviews the logs generated by DigiCert Europe’s systems, makes system and file integrity checks, and conducts a vulnerability assessment. The administrator may perform the checks using automated tools. During these checks, the administrator (1) checks whether anyone has tampered with the log, (2) scans for anomalies or specific conditions, including any evidence of malicious activity, and (3) if necessary, prepares a written summary of the review. Any anomalies or irregularities found in the logs are investigated. The summaries may include recommendations to DigiCert Europe’s operations management committee and are made available to auditors upon request. DigiCert Europe documents any actions taken as a result of a review.

5.4.3. Retention Period For Audit Log

Audit logs relating to the Certificate lifecycle are retained as archive records for a period no less than eleven (11) years for Swiss Qualified Certificates and for seven (7) years for all other Certificates starting from the destruction of the CA Private Key or revocation or expiration of the Certificate. Certain high volume system generated logs are retained for 24 months based on a risk assessment.

DigiCert Europe makes the audit logs available to auditors, as defined in Section 8, available upon request.

5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log

The relevant audit data collected is regularly analysed for any attempts to violate the integrity of any element of the DigiCert Europe PKI. Only certain DigiCert Europe Trusted Roles and auditors may view audit logs in whole. DigiCert Europe decides whether particular audit records need to be viewed by others in specific instances and makes those records available. Consolidated logs are protected from modification and destruction. All audit logs are protected in an encrypted format via a Key and Certificate generated especially for the purpose of protecting the logs.

5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures

Each Issuing CA performs an onsite backup of the audit log daily. The backup process also includes weekly backups to an off-site location.

Backup procedures apply to the DigiCert Europe PKI and the Participants therein including the DigiCert Europe Root CAs, Issuing CAs, and RAs.

5.4.6. Audit Collection System (Internal vs. External)

The security audit process of each Issuing CA runs independently of the Issuing CA software. Security audit processes are invoked at system start up and cease only at system shutdown.

5.4.7. Notification to Event-Causing Subject

Where an event is logged, no notice is required to be given to the individual, organisation, device, or application that caused the event.

5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessment

DigiCert Europe performs monthly vulnerability scans on its PKI systems and infrastructure. Identified vulnerabilities are rated and addressed on the basis of the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).

DigiCert Europe's audit log monitoring tools alert the appropriate personnel of any events, such as repeated failed actions, requests for privileged information, attempted access of system files, and unauthenticated responses.

DigiCert Europe performs annual risk assessments that identify and assess reasonably foreseeable

internal and external threats that could result in unauthorised access, disclosure, misuse, alteration, or destruction of any Certificate data or Certificate issuance process. DigiCert Europe also routinely assesses the sufficiency of the policies, procedures, information systems, technology, and other arrangements that DigiCert Europe has in place to control risks identified in risk assessments. DigiCert Europe's Internal Auditors review the security audit data checks for continuity.

Based on the risk assessment, DigiCert Europe develops, implements, and maintains a security plan consisting of security procedures, measures, and products designed to achieve the objectives set forth above and to manage and control the risks identified during the risk assessment, commensurate with the sensitivity of the Certificate data and management processes.

5.5. RECORDS ARCHIVAL

5.5.1. Types of Records Archived

DigiCert Europe archives records related to the security of their Certificate Systems, Certificate Management Systems, Root CA Systems, and Delegated Third Party Systems, including event records and documentation related to their verification, issuance, and revocation of Certificate requests and Certificates.

DigiCert Europe archives records relating to:

- CA Certificate and key lifecycle management event records (as set forth in Section 5.4.1)
- Subscriber Certificate lifecycle management event records (as set forth in Section; and
- Security event records (as set forth in Section 5.4.1)

DigiCert Europe retains the following information in its archives (as such information pertains to DigiCert Europe's CA / TSA operations):

1. Accreditations of DigiCert Europe;
2. CP/CPS versions;
3. Contractual obligations and other agreements concerning the operation of the CA/TSA;
4. System and equipment configurations, modifications, and updates;
5. Rejection or acceptance of a Certificate request;
6. Certificate issuance, rekey, renewal, and revocation requests;
7. Sufficient identity authentication data to satisfy the identification requirements of Section 3.2, including information about telephone calls made for verification purposes;
8. Any documentation related to the receipt or acceptance of a Certificate or token;
9. Subscriber Agreements;
10. Issued Certificates;
11. A record of Certificate re-keys;
12. Data or applications necessary to verify an archive's contents;

13. Compliance auditor reports;
14. Changes to DigiCert Europe audit parameters;
15. Any attempt to delete or modify audit logs;
16. CA Key generation and destruction;
17. Access to Private Keys for key recovery purposes;
18. Changes to trusted Public Keys;
19. Export of Private Keys;
20. Approval or rejection of a revocation request;
21. Appointment of an individual to a trusted role;
22. Destruction of a cryptographic module;
23. Certificate compromise notifications;
24. Remedial action taken as a result of violations of physical security; and
25. Violations of the CP/CPS.

5.5.2. Retention Period For Archive

Audit logs relating to the Certificate lifecycle are retained as archive records for a period no less than eleven (11) years for Swiss Qualified Certificates and for seven (7) years for all other Certificates. Detailed system generated logs are retained for 24 months based on a risk assessment.

5.5.3. Protection of Archive

Archive records are stored at a secure location and are maintained in a manner that prevents unauthorised modification, substitution, or destruction. Archives are not released except as allowed by the DCPA or as required by law. DigiCert Europe maintains any software application required to process the archive data until the data is either destroyed or transferred to a newer medium.

If DigiCert Europe needs to transfer any media to a different archive site or equipment, DigiCert Europe will maintain both archived locations and/or pieces of equipment until the transfer are complete. All transfers to new archives will occur in a secure manner.

5.5.4. Archive Backup Procedures

On at least an annual basis, DigiCert Europe creates an archive of the data listed in Section 5.5.1. Each archive is stored separately and available for integrity verification at a later date. DigiCert Europe stores the archive in a secure location for the duration of the set retention period.

5.5.5. Requirements For Time-Stamping Of Records

DigiCert Europe supports time stamping of its records. All events that are recorded within the DigiCert Europe service include the date and time of when the event took place. This date and time are based on the system time on which the CA is operating. DigiCert Europe uses procedures to review and ensure that all systems operating within the DigiCert Europe PKI rely on a trusted time

source.

5.5.6. Archive Collection System (Internal or External)

The DigiCert Europe Archive Collection System is internal.

5.5.7. Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information

Access to archives is granted only to persons in Trusted Roles and based on least privilege. The contents of the archives will not be released as a whole, except as required by law. DigiCert Europe may decide to release records of individual transactions upon request of any of the entities involved in the transaction or their authorised representatives. A reasonable handling fee per record (subject to a minimum fee) will be assessed to cover the cost of record retrieval.

5.6. KEY CHANGEOVER

Key changeover is not automatic but procedures enable the smooth transition from expiring CA Certificates to new CA Certificates. Towards the end of the CA Private Key's lifetime, DigiCert Europe ceases using its expiring CA Private Key to sign Certificates (well in advance of expiration) and uses the old Private Key only to sign CRLs associated with that key. A new CA signing Key Pair is commissioned and all subsequently issued Certificates and CRLs are signed with the new private signing key. Both the old and the new Key Pairs may be concurrently active.

5.7. COMPROMISE AND DISASTER RECOVERY

5.7.1. Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures

5.7.1.1. Incident Response and Disaster Recovery Plans

DigiCert Europe maintains internal incident response procedures to guide personnel in response to security incidents, natural disasters, and similar events that may give rise to system compromise. These procedures include notification to Application Software Vendors, Subscribers, and Relying Parties as appropriate in the event of a disaster, security compromise, or business failure. DigiCert Europe reviews, tests, and updates its incident response plans and procedures on a periodic basis.

5.7.1.2. Mass Revocation Plans

DigiCert Europe maintains a mass revocation plan to ensure a rapid, consistent, and reliable response to large-scale certificate revocation events. The Mass Revocation Plan is tested, reviewed, and updated at least annually. The Mass Revocation Plan is made available to DigiCert Europe's auditors upon request.

5.7.2. Computing Resources, Software, and/or Data Are Corrupted

DigiCert Europe makes regular system backups on a weekly basis and maintains backup copies of its CA Private Keys, which are stored in a secure, separate location. If DigiCert Europe discovers that any of its computing resources, software, or data operations have been compromised, DigiCert Europe assesses the threats and risks that the compromise presents to the integrity or security of its

operations or those of affected parties. If DigiCert Europe determines that a continued operation could pose a significant risk to Relying Parties or Subscribers, DigiCert Europe suspends such operation until it determines that the risk is mitigated.

5.7.3. Entity Private Key Compromise Procedures

If DigiCert Europe suspects that one of its CA Private Keys has been compromised, the DCPA will convene a response team to assess the incident and take appropriate action.

DigiCert Europe will meet the requirements of Section 1.1 by following incident response plans whose steps generally include the following:

1. Collect information related to the incident;
2. Determine the degree and scope of compromise; and report on the course of action that should be taken to correct the problem and prevent reoccurrence;
3. If appropriate, contact government agencies, law enforcement, and other interested parties and activate any other appropriate additional security measures; and
4. Incorporate lessons learned into the implementation of long term solutions and the Incident Response Plan.

DigiCert Europe may generate a new Key Pair and sign a new Certificate. If a disaster physically damages DigiCert Europe's equipment and destroys all copies of DigiCert Europe's Private Keys then DigiCert Europe will provide notice to affected parties at the earliest feasible time.

5.7.4. Business Continuity Capabilities After a Disaster

To maintain the integrity of its services, DigiCert Europe implements data backup and recovery procedures as part of its Business Continuity Management Plan (BCMP). Stated goals of the BCMP are to ensure that Certificate status services be only minimally affected by any disaster involving DigiCert Europe's primary facility and that DigiCert Europe be capable of maintaining other services or resuming them as quickly as possible following a disaster.

DigiCert Europe periodically reviews, tests, and updates the BCMP and supporting procedures.

5.8. CA OR RA TERMINATION

Unless otherwise addressed in an applicable agreement between DigiCert Europe and a counterparty, before terminating its CA or RA activities, DigiCert Europe may:

1. Notify relevant Government and Certification bodies under applicable laws and related regulations;
2. Provide notice and information about the termination by sending notice by email to its customers, Application Software Vendors and by posting such information on DigiCert Europe's web site; and
3. Transfer all responsibilities to a qualified successor entity.

Unless otherwise addressed in an applicable agreement between DigiCert Europe and a

counterparty, if a qualified successor entity does not exist, DigiCert Europe may:

1. Transfer those functions capable of being transferred to a reliable third party and arrange to preserve all relevant records with a reliable third party or a government, regulatory, or legal body with appropriate authority;
2. Revoke all Certificates that are still un-revoked or un-expired on a date as specified in the notice and publish final CRLs;
3. Destroy all Private Keys; and
4. make other necessary arrangements that are in accordance with this CP/CPS.

Term	Description
CH	For Qualified Certificates, a notice of termination of the Issuing CA must be communicated in accordance with pre-established procedures to SAS, the body responsible for accrediting the Certificate Service Provider.
EU	For EU Qualified Certificates, DigiCert Europe has implemented procedures to be followed in the event of termination of the service provision. These procedures provide for the transfer of relevant records to a regulatory body and the continuation of revocation status in the event of termination. DigiCert Europe also has formally documented complaint and dispute resolution procedures.

DigiCert Europe has made arrangements to cover the costs associated with fulfilling these requirements in case DigiCert Europe becomes bankrupt or is unable to cover the costs. Any requirements of this Section that are varied by contract apply only the contracting parties.

6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS

6.1. KEY PAIR GENERATION AND INSTALLATION

6.1.1. Key Pair Generation

6.1.1.1. CA Key Pair Generation

DigiCert Europe CA Key Pairs are generated by multiple trusted individuals acting in trusted roles and using a cryptographic hardware device as part of scripted key generation ceremony in the environments described in Section 5.1 and logged in accordance with Section 5.4. The cryptographic hardware is evaluated to at least FIPS 140-2 Level 3, FIPS 140-2 Level 3 and/or Common Criteria EAL 4 or higher. Hardware Security Modules (HSM) are always stored in a physically secure environment and are subject to security controls throughout their lifecycle.

Activation of the hardware requires the use of two-factor authentication tokens.

DigiCert Europe creates auditable evidence during the key generation process to prove that the CP/CPS was followed and role separation was enforced during the key generation process. DigiCert Europe requires that an external auditor witness the generation of or review a recording of any CA keys to be used as publicly-trusted Root Certificates. For other CA Key Pair generation ceremonies, an Internal Auditor, external auditor, or independent third party attends the ceremony, or an external auditor examines the signed and documented record of the key generation ceremony, as allowed by applicable policy.

Subscribers must generate their Key Pair in a manner that is appropriate for the Certificate type.

CH EU	<p>For EU Qualified Certificates of type QCP-n-qscd or QCP-l-qscd, the Subscriber Private Keys are generated and stored on a QSCD which meets the requirements laid down in Annex II of the eIDAS Regulation and is certified to the appropriate standards.</p> <p>For Swiss Qualified Certificates of type QCP-n-qscd, and for Swiss Regulated Certificates, the Subscriber Private Keys are generated and stored on a QSCD.</p> <p>In the case that a QSCD used by DigiCert Europe for QCP-n-qscd or QCP-l-qscd loses its certification status, non-expired Certificates using the affected QSCD will be revoked. In some cases, a QTSP generates and manages Private Keys on behalf of the Subscriber. This is signified by the presence of the 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.410 OID in Certificate policies. See also Section 10.1.1.</p>
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6.1.1.2. RA Key Pair Generation

No stipulation

6.1.1.3. Subscriber Key Pair Generation

DigiCert Europe shall reject a Certificate request if one or more of the following conditions are met:

1. The Key Pair does not meet the requirements set forth in Section 6.1.5 and/or Section 6.1.6;
2. There is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed;
3. DigiCert Europe is aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Applicant's Private Key to compromise;
4. DigiCert Europe has previously been notified that the applicant's Private Key has suffered a Key Compromise using the Issuer CA's procedure for revocation request as described in Section 4.9.3 and Section 4.9.12;
5. The Public Key corresponds to an industry-demonstrated weak Private Key. For requests submitted on or after November 15, 2024, at least the following precautions SHALL be implemented:
 - In the case of Debian weak keys vulnerability (<https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys>), the Issuer CA shall reject all keys found at <https://github.com/cabforum/Debian-weak-keys/> for each key type (e.g. RSA, ECDSA) and size listed in the repository. For all other keys meeting the requirements of Section 6.1.5, with the exception of RSA key sizes greater than 8192 bits, DigiCert Europe shall reject Debian weak keys.
 - In the case of ROCA vulnerability, the Issuer CA shall reject keys identified by the tools available at <https://github.com/crocs-muni/roca> or equivalent.
 - In the case of Close Primes vulnerability (<https://fermatattack.secvuln.info/>), DigiCert Europe shall reject weak keys which can be factored within 100 rounds using Fermat's factorization method.

For Adobe Acrobat Trust List (AATL) Certificates, Subscribers must generate their Key Pairs in a medium that prevents exportation or duplication and that meets or exceeds FIPS 140-2 Level 3.

DigiCert Europe never creates key pairs for publicly-trusted TLS Certificates and will not accept a Certificate request using a Key Pair previously generated by DigiCert or DigiCert Europe.

6.1.2. Private Key Delivery To Subscriber

Where DigiCert Europe generates Private Keys on behalf of the Subscriber, they are provided in a secure manner via the DigiCert Europe Portal (for example for S/MIME Certificates) or Digital Signature platform. Keys may be delivered electronically (such as through secure email or stored in a cloud-based system) or on a hardware cryptographic module.

In all cases:

- Except where escrow/backup services are authorised and permitted, the key generator must not retain access to the Subscriber's Private Key after delivery;
- The key generator must protect the Private Key from activation, compromise, or modification during the delivery process;
- The Subscriber must acknowledge receipt of the Private Key(s), typically by having the Subscriber use the related Certificate; and
- The key generator delivers the Private Key in a way that ensures that the correct tokens and activation data are provided to the correct Subscribers securely.

CH EU	For some EU Qualified and Swiss Qualified/Regulated Certificates, DigiCert Europe may generate and manage Private Keys on behalf of the Subscriber. Where the policy requires the use of a QSCD then the signatures shall only be created by the QSCD. In the case of natural persons, the Subscribers' Private Key is maintained and used under their sole control and used only for Electronic Signatures. In the case of legal persons, the Private Key is maintained and used under their control and used only for Electronic Seals.
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If DigiCert Europe or an Enterprise RA becomes aware that a Subscriber's Private Key has been communicated to a person or organisation not authorised by the Subscriber, then DigiCert Europe will revoke all Certificates associated with that Private Key.

Electronic Signature Subscribers are solely responsible for the generation of the Private Keys used in their Certificate requests.

6.1.3. Public Key Delivery To Certificate Issuer

Subscribers generate Key Pairs and deliver Public Keys to the Issuing CA in a secure and trustworthy manner.

6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery To Relying Parties

DigiCert Europe's Public Keys are provided to Relying Parties as specified in a Certificate validation or path discovery policy file, as trust anchors in commercial browsers and operating system root stores, and/or as roots signed by other CAs. All Accreditation Authorities supporting DigiCert Europe Certificates and all Application Software Vendors are permitted to redistribute DigiCert Europe CA Certificates.

DigiCert Europe may also distribute Public Keys that are part of an updated signature Key Pair as a self-signed Certificate, as a new CA Certificate, or in a key roll-over Certificate. Relying Parties may also obtain DigiCert Europe CA Certificates from DigiCert Europe's web site or by email.

6.1.5. Key Sizes

DigiCert Europe follows the relevant ETSI and NIST guidance in using and retiring signature algorithms and key sizes. Key sizes for individual Certificate Profiles are disclosed in Appendix A. Currently DigiCert Europe generates and uses at least the following key sizes, signature algorithms and hash algorithms for signing Certificates, CRLs, and OCSP responses:

- 2048-bit or greater RSA Key (with a modulus size in bits divisible by 8);
- 256-bit ECDSA Key or greater with the matching Secure Hash Algorithm version as required and a valid point on the elliptic curve; or
- a hash algorithm that is equally or more resistant to a collision attack allowed by the references in Sections 1.1 and 8.1.

Signatures on CRLs, OCSP responses, and OCSP responder Certificates that provide status information for Certificates that were generated using SHA-1 may continue to be generated using the SHA-1 algorithm if it is compliant with all applicable programs listed in Section 1.1. All other

signatures on CRLs, OCSP responses, and OCSP responder Certificates must use the SHA-256 hash algorithm or one that is equally or more resistant to collision attack.

DigiCert Europe requires end-entity Certificates to contain a key size that is at least 2048 bits for RSA, DSA, or Diffie-Hellman and 224 bits for elliptic curve algorithms. DigiCert Europe may require higher bit keys in its sole discretion.

Any Root Certificates participating in the AATL program must be at least 3072-bit for RSA and 256-bit for ECDSA.

DigiCert Europe and Subscribers may fulfil transmission security requirements using TLS or another protocol that provides similar security, provided the protocol requires at least AES 128 bits or equivalent for the symmetric key and at least 2048-bit RSA or equivalent for the asymmetric keys.

6.1.6. Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking

DigiCert Europe uses cryptographic modules that conform to FIPS 186-2 and provide random value generation and on-board generation of Public Keys and a wide range of ECC curves.

6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (As Per X.509 V3 Key Usage Field)

Private Keys corresponding to DigiCert Europe Root Certificates are not used to sign Certificates except in the following cases:

1. Self-signed Certificates to represent the DigiCert Europe Root CA itself;
2. Certificates for Subordinate CAs and Cross Certificates;
3. Certificates for infrastructure purposes (administrative role certificates, internal CA operational device certificates); and
4. Certificates for OCSP Response verification.

Subscriber Certificates assert key usages based on the intended application of the Key Pair and cannot include anyExtendedKeyUsage. Key usage bits and extended key usages are specified in Appendix A.

An Issuing CA's Private Keys may be used for Certificate signing and CRL and OCSP response signing and shall not be used for any other purpose.

6.2. PRIVATE KEY PROTECTION AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE ENGINEERING CONTROLS

All Participants in the DigiCert Europe PKI are required to take all appropriate and adequate steps to protect their Private Keys in accordance with the requirements of this DigiCert Europe CP/CPS. Without limitation to the generality of the foregoing, all Participants in the DigiCert Europe PKI must (1) secure their Private Key and take all reasonable and necessary precautions to prevent the loss, damage, disclosure, modification, or unauthorised use of their Private Key (to include password, Token or other activation data used to control access to the Private Key); and (2) exercise

sole and complete control and use of the Private Key that corresponds to their Public Key.

6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards And Controls

The cryptographic modules used by the DigiCert Europe PKI are validated to provide at least FIPS 140-2 Level 3, FIPS 140-3 Level 3 and/or Common Criteria EAL 4 security standards in both the generation and the maintenance in all Root and Issuing CA Private Keys.

CH EU	<p>For EU Qualified Certificates of type QCP-n-qscd or QCP-l-qscd, the Subscriber Private Keys are generated and stored on a QSCD which meets the requirements laid down in Annex II of the eIDAS Regulation and is certified to the appropriate standards.</p> <p>For Swiss Qualified Certificates of type QCP-n-qscd, and Swiss Regulated Certificates, the Subscriber Private Keys are generated and stored on a QSCD. In some cases, DigiCert Europe generates and manages Private Keys on behalf of the Subscriber and operates the QSCD in accordance with Annex II of the eIDAS Regulation. This will be signified by the presence of the 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.410 OID in Certificate policies. See also Section 10.1.1.</p>
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DigiCert Europe must verify that QSCDs are certified as a QSCD in accordance requirements laid down in Annex II of the eIDAS Regulation. DigiCert Europe must monitor this certification status and take appropriate measures if the certification status of a QSCD changes. The QSCD certification status and evidence of the DigiCert Europe monitoring are in scope of the external eIDAS/ETSI conformity assessments.

For Code Signing Certificates, Subscribers must generate and protect Private Keys:

- Using a cryptographic module certified to FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+; or
- Using cloud-based generation and protection solution as defined in Section 16.3.1 of the Code Signing Baseline Requirements; or
- Using signing service as defined in Section 16.2 of the Code Signing Baseline Requirements.

6.2.2. Private Key (N out of M) Multi-Person Control

DigiCert Europe's authentication mechanisms are protected securely when not in use and may only be accessed by actions of multiple trusted persons. Backups of CA Private Keys are securely stored and require two-person access. Re-activation of a backed-up CA Private Key (unwrapping) requires the same security and multi-person control as when performing other sensitive CA Private Key operations.

6.2.3. Private Key Escrow

DigiCert Europe does not escrow its CA signature keys. DigiCert Europe may provide escrow services for end entity Subscriber Certificates in order to provide key recovery as described in Section 4.12.1.

6.2.4. Private Key Backup

DigiCert Europe CA Private Keys are generated and operated inside cryptographic modules which have been evaluated to at least FIPS 140-2 Level 3. When keys are transferred to other media for backup and disaster recovery purposes, the keys are transferred and stored in an encrypted form. DigiCert Europe's CA Key Pairs are backed up by multiple trusted individuals using a cryptographic hardware device as part of scripted key backup process.

DigiCert Europe may provide backup services for Private Keys that are not required to be kept on a hardware device. Access to back up Certificates is protected in a manner that only the Subscriber can control the Private Key. Backed up keys are never stored in a plain text form outside of the cryptographic module. Copies of CA Private Keys are subject to at least the same level of security controls as keys currently in use.

6.2.5. Private Key Archival

DigiCert Europe does not archive CA Certificate Private Keys.

6.2.6. Private Key Transfer Into or From a Cryptographic Module

All CA keys must be generated by and in a cryptographic module. Private Keys are exported from the cryptographic module into backup tokens only for HSM transfer, offline storage, and backup purposes. The Private Keys are encrypted when transferred out of the module and never exist in plaintext form. When transported between cryptographic modules, DigiCert Europe encrypts the Private Key and protects the keys used for encryption from disclosure. Private Keys used to encrypt backups are securely stored and require two-person access. If DigiCert Europe becomes aware that an Issuing CA's Private Key has been communicated to an unauthorised person or an organisation not affiliated with the Issuing CA, then DigiCert Europe will revoke all Certificates that include the Public Key corresponding to the communicated Private Key.

If DigiCert Europe pre-generates Private Keys and transfers them into a hardware token, for example transferring generated end-entity Subscriber Private Keys into a smart card, it will securely transfer such Private Keys into the token to the extent necessary to prevent loss, theft, modification, unauthorised disclosure, or unauthorised use of such Private Keys.

6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module

All CA Private Keys are stored on a cryptographic module which has been evaluated to at least FIPS 140-2 level 3, FIPS 140-3 level 3, or an appropriate Common Criteria Protection Profile or Security Target, EAL 4 (or higher), which includes requirements to protect the Private Key and other assets against known threats. Root CA Private Keys are stored offline in cryptographic modules or backup tokens as described above in Sections 6.2.2, 6.2.4, and 6.2.6.

6.2.8. Method of Activating Private Key

DigiCert Europe's Private Keys are activated according to the specifications of the HSM manufacturer. Activation data entry is protected from disclosure. Subscribers are solely responsible for protecting their Private Keys in a manner commensurate with the Certificate type. Subscribers should use a strong password or equivalent authentication method to prevent

unauthorised access or use of the Subscriber Private Key. When deactivated, Private Keys shall be kept in encrypted form only and secured. At a minimum, Subscribers are required to authenticate themselves to the cryptographic module before activating their Private Keys.

6.2.9. Method of Deactivating Private Key

DigiCert Europe's Private Keys are deactivated via manual and passive logout procedures on the applicable HSM device when not in use. DigiCert Europe never leaves its HSM devices in an active unlocked or unattended state.

Subscribers should deactivate their Private Keys via logout and removal procedures when not in use.

6.2.10. Method of Destroying Private Key

DigiCert Europe personnel, acting in trusted roles, destroy CA, RA, and status server Private Keys when no longer needed. Subscribers shall destroy their Private Keys when the corresponding Certificate is revoked or expired or if the Private Key is no longer needed.

DigiCert Europe may destroy a Private Key by deleting it from all known storage partitions. DigiCert Europe also zeroises the HSM device and associated backup tokens according to the specifications of the hardware manufacturer. This reinitialises the device and overwrites the data with binary zeros. If the zeroization or re-initialization procedure fails, DigiCert Europe will crush, shred, and/or incinerate the device in a manner that destroys the ability to extract any Private Key. Such destruction shall be documented.

6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating

The cryptographic modules used by the DigiCert Europe PKI are validated to at least FIPS 140-2 Level 3 and/or Common Criteria EAL 4 security standards or higher.

CH EU	<p>For EU Qualified Certificates of type QCP-n-qscd or QCP-l-qscd, the Subscriber Private Keys are generated and stored on a QSCD which meets the requirements laid down in Annex II of the eIDAS Regulation and is certified to the appropriate standards.</p> <p>For Swiss Qualified Certificates of type QCP-n-qscd, and Swiss Regulated Certificates, the Subscriber Private Keys are generated and stored on a QSCD.</p> <p>In some cases, DigiCert Europe generates and manages Private Keys on behalf of the Subscriber and operates the QSCD in accordance with Annex II of the eIDAS Regulation. This will be signified by the presence of the 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.410 OID in Certificate policies. See also Section 10.1.1.</p>
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6.3. OTHER ASPECTS OF KEY PAIR MANAGEMENT

6.3.1. Public Key Archival

DigiCert Europe archives copies of Public Keys in accordance with section 5.5.

6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods

The maximum validity periods for Certificates issued within the DigiCert Europe PKI are:

Type	Certificate Term
Publicly-trusted Root CAs	25 years
Publicly-trusted Issuing CAs	15 years
Qualified Certificates for Electronic Signature and Electronic Seal	12 to 36 months
TLS Certificates including Qualified Web Authentication Certificates (QEVCP-w)	398 days
S/MIME Certificates	825 days
Code Signing Certificates	39 months

For the purpose of calculations, a day is measured as 86,400 seconds. Any amount of time greater than this, including fractional seconds and/or leap seconds, represents an additional day. For the purposes of calculating time periods in this document, increments are rounded down subject to the imposed maximum requirements listed in Section 1.1 as applicable.

Relying Parties may still validate signatures generated with these keys after expiration of the Certificate.

DigiCert Europe may voluntarily retire its CA Private Keys before the periods listed above to accommodate key changeover processes. DigiCert Europe does not issue Subscriber Certificates with an expiration date that exceeds the Issuing CA's Public Key term or that exceeds the routine re-key identification requirements specified in Section 3.1.1.

6.3.2.1. Reduced Validity for TLS Certificates

Subscriber Certificates issued before 15 March 2026 should not have a Validity Period greater than 397 days and must not have a Validity Period greater than 398 days.

Subscriber Certificates issued on or after 15 March 2026 and before 15 March 2027 should not have a Validity Period greater than 199 days and must not have a Validity Period greater than 200 days.

Subscriber Certificates issued on or after 15 March 2027 and before 15 March 2029 should not have a Validity Period greater than 99 days and must not have a Validity Period greater than 100 days.

Subscriber Certificates issued on or after 15 March 2029 should not have a Validity Period greater than 46 days and must not have a Validity Period greater than 47 days.

6.4. ACTIVATION DATA

6.4.1. Activation Data Generation and Installation

DigiCert Europe activates the cryptographic module containing its CA Private Keys according to the specifications of the hardware manufacturer meeting the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 3 and/or Common Criteria EAL 4. The cryptographic hardware is held under two-person control as

explained in Section 5.2.2 and elsewhere in this CP/CPS. DigiCert Europe will only transmit activation data via an appropriately protected channel and at a time and place that is distinct from the delivery of the associated cryptographic module.

DigiCert Europe personnel and Subscribers are instructed to use strong passwords and to protect PINs and passwords that meet the requirements specified by the CA/Browser Forum's Network Security Requirements and other relevant standards.

6.4.2. Activation Data Protection

If activation data must be transmitted, it shall be via a channel of appropriate protection, and distinct in time and place from the associated Cryptographic Module. PINs may be supplied to Users in two portions using different delivery methods, for example by e-mail and by standard post, to provide increased security against third-party interception of the PIN.

Activation Data should be memorised, not written down. Activation Data must never be shared. Activation data must not consist solely of information that could be easily guessed, e.g., a Subscriber's personal information.

6.4.3. Other Aspects of Activation Data

Where a PIN is used, the User is required to enter the PIN and identification details such as their Distinguished Name before they are able to access and install their Keys and Certificates.

6.5. COMPUTER SECURITY CONTROLS

DigiCert Europe has a formal Information Security Policy that documents the DigiCert Europe policies, standards and guidelines relating to information security. This Information Security Policy has been approved by management and is communicated to all employees.

6.5.1. Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements

DigiCert Europe secures its CA systems and authenticates and protects communications between its systems and trusted roles. DigiCert Europe's CA servers and support-and-vetting workstations run on trustworthy systems that are configured and hardened using industry best practices. All CA systems are scanned for malicious code and protected against spyware and viruses. Inactivity log out timeframes are set and enforced through internal information security policies and procedures to ensure security.

RAs must ensure that the systems maintaining RA software and data files are trustworthy systems secure from unauthorised access, which can be demonstrated by compliance with audit criteria applicable under Section 5.4.1.

RAs must logically separate access to these systems and this information from other components. This separation prevents access except through defined processes. RAs must use firewalls to protect the network from internal and external intrusion and limit the nature and source of activities that may access such systems and information. RAs must require the use of passwords with a minimum character length and a combination of alphanumeric and special characters.

DigiCert Europe's CA systems are configured to:

1. Authenticate the identity of users before permitting access to the system or applications;
2. Manage the privileges of users and limit users to their assigned roles;
3. Generate and archive audit records for all transactions;
4. Enforce domain integrity boundaries for security critical processes; and
5. Support recovery from key or system failure.

All Certificate Status Servers:

1. Authenticate the identity of users before permitting access to the system or applications;
2. Manage privileges to limit users to their assigned roles;
3. Enforce domain integrity boundaries for security critical processes; and
4. Support recovery from key or system failure.

DigiCert Europe enforces multi-factor authentication on any Portal account capable of directly causing Certificate issuance.

6.5.2. Computer Security Rating

No stipulation.

6.6. LIFE CYCLE TECHNICAL CONTROLS

6.6.1. System Development Controls

DigiCert Europe has mechanisms in place to control and monitor the acquisition and development of its CA systems. Change requests require the approval of at least one administrator who is different from the person submitting the request. DigiCert Europe only installs software on CA systems if the software is part of the CA's operation. CA hardware and software are dedicated to performing operations of the CA.

Vendors are selected based on their reputation in the market, ability to deliver quality product, and likelihood of remaining viable in the future. Management is involved in the vendor selection and purchase decision process. Non-PKI hardware and software is purchased without identifying the purpose for which the component will be used. All hardware and software are shipped under standard conditions to ensure delivery of the component directly to a trusted employee who ensures that the equipment is installed without opportunity for tampering.

Some of the PKI software components used by DigiCert Europe are developed in-house or by consultants using standard software development methodologies. All such software is designed and developed in a controlled environment and subjected to quality assurance review. Other software is purchased commercial off-the-shelf (COTS). Quality assurance is maintained throughout the process through testing and documentation or by purchasing from trusted vendors as discussed above.

Updates of equipment and software are purchased or developed in the same manner as the original

equipment or software and are installed and tested by trusted and trained personnel. All hardware and software essential to DigiCert Europe's operations is scanned for malicious code on first use and periodically thereafter.

If the CA uses Linting software developed by third parties, it should monitor for updated versions of that software and plan for updates no later than 3 months from the release of the update.

6.6.2. Security Management Controls

DigiCert Europe has mechanisms in place to control and continuously monitor the security-related configurations of its CA systems. The maximum interval between consecutive checks of CA systems for compliance, integrity, and security is six (6) months.

When loading software onto a CA system, DigiCert Europe verifies that the software is the correct version and is supplied by the vendor free of any modifications.

6.6.3. Life Cycle Security Controls

No stipulation.

6.7. NETWORK SECURITY CONTROLS

DigiCert Europe CA and RA functions are performed using networks secured in accordance with the standards documented in the CP/CPS to prevent unauthorised access, tampering, and denial-of-service attacks. Communications of sensitive information shall be protected using point-to-point encryption for confidentiality and Digital Signatures for non-repudiation and authentication.

DigiCert Europe documents and controls the configuration of its systems, including any upgrades or modifications made. DigiCert Europe's CA system is connected to one internal network and is protected by firewalls and Network Address Translation for all internal IP addresses (e.g., 192.168.x.x). DigiCert Europe's customer support and vetting workstations are also protected by firewall(s) and only use internal IP addresses.

Root Keys are kept offline and brought online only when necessary to sign Certificate-issuing subordinate CAs, OCSP Responder Certificates, or periodic CRLs. Firewalls and boundary control devices are configured to allow access only by the addresses, ports, protocols and commands required for the trustworthy provision of PKI services by such systems.

Remediation timelines are governed by severity, with critical vulnerabilities addressed within 48 hours and high/medium issues resolved within 45 to 60 days. Exceptions are documented, assessed for risk, and recorded.

DigiCert Europe's security policy is to block all ports and protocols and open only ports necessary to enable CA functions. All CA equipment is configured with a minimum number of services and all unused network ports and services are disabled. DigiCert Europe's network configuration is available for review on-site by its auditors and consultants under an appropriate non-disclosure agreement.

6.8. TIME-STAMPING

See Section 5.5.5.

In addition, DigiCert Europe provides Time-Stamp Authority (TSA) services for use with specific DigiCert Europe products such as Qualified Electronic Signatures or Code Signing Certificates.

The DigiCert Europe Time-Stamp Policy/Practice Statement is structured in accordance with ETSI EN 319 421 and should be read in conjunction with this CP/CPS.

7. CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES

DigiCert Europe uses the ITU X.509, version 3 standard to construct Certificates. DigiCert Europe adds certain Certificate extensions to the basic Certificate structure for the purposes intended by X.509v3 as per Amendment 1 to ISO/IEC 9594-8, 1995. See Appendix A.

For publicly-trusted TLS Certificates, DigiCert Europe meets the technical requirements set forth in Sections 2.2, 6.1.5, and 6.1.6 of the TLS BR or S/MIME BR (as applicable) and this CP/CPS.

DigiCert Europe generates non-sequential Certificate serial numbers (positive numbers greater than zero) that contain at least 64 bits of output from a CSPRNG.

7.1. CERTIFICATE PROFILE

The table below describes the basic fields that may be included in DigiCert Europe Certificates. Refer to Appendix A for additional Certificate contents that are specific to the individual Certificate Profiles.

7.1.1. Version Number(s)

All Certificates are X.509 version 3 Certificates.

7.1.2. Certificate Extensions

The extensions defined for X.509 v3 Certificates provide methods for associating additional attributes with users or Public Keys and for managing relationships between CAs. See Appendix A.

For Root CA, Subordinate CA, and Subscriber Certificates used for publicly-trusted Certificates, DigiCert Europe abides by the relevant Baseline Requirements and configures the Certificate extensions to those requirements.

Subordinate CA Certificates for publicly-trusted Certificates, with the exception of cross-certificates that share a Private Key with a corresponding Root Certificate, will contain an EKU extension, and cannot include the anyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeId. DigiCert Europe no longer includes both the id-kp-serverAuth and id-kp-emailProtection KeyPurposeIds in the same Certificate.

For TLS Certificates, the subjectAltName extension is populated in accordance with RFC 5280 with the authenticated value in the Common Name field of the subject DN (domain name or public IP address). The SubjectAltName extension may contain additional authenticated domain names or public IP addresses. The name forms and extensions will abide by Section 7.1.4 of this CP/CPS and the TLS BR.

For internationalised domain names, the Common Name is represented as a puny-code value and that Common Name will be represented in the Subject Alternative Name extension as a puny-coded A-label value. These different encodings of the same name are treated as equal values for the purposes of Common Name to Subject Alternative Name duplication requirements.

For S/MIME Certificates, the subjectAltName extension must include at least one GeneralName entry Rfc822Name and/or an otherName of type id-on-SmtpUTF8Mailbox, encoded in accordance

with RFC 8398. All Mailbox Addresses in the Subject or SAN entries of type dirName are repeated as Rfc822Name and/or an otherName of type id-on-SmtpUTF8Mailbox in the SAN.

DigiCert Europe's Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificates include an Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension specifying all extended key usages for which the Subordinate CA Certificate is authorised to issue Certificates. The anyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeId does not appear in the EKU extension of publicly-trusted Certificates.

7.1.3. Algorithm Object Identifiers

DigiCert Europe Certificates are signed using one of the following algorithms or others as approved in accordance with Section 1.1:

Algorithm	OID
sha256WithRSAEncryption	[iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 11]
sha384WithRSAEncryption	[iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 12]
sha512WithRSAEncryption	[iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) sha512WithRSAEncryption(13)]
ecdsa-with-SHA256	[iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2]
ecdsa-with-SHA384	[iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3]
id-RSASSA-PSS	[iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) rsassa-pss(10)]

Issuing CAs shall not issue Certificates with SHA-1 as an algorithm.

RSASSA-PSS is not used for TLS Certificates and specifies the SHA-256 hash algorithm (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1) as a parameter. For all other RSA algorithms the parameters field is NULL.

DigiCert Europe and Subscribers may generate Key Pairs using the following:

Algorithm	OID
id-dsa	[iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9cm(4) 1]
RsaEncryption	[iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 1]
Dhpublicnumber	[iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x942(10046) number-type(2) 1]
id-keyExchangeAlgorithm	[joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) algorithms(1) 22]
id-ecPublicKey	[iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) id-publicKeyType(2) 1]

Elliptic curve Public Keys submitted to DigiCert Europe for inclusion in end entity Certificates should be based on NIST "Suite B" curves.

As described in Section 1.2, DigiCert Europe uses the Key and hash algorithms specified in the

relevant CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements. See also Appendix A.

7.1.4. Name Forms

Each Certificate includes a serial number that is unique to the Issuing CA. Optional subfields in the subject of a TLS Certificate must either contain information verified by DigiCert Europe or be left empty. TLS Server Certificates cannot contain metadata such as ‘.’, ‘-’ and ‘ ’ characters and/or any other indication that the value/field is absent, incomplete, or not applicable.

DigiCert Europe does not issue publicly-trusted TLS Certificates to a Reserved IP address or Internal Name, and does not issue publicly-trusted TLS or S/MIME Certificates with an OU attribute.

For CA Certificates, the commonName attribute is present contains an identifier that uniquely identifies the CA and distinguishes it from other CAs. Certificates are populated with the Issuer Name and Subject Distinguished Name required under Section 3.1.1. Issuer DNs meet the requirements in the relevant CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements.

The contents of EV Certificates meet the requirements in Section 9 of the EV Guidelines.

The contents of S/MIME Certificates are validated according to Section 3 of this CP/CPS and the S/MIME Baseline Requirements. Enterprise RAs may include optional attributes in the Certificate as specified in Section 7.1.4.2.5 of the S/MIME BR and are responsible for validating them in accordance with Section 3.

See also Appendix A.

7.1.5. Name Constraints

DigiCert Europe may use nameConstraints when appropriate. For publicly-trusted Certificates, DigiCert Europe follows the requirements of Section 7.1.5 of the TLS BR and the S/MIME BR as relevant.

7.1.5.1. Name-Constrained serverAuth CAs

If the technically constrained Issuing CA Certificate includes the id=serverAuth EKU, then it includes the Name Constraints X.509v3 extension with constraints on dNSName, iPAAddress and DirectoryName as follows:

1. For each dNSName in permittedSubtrees, DigiCert Europe confirms that the Applicant has registered the dNSName or has been authorised by the domain registrant to act on the registrant’s behalf in line with the verification practices of TLS BR Section 3.2.2.4.
2. For each iPAAddress range in permittedSubtrees, DigiCert Europe confirms that the Applicant has been assigned the iPAAddress range or has been authorised by the assigner to act on the assignee’s behalf.
3. For each DirectoryName in permittedSubtrees DigiCert Europe confirms the Applicant’s and/or Subsidiary’s Organisational name(s) and location(s) such that end entity Certificates issued from the Issuing CA will comply with Section 7.1.2.4 and 7.1.2.5 of the TLS BR.

If the Issuing CA is not allowed to issue Certificates with an iPAAddress, then the Issuing CA

Certificate specifies the entire IPv4 and IPv6 address ranges in excludedSubtrees. The Issuing CA Certificate includes within excludedSubtrees an ipAddress GeneralName of 8 zero octets (covering the IPv4 address range of 0.0.0.0/0). The Issuing CA Certificate also includes within excludedSubtrees an ipAddress GeneralName of 32 zero octets (covering the IPv6 address range of ::0/0). Otherwise, the Issuing CA Certificate includes at least one ipAddress in permittedSubtrees.

If the Issuing CA is not allowed to issue Certificates with dNSNames, then the Issuing CA Certificate includes a zero-length dNSName in excludedSubtrees. Otherwise, the Issuing CA Certificate includes at least one dNSName in permittedSubtrees.

7.1.5.2. Name-Constrained emailProtection CAs

If the technically constrained Issuing CA includes the id-kp-emailProtection EKU, it also includes the Name Constraints X.509v3 extension with constraints on rfc822Name, with at least one name in permittedSubtrees, each such name having its ownership validated according to Section 7.1.5 of the S/MIME BR.

7.1.6. Certificate Policy Object Identifier

An object identifier (OID) is a unique number that identifies an object or policy. Certificate Policy OIDs that incorporate this CP/CPS into different Certificate Profiles are listed in Appendix A.

7.1.7. Usage Of Policy Constraints Extension

Not applicable.

7.1.8. Policy Qualifiers Syntax and Semantics

DigiCert Europe Certificates may include a brief statement in the Policy Qualifier field of the Certificate Policy extension to inform potential Relying Parties on notice of the limitations of liability and other Terms and Conditions on the use of the Certificate, including those contained in this CP/CPS, which are incorporated by reference into the Certificate.

7.1.9. Processing Semantics for the Critical Certificate Policies Extension

No stipulation.

7.2. CRL PROFILE

DigiCert Europe CRL profile conforms to RFC 5280. For TLS revocations, the CRL profile conforms to the TLS BR.

7.2.1. Version number(s)

CRLs must be version 2 CRLs that conform to RFC5280.

7.2.2. CRL and CRL Entry Extensions

CRLs must use CRL extensions that conform to RFC 5280 and other requirements as applicable. CRLs containing revocation information about TLS Certificates conform to the TLS BR.

Extension	Value
CRL Number	Never repeated monotonically increasing integer
Authority Key Identifier	Subject Key Identifier of the CRL issuer Certificate
Invalidity Date	Optional date in UTC format
Reason Code	Reason for revocation as described in Section 7.2
Issuing Distribution Point	Configured per RFC 5280 requirements, if included.

If a CRL entry reasonCode extension is present, the reason must indicate the appropriate reason for revocation of the Certificate.

If a CRL entry is for a Root CA or Subordinate CA Certificate, including Cross Certificates, the reasonCode extension shall be present and must not be unspecified (0) or certificateHold(6).

Certificates may be revoked with one of the following reason codes. The codes are arranged in order of preference and in cases where multiple reason codes are applicable the code of highest preference should be used. cACompromise or aACompromise shall be used to indicate key compromise of Certificate Authority (CA) or Attribute Authority (AA) Certificates respectively.

Table 1. Revocation Reason Code Usage by Certificate Type

Code	Description	TLS Permitted	S/MIME Permitted	Code-Signing Permitted	All Others Permitted
0	Unspecified; If permitted, the reasonCode extension should just be omitted	Yes, but not for CA Certificates	Yes, but not for CA Certificates	Yes	Yes
1	keyCompromise	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2	cACompromise	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
10	aACompromise	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
9	privilegeWithdrawn	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
5	cessationOfOperation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
3	affiliationChanged	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4	superseded	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
6	certificateHold	No	No, as per TLS BR	No, as per TLS BR	No, as per TLS BR
7	Value 7 is not used	No	No	No	No
8	removeFromCRL	No	No	No	No

7.2.2.1. CRL reasonCode Extension Entries

The following is a description of each of these reason codes and circumstances where DigiCert Europe or a Subscriber will be obligated to use it for their revocation circumstances:

7.2.2.1.1. keyCompromise

The CRLReason keyCompromise is used if:

- DigiCert Europe obtains verifiable evidence that the Certificate Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the public key in the Certificate suffered a key compromise; or
- DigiCert Europe is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Certificate Subscriber's Private Key to compromise; or
- There is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed; or
- DigiCert Europe is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can easily compute the Certificate Subscriber's Private Key based on the public key in the Certificate (such as a Debian weak key, see <https://wiki.debian.org/TLSkeys>); or
- The Certificate Subscriber requests that DigiCert Europe revoke the Certificate for this reason, with the scope of revocation being described below.

If DigiCert Europe obtains verifiable evidence of Private Key compromise for a Certificate whose CRL entry does not contain a reasonCode extension or has a reasonCode extension with a non-keyCompromise reason, DigiCert Europe may update the CRL entry to enter keyCompromise as the CRLReason in the reasonCode extension. Additionally, DigiCert Europe may update the revocation date in a CRL entry when it is determined that the Private Key of the Certificate was compromised prior to the revocation date that is indicated in the CRL entry for that Certificate.

7.2.2.1.2. privilegeWithdrawn

The CRLReason privilegeWithdrawn is used for Subscriber-side infractions that do not compromise the Certificate's Private Key, such as when the Certificate Subscriber provided misleading information in their Certificate request or has breached a non-waived breach of the Subscriber agreement or terms of use.

CRLReason privilegeWithdrawn is used when:

- DigiCert Europe obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused; or
- DigiCert Europe is made aware that the Certificate Subscriber has violated one or more of its material obligations under the Subscriber agreement or terms of use; or
- DigiCert Europe is made aware that a wildcard Certificate has been used to authenticate a fraudulently misleading subordinate fully-qualified domain name; or
- DigiCert Europe is made aware of a material change in the information contained in the Certificate; or
- DigiCert Europe determines or is made aware that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate; or
- DigiCert Europe is made aware that the original Certificate request was not authorised and that

the Subscriber does not retroactively grant authorisation.

7.2.2.1.3. cessationOfOperation

The CRLReason cessationOfOperation is used when a website with the Certificate is shut down prior to the expiration of the Certificate or the Subscriber no longer owns or controls the domain name in the Certificate.

CRLReason cessationOfOperation is used when:

- The Certificate Subscriber will no longer be using the Certificate because they are discontinuing their website; or
- DigiCert Europe is made aware of any circumstance indicating that use of a fully-qualified domain name or IP address in the Certificate is no longer legally permitted (e.g. a court or arbitrator has revoked a domain name registrant's right to use the domain name, a relevant licensing or services agreement between the domain name registrant and the applicant has terminated, or the domain name registrant has failed to renew the domain name).
- The Certificate Subscriber has requested that their Certificate be revoked for this reason; or
- DigiCert Europe received verifiable evidence that the Certificate Subscriber no longer controls, or is no longer authorised to use, all of the domain names in the Certificate.

Otherwise, the cessationOfOperation CRLReason is not used.

7.2.2.1.4. affiliationChanged

CRLReason affiliationChanged indicates that the subject's name or other subject identity information in the Certificate has changed but there is no evidence that the Certificate's Private Key was compromised.

CRLReason affiliationChanged is used when:

- The Certificate Subscriber has requested that their Certificate be revoked for this reason; or
- DigiCert Europe replaced the Certificate due to changes in the Certificate's subject information and the CA has not replaced the Certificate for the other reasons: keyCompromise, superseded, cessationOfOperation, or privilegeWithdrawn.

Otherwise, the affiliationChanged CRLReason must not be used.

7.2.2.1.5. superseded

The CRLReason superseded is used when:

- The Certificate Subscriber has requested a new Certificate to replace an existing Certificate; or
- DigiCert Europe obtains reasonable evidence that the validation of domain authorisation or control for any fully-qualified domain name or IP address in the Certificate should not be relied upon; or
- DigiCert Europe revoked the Certificate for compliance reasons such as the Certificate does not comply with the DigiCert Europe Public Trust CP/CPS, the CA/B Forum's Baseline Requirements,

or the Mozilla Root Store Policy. Unless the keyCompromise CRLReason is being used, the CRLReason superseded must be used when:

- The Certificate Subscriber has requested that their Certificate be revoked for this reason; or
- DigiCert Europe revoked the Certificate due to domain authorisation or compliance issues other than those related to keyCompromise or privilegeWithdrawn.

Otherwise, the superseded CRLReason is not used.

7.3. OCSF PROFILE

7.3.1. Version Number(s)

The DigiCert Europe OCSF Responders conform to version 1, as defined by RFC 6960. If an OCSF response is for a Root CA or Issuing CA, including Cross Certificates, and that Certificate has been revoked, the revocationReason field within the RevokedInfo of the CertStatus is present and asserted.

OCSF Responder Certificates have a maximum validity of 12 months.

7.3.2. OCSF Extensions

The singleExtensions of an OCSF response cannot contain the reasonCode (OID 2.5.29.21) CRL entry extension.

7.4. CERTIFICATE FIELDS AND ROOT CA CERTIFICATE HASHES

7.4.1. Certificate Fields

7.4.2. DigiCert Europe Root Certificate Hashes

Note that all DigiCert Europe CA Certificates and CRLs are available for download from the DigiCert Europe Repository at <https://www.digicert.com/legal-repository/europe>.

7.4.2.1. G1 and G3 Roots

QuoVadis Root CA 1 G3

Field	Certificate Profile
Serial Number	78585F2EAD2C194BE3370735341328B596D46593
SHA-256 Fingerprint	8A866FD1B276B57E578E921C65828A2BED58E9F2F288054134B7F1F4BFC9CC74
Valid To	Jan 12, 2042

QuoVadis Root CA 2

Field	Certificate Profile
Serial Number	0509
SHA-256 Fingerprint	85A0DD7DD720ADB7FF05F83D542B209DC7FF4528F7D677B18389FEA5E5C49E86
Valid To	Nov 24, 2031

QuoVadis Root CA 2 G3

Field	Certificate Profile
Serial Number	445734245B81899B35F2CEB82B3B5BA726F07528
SHA-256 Fingerprint	8FE4FB0AF93A4D0D67DB0BEBB23E37C71BF325DCBCDD240EA04DAF58B47E1840
Valid To	Jan 12, 2042

QuoVadis Root CA 3

Field	Certificate Profile
Serial Number	05C6
SHA-256 Fingerprint	18F1FC7F205DF8ADDDEB7FE007DD57E3AF375A9C4D8D73546BF4F1FED1E18D35
Valid To	Nov 24, 2031

QuoVadis Root CA 3 G3

Field	Certificate Profile
Serial Number	2EF59B0228A7DB7AFFD5A3A9EEBD03A0CF126A1D
SHA-256 Fingerprint	88EF81DE202EB018452E43F864725CEA5FBD1FC2D9D205730709C5D8B8690F46
Valid To	Jan 12, 2042

7.4.2.2. G4 Roots

QuoVadisClientECCP384RootG4

Field	Certificate Profile
Serial Number	1561345225c6de0a833890c40560cc7a0f9e02aa

Field	Certificate Profile
SHA-256 Fingerprint	d3c07ac44bd8ff1975bc62f1c7e9840ea8e188a4ba51133b8c4eff05e34a2729
Valid To	Mar 9, 2048

QuoVadisClientRSA4096RootG4

Field	Certificate Profile
Serial Number	7b9b8e6f11c9e13db7cb9beb3920b4ca3566f648
SHA-256 Fingerprint	80ac91fa891c79723a61abc77f86e19905a92da27e51695ca0c0b66c1c039bf2
Valid To	Mar 9, 2048

QuoVadisPrivateTLSECCP384RootG4

Field	Certificate Profile
Serial Number	1f1acc18f4b3f2303af4053a88af89f413c598df
SHA-256 Fingerprint	b421fee95c6d9f034e89cf51e92f4a54eb9ecc15757008179f9ef0a417b76317
Valid To	Mar 9, 2048

QuoVadisPrivateTLRSA4096RootG4

Field	Certificate Profile
Serial Number	1ca30d76a478fe3d12e2024e11cf06fa83b64775
SHA-256 Fingerprint	a20fe0b76eed3d700661e24ee8619c08bf989716a50ce911c2cea354a9cfbf8b
Valid To	Mar 9, 2048

QuoVadisSigningECCP384RootG4

Field	Certificate Profile
Serial Number	35dceaa8f16e77a5ddfc16ad369c34bd1545ce29
SHA-256 Fingerprint	771535d43d4633bd307eb7b8a3966b5df00707c088089920080c1ae6d3cb0f68
Valid To	Mar 9, 2048

QuoVadisSigningRSA4096RootG4

Field	Certificate Profile
Serial Number	0f1d1740690044943bad6b5eb487045759b0808d
SHA-256 Fingerprint	9f8e6db31e740285e0c2c2deb09e442bdd4e74bdeae2962bc82d1ecb9f39855
Valid To	Mar 9, 2048

QuoVadisSMIMECCP384RootG4

Field	Certificate Profile
Serial Number	35dceaa8f16e77a5ddfc16ad369c34bd1545ce29
SHA-256 Fingerprint	771535d43d4633bd307eb7b8a3966b5df00707c088089920080c1ae6d3cb0f68
Valid To	Mar 9, 2048

QuoVadisSMIMERSA4096RootG4

Field	Certificate Profile
Serial Number	0f1d1740690044943bad6b5eb487045759b0808d
SHA-256 Fingerprint	9f8e6db31e740285e0c2c2deb09e442bdd4e74bdeae2962bc82d1ecb9f39855
Valid To	Mar 9, 2048

QuoVadisTLSECCP384RootG4

Field	Certificate Profile
Serial Number	691b041f159f6e1c24d241c3e6e442ffc122899d
SHA-256 Fingerprint	6e1fd3ae0d2d477c8f5ee5f335cc5b6356872654e5356a73d8c0a30a17c252a2
Valid To	Mar 9, 2048

QuoVadisTLRSA4096RootG4

Field	Certificate Profile
Serial Number	025fe5839fb3aabdc3721eed699e7649ff6634fe
SHA-256 Fingerprint	c8a2d38a24f5ac302d8a08ebd38923d9a750b49220f092e82d1c53249e1533d0
Valid To	Mar 9, 2048

7.5. CERTIFICATE TRANSPARENCY

DigiCert Europe TLS Certificates may include Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCT) from independent CT Logs. Information on Certificate Transparency may be found in IETF RFC 6962.

8. COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS

8.1. FREQUENCY OR CIRCUMSTANCES OF ASSESSMENT

The practices in this CP/CPS are designed to meet or exceed the requirements of generally accepted industry standards, including the latest versions of the WebTrust Programs for CAs as required by the Mozilla Root Store policy and other programs and standards listed in Section 1.1 and 1.6.3.

Publicly available audit reports provided by Conformance Assessment Bodies responsible for these audits will be published at <https://www.digicert.com/webtrust-audits>. Compliance audits as carried out under these provisions may substitute for audits noted in this CP/CPS.

8.2. IDENTITY/QUALIFICATIONS OF ASSESSOR

WebTrust auditors must meet the requirements of Section 8.2 of the TLS BR, S/MIME BR, and Mozilla Root Store Policy as relevant. ETSI Conformance Assessment Bodies must meet the requirements of the relevant national accrediting authority. Auditors shall be experienced in performing information security audits, specifically having significant experience with PKI and cryptographic technologies.

8.3. ASSESSOR'S RELATIONSHIP TO ASSESSED ENTITY

DigiCert Europe and the auditors do not have any other relationship that would impair their independence and objectivity under Generally Accepted Auditing Standards. These relationships include financial, legal, social, or other relationships that could result in a conflict of interest.

8.4. TOPICS COVERED BY ASSESSMENT

Audits as applicable cover DigiCert Europe's business practices disclosure, the integrity of DigiCert Europe's PKI operations, and an Issuing CAs' compliance with this CP/CPS and referenced requirements. Audits verify that DigiCert Europe is compliant with the CP/CPS and applicable standards and regulatory requirements.

Each audit scheme used by DigiCert Europe incorporates periodic monitoring and/or accountability procedures to ensure that audits continue to be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the scheme.

8.5. ACTIONS TAKEN AS A RESULT OF DEFICIENCY

If an audit reports a material noncompliance with applicable law, this CP/CPS, or any other contractual obligations related to DigiCert Europe's services, then (i) the auditor will document the discrepancy, (ii) the auditor will promptly notify DigiCert Europe, and (iii) DigiCert Europe will

develop a plan to cure the noncompliance. DigiCert Europe will submit the plan to the DCPA for approval and to any third party that DigiCert Europe is legally obligated to satisfy. The DCPA may require additional action if necessary to rectify any significant issues created by the non-compliance, including requiring revocation of affected Certificates. DigiCert Europe is entitled to suspend and/or terminate services through revocation or other actions as deemed by the DCPA to address the non-compliant Issuing CA.

CH EU	For Qualified Certificates, the course of action and time frame for rectification of any deficiency as set by the relevant accrediting authority must be followed.
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8.6. COMMUNICATION OF RESULTS

The results of each audit are reported to the DCPA and to any third party entities which are entitled by law, regulation, or agreement to receive a copy of the audit results. The results of the most recent audits of DigiCert Europe are posted at <https://www.digicert.com/webtrust-audits> on an annual basis and within three months of completion.

8.7. SELF AUDITS

DigiCert Europe controls service quality by performing quarterly self-audits against a randomly selected sample of TLS and S/MIME Certificates, being no less than three percent of the Certificates issued.

DigiCert Europe may use a Linting process to verify the technical accuracy of Certificates within the selected sample set independently of previous Linting performed on the same Certificates.

Audits of other Certificate types will be at the discretion of DigiCert Europe to gain reasonable assurance of compliance to applicable requirements.

9. OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS

9.1. FEES

9.1.1. Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees

DigiCert Europe charges fees in connection to verification, certificate issuance and renewal. DigiCert Europe may change its pricing for future purchases fees at any time in accordance with the applicable customer agreement.

9.1.2. Certificate Access Fees

DigiCert Europe may charge a reasonable fee for access to its Certificate databases.

9.1.3. Revocation or Status Information Access Fees

DigiCert Europe does not charge a Certificate revocation fee or a fee for checking the validity status of an issued Certificate using a CRL. DigiCert Europe may charge a fee for providing customised CRLs, OCSP services, or other value-added revocation and status information services. DigiCert Europe does not permit access to revocation information, Certificate status information, or time stamping in their Repositories by third parties that provide products or services that utilise such Certificate status information without DigiCert Europe's prior express written consent.

9.1.4. Fees For Other Services

DigiCert Europe does not charge a fee for access to this CP/CPS. Any use made for purposes other than simply viewing the document, such as reproduction, redistribution, modification, or creation of derivative works, shall be subject to a license agreement with the entity holding the copyright to the document.

9.1.5. Refund Policy

DigiCert Europe or Issuing CAs under the DigiCert Europe hierarchy may establish a refund policy, details of which may be contained in relevant contractual agreements.

9.2. FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES

9.2.1. Insurance Coverage

DigiCert Europe maintains Commercial General Liability insurance with a policy limit of at least \$2 million in coverage and Professional Liability/Errors & Omissions insurance with a policy limit of at least \$5 million in coverage. Insurance is carried through companies rated no less than A- as to Policy Holder's Rating in the current edition of Best's Insurance Guide (or with an association of companies, each of the members of which are so rated).

CH	In accordance with ZertES, policy limits concerning Swiss Qualified Certificates are maintained in excess of CHF Two Million per occurrence and CHF Eight Million annual aggregate.
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9.2.2. Other Assets

No stipulation.

9.2.3. Insurance or Warranty Coverage For End-Entities

No stipulation.

9.2.4. Fiduciary Relationships

DigiCert Europe is not the agent, fiduciary or other representative of any Subscriber and/or Relying Party and must not be represented by the Subscriber and/or Relying Party to be so. Subscribers and/or Relying Parties have no authority to bind DigiCert Europe by contract or otherwise, to any obligation.

Participation in the DigiCert Europe PKI does not make any participant an agent, fiduciary, trustee, or other representative of any entity, legal or otherwise. Nothing contained in this DigiCert Europe CP/CPS or in any corresponding Subscriber or Relying Party Agreement shall be deemed to constitute DigiCert Europe, DigiCert Europe PKI Participants or any of their agents, directors, employees, consultants, suppliers, contractors, partners or Counterparties a fiduciary, endorser, promoter, agent, partner, representative, or Counterparty of any entity, and the use of or reliance upon Certificates or other forms of participation within the DigiCert Europe PKI is to be construed accordingly.

9.3. CONFIDENTIALITY OF BUSINESS INFORMATION

9.3.1. Scope of Confidential Information

DigiCert Europe keeps the following types of information confidential and maintains reasonable controls to prevent the exposure of such records to non-trusted personnel.

- Private Keys;
- Activation data used to access Private Keys or to gain access to the CA system;
- Business continuity, incident response, contingency, and disaster recovery plans;
- Other security practices used to protect the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information;
- Information held by DigiCert Europe as private information in accordance with Section 9.4;
- Audit logs and archive records; and
- Transaction records, financial audit records, and external or internal audit trail records and any audit reports (with the exception of an auditor's letter confirming the effectiveness of the controls set forth in this CP/CPS).

Any personal or corporate information held by Issuing CAs related to a Subscriber's application and the issuance of Certificates is considered confidential and will not be released without the prior consent of the relevant Holder, unless required otherwise by law or to fulfil the requirements of this DigiCert Europe CP/CPS.

There is no requirement to place a copy of any Private Key with any backup/recovery or escrow service. Under contract between an Issuing CA and a Subscriber or the Subscriber's Nominating RA, a copy of an entity's encryption Keys may be escrowed by DigiCert Europe for possible retrieval of encrypted information upon the loss or corruption of the original encryption Keys.

9.3.2. Information Not Within the Scope of Confidential Information

Information appearing in Certificates or stored in the Repository is considered public and not within the scope of confidential information, unless statutes or special agreements so dictate.

9.3.3. Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information

DigiCert Europe employees, agents, and contractors are responsible for protecting confidential information and are contractually obligated to do so. Employees receive training on how to handle confidential information.

9.4. PRIVACY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION

9.4.1. Privacy Plan

DigiCert Europe follows the Privacy Notices posted on its website when handling personal information. See <https://www.digicert.com/privacy-center> which also includes privacy information for Remote Identity Verification. Personal information is only disclosed when the disclosure is required by law or when requested by the subject of the personal information. Such privacy policies shall conform to applicable local privacy laws and regulations including the Council Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 and the Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection of June 19, 1992 (SR 235.1).

9.4.2. Information Treated as Private

DigiCert Europe treats all personal information about an individual that is not publicly available in the contents of a Certificate or CRL as private information. DigiCert Europe protects private information using appropriate safeguards and a reasonable degree of care.

9.4.3. Information Deemed Not Private

Certificates, CRLs, and personal or corporate information appearing in them are not considered private. This DigiCert Europe CP/CPS is a public document and is not confidential information and is not treated as private.

9.4.4. Responsibility to Protect Private Information

DigiCert Europe employees and contractors are expected to handle personal information in strict

confidence and meet the requirements of US and European law concerning the protection of personal data. DigiCert Europe will not divulge any private Subscriber information to any third party for any reason, unless compelled to do so by law or competent regulatory authority. All sensitive information is securely stored and protected against accidental disclosure.

9.4.5. Notice And Consent to Use Private Information

In the course of accepting a Certificate, individuals have agreed to allow their personal data submitted in the course of registration to be processed by and on behalf of DigiCert Europe, and used as explained in the registration process. They have also been given an opportunity to decline from having their personal data used for particular purposes. They have also agreed to let certain personal data appear in publicly accessible directories and be communicated to others.

9.4.6. Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process

If required by a legitimate and lawful judicial order or regulation that complies with requirements of this CP/CPS, DigiCert Europe may disclose private information without notice.

9.4.7. Other Information Disclosure Circumstances

No stipulation.

9.5. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

DigiCert Europe owns the intellectual property rights in DigiCert Europe's services, including the Certificates, trademarks and the Proprietary Marks used in providing the services, and this CP/CPS.

For the avoidance of doubt, external documents or electronic records signed or protected using DigiCert Europe Certificates are not considered to be DigiCert Europe documents for the purposes of this Section, nor is DigiCert Europe responsible for the content of those documents or records.

9.5.1. Property Rights in Certificates and Revocation Information

DigiCert Europe retains all intellectual property rights in and to the Certificates and revocation information that it issues. DigiCert Europe and customers shall grant permission to reproduce and distribute Certificates on a nonexclusive royalty-free basis, provided that they are reproduced in full and that use of Certificates is subject to the Relying Party Agreement referenced in the Certificate. DigiCert Europe, and customers shall grant permission to use revocation information to perform Relying Party functions subject to the applicable CRL usage agreement, Relying Party Agreement, or any other applicable agreements.

9.5.2. Property Rights in the CP/CPS

Issuing CAs acknowledge that DigiCert Europe retains all intellectual property rights in and to this CP/CPS.

9.5.3. Property Rights in Names

A Subscriber and/or Applicant retains all rights it has (if any) in any trademark, service mark, or trade name contained in any Certificate and Distinguished Name within any Certificate issued to such Subscriber or Applicant.

9.5.4. Property Rights in Keys and Key Material

Key Pairs corresponding to Certificates of CAs and end-user Subscribers are the property of DigiCert Europe and end-user Subscribers that are the respective Subjects of the Certificates, regardless of the physical medium within which they are stored and protected, and such persons retain all intellectual property rights in and to these Key Pairs. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, DigiCert Europe Root Public Keys and the Root CA Certificates containing them, including all Public Keys and self-signed Certificates, are the property of DigiCert Europe. DigiCert Europe licenses software and hardware manufacturers to reproduce such Root CA Certificates to place copies in trustworthy hardware devices or software.

9.5.5. Violation of Property Rights

Issuing CAs shall not knowingly violate the intellectual property rights of any third party.

9.6. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES

9.6.1. CA Representations and Warranties

By issuing a Certificate, DigiCert Europe represents and warrants that, during the period when the Certificate is valid, DigiCert Europe has complied with this CP/CPS in issuing and managing the Certificate to the parties listed below:

- The party to the relevant DigiCert Europe Subscriber Agreement and Terms of Use;
- All Relying Parties who reasonably rely on a Valid Certificate; and
- All Application Software Vendors with whom DigiCert Europe has entered into a contract for inclusion of its Root Certificate in software distributed by such Application Software Vendor.

DigiCert Europe discharges its obligations by:

- DigiCert Europe complies, in all material aspects, with this CP/CPS, and all applicable laws and regulations;
- DigiCert Europe publishes and updates CRLs and OCSP responses on a regular basis;
- All Certificates issued under this CP/CPS will be verified in accordance with this CP/CPS and meet the minimum requirements found herein and in the relevant CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements; and
- DigiCert Europe will maintain a Repository of public information on its website.

DigiCert Europe hereby warrants (i) it has taken reasonable steps to verify that the information contained in any Certificate is accurate at the time of issue (ii) Certificates shall be revoked if DigiCert Europe believes or is notified that the contents of the Certificate are no longer accurate, or

that the Private Key associated with a Certificate has been compromised in any way.

DigiCert Europe makes no other warranties, and all warranties, express or implied, statutory or otherwise, are excluded to the greatest extent permissible by applicable law, including without limitation all warranties as to merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. DigiCert Europe provides test Certificates for all types of Certificates.

9.6.2. RA Representations And Warranties

RAs represent and warrant that:

1. The RA's Certificate issuance and management services conform to the DigiCert Europe CP/CPS and applicable CA or RA Agreements;
2. Information provided by the RA does not contain any false or misleading information;
3. Reasonable steps are taken to verify that the information contained in any Certificate is accurate at the time of issue;
4. Translations performed by the RA are an accurate translation of the original information;
5. All Certificates requested by the RA meet the requirements of this CP/CPS and RA Agreement; and
6. The RA will request that Certificates be revoked by DigiCert Europe if they believe or are notified that the contents of the Certificate are no longer accurate, or that the key associated with a Certificate has been compromised in any way.

DigiCert Europe's RA Agreement may contain additional representations. Subscriber Agreements may include additional representations and warranties.

9.6.3. Subscriber Representations And Warranties

Prior to being issued and receiving a Certificate, Subscribers are solely responsible for any misrepresentations they make to third parties and for all transactions that use Subscriber's Private Key, regardless of whether such use was authorised. Subscribers are required to notify DigiCert Europe and any applicable RA if a change occurs that could affect the status of the Certificate.

DigiCert Europe requires, as part of the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use, that the Applicant make the commitments and warranties in this Section for the benefit of DigiCert Europe and all Relying Parties and Application Software Vendors. This may take the form of either:

1. The Applicant's agreement to the Subscriber Agreement with DigiCert Europe; or
2. The Applicant's acknowledgement of the Terms of Use.

Subscribers represent to DigiCert Europe, Application Software Vendors, and Relying Parties that, for each Certificate, the Subscriber will:

- Securely generate its Private Keys and protect its Private Keys from compromise, and exercise sole and complete control and use of its Private Keys;
- Provide accurate and complete information when communicating with DigiCert Europe, and to respond to DigiCert Europe's instructions concerning Key Compromise or Certificate misuse;

- Confirm the accuracy of the Certificate data prior to installing or using the Certificate;
- For Qualified Certificates (a) if the policy requires the use of a QSCD, Electronic Signatures must only be created by a QSCD, (b) in the case of natural persons, the Private Key should only be used for Electronic Signatures, and (c) in the case of legal persons, the Private Key must be maintained and used under the control of the Subscriber and it should only be used for Electronic Seals.
- Promptly (a) request revocation of a Certificate, cease using it and its associated Private Key, and notify DigiCert Europe if there is any actual or suspected misuse or compromise of the Private Key associated with the Public Key included in the Certificate, and (b) request revocation of the Certificate, and cease using it, if any information in the Certificate is or becomes incorrect or inaccurate;
- For Remote Identity Verification, use the identity proofing software distributed by DigiCert Europe. The Subscriber is obliged to agree with the processing of biometric data for identity verification purposes during Remote Identity Verification;
- Ensure that individuals using Certificates on behalf of an organisation have received security training appropriate to the Certificate;
- Use the Certificate only for authorised and legal purposes, consistent with the Certificate purpose, this CP/CPS, and the relevant Subscriber Agreement, including only installing TLS Server Certificates on servers accessible at the Domain listed in the Certificate and not using Code Signing Certificates to sign malicious code or any code that is downloaded without a user's consent; and
- Promptly cease using the Certificate and related Private Key after the Certificate's expiration or revocation, or in the event that DigiCert Europe notifies the Subscriber that the DigiCert Europe PKI has been compromised.

Subscriber Agreements may include additional representations and warranties.

9.6.4. Relying Party Representations And Warranties

Relying parties are required to act in accordance with this CP/CPS and the Relying Party Agreement. A Relying Party must exercise Reasonable Reliance as set out in this Section.

- Prior to relying on the Certificate or other authentication product or service, Relying Parties are obliged to check all status information provided by DigiCert Europe related to the Certificate or other authentication product or service to confirm that the information was still valid and that the product or service had not expired or been revoked. For Certificates, this includes checking to ensure that each Certificate in the Certificate Chain is valid, unexpired, and non-revoked (by using any CRL or OCSP information available).

EU	To be relied upon as an EU Qualified Certificate, the CA/trust anchor for the validation of the Certificate shall be as identified in a service digital identifier of an EU Trusted List entry with service type identifier https://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC for a QTSP. ETSI TS 119 615 provides guidance on how to validate a Certificate against the EU Trusted Lists. ETSI TS 119 172-4 describes how to validate a digital signature to determine whether it can be considered as an EU Qualified electronic signature or seal.
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- Prior to relying on an authentication product or service, Relying Parties must gather sufficient information to make an informed decision about the proper use of the authentication product or service and whether intended reliance on the authentication product or service was reasonable in light of the circumstances. This includes evaluating the risks associated with their intended use and the limitations associated with the authentication product or service provided by DigiCert Europe.
- Relying Parties' reliance on the authentication product or service is reasonable based on the circumstances. Relying Parties reliance will be deemed reasonable if:
 1. The attributes of the Certificate relied upon and the level of assurance in the Identification and Authentication provided by the Certificate are appropriate in all respects to the level of risk and the reliance placed upon that Certificate by the Relying Party;
 2. The Relying Party has, at the time of that reliance, used the Certificate for purposes appropriate and permitted by the CP/CPS and under the laws and regulations of the jurisdiction in which the Relying Party is located;
 3. The Relying Party has, at the time of that reliance, acted in good faith and in a manner appropriate to all the circumstances known, or circumstances that ought reasonably to have been known, to the Relying Party;
 4. The Relying Party has, at the time of that reliance, verified the Digital Signature, if any;
 5. The Relying Party has, at the time of that reliance, verified that the Digital Signature, if any, was created during the Operational Term of the Certificate being relied upon;
 6. The Relying Party ensures that the data signed has not been altered following signature by utilising trusted application software,
 7. The signature is trusted and the results of the signature are displayed correctly by utilising trusted application software;
 8. The identity of the Subscriber is displayed correctly by utilising trusted application software; and
 9. Any alterations arising from security changes are identified by utilising trusted application software.

If the circumstances indicate a need for additional assurances, it is Relying Parties' responsibility to obtain such assurances. A Relying Party shall make no assumptions about information that does not appear in a Certificate. All obligations within this Section relate to Reasonable Reliance on the validity of a Digital Signature, not the accuracy of the underlying electronic record. Relying Party Agreements may include additional representations and warranties.

9.6.5. Representations And Warranties Of Other Participants

Participants within the DigiCert Europe PKI represent and warrant that they accept and will perform any and all duties and obligations as specified by this CP/CPS.

9.7. DISCLAIMERS OF WARRANTIES

OTHER THAN AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 9.6.1, THE CERTIFICATES ARE PROVIDED "AS IS" AND "AS AVAILABLE" AND TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, DIGICERT EUROPE DISCLAIMS

ALL EXPRESS AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. DIGICERT EUROPE DOES NOT WARRANT THAT ANY CERTIFICATE WILL MEET SUBSCRIBER'S OR ANY OTHER PARTY'S EXPECTATIONS OR THAT ACCESS TO THE CERTIFICATES WILL BE TIMELY OR ERROR-FREE. DIGICERT EUROPE does not guarantee the accessibility of any Certificates and may modify or discontinue offering any Certificates at any time. Subscriber's sole remedy for a defect in the Certificates is for DIGICERT EUROPE to use commercially reasonable efforts, upon notice of such defect from Subscriber, to correct the defect, except that DIGICERT EUROPE has no obligation to correct defects that arise from (i) misuse, damage, modification or damage of the Certificates or combination of the Certificates with other products and services by parties other than DIGICERT EUROPE, or (ii) Subscriber's breach of any provision of the Subscriber Agreement.

9.8. LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY

This Section 9.8 does not limit a party's liability for: (i) death or personal injury resulting from the negligence of a party; (ii) gross negligence, willful misconduct or violations of applicable law, or (iii) fraud or fraudulent statements made by a party to the other party in connection with this CP/CPS.

TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW AND NOTWITHSTANDING ANY FAILURE OF ESSENTIAL PURPOSE OF ANY LIMITED REMEDY OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY: (A) DIGICERT EUROPE AND ITS AFFILIATES, SUBSIDIARIES, OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, EMPLOYEES, AGENTS, PARTNERS AND LICENSORS (THE DIGICERT EUROPE ENTITIES) WILL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES (INCLUDING ANY DAMAGES ARISING FROM LOSS OF USE, LOSS OF DATA, LOST PROFITS, BUSINESS INTERRUPTION, OR COSTS OF PROCURING SUBSTITUTE SOFTWARE OR SERVICES) ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS CP/CPS OR THE SUBJECT MATTER HEREOF; AND (B) THE DIGICERT EUROPE ENTITIES' TOTAL CUMULATIVE LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS CP/CPS OR THE SUBJECT MATTER HEREOF WILL NOT EXCEED THE AMOUNTS PAID BY OR ON BEHALF OF SUBSCRIBER TO DIGICERT EUROPE IN THE TWELVE MONTHS PRIOR TO THE EVENT GIVING RISE TO SUCH LIABILITY, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER SUCH LIABILITY ARISES FROM CONTRACT, INDEMNIFICATION, WARRANTY, TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE), STRICT LIABILITY OR OTHERWISE, AND REGARDLESS OF WHETHER DIGICERT EUROPE HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH LOSS OR DAMAGE.

NO CLAIM, REGARDLESS OF FORM, WHICH IN ANY WAY ARISES OUT OF THIS CP/CPS, MAY BE MADE OR BROUGHT BY SUBSCRIBER OR SUBSCRIBER'S REPRESENTATIVES MORE THAN ONE (1) YEAR AFTER THE BASIS FOR THE CLAIM BECOMES KNOWN TO SUBSCRIBER.

CH	For Swiss Qualified Certificates, DigiCert Europe liability is in accordance with Articles 17, 18, 19 of ZertES.
EU	For EU Qualified Certificates, DigiCert Europe liability is in accordance with Extract 37 and Article 13 of the eIDAS Regulation.

9.9. INDEMNITIES

9.9.1. Indemnification By DigiCert Europe

To the extent permitted by applicable law, DigiCert Europe shall indemnify each Application Software Vendor against any claim, damage, or loss suffered by an Application Software Vendor related to an Certificate issued by DigiCert Europe, regardless of the cause of action or legal theory involved, except where the claim, damage, or loss suffered by the Application Software Vendor was directly caused by the Application Software Vendor's software displaying either (i) a valid and trustworthy Certificate as not valid or trustworthy or (ii) displaying as trustworthy (a) an Certificate that has expired or (b) a revoked Certificate where the revocation status is available online but the Application Software Vendor's software failed to check or ignored the status.

9.9.2. Indemnification By Subscribers

To the extent permitted by law, each Subscriber shall indemnify DigiCert Europe, its partners, and their respective directors, officers, employees, agents, and contractors against any loss, damage, or expense, including reasonable attorney's fees, related to (i) any misrepresentation or omission of material fact by Subscriber, regardless of whether the misrepresentation or omission was intentional or unintentional; (ii) Subscriber's breach of the Subscriber Agreement, this CP/CPS, or applicable law; (iii) the compromise or unauthorised use of a Certificate or Private Key caused by the Subscriber's negligence or intentional acts; or (iv) Subscriber's misuse of the Certificate or Private Key. The applicable Subscriber Agreement may include additional indemnity obligations.

9.9.3. Indemnification By Relying Parties

To the extent permitted by law, each Relying Party shall indemnify DigiCert Europe, its partners, and their respective directors, officers, employees, agents, and contractors against any loss, damage, or expense, including reasonable attorney's fees, related to the Relying Party's (i) breach of the Relying Party Agreement, an End-User License Agreement, this CP/CPS, or applicable law; (ii) unreasonable reliance on a Certificate; or (iii) failure to check the Certificate's status prior to use.

9.10. TERM AND TERMINATION

9.10.1. Term

This CP/CPS and any amendments to this CP/CPS are effective when published in the DigiCert Europe Repository and remain in effect until replaced with a newer version.

9.10.2. Termination

This CP/CPS as amended from time to time shall remain in force until it is replaced by a newer version.

9.10.3. Effect Of Termination And Survival

The conditions and effect resulting from termination of this CP/CPS will be communicated via the DigiCert Europe website upon termination. That communication will outline the provisions that may survive termination of this CP/CPS and remain in force. The responsibilities for protecting business confidential and private personal information shall survive termination, and the Terms

and Conditions for all existing Certificates shall remain valid for the remainder of the validity periods of such Certificates.

9.11. INDIVIDUAL NOTICES AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH PARTICIPANTS

DigiCert Europe accepts notices related to this CP/CPS at the locations specified in Section 1.5. Notices are deemed effective after the sender receives a valid and digitally signed acknowledgment of receipt from DigiCert Europe. If an acknowledgement of receipt is not received within five days, the sender must resend the notice in paper form to the street address specified in Section 2.2 using either a courier service that confirms delivery or via certified or registered mail with postage prepaid and return receipt requested. DigiCert Europe may allow other forms of notice in its Subscriber Agreements.

Notices to Application Software Vendors are sent out in accordance with the respective requirements.

9.12. AMENDMENTS

9.12.1. Procedure For Amendment

Amendments to this CP/CPS are made and approved by the DCPA at least annually. Amendments are made by posting an updated version of the CP/CPS to the Repository. Updates supersede any designated or conflicting provisions of the referenced version of the CP/CPS. Controls are in place to reasonably ensure that this CP/CPS is not amended and published without the prior authorisation of the DCPA.

9.12.2. Notification Mechanism And Period

DigiCert Europe posts CP/CPS revisions to the Repository (<https://www.digicert.com/legal-repository/europe>). The DCPA is responsible for determining what constitutes a material change of the CP/CPS. For routine modifications, DigiCert Europe does not guarantee or set a notice-and-comment period and may make changes to this CP/CPS without notice and without changing the version number. When the DCPA determines a CP/CPS change may have a significant impact on Subscribers or Relying Parties, due notice of seven (7) days will be provided in the Repository. Subscribers whose Certificates remain valid at the effective date of the CP/CPS change shall be deemed to have accepted the modification.

9.12.3. Circumstances Under Which OID Must Be Changed

The DCPA is solely responsible for determining whether an amendment to the CP/CPS requires an OID change.

9.13. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVISIONS

For general complaints Subscribers and Subjects can send an email to qv.complaints@digicert.com.

For dispute resolution, to the extent permitted by law, before a Participant files suit or initiates an arbitration claim with respect to a dispute involving any aspect of this Agreement, Participant shall notify DigiCert Europe, and any other party to the dispute for the purpose of seeking business resolution. Both Participant and DigiCert Europe shall make good faith efforts to resolve such dispute via business discussions. If the dispute is not resolved within sixty (60) days after the initial notice, then a party may proceed as permitted under applicable law and as specified under this CP/CPS and other relevant agreements.

1. Arbitration: In the event a dispute is allowed or required to be resolved through arbitration, the parties will maintain the confidential nature of the existence, content, or results of any arbitration hereunder, except as may be necessary to prepare for or conduct the arbitration hearing on the merits, or except as may be necessary in connection with a court application for a preliminary remedy, a judicial confirmation or challenge to an arbitration award or its enforcement, or unless otherwise required by law or judicial decision.
2. Class Action and Jury Trial Waiver: THE PARTIES EXPRESSLY WAIVE THEIR RESPECTIVE RIGHTS TO A JURY TRIAL FOR THE PURPOSES OF LITIGATING DISPUTES HEREUNDER. Each party agrees that any dispute must be brought in the respective party's individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class, collective, representative, multiple plaintiffs, or similar proceeding ("Class Action"). The parties expressly waive any ability to maintain any Class Action in any forum in connection with any dispute. If the dispute is subject to arbitration, the arbitrator will not have authority to combine or aggregate similar claims or conduct any Class Action nor make an award to any person or entity not a party to the arbitration. Any claim that all or part of this Class Action waiver is unenforceable, unconscionable, void, or voidable may be determined only by a court of competent jurisdiction and not by an arbitrator.

CH	For Swiss Qualified Certificates, such arbitration shall, unless agreed otherwise between the parties, take place in Switzerland.
EU	For Qualified Certificates issued in accordance with eIDAS, arbitration for disputes related to financial or commercial matters will be dealt with in the country of the relevant DigiCert Europe entity named in the contract with the client. Arbitration for Certificate-related disputes will be dealt with in the country named in relevant DigiCert Europe Issuing CA Certificate.

9.14. GOVERNING LAW

The (i) laws that govern the interpretation, construction, and enforcement of this Agreement and all matters, claims or disputes related to it, including tort claims, and (ii) the courts or arbitration bodies that have exclusive jurisdiction over any of the matters, claims or disputes contemplated in sub-Section (i) above, will each depend on where Customer is domiciled as set forth in the table below; provided, for clarity, that rights and obligations arising from other applicable local laws continue to be governed by such laws, including with respect to EU Regulation 910/2014 (i.e., eIDAS), the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and trade compliance laws.

In instances where the International Chamber of Commerce is designated below as the court or arbitration body with exclusive jurisdiction of such matters, claims or disputes, then the parties hereby agree that (x) all matters, claims or disputes arising out of or in connection with this

Agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (Rules) by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the Rules, (y) judgment on the award rendered by such arbitration may be entered in any court having jurisdiction, and (z) this arbitration clause shall not preclude parties from seeking provisional remedies in aid of arbitration from a court of appropriate jurisdiction.

Customer is Domiciled in or the Services are:	Governing Law is laws of:	Court or arbitration body with exclusive jurisdiction:
The United States of America, Canada, Mexico, Central America, South America, the Caribbean, or any other country not otherwise included in the rest of the table below	Utah state law and United States federal law	State and Federal courts located in Salt Lake County, Utah
Europe, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Russia, the Middle East or Africa	England	International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration, with seat of arbitration in the below city corresponding to the DigiCert Europe contracting entity listed in the Order Form. For CH: Zurich For NL: Amsterdam For DE: Munich For BE/DigiCert Europe: Brussels For UK: London
Japan	Japan	International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration, with seat of arbitration in Tokyo
Australia or New Zealand	Australia	International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration, with seat of arbitration in Melbourne
A Country in Asia or the Pacific region, other than Japan, Australia or New Zealand	Singapore	International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration, with seat of arbitration in Singapore

9.15. COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAW

This CP/CPS is subject to all applicable laws and regulations, including United States restrictions on the export of software and cryptography products. Subject to Section 9.4.5, DigiCert Europe meets

the requirements of the European data protection laws and has established appropriate technical and organisation measures against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against the loss, damage, or destruction of personal data.

9.16. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

9.16.1. Entire Agreement

DigiCert Europe contractually obligates each RA to comply with this CP/CPS and applicable industry guidelines. DigiCert Europe also requires each party using its products and services to enter into an agreement that delineates the terms associated with the product or service. If an agreement has provisions that differ from this CP/CPS, then the agreement with that party controls, but solely with respect to that party. Third parties may not rely on or bring action to enforce such agreement.

9.16.2. Assignment

Any entities operating under this CP/CPS may not assign their rights or obligations without the prior written consent of DigiCert Europe. Unless specified otherwise in a contract with a party, DigiCert Europe does not provide notice of assignment.

9.16.3. Severability

If any provision of this CP/CPS is held invalid or unenforceable by a competent court or tribunal, the remainder of the CP/CPS will remain valid and enforceable. Each provision of this CP/CPS that provides for a limitation of liability, disclaimer of a warranty, or an exclusion of damages is severable and independent of any other provision.

9.16.4. Enforcement (Attorneys' Fees And Waiver of Rights)

DigiCert Europe may seek indemnification and attorneys' fees from a party for damages, losses, and expenses related to that party's conduct. DigiCert Europe's failure to enforce a provision of this CP/CPS does not waive DigiCert Europe's right to enforce the same provision later or right to enforce any other provision of this CP/CPS. To be effective, waivers must be in writing and signed by DigiCert Europe.

9.16.5. Force Majeure

DigiCert Europe is not liable for any delay or failure to perform an obligation under this CP/CPS to the extent that the delay or failure is caused by an occurrence beyond DigiCert Europe's reasonable control. The operation of the Internet is beyond DigiCert Europe's reasonable control.

To the extent permitted by applicable law, Subscriber Agreements and Relying Party Agreements shall include a force majeure clause protecting DigiCert Europe. See also Section 9.8.3 (Excluded Liability) above.

9.17. OTHER PROVISIONS

No stipulation.

10. APPENDIX A

10.1. CERTIFICATE PROFILES

Within the DigiCert Europe PKI an Issuing CA can only issue Certificates with approved Certificate Profiles. All Certificate Profiles within the DigiCert Europe PKI are detailed below.

Procedures for Subscriber registration as well as descriptions of fields are described below for each type of Certificate issued. Additionally, specific Certificate Policies and DigiCert Europe's liability arrangements that are not described in this CP/CPS may be drawn up under contract for individual Subscribers.

10.1.1. DigiCert Europe Certificate Class

Certificate Class	Description	Policy OID	Assurance Level	Requires token?
Standard	Based on the ETSI Lightweight Certificate Policy (LCP), which has the policy identifier OID 0.4.0.2042.1.3	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Certificate Class OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.100 (optional, may also use S/MIME BR OIDs)• ETSI policy identifier OID: 0.4.0.2042.1.3 (optional)	Low	Optional
Advanced	Based on the ETSI Normalised Certificate Policy (NCP), which has the OID 0.4.0.2042.1.1. Features face-to-face (or equivalent) authentication of holder identity and organisational affiliation (if included).	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Certificate Class OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.200• ETSI policy identifier OID: 0.4.0.2042.1.1 (optional)	Medium	Optional
Advanced+	Similar to "Advanced" issued on an SSCD. Based on the ETSI Normalised Certificate Policy requiring an SSCD (NCP+), which has the OID 0.4.0.2042.1.2. Includes Swiss Regulated Certificates.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Certificate Class OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.300• ETSI policy identifier OID: 0.4.0.2042.1.2 (optional)	High	Yes Adobe AATL Approved

Certificate Class	Description	Policy OID	Assurance Level	Requires token?
Qualified	Qualified Certificate on a QSCD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Certificate Class OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.400 • ETSI policy identifier OIDs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ 0.4.0.194112.1.2 (QCP-n-qscd) ◦ 0.4.0.194112.1.3 (QCP-l-qscd) 	High	Yes Adobe AATL Approved
Qualified	Qualified Certificate on a QSCD, where the device is managed by a QTSP. Relevant to the Policy in ETSI EN 319 411-2 for: EU Qualified Certificates issued to a natural person (QCP-n-qscd), with the OID 0.4.0.194112.1.2. EU Qualified Certificates issued to a legal person (QCP-l-qscd), with the OID 0.4.0.194112.1.3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Certificate Class OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.410 • ETSI policy identifier OIDs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ 0.4.0.194112.1.2 (QCP-n-qscd) ◦ 0.4.0.194112.1.3 (QCP-l-qscd) 	High	Yes Adobe AATL Approved
Qualified	Qualified Certificate not on a QSCD. Relevant to the Policy in ETSI EN 319 411-2 for: EU Qualified Certificates issued to a natural person (QCP-n), with the OID 0.4.0.194112.1.0. EU Qualified Certificates issued to a legal person (QCP-l), with the OID 0.4.0.194112.1.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Certificate Class OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.450 • ETSI policy identifier OIDs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ 0.4.0.194112.1.0 (QCP-n) ◦ 0.4.0.194112.1.1 (QCP-l) 	High	No

Certificate Class	Description	Policy OID	Assurance Level	Requires token?
Qualified	Qualified Certificate not on a QSCD, where the device is managed by a QTSP.+ Relevant to the Policy in ETSI EN 319 411-2 for: EU Qualified Certificates issued to a natural person (QCP-n), with the OID 0.4.0.194112.1.0. EU Qualified Certificates issued to a legal person (QCP-l), with the OID 0.4.0.194112.1.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Certificate Class OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.460 • ETSI policy identifier OIDs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ 0.4.0.194112.1.0 (QCP-n) ◦ 0.4.0.194112.1.1 (QCP-l) 	High	No
Closed Community	Used for reliance by members of the Issuer community only. Policies are defined in the CP/CPS of the Issuing CA.	1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.500	Medium	Optional
Device	Issued to devices, including Time-stamp Certificates.	1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.600	Medium	Optional

10.1.2. Key Usage And Escrow

Different DigiCert Europe Certificate Profiles may be issued with different key usages, and be eligible for optional Key Escrow, according to the following table:

Certificate Type	Key Usage/Extended Key Usage Options	Standard	Advanced	Advanced +	Qualified
Signing and Encryption	Key Usage digitalSignature nonRepudiation keyEncipherment keyAgreement Extended Key Usage smartcardlogon clientAuth emailProtection documentSigning enrolmentAgent	Allowed (Escrow only permitted for certain Issuing CAs. Not permitted for any CAs on EUTL)	Allowed (Escrow only permitted for certain Issuing CAs. Not permitted for any CAs on EUTL)	Allowed (Escrow not permitted)	Not Allowed

Certificate Type	Key Usage/Extended Key Usage Options	Standard	Advanced	Advanced +	Qualified
Signing	Key Usage digitalSignature nonRepudiation Extended Key Usage smartcardlogon clientAuth emailProtection documentSigning enrolmentAgent	Allowed (Escrow not permitted)	Allowed (Escrow not permitted)	Allowed (Escrow not permitted)	Allowed (Escrow not permitted)
Encryption	Key Usage keyEncipherment keyAgreement Extended Key Usage emailProtection	Allowed (Escrow permitted)	Allowed (Escrow permitted)	Allowed (Escrow not permitted)	Not Allowed
Authenticat tion	Key Usage digitalSignature Extended Key Usage smartcardlogon clientAuth enrolmentAgent	Allowed (Escrow not permitted)	Allowed (Escrow not permitted)	Allowed (Escrow not permitted)	Not Allowed

The Certificate Profiles that follow indicate the fields which are VARIABLE on initial registration by the Subscriber (“Holder Variable”) and those which are FIXED by the Issuing CA either based on policy or by IETF Standard, applicable law, or regulation.

10.2. STANDARD

Purpose

Standard Certificates provide flexibility for a range of uses appropriate to their reliance value including S/MIME, electronic signatures, authentication, and encryption.

Registration Process

Validation procedures for Standard Certificates collect either direct evidence or an Attestation from an appropriate and authorised source of the identity (such as name and organisational affiliation) and other specific attributes of the Subject. Subjects may include an Individual (natural person); an Organisation (legal person); or a natural person, device, or system identified in association with an Organisation. Identity proofing may be conducted via enterprise records, physical presence; Remote Identity Verification (RIV1-4), reliance on electronic signature, or video verification.

Attribute	Values	Comment
Subject	/CN Mandatory (GN+SN or Pseudonym) (Optional) /GN (Optional if SN present) /SN (Optional if GN present) Pseudonym (Optional) /O (Optional) /OU (Optional) /organizationalIdentifier (Optional) /serialNumber (Optional) /E (Optional) /L (Optional) /ST (optional) /C (mandatory)	See definitions in Section 7.1.1. Variable
SAN	/E 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.3 UPN	Variable
Key Usage (Critical)	digitalSignature (optional) nonRepudiation keyEncipherment (Optional) keyAgreement (Optional)	Variable
Extended Key Usage	clientAuth emailProtection documentSigning smartcardLogon enrolmentAgent	Variable (at least one is present)

Certificate Policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.100 QV Standard Certificate (optional) • 0.4.0.2042.1.3 ETSI LCP OID (optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.1.1 S/MIME Mailbox-Legacy (optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.2.1 S/MIME Org-Legacy (optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.3.1 S/MIME Sponsor-Legacy (optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.4.1 S/MIME Individual-Legacy (optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.1.2 S/MIME Mailbox-Multipurpose (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.1.3 S/MIME Mailbox-Strict (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.2.2 S/MIME Org-Multipurpose (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.2.3 S/MIME Org-Strict (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.3.2 S/MIME Sponsor-Multipurpose (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.3.3 S/MIME Sponsor-Strict (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.4.2 S/MIME Individual-Multipurpose (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.4.3 S/MIME Individual-Strict (Optional) 	<p>Fixed</p> <p>(Effective July 15, 2025 S/MIME Subscriber Certificates SHALL NOT be issued using the Legacy Generation profiles 2.23.140.1.5.1.1, 2.23.140.1.5.2.1, 2.23.140.1.5.3.1, or 2.23.140.1.5.4.1.)</p>
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10.3. ADVANCED

Purpose

Advanced Certificates provide reliable verification of the Subject's identity and may be used for a broad range of applications including Digital Signatures, encryption, and authentication.

Registration Process

Validation procedures for Advanced Certificates are based on the Normalised Certificate Policy (NCP) described in ETSI EN 319 411-1.

Subjects may include an Individual (natural person); an Organisation (legal person); or a natural person, device, or system identified in association with an Organisation. See Section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. Identity proofing may be conducted via physical presence, Remote Identity Verification (RIV4 for NFC with RIV2 as a fallback option if NFC is not available), or reliance on electronic signature.

Attribute	Values	Comment
Subject	/CN (mandatory) = Natural Person (/GN+/SN or Pseudonym) = Legal Person (/O) /GN (mandatory if CN without Pseudonym, Optional if SN is present) /SN (mandatory if CN without Pseudonym, Optional if GN is present) Pseudonym (optional for natural person) /O (optional) /OU (optional) /organizationalIdentifier (optional) /serialNumber (optional) /E (optional) /L (optional) /ST (optional) /C (mandatory)	See definitions in Section 7.1.1. Variable
SAN	/E 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.3 UPN	Variable

Certificate Policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.200 Advanced Certificate • 0.4.0.2042.1.1 ETSI NCP OID (optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.2.1 S/MIME Org-Legacy (optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.3.1 S/MIME Sponsor-Legacy (optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.4.1 S/MIME Individual-Legacy (optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.2.2 S/MIME Org-Multipurpose (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.2.3 S/MIME Org-Strict (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.3.2 S/MIME Sponsor-Multipurpose (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.3.3 S/MIME Sponsor-Strict (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.4.2 S/MIME Individual-Multipurpose (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.4.3 S/MIME Individual-Strict (Optional) 	Fixed (Effective July 15, 2025 S/MIME Subscriber Certificates SHALL NOT be issued using the Legacy Generation profiles 2.23.140.1.5.1.1, 2.23.140.1.5.2.1, 2.23.140.1.5.3.1, or 2.23.140.1.5.4.1.)
Key Usage (Critical)	digitalSignature (optional) nonRepudiation keyEncipherment (optional)	Variable
Extended Key Usage	clientAuth emailProtection documentSigning smartcardLogon	Variable (at least one is present)

10.4. ADVANCED+

Purpose		
Advanced+ Certificates are used for the same purposes as Advanced Certificates, with the only difference being that they are issued on a Secure Cryptographic Device. The Advanced+ Certificate Class is trusted in the Adobe Approved Trust List (AATL).		
Registration Process		
Advanced+ Certificates are based on with the Normalised Certificate Policy (NCP+) described in ETSI EN 319 411-1.		
Subjects may include an Individual (natural person); an Organisation (legal person); or a natural person, device, or system identified in association with an Organisation. See Section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.		
Identity proofing may be conducted via physical presence, Remote Identity Verification, or reliance on electronic signature.		
AATL Certificates may use RIV1 or higher, ETSI Certificates may use RIV4 for NFC with RIV2 as a fallback option if NFC is not available.		
Advanced+ Certificates must be issued on a Secure Cryptographic Device either held by the Subscriber or managed by DigiCert Europe and adhere to the following requirements:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Secure Cryptographic Device storage, preparation, and distribution is securely controlled by CA or RA;- User activation data is securely prepared and distributed separately from the Secure Cryptographic Device;- If keys are generated under the Subscriber's control, they are generated within the Secure Cryptographic Device used for signing or decrypting;- The Subscriber's Private Key can be maintained under the subject's sole control; and- Only use the Subscriber's Private Key for signing or decrypting with the Secure Cryptographic Device.		
Attribute	Values	Comment

Subject	/CN (mandatory) = Natural Person (/GN+/SN or Pseudonym) = Legal Person (/O) /GN (optional if ETSI NCP+ OID is not present) (mandatory if ETSI NCP+ OID is present) /SN (optional if ETSI NCP+ OID is not present) (mandatory if ETSI NCP+ OID is present) Combination of /GN and /SN is optional in accordance with national preference. Pseudonym (optional for natural person, shall not be combined with /GN or /SN) /O (optional) /OU (optional) /organizationalIdentifier (optional) /serialNumber (optional) /E (optional) /L (optional) /ST (optional) /C (mandatory)	See definitions in Section 7.1.1. Variable
SAN	/E 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.3 UPN	Variable
Certificate Policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.300 Advanced+ Certificate • 0.4.0.2042.1.2 ETSI NCP+ OID (optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.2.1 S/MIME Org-Legacy (optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.3.1 S/MIME Sponsor-Legacy (optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.4.1 S/MIME Individual-Legacy (optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.2.2 S/MIME Org-Multipurpose (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.2.3 S/MIME Org-Strict (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.3.2 S/MIME Sponsor-Multipurpose (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.3.3 S/MIME Sponsor-Strict (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.4.2 S/MIME Individual-Multipurpose (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.4.3 S/MIME Individual-Strict (Optional) 	Fixed (Effective July 15, 2025 S/MIME Subscriber Certificates SHALL NOT be issued using the Legacy Generation profiles 2.23.140.1.5.1.1, 2.23.140.1.5.2.1, 2.23.140.1.5.3.1, or 2.23.140.1.5.4.1.)
Adobe Acrobat Trust List	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1.2.840.113583.1.1.9.1 Adobe Time-stamp (link to TSA) • 1.2.840.113583.1.1.9.2 Adobe Archive RevInfo (long term validation) 	Optional

Key Usage (Critical)	digitalSignature (optional) nonRepudiation keyEncipherment (optional)	Variable
Extended Key Usage	clientAuth emailProtection documentSigning smartcardLogon	Variable (at least one is present)

10.5. EIDAS QUALIFIED

10.5.1. eIDAS Qualified Certificate issued to a Natural Person on a QSCD

Purpose

The purpose of these EU Qualified Certificates are to identify the Subscriber with a high level of assurance, for the purpose of creating Qualified Electronic Signatures meeting the qualification requirements defined by the eIDAS Regulation.

These Certificates meet the relevant ETSI “Policy for EU Qualified certificate issued to a natural person where the Private Key and the related certificate reside on a QSCD” (QCP-n-qscd).

The content of these Certificates meet the relevant requirements of:

- ETSI EN 319 412-1: Certificate Profiles; Part 1: Overview and common data structures
- ETSI EN 319 412-2: Certificate Profiles; Part 2: Certificate profile for certificates issued to natural persons
- ETSI EN 319 412-5: Certificate Profiles; Part 5: QCStatements

Registration Process

Identity validation procedures for these Certificates meet the relevant requirements of ETSI EN 319 411-2 for “Policy for EU qualified certificate issued to a natural person where the Private Key and the related certificate reside on a QSCD” (QCP-n-qscd). DigiCert Europe recommends that QCP-n-qscd certificates are used only for electronic signatures.

Subjects may include an Individual (natural person) or a natural person identified in association with an Organisation. Only methods approved for eIDAS Qualified Certificates may be used. See Section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.

Identity proofing may be conducted via physical presence, Remote Identity Verification (for Netherlands Qualified, RIV4 only).

For Belgium Qualified, RIV4 for NFC with RIV2 as a fallback option if NFC is not available), or reliance on Qualified Electronic Signature.

These Certificates require a QSCD that meets the requirements laid down in Annex II of the eIDAS Regulation. The Subscriber’s obligations (or respectively the obligations on the TSP managing the key on their behalf) require that the Private Key is maintained (or respectively is used) under the Subject’s sole control.

Attribute	Values	Comment
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Subject	/CN (mandatory) = Natural Person (/GN+/SN or Pseudonym) = Legal Person (/O) /GN (mandatory if CN without Pseudonym, Optional if SN is present) /SN (mandatory if CN without Pseudonym, Optional if GN is present) Pseudonym (optional for natural person) /T (optional) /O (optional) /OU (optional) /organizationalIdentifier (optional) /serialNumber (optional) /E (optional) /L (optional) /ST (optional) /C (mandatory) If serialNumber is present then it must be structured per Section 5.1.3 of ETSI EN 319 412- 1: 3 character identity type reference (e.g. PAS or IDC); 2 character ISO 3166 country code; hyphen-minus "-" (0x2D (ASCII), U+002D (UTF8)); and identifier.	See definitions in Section 7.1.1. Variable
SAN	/E	Optional

Certificate Policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.400 QV Qualified QSCD, or 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.410 QV Qualified QSCD – on behalf of 0.4.0.194112.1.2 (QCP-n-qscd) • 2.23.140.1.5.3.1 S/MIME Sponsor-Legacy (optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.4.1 S/MIME Individual-Legacy (optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.3.2 S/MIME Sponsor-Multipurpose (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.3.3 S/MIME Sponsor-Strict (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.4.2 S/MIME Individual-Multipurpose (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.4.3 S/MIME Individual-Strict (Optional) <p>URL: https://www.quovadisglobal.com/repository User Notice: Qualified certificate</p>	Fixed (Effective July 15, 2025 S/MIME Subscriber Certificates SHALL NOT be issued using the Legacy Generation profiles 2.23.140.1.5.1.1, 2.23.140.1.5.2.1, 2.23.140.1.5.3.1, or 2.23.140.1.5.4.1.) Only Swiss Qualified
Adobe Acrobat Trust List	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1.2.840.113583.1.1.9.1 Adobe Time-stamp (link to TSA) • 1.2.840.113583.1.1.9.2 Adobe Archive RevInfo (long term validation) 	Optional
Key Usage (Critical)	digitalSignature (optional) nonRepudiation keyEncipherment (optional)	Variable
Extended Key Usage	clientAuth (optional) emailProtection documentSigning	Variable (at least one is present)
qcStatements		
id-etsi-qcs-QcCompliance (0.4.0.1862.1.1) id-etsi-qcs-1	esi4-qcStatement-1: Claim that the certificate is an EU Qualified Certificate in accordance with Regulation EU No 910/2014	Fixed
id-etsi-qcs-QcSSCD (0.4.0.1862.1.4) id-etsi-qcs-4	esi4-qcStatement-4: The Private Key related to the certified public key resides on a QSCD.	Fixed
id-etsi-qcs-QcType (0.4.0.1862.1.6) id-etsi-qcs-6	esi4-qcStatement-6: Type of certificate id-etsi-qcs-QcType 1 = Certificate for electronic Signatures as defined in Regulation EU No 910/2014	Fixed
id-etsi-qcs-QcPDS (0.4.0.1862.1.5) id-etsi-qcs-5	URL= https://www.quovadisglobal.com/repository Language = EN	Fixed

id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2 (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.11.2)	0.4.0.194121.1.1 (optional semantics identifier OID that is included in DigiCert Europe Certificates)	Fixed
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10.5.2. eIDAS Qualified Certificate issued to a Natural Person

Purpose		
<p>The purpose of these EU Qualified Certificates are to identify the Subscriber with a high level of assurance, for the purpose of creating Advanced Electronic Signatures meeting the qualification requirements defined by the eIDAS Regulation.</p> <p>This type of Qualified Certificate does not use a QSCD for the protection of the Private Key. The content of these Certificates meet the relevant requirements of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- ETSI EN 319 412-1: Certificate Profiles; Part 1: Overview and common data structures- ETSI EN 319 412-2: Certificate Profiles; Part 2: Certificate profile for certificates issued to natural persons- ETSI EN 319 412-5: Certificate Profiles; Part 5: QCStatements		
Registration Process		
<p>Identity validation procedures for these Certificates meet the relevant requirements of ETSI EN 319 411-2 for the “Policy for EU qualified certificate issued to a natural person” (QCP-n). DigiCert Europe recommends that QCP-n certificates are used only for electronic signatures.</p> <p>Subjects may include an Individual (natural person) or a natural person identified in association with an Organisation. Only methods approved for eIDAS Qualified Certificates may be used. See Section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. Identity proofing may be conducted via physical presence, Remote Identity Verification (for Netherlands Qualified, RIV4 only; for Belgium Qualified, RIV4 for NFC with RIV2 as a fallback option if NFC is not available), or reliance on Qualified Electronic Signature.</p> <p>The Subscriber’s obligations (or respectively the obligations on the TSP managing the key on their behalf) require that the Private Key is maintained (or respectively is used) under the Subject’s sole control.</p>		
Attribute	Values	Comment

Subject	/CN (mandatory) = Natural Person (/GN+/SN or Pseudonym) /GN (mandatory if CN without Pseudonym, Optional if SN is present) /SN (mandatory if CN without Pseudonym, Optional if GN is present) Pseudonym (optional if natural person) /T (optional) /O (optional) /OU (optional) /organizationalIdentifier (optional) /serialNumber (optional) /E (optional) /L (optional) /ST (optional) /C (mandatory) If serialNumber is present then it must be structured per Section 5.1.3 of ETSI EN 319 412- 1: 3 character identity type reference (e.g. PAS or IDC); 2 character ISO 3166 country code; hyphen-minus "-" (0x2D (ASCII), U+002D (UTF8)); and identifier.	See definitions in Section 7.1.1. Variable
SAN	/E	Optional

Certificate Policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.450 QV Qualified no QSCD, or 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.460 QV Qualified no QSCD – on behalf of 0.4.0.194112.1.0 (QCP-n) • 2.23.140.1.5.3.1 S/MIME Sponsor-Legacy (optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.4.1 S/MIME Individual-Legacy (optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.3.2 S/MIME Sponsor-Multipurpose (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.3.3 S/MIME Sponsor-Strict (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.4.2 S/MIME Individual-Multipurpose (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.4.3 S/MIME Individual-Strict (Optional) <p>URL: https://www.quovadisglobal.com/repository</p>	Fixed (Effective July 15, 2025 S/MIME Subscriber Certificates SHALL NOT be issued using the Legacy Generation profiles 2.23.140.1.5.1.1, 2.23.140.1.5.2.1, 2.23.140.1.5.3.1, or 2.23.140.1.5.4.1.)
Key Usage (Critical)	digitalSignature (optional) nonRepudiation keyEncipherment (optional)	Variable
Extended Key Usage	emailProtection clientAuth documentSigning	Variable (at least one is present)
qcStatements		
id-etsi-qcs-QcCompliance (0.4.0.1862.1.1) id-etsi-qcs-1	esi4-qcStatement-1: Claim that the certificate is an EU Qualified Certificate in accordance with Regulation EU No 910/2014	Fixed
id-etsi-qcs-QcType (0.4.0.1862.1.6) id-etsi-qcs-6	esi4-qcStatement-6: Type of certificate id-etsi-qcs-QcType 1 = Certificate for electronic Signatures as defined in Regulation EU No 910/2014	Fixed
id-etsi-qcs-QcPDS (0.4.0.1862.1.5) id-etsi-qcs-5	URL= https://www.quovadisglobal.com/repository Language = EN	Fixed
id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2 (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.11.2)	0.4.0.194121.1.1 (id-etsi-qcs-semanticsIdNatural) (optional semantics identifier OID that is included in DigiCert Europe Certificates)	Fixed
id-etsi-qcs-QcCompliance (0.4.0.1862.1.1) id-etsi-qcs-1	esi4-qcStatement-1: Claim that the certificate is an EU Qualified Certificate in accordance with Regulation EU No 910/2014	Fixed

10.5.3. eIDAS Qualified Certificate issued to a Legal Person on a QSCD

Purpose

The purpose of these EU Qualified Certificates are to identify the Subscriber with a high level of assurance, for the purpose of creating Qualified Electronic Seals meeting the qualification requirements defined by the eIDAS Regulation. This type of Qualified Certificate uses a QSCD for the protection of the Private Key.

These Certificates meet the relevant ETSI “Policy for EU qualified certificate issued to a legal person where the Private Key and the related certificate reside on a QSCD” (QCP-l-qscd). DigiCert Europe recommends that QCP-l-qscd certificates are used only for electronic seals.

The content of these Certificates meet the relevant requirements of:

- ETSI EN 319 412-1: Certificate Profiles; Part 1: Overview and common data structures
- ETSI EN 319 412-2: Certificate Profiles; Part 3: Certificate profile for certificates issued to legal persons
- ETSI EN 319 412-5: Certificate Profiles; Part 5: QCStatements
- ETSI TS 119 495: Qualified Certificate Profiles and TSP Policy Requirements under the payment services Directive (EU) 2015/2366

Registration Process

Identity validation procedures for these Certificates meet the relevant requirements of ETSI EN 319 411-2 for “Policy for EU qualified certificate issued to a legal person where the Private Key and the related certificate reside on a QSCD” (QCP-l-qscd).

Subjects may include an Organisation (legal person). Only methods approved for eIDAS Qualified Certificates may be used to verify the identity, authorisation, and approval of the authorised representative of the legal person. See Section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. Identity proofing may be conducted via physical presence, Remote Identity Verification (for Netherlands Qualified, RIV4 only; for Belgium Qualified, RIV4 for NFC with RIV2 as a fallback option if NFC is not available), or reliance on Qualified Electronic Signature.

Additional steps to verify PSD2 specific attributes including name of the National Competent Authority (NCA), the PSD2 Authorisation Number or other recognised identifier, and PSD2 roles. These details are provided by the Certificate Applicant and confirmed by DigiCert Europe using authentic information from the NCA (e.g, using a national public register, EBA PSD2 Register, EBA Credit Institution Register or authenticated letter). DigiCert Europe also confirms the PSD2 role(s) of the Certificate Applicant (RolesOfPSP) in accordance with the rules for validation provided by the NCA, if applicable:

- i) account servicing (PSP_AS) OID: id-psd2-role-psp-as { 0.4.0.19495.1.1 }
- ii) payment initiation (PSP_PI) OID: id-psd2-role-psp-pi { 0.4.0.19495.1.2 }
- iii) account information (PSP_AI) OID: id-psd2-role-psp-ai { 0.4.0.19495.1.3 }
- iv) issuing of card-based payment instruments (PSP_IC) OID: id-psd2-role-psp-ic { 0.4.0.19495.1.4 }

These Certificates require a QSCD that meets the requirements laid down in Annex II of the eIDAS Regulation. The Subscriber’s obligations (or respectively the obligations on the TSP managing the key on their behalf) require that the Private Key is maintained (or respectively is used) under the Subject’s sole control.

Attribute	Values	Comment
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Subject	<p>/CN (mandatory) =/0 /O (optional) /OU (optional) /organizationalIdentifier (mandatory) /serialNumber (optional) /E (optional) /L (optional) /ST (optional) /C (mandatory)</p> <p>If serialNumber is present then it must be structured per Section 5.1.3 of ETSI EN 319 412-1: 3 character identity type reference (e.g. PAS or IDC); 2 character ISO 3166 country code; hyphen-minus "-" (0x2D (ASCII), U+002D (UTF8)); and identifier.</p> <p>For PSD2: "PSD" as 3 character legal person identity type reference; 2 character ISO 3166 [7] country code representing the NCA country; hyphen-minus "-" (0x2D (ASCII), U+002D (UTF8)); and 2-8 character NCA identifier (A-Z uppercase only, no separator) hyphen-minus "-" (0x2D (ASCII), U+002D (UTF8)); and PSP identifier (authorisation number as specified by the NCA).</p>	See definitions in Section 7.1.1. Variable
SAN	/E	Optional
Certificate Policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.400 QV Qualified – QSCD or 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.410 QV Qualified QSCD – on behalf of 0.4.0.194112.1.3 (QCP-l-qscd) 2.23.140.1.5.2.1 S/MIME Org-Legacy (optional) URL: https://www.quovadisglobal.com/repository 	Fixed
Adobe Acrobat Trust List	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1.2.840.113583.1.1.9.1 Adobe Time-stamp (link to TSA) 1.2.840.113583.1.1.9.2 Adobe Archive RevInfo (long term validation) 	Optional

Key Usage (Critical)	nonRepudiation digitalSignature (optional)	Variable
Extended Key Usage	clientAuth (optional) emailProtection (optional) documentSigning (optional)	Variable (at least one is present)
qcStatements		
id-etsi-qcs-QcCompliance (0.4.0.1862.1.1) id-etsi-qcs-1	esi4-qcStatement-1: Claim that the certificate is an EU Qualified Certificate in accordance with Regulation EU No 910/2014	Fixed
id-etsi-qcs-QcSSCD (0.4.0.1862.1.4) id-etsi-qcs-4	esi4-qcStatement-4: The Private Key related to the certified public key resides on a QSCD.	Fixed
id-etsi-qcs-QcType (0.4.0.1862.1.6) id-etsi-qcs-6	esi4-qcStatement-6 : Type of certificate id-etsi-qcs-QcType 2 = Certificate for electronic Seals as defined in Regulation EU No 910/2014	Fixed
id-etsi-qcs-QcPDS (0.4.0.1862.1.5) id-etsi-qcs-5	URL= https://www.quovadisglobal.com/repository Language = EN	Fixed
id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2 (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.11.2)	0.4.0.194121.1.2 optional semantics identifier OID (id-etsi-qcs- SemanticsId-Legal) that is included in DigiCert Europe Certificates	Fixed
id-etsi-psd2-qcStatement (0.4.0.19495.2)	PSD2QcType ::= SEQUENCE{rolesOfPSP RolesOfPSP, nCAnName NCAnName,nCAId NCAId}	Only for PSD2, Variable. Refer to: ETSI TS 119 495 5.1

10.5.4. eIDAS Qualified Certificate issued to a Legal Person

Purpose

The purpose of these EU Qualified Certificates are to identify the Subscriber with a high level of assurance, for the purpose of creating Advanced Electronic Seals meeting the qualification requirements defined by the eIDAS Regulation.

These Certificates meet the relevant ETSI “Policy for EU qualified certificate issued to a legal person” (QCP-I). DigiCert Europe recommends that QCP-I certificates are used only for electronic seals. The content of these Certificates meet the relevant requirements of:

- ETSI EN 319 412-1: Certificate Profiles; Part 1: Overview and common data structures
- ETSI EN 319 412-2: Certificate Profiles; Part 3: Certificate profile for certificates issued to legal persons
- ETSI EN 319 412-5: Certificate Profiles; Part 5: QCStatements
- ETSI TS 119 495: Qualified Certificate Profiles and TSP Policy Requirements under the payment services Directive (EU) 2015/2366

Registration Process

Identity validation procedures for these Certificates meet the relevant requirements of ETSI EN 319 411-2 for “Policy for EU qualified certificate issued to a legal person” (QCP-I). The identity of the legal person and, if applicable, any specific attributes of the person, shall be verified:

Subjects may include an Organisation (legal person). Only methods approved for eIDAS Qualified Certificates may be used to verify the identity, authorisation, and approval of the authorised representative of the legal person. See Section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. Identity proofing may be conducted via physical presence, Remote Identity Verification (for Netherlands Qualified, RIV4 only; for Belgium Qualified, RIV4 for NFC with RIV2 as a fallback option if NFC is not available), or reliance on Qualified Electronic Signature.

Additional steps to verify PSD2 specific attributes including name of the National Competent Authority (NCA), the PSD2 Authorisation Number or other recognised identifier, and PSD2 roles. These details are provided by the Certificate Applicant and confirmed by DigiCert Europe using authentic information from the NCA (e.g., using a national public register, EBA PSD2 Register, EBA Credit Institution Register or authenticated letter). DigiCert Europe also confirms the PSD2 role(s) of the Certificate Applicant (RolesOfPSP) in accordance with the rules for validation provided by the NCA, if applicable:

- i) account servicing (PSP_AS)

OID: id-psd2-role-psp-as { 0.4.0.19495.1.1 }

- ii) payment initiation (PSP_PI)

OID: id-psd2-role-psp-pi { 0.4.0.19495.1.2 }

- iii) account information (PSP_AI)

OID: id-psd2-role-psp-ai { 0.4.0.19495.1.3 }

- iv) issuing of card-based payment instruments (PSP_IC)

OID: id-psd2-role-psp-ic { 0.4.0.19495.1.4 }

The Subscriber’s obligations (or respectively the obligations on the TSP managing the key on their behalf) require that the Private Key is maintained (or respectively is used) under the Subject’s sole control.

Attribute	Values	Comment
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Subject	<p>/CN (mandatory) =/0</p> <p>/O (optional)</p> <p>/OU (optional)</p> <p>organizationalIdentifier (mandatory)</p> <p>/serialNumber (optional)</p> <p>/E (optional)</p> <p>/L (optional)</p> <p>/ST (optional)</p> <p>/C (mandatory)</p> <p>If serialNumber is present then it must be structured per Section 5.1.3 of ETSI EN 319 412-1:</p> <p>3 character identity type reference (e.g. PAS or IDC);</p> <p>2 character ISO 3166 country code; hyphen-minus "-" (0x2D (ASCII), U+002D (UTF8)); and identifier.</p> <p>For PSD2:</p> <p>"PSD" as 3 character legal person identity type reference;</p> <p>2 character ISO 3166 [7] country code representing the NCA country;</p> <p>hyphen-minus "-" (0x2D (ASCII), U+002D (UTF8)); and</p> <p>2-8 character NCA identifier (A-Z uppercase only, no separator)</p> <p>hyphen-minus "-" (0x2D (ASCII), U+002D (UTF8)); and</p> <p>PSP identifier (authorisation number as specified by the NCA).</p>	<p>See definitions in Section 7.1.1. Variable</p>
SAN	/E	Optional

Certificate Policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.450 QV Qualified – no QSCD or 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.460 QV Qualified no QSCD – on behalf of 0.4.0.194112.1.1 (QCP-1) 2.23.140.1.5.2.1 S/MIME Org-Legacy (optional) URL: https://www.quovadisglobal.com/repository 	Fixed
Key Usage (Critical)	digitalSignature (optional) nonRepudiation	Variable
Extended Key Usage	clientAuth (optional) emailProtection (optional) documentSigning (optional)	Variable (at least one is present)
qcStatements		
id-etsi-qcs-QcCompliance (0.4.0.1862.1.1) id-etsi-qcs-1	esi4-qcStatement-1: Claim that the certificate is an EU Qualified Certificate in accordance with Regulation EU No 910/2014	Fixed
id-etsi-qcs-QcType (0.4.0.1862.1.6) id-etsi-qcs-6	esi4-qcStatement-6 : Type of certificate id-etsi-qcs-QcType 2 = Certificate for electronic Seals as defined in Regulation EU No 910/2014	Fixed
id-etsi-qcs-QcPDS (0.4.0.1862.1.5) id-etsi-qcs-5	URL= https://www.quovadisglobal.com/repository Language = EN	Fixed
id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2 (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.11.2)	0.4.0.194121.1.2 optional semantics identifier OID (id-etsi-qcs- SemanticsId-Legal) that is included in DigiCert Europe Certificates	Fixed
id-etsi-psd2-qcStatement (0.4.0.19495.2)	PSD2QcType ::= SEQUENCE{rolesOfPSP RolesOfPSP, nCAnName NCAnName,nCAId NCAId}	Only for PSD2, Variable. Refer to: ETSI TS 119 495 5.1

10.5.5. DigiCert Europe Qualified Website Authentication Certificate (QEVCP-w)

DigiCert Europe Qualified Website Authentication Certificates (QEVCP-w) (QWAC) are issued under the requirements of ETSI EN 319 411-2 aim to support website authentication based on a Qualified Certificate defined in articles 3 (38) and 45 of the eIDAS Regulation.

QEVCP-w Certificates issued under these requirements endorse the requirement of EV Certificates whose purpose is specified in clause 5.5 of ETSI EN 319 411-1 [2].

QWACs issued under this policy provide a means by which a visitor to a website can be assured that there is a genuine and legitimate entity standing behind the website as specified in the eIDAS Regulation.

The DigiCert Europe QWAC is designed to comply with:

- CA/Browser Forum EV Guidelines;
- ETSI EN 319 411-2 Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing EU Qualified Certificates;
- ETSI EN 319 412-4 Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Certificate profile for web site certificates; and
- ETSI EN 319 412-5 Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); QCStatements

Field	Value	Comments
Version	V3 (2)	
Serial Number	Unique system generated random number assigned to each certificate, containing at least 64 bits of output	
Validity Period	397 days.	
Subject Distinguished Name		
Organisation Name	subject:organisationName (2.5.4.10)	This field MUST contain the Subject's full legal organisation name as listed in the official records of the Incorporating or Registration Agency in the Subject's Jurisdiction of Incorporation. In addition, an assumed name or d/b/a name used by the Subject MAY be included at the beginning of this field, provided that it is followed by the full legal organisation name in parenthesis. If the combination of the full legal organisation name and the assumed or d/b/a name exceeds 64 characters as defined by RFC 5280, only the full legal organisation name will be used.

Field	Value	Comments
Organisation Identifier	subject:organisationIdentifier (2.5.4.97)	Refer to: CA/Browser Forum Ballot SC17
Organisation Unit	subject:organisationUnit (2.5.6.5)	Not permitted
Common Name	subject:commonName (2.5.4.3) cn = Common name	subjectAlternativeName:dNSName is found below in this table. This field MUST contain one or more host domain name(s) owned or controlled by the Subject and to be associated with Subject's publicly accessible server. Such server may be owned and operated by the Subject or another entity (e.g., a hosting service). Wildcard Certificates are not allowed for EV Certificates.
City or Town of Incorporation	subject:jurisdictionOfIncorporationLocalityName (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.1)	ASN.1 - X520LocalityName as specified in RFC 5280 Full name of Jurisdiction of Incorporation for an Incorporating or Registration Agency at the city or town level, including both country and state or province information as follows.
State/ Province of Incorporation	subject:jurisdictionOfIncorporationStateOrProvinceName (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.2)	ASN.1 - X520StateOrProvinceName as specified in RFC 5280 Full name of Jurisdiction of Incorporation for an Incorporating or Registration Agency at the state or province level, including country information as follows, but not city or town information above.
Country of Incorporation	subject:jurisdictionOfIncorporationCountryName (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3)	ASN.1 - X520countryName as specified in RFC 5280 Jurisdiction of Incorporation for an Incorporating or Registration Agency at the country level would include country information but would not include state or province or city or town information. Country information MUST be specified using the applicable ISO country code.

Field	Value	Comments
Registration Number	Subject:serialNumber (2.5.4.5)	For Private Organisations and Business Entities, this field MUST contain the unique Registration Number assigned to the Subject by the Incorporating or Registration Agency in its Jurisdiction of Incorporation. If the Incorporating or Registration Agency does not provide Registration Numbers, then the field will contain the date of incorporation or registration. For Government Entities, that do not have a Registration Number or verifiable date of creation, the field will contain the label "Government Entity".
Business Category	Subject:businessCategory (2.5.4.15)	This field MUST contain one of the following strings: "Private Organization", "Government Entity", "Business Entity", or "NonCommercial Entity", depending on which Section of the EV Guidelines applies to the Subject.
City or town	subject:localityName (2.5.4.7)	City or town
State or province (if any)	subject:stateOrProvinceName (2.5.4.8)	State or province (if any)
Country	subject:countryName (2.5.4.6)	Country
Subject Public Key Information	2048-bit RSA key modulus, rsaEncryption (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)	Subject Public Key Information
Signature Algorithm	sha256RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)	Signature Algorithm
Extension	Value	
Authority Key Identifier	c=no; Octet String – Same as Issuer's Subject Key Identifier	
Subject Key Identifier	c=no; Octet String – Same as calculated by CA from PKCS#10	

Field	Value	Comments
Key Usage	c=yes; Digital Signature, Key Encipherment	
Extended Key Usage	c=no; Server Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)	
Certificate Policies	c=no; [1] Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=0.4.0.194112.1.4 [2] Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier= 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.2.100.1.2 [3] Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier= 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.450 [3,1] Policy Qualifier Info: Policy Qualifier Id=CPS Qualifier: http://www.quovadisglobal.com/repository [4] Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=2.23.140.1.1	[1] QEVCP-W policy from ETSI EN 319 411-2 [2] DigiCert Europe EV policy OID [3] DigiCert Europe Qualified (not on QSCD policy OID) [4] CAB Forum EV OID
Certificate Transparency (optional)	(1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.4) This field MAY include two or more Certificate Transparency proofs from approved CT Logs.	
Subject Alternative Name	c=no; DNS = FQDN of Device (e.g., domain.com)	

Field	Value	Comments
Authority Information Access	c=no; Access Method= - id-ad-ocsp (On-line Certificate Status Protocol - 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1); URL = http://ocsp.quovadisglobal.com Access Method=Certification Authority Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2); URL = http://trust.quovadisglobal.com/qvqwebg1.crt	
CRL Distribution Points	c = no; CRL HTTP URL = http://crl.quovadisglobal.com/qvqwebg1.crl	
cabfOrganizationIdentifier	cabfOrganizationIdentifier 2.23.140.3.1	Optional Refer to: CA/Browser Forum Ballot SC17
qcStatements		
id-etsi-qcs-QcCompliance	id-etsi-qcs (1 0.4.0.1862.1.1) esi4-qcStatement-1: Claim that the certificate is an EU Qualified Certificate in accordance with Regulation EU No 910/2014	Refer to: ETSI EN 319 412-5
id-etsi-qcs-QcType	id-etsi-qcs-6 (0.4.0.1862.1.6) esi4-qcStatement-6 : Type of certificate id-etsi-qct-web (0.4.0.1862.1.6.3) id-etsi-qcs-QcType 3 = Certificate for website authentication as defined in Regulation EU No 910/2014	Refer to: ETSI EN 319 412-5
id-etsi-qcs-QcPDS	id-etsi-qcs-5 (0.4.0.1862.1.5) URL= https://www.quovadisglobal.com/repository Language = EN	Refer to: ETSI EN 319 412-5
id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.11.2	

Verification Requirements

The verification requirements for a DigiCert Europe Qualified Website Authentication (QEVCP-w)

certificate are consistent with the vetting requirements for a DigiCert Europe EV TLS certificate, with the additional verification:

DigiCert Europe policy is that DigiCert Europe Qualified Website Authentication (QEVCP-w) certificates are only issued to legal persons and not natural persons.

The identity of the legal person and, if applicable, any specific attributes of the legal person, shall be verified using methods which provide equivalent assurance in terms of reliability to the physical presence of an authorised representative of the legal person and for which DigiCert Europe can prove the equivalence.

This may include via physical presence, Remote Identity Verification (RIV4 only), or reliance on a Qualified Electronic Signature.

10.5.6. DigiCert Europe QCP-w-psd2

ETSI TS 119 495 defines QWAC profiles and TSP policy requirements under the Payment Services Directive (EU) 2015/2366, which are supplemented by Ballot SC17 of the CA/Browser Forum. DigiCert Europe QCP-w-psd2 follow the same profile as DigiCert Europe QEVCP-w Certificates with the following variations:

Field	Value	Comments
Subject Distinguished Name		
Organisation Identifier	subject:organizationIdentifier (2.5.4.97)	PSD2 Authorisation Number Refer to: ETSI TS 119 495 5.1 CA/Browser Forum Ballot SC17
Extension	Value	
Certificate Policies	c=no; [1] Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=0.4.0.194112.1.4 [2] Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier= 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.2.100.1.2 [3] Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier= 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.450 [3,1] Policy Qualifier Info: Policy Qualifier Id=CPS Qualifier: http://www.quovadisglobal.com/repository [4] Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=2.23.140.1.1 [5] Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=0.4.0.19495.3.1	[1] QEVCP-W policy from ETSI EN 319 411-2 [2] DigiCert Europe EV policy OID [3] DigiCert Europe Qualified (not on QSCD policy OID) [4] CAB Forum EV OID [5] PSD2 OID QCP-w-PSD2
cabfOrganizationIdentifier		
cabfOrganizationIdentifier	cabfOrganizationIdentifier 2.23.140.3.1	Refer to: CA/Browser Forum Ballot SC17
qcStatements		

id-etsi-qcs- QcCompliance	id-etsi-qcs (1 0.4.0.1862.1.1) esi4-qcStatement-1: Claim that the certificate is an EU Qualified Certificate in accordance with Regulation EU No 910/2014	Refer to: ETSI EN 319 412-5
id-etsi-qcs-QcType	id-etsi-qcs-6 (0.4.0.1862.1.6) esi4-qcStatement-6 : Type of certificate id-etsi-qct-web (0.4.0.1862.1.6.3) id-etsi-qcs-QcType 3 = Certificate for website authentication as defined in Regulation EU No 910/2014	Refer to: ETSI EN 319 412-5
id-etsi-qcs-QcPDS	id-etsi-qcs-5 (0.4.0.1862.1.5) URL= https://www.quovadisglobal.com/repository Language = EN	Refer to: ETSI EN 319 412-5
Etsi-psd2-qcstatement	id-etsi-psd2-qcStatement (0.4.0.19495.2) PSD2QcType ::= SEQUENCE{ rolesOfPSP RolesOfPSP, nCAName NCAName, nCAId NCAId }	Refer to: ETSI TS 119 495 5.1
id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.11.2	

Verification Requirements

The verification requirements for a DigiCert Europe Qualified Website Authentication (QCP-w-PSD) certificate are the same for QEVCP-w with additional steps to verify PSD2 specific attributes including name of the National Competent Authority (NCA), the PSD2 Authorisation Number or other recognised identifier, and PSD2 roles. DigiCert Europe also confirms the PSD2 role(s) of the Certificate Applicant (RolesOfPSP) in accordance with the rules for validation provided by the NCA, if applicable:

Authorisation Number

The PSD2 Authorisation Number within the certificate takes the following format:

PSD	NL	-	DNB	-	12345Ab
"PSD" as 3-character identifier for the Registration Scheme					
2 character ISO 3166 [7] country code representing the NCA country					
Hyphen-minus "-" (0x2D (ASCII), U+002D (UTF-8))					
2-8 character NCA identifier (A-Z uppercase only, no separator)					
hyphen-minus "-" (0x2D (ASCII), U+002D (UTF-8))					

PSD	NL	-	DNB	-	12345Ab
					PSP identifier (Authorisation Number as specified by the NCA)

NCA's are described by a name "NCAName" and an identifier "NCAId". A list of valid values for "NCAName" and "NCAId" is provided by the EBA (European Banking Authority) and published in ETSI TS 119 495, Annex D.

Note: PSP identifiers MAY contain hyphens, but Registration Schemes, ISO 3166 country codes, and NCA identifiers do not. Therefore if more than one hyphen appears in the final PSP identifier, the leftmost hyphen is a separator and the remaining hyphens are part of the PSP identifier.

PSD2 Roles

The NCA can assign one or more roles (RolesOfPSP) to payment service providers. DigiCert Europe also confirms the PSD2 role of the Certificate Applicant (RolesOfPSP):

1. account servicing (PSP_AS)
 - OID: id-psd2-role-psp-as { 0.4.0.19495.1.1 }
Role: PSP_AS
2. payment initiation (PSP_PI)
 - OID: id-psd2-role-psp-pi { 0.4.0.19495.1.2 }
Role: PSP_PI
3. account information (PSP_AI)
 - OID: id-psd2-role-psp-ai { 0.4.0.19495.1.3 }
Role: PSP_AI
4. issuing of card-based payment instruments (PSP_IC)
 - OID: id-psd2-role-psp-ic { 0.4.0.19495.1.4 }
Role: PSP_IC

Revocation Requests

Based on an authenticated request from an NCA, in accordance with ETSI TS 119 495 Section 6.2.6, DigiCert Europe shall revoke a PSD2 certificate within 24 hours if:

- the Authorisation of the PSP has been revoked;
- any PSP role included in the certificate has been revoked.

DigiCert Europe will investigate unauthenticated requests from an NCA, and shall revoke the affected certificate(s) if necessary. Unauthenticated NCA notifications need not be processed within 24 hours.

10.6. ZERTES QUALIFIED AND REGULATED

10.6.1. Swiss Qualified Certificate

Purpose

Swiss Qualified Certificates are Qualified personal certificates according to the Swiss Federal signature law (ZertES). They are issued out of the “QuoVadis Swiss Regulated CAs” and have the notice text “qualified certificate” in the CertificatePolicies user notice. Swiss Qualified Certificates are used to sign documents electronically. The Digital Signature is legally equivalent to a handwritten signature.

Registration Process

Swiss Qualified Certificates are issued in accordance with the ZertES requirements using various DigiCert Europe Signing Services designed for this type of Certificate. The guidelines in TAV-ZERTES apply to the specification of Qualified Switzerland Certificates.

Subjects may include an Individual (natural person) or a natural person identified in association with an Organisation. See Section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. Only Remote Identity Verification means approved according to ZertES may be used. Identity proofing may be conducted via physical presence, Remote Identity Verification (RIV4 for NFC with RIV2 as a fallback option if NFC is not available), reliance on Qualified Electronic Signature, or video verification. Only a valid passport or national ID which allows entrance into Switzerland is accepted as evidence. Storage of personal data is in accordance with ZertES.

Private Keys for Swiss Qualified Certificates are generated and stored on an HSM or USB Token that meets the ZertES requirements FIPS PUB 140-2, level 3 or EAL 4 standards. HSMs for DigiCert Europe Signing Services are located in DigiCert Europe datacentres. Access by the Subscriber to the keys is protected using multifactor authentication aimed to achieve the same level of assurance of sole control as achieved by a stand-alone SSCD. Swiss Qualified Certificates have a maximum validity of three years; in special use-cases they are issued with a validity of only one hour.

Attribute	Values	Comment
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Purpose		
Subject	<p>/CN (mandatory) = Natural Person (/GN+/SN or Pseudonym)</p> <p>/GN (mandatory if CN without Pseudonym, Optional if SN is present) /SN (mandatory if CN without Pseudonym, Optional if GN is present)</p> <p>Pseudonym (optional if natural person)</p> <p>/T (optional) /O (optional) /OU (optional) /organizationIdentifier (optional) /serialNumber (optional) /E (optional) /L (optional) /ST (optional) /C (mandatory)</p> <p>If serialNumber is present then Section 5.1.3 of ETSI EN 319 412-1 applies.</p>	<p>See definitions in Section 7.1.1</p> <p>Variable</p>
SAN	/E	Variable

Purpose		
Certificate Policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.400 QV Qualified – QSCD or 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.410 QV Qualified QSCD – on behalf of 0.4.0.194112.1.2 (QCP-n-qcsd) • 2.23.140.1.5.3.1 S/MIME Sponsor-Legacy (optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.4.1 S/MIME Individual-Legacy (optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.3.2 S/MIME Sponsor-Multipurpose (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.3.3 S/MIME Sponsor-Strict (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.4.2 S/MIME Individual-Multipurpose (Optional) • 2.23.140.1.5.4.3 S/MIME Individual-Strict (Optional) • URL: https://www.quovadisglobal.com/repository • User Notice : qualified certificate 	Fixed (Effective July 15, 2025 S/MIME Subscriber Certificates SHALL NOT be issued using the Legacy Generation profiles 2.23.140.1.5.1.1, 2.23.140.1.5.2.1, 2.23.140.1.5.3.1, or 2.23.140.1.5.4.1.)
Adobe Acrobat Trust List	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1.2.840.113583.1.1.9.1 Adobe Time-stamp (link to TSA) • 1.2.840.113583.1.1.9.2 Adobe Archive RevInfo (long term validation) 	Optional
Key Usage (Critical)	nonRepudiation	Fixed
Extended Key Usage	emailProtection documentSigning	Fixed
qcStatements		

Purpose		
id-etsi-qcs-QcCompliance (0.4.0.1862.1.1) id-etsi-qcs-1	esi4-qcStatement-1: Claim that the certificate is an EU Qualified Certificate in accordance with Regulation EU No 910/2014 esi4-qcStatement-7: Claim that the certificate is a Swiss Qualified Certificate (CH)	Fixed: issued before January 13, 2021
id-etsi-qcs-QcCClegislation (0.4.0.1862.1.7) id-etsi-qcs-7		Fixed: issued after January 13, 2021
id-etsi-qcs-QcSSCD (0.4.0.1862.1.4) id-etsi-qcs-4	esi4-qcStatement-4: The Private Key related to the certified public key resides on a QSCD.	Fixed
id-etsi-qcs-QcType (0.4.0.1862.1.6) id-etsi-qcs-6	esi4-qcStatement-6: Type of certificate id-etsi-qcs-QcType 1 = Certificate for electronic Signatures as defined in Regulation EU No 910/2014	Fixed
id-etsi-qcs-QcPDS (0.4.0.1862.1.5) id-etsi-qcs-5	URL= https://www.quovadisglobal.com/repository Language = en	Fixed
id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2 (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.11.2)	0.4.0.194121.1.2 (optional semantics identifier OID that is included in DigiCert Europe Certificates)	Optional

10.6.2. Swiss Regulated Certificate issued to a Natural Person

Purpose

Swiss Regulated Certificates (non qualified) issued under the Swiss Federal signature law (ZertES) are included in the Advanced+ Certificate Class. They are issued out of Swiss Regulated CAs and have the notice text “regulated certificate” in the CertificatePolicies user notice. Swiss Qualified Certificates are described in a separate Section of this CP/CPS.

Registration Process

Swiss Regulated Certificates are issued in accordance with the ZertES requirements using the DigiCert Europe Signing Service. The guidelines in TAV-ZERTES apply to the specification of Swiss Regulated Certificates.

For the issuance and life cycle management of Swiss Regulated Certificates, DigiCert Europe adheres to the same organisational and operational procedures and uses the same technical infrastructure as for a ZertES Qualified Certificate.

Subjects may include an Individual (natural person) or a natural person identified in association with an Organisation. See Section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. Identity proofing may be conducted via physical presence, Remote Identity Verification (RIV4 for NFC with RIV2 as a fallback option if NFC is not available), reliance on electronic signature, or video verification (in enrolments involving Financial Intermediaries).

Only a valid passport or national ID which allows entrance into Switzerland is accepted as evidence. Storage of personal data is in accordance with ZertES.

These Certificates require a QSCD that meets the requirements laid down in Annex II of the eIDAS Regulation. The Subscriber’s obligations (or the obligations on the TSP managing the key on their behalf) require that the Private Key is maintained (or is used) under the Subject’s sole control. Swiss Regulated Certificates have a maximum validity of three years.

Attribute	Values	Comment
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Subject	/CN (mandatory) = Natural Person (/GN+/SN or Pseudonym) /GN (mandatory if CN without Pseudonym) /SN (mandatory if CN without Pseudonym) Pseudonym (optional for natural person) /T (optional) /O (optional) /OU (optional) /organizationIdentifier (optional) /E (optional) /L (optional) /ST (optional) /C (mandatory)	See definitions in Section 7.1.1 Variable
SAN	/E 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.3 UPN	Variable
Certificate Policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.300 QV Advanced+ Certificate 0.4.0.2042.1.2 ETSI NCP+ OID 2.23.140.1.5.3.1 S/MIME Sponsor-Legacy (optional) 2.23.140.1.5.4.1 S/MIME Individual-Legacy (optional) 2.23.140.1.5.3.2 S/MIME Sponsor-Multipurpose (Optional) 2.23.140.1.5.3.3 S/MIME Sponsor-Strict (Optional) 2.23.140.1.5.4.2 S/MIME Individual-Multipurpose (Optional) 2.23.140.1.5.4.3 S/MIME Individual-Strict (Optional) URL: https://www.quovadisglobal.com/repository User Notice: Regulated certificate 	Fixed (Effective July 15, 2025 S/MIME Subscriber Certificates SHALL NOT be issued using the Legacy Generation profiles 2.23.140.1.5.1.1, 2.23.140.1.5.2.1, 2.23.140.1.5.3.1, or 2.23.140.1.5.4.1.)

Adobe Acrobat Trust List	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1.2.840.113583.1.1.9.1 Adobe Time-stamp (link to TSA) • 1.2.840.113583.1.1.9.2 Adobe Archive RevInfo (long term validation) 	Optional
Key Usage (Critical)	digitalSignature	Fixed
Extended Key Usage	clientAuth emailProtection smartcardlogon	Fixed
qcStatements		
id-etsi-qcs-QcCompliance (0.4.0.1862.1.1) id-etsi-qcs-1	esi4-qcStatement-1: Claim that the certificate is an EU Qualified Certificate in accordance with Regulation EU No 910/2014	Fixed
id-etsi-qcs-QcCClegislation (0.4.0.1862.1.7) id-etsi-qcs-7	esi4-qcStatement-7: Claim that the certificate is a Swiss Qualified Certificate (CH)	
id-etsi-qcs-QcSSCD (0.4.0.1862.1.4) id-etsi-qcs-4	esi4-qcStatement-4: The Private Key related to the certified public key resides on a QSCD.	Fixed

10.6.3. Swiss Regulated Certificate issued to a Legal Person (Company Seal)

Purpose

Swiss Regulated Certificates (non qualified) issued under the Swiss Federal signature law (ZertES) are included in the Advanced+ Certificate Class. They are issued out of Swiss Regulated CAs and have the notice text “regulated certificate” in the CertificatePolicies user notice. Swiss Qualified Certificates are described in a separate Section of this CP/CPS.

Registration Process

Swiss Regulated Certificates are issued in accordance with the ZertES requirements using the DigiCert Europe Signing Service. The guidelines in TAV-ZERTES apply to the specification of Swiss Regulated Certificates.

For the issuance and life cycle management of Swiss Regulated Certificates, DigiCert Europe adheres to the same organisational and operational procedures and uses the same technical infrastructure as for a ZertES compliant Qualified Certificate.

Subjects may include an Organisation (legal person). Only methods approved for ZertES may be used to verify the identity, authorisation, and approval of the authorised representative of the legal person. See Section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. Identity proofing may be conducted via physical presence, Remote Identity Verification (RIV4 for NFC with RIV2 as a fallback option if NFC is not available), reliance on electronic signature, or video verification (in enrolments involving Financial Intermediaries).

Only a valid passport or national ID which allows entrance into Switzerland is accepted as evidence. Storage of personal data is in accordance with ZertES. These Certificates require a QSCD that meets the requirements laid down in Annex II of the eIDAS Regulation. The Subscriber’s obligations (or the obligations on the TSP managing the key on their behalf) require that the Private Key is maintained (or is used) under the Subject’s sole control. Swiss Regulated Certificates have a maximum validity of three years.

Attribute	Values	Comment
Subject	/CN (mandatory) = /O /O (mandatory) /OU (optional) /organizationIdentifier (mandatory) /E (optional) /L (optional) /ST (optional) /C (mandatory)	See definitions in Section 7.1.1 Variable
SAN	/E	Variable

Purpose		
Certificate Policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.1.300 QV Advanced+ Certificate 0.4.0.2042.1.2 ETSI NCP+ OID 2.23.140.1.5.2.1 S/MIME Org-Legacy (optional) 2.23.140.1.5.2.2 S/MIME Org-Multipurpose (Optional) 2.23.140.1.5.2.3 S/MIME Org-Strict (Optional) URL: https://www.quovadisglobal.com/repository User Notice: Regulated certificate 	Fixed (Effective July 15, 2025 S/MIME Subscriber Certificates SHALL NOT be issued using the Legacy Generation profiles 2.23.140.1.5.1.1, 2.23.140.1.5.2.1, 2.23.140.1.5.3.1, or 2.23.140.1.5.4.1.)
Adobe Acrobat Trust List	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1.2.840.113583.1.1.9.1 Adobe Time-stamp (link to TSA) 1.2.840.113583.1.1.9.2 Adobe Archive RevInfo (long term validation) 	Optional
Key Usage (Critical)	digitalSignature	Fixed
Extended Key Usage	emailProtection documentSigning	Fixed
qcStatements		
id-etsi-qcs-QcCompliance (0.4.0.1862.1.1) id-etsi-qcs-1	esi4-qcStatement-1: Claim that the certificate is an EU Qualified Certificate in accordance with Regulation EU No 910/2014	Fixed
id-etsi-qcs-QcCClegislation (0.4.0.1862.1.7) id-etsi-qcs-7	esi4-qcStatement-7: Claim that the certificate is a Swiss Qualified Certificate (CH)	
id-etsi-qcs-QcSSCD (0.4.0.1862.1.4) id-etsi-qcs-4	esi4-qcStatement-4: The Private Key related to the certified public key resides on a QSCD.	Fixed

The OU attribute of a Swiss Regulated Certificate issued to a Swiss Government Authority complies with the requirements of Section 2.3.4 of TAV-ZERTES.

10.7. CLOSED COMMUNITY

Closed Community Issuing CAs can, under contract, create Certificate Profiles for the issuance of Certificates to members of that community. Certificates issued by Closed Community Issuing CAs are for reliance by members of that community only, and as such a Closed Community Issuing CA can, by publication of a stand-alone CP/CPS to its community issue various Certificates in accordance with the CP/CPS.

DigiCert Europe must approve all closed community Certificate policies to ensure that they do not conflict with the terms of the relevant CP/CPS and also industry standards. Under no circumstances can Closed Community Issuing CAs issue eIDAS or ZertES Qualified or Regulated Certificates.

10.8. DEVICE

Purpose
Device Certificates are intended for a variety of uses including for Time-stamp Authority (TSA) applications.
Registration Process
DigiCert Europe acts as RA for Device Certificates it issues. Before issuing a Device Certificate, DigiCert Europe performs procedures to verify that all Subject information in the Certificate is correct, and that the Applicant is authorised to use the domain name and/or Organisation name to be included in the Certificate, and has accepted a Subscriber Agreement for the requested Certificate.
Documentation requirements for organisation Applicants may include Certificate of Incorporation, Memorandum of Association, Articles of Incorporation or equivalent documents. Documentation requirements for individual Applicants may include trustworthy, valid photo ID issued by a Government Agency (such as a passport).
DigiCert Europe may accept at its discretion other official documentation supporting an application. For additional details, see the DigiCert Europe Time Stamp Policy / Practice Statement including Section 4.3 TimeStamping Authority.

10.9. TLS CERTIFICATES

10.9.1. OV - Business TLS

Field	Value
Validity Period	397 days
Subject Distinguished Name	
Organisation Name	subject:organisationName (2.5.4.10)
Organisation Unit	subject:organisationUnit (2.5.6.5) Discontinued effective August 31, 2020.

Common Name	subject:commonName (2.5.4.3) cn = Common name
State or province (if any)	subject:stateOrProvinceName (2.5.4.8)
Country	subject:countryName (2.5.4.6)
Subject Public Key Information	2048-bit RSA key modulus, rsaEncryption (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
Signature Algorithm	sha256RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
Extension	Value
Authority Key Identifier	c=no; Octet String – Same as Issuer’s Subject Key Identifier
Subject Key Identifier	c=no; Octet String – Same as calculated by CA from PKCS#10
Key Usage	c=yes; Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
Extended Key Usage	c=no; serverAuth (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) clientAuth (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)
Certificate Policies	c=no; Certificate Policies; {1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.1.100.1.1 or 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.3.100.1.1 or 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.2.100.1.1} Certificate Policies; {2.23.140.1.2.2} [1,1] Policy Qualifier Info: Policy Qualifier Id=CPS Qualifier: http://www.quovadisglobal.com/repository
Certificate Transparency (optional)	(1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.4) This field MAY include two or more Certificate Transparency proofs from approved CT Logs.

Purposes of Business TLS

DigiCert Europe Business TLS Certificates are intended for use in establishing web-based data communication conduits via TLS protocols. The primary purposes of a Business TLS Certificate are to:

- Identify the individual or entity that controls a website; and
- Facilitate the exchange of encryption keys in order to enable the encrypted communication of information over the Internet between the user of an Internet browser and a website.

DigiCert Europe Certificates focus only on the identity of the Subject named in the Certificate, and not on the behaviour of the Subject. As such, Certificates are not intended to provide any assurances, or otherwise represent or warrant:

- That the Subject named in the Certificate is actively engaged in doing business;
- That the Subject named in the Certificate complies with applicable laws;
- That the Subject named in the Certificate is trustworthy, honest, or reputable in its business

dealings; or

- That it is “safe” to do business with the Subject named in the Certificate.

Eligible Applicants

Individuals (natural persons), incorporated entities, government entities, general partnerships, unincorporated associations, and sole proprietorships may apply for DigiCert Europe Business TLS Certificates.

Verification Requirements

Identity: DigiCert Europe verifies the identity and address of the organisation and that the address is the Applicant’s address of existence or operation. DigiCert Europe verifies the identity and address of the Applicant using documentation provided by, or through communication with, at least one of the following:

1. A government agency in the jurisdiction of the Applicant’s legal creation, existence, or recognition;
2. A third party database that is periodically updated and considered a Reliable Data Source;
3. A site visit by the CA or a third party who is acting as an agent for the CA; or
4. An Attestation Letter.

DBA/Tradename: If the Subject Identity Information is to include a DBA or tradename, DigiCert Europe verifies the Applicant’s right to use the DBA/tradename using at least one of the following:

1. Documentation provided by, or communication with, a government agency in the jurisdiction of the Applicant’s legal creation, existence, or recognition;
2. A Reliable Data Source;
3. Communication with a government agency responsible for the management of such DBAs or tradenames;
4. An Attestation Letter accompanied by documentary support; or
5. A utility bill, bank statement, credit card statement, government-issued tax document, or other form of identification that the CA determines to be reliable.

Verification of Country: DigiCert Europe verifies the country associated with the Subject using one of the following:

1. the IP Address range assignment by country for either the web site’s IP address, as indicated by the DNS record for the web site or the Applicant’s IP address;
2. the ccTLD of the requested Domain Name;
3. information provided by the Domain Name Registrar; or
4. a method identified in “Identity” above.

Application Process

During the Certificate approval process, DigiCert Europe Validation Specialists employ controls to

validate the identity of the Applicant and other information featured in the Certificate Application to ensure compliance with this CP/CPS.

Step 1: The Applicant provides a signed Certificate Application to DigiCert Europe, which includes identifying information to assist DigiCert Europe in processing the request and issuing the Business TLS Certificate, along with a PKCS#10 CSR and billing details.

Step 2: DigiCert Europe independently verifies information using a variety of sources.

Step 3: The Applicant accepts the Subscriber Agreement and approves Certificate issuance.

Step 4: All signatures are verified through follow-up procedures or telephone calls.

Step 5: DigiCert Europe obtains and documents further explanation or clarification as necessary to resolve discrepancies or details requiring further explanation. If satisfactory explanation and/or additional documentation are not received within a reasonable time, DigiCert Europe will decline the Certificate request and notify the Applicant accordingly. Two DigiCert Europe Validation Specialists must approve issuance of the Certificate.

Step 6: DigiCert Europe creates the Business TLS Certificate.

Step 7: The Business TLS Certificate is delivered to the Applicant.

Renewal

Renewal requirements and procedures include verification that the Applicant continues to have authority to use the domain name, and that the Certificate Application is approved by an authorised representative of the Applicant.

10.9.2. EV - Extended Validation TLS

Field	Value	Comments
Validity Period	397 days	
Subject Distinguished Name		
organisationName (2.5.4.10)	This field MUST contain the Subject's full legal organisation name as listed in the official records of the Incorporating or Registration Agency in the Subject's Jurisdiction of Incorporation. In addition, an assumed name or d/b/a name used by the Subject MAY be included at the beginning of this field, provided that it is followed by the full legal organisation name in parenthesis. If the combination of the full legal organisation name and the assumed or d/b/a name exceeds 64 characters as defined by RFC 5280, only the full legal organisation name will be used.	subject:organisation Name (2.5.4.10)
organisationUnit (2.5.6.5)	Not permitted in EV TLS.	subject:organisation
commonName (2.5.4.3) cn = Common name	subjectAlternativeName:dNSName is found below in this table. This field MUST contain one or more host domain name(s) owned or controlled by the Subject and to be associated with Subject's publicly accessible server. Such server may be owned and operated by the Subject or another entity (e.g., a hosting service). Wildcard Certificates are not allowed for EV Certificates.	subject:commonName (2.5.4.3) cn = Common name
Organisation Identifier (2.5.4.97) (optional)	subject:organizationIdentifier (2.5.4.97)	Refer to: CA/Browser Forum Ballot SC17
jurisdictionOfIncorporation LocalityName (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.1)	ASN.1 - X520LocalityName as specified in RFC 5280 Full name of Jurisdiction of Incorporation for an Incorporating or Registration Agency at the city or town level, including both country and state or province information as follows.	subject:jurisdictionOfIncorporationLocalityName (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.1)

jurisdictionOfIncorporationStateOrProvinceName (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.2)	ASN.1 - X520StateOrProvinceName as specified in RFC 5280 Full name of Jurisdiction of Incorporation for an Incorporating or Registration Agency at the state or province level, including country information as follows, but not city or town information above.	subject:jurisdictionOfIncorporationStateOrProvinceName (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.2)
jurisdictionOfIncorporationCountryName (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3)	ASN.1 - X520countryName as specified in RFC 5280 Jurisdiction of Incorporation for an Incorporating or Registration Agency at the country level would include country information but would not include state or province or city or town information. Country information MUST be specified using the applicable ISO country code	subject:jurisdictionOfIncorporationCountryName (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3)
serialNumber (2.5.4.5)	For Private Organisations and Business Entities, this field MUST contain the unique Registration Number assigned to the Subject by the Incorporating or Registration Agency in its Jurisdiction of Incorporation. If the Incorporating or Registration Agency does not provide Registration Numbers, then the field will contain the date of incorporation or registration. For Government Entities, that do not have a Registration Number or verifiable date of creation, the field will contain the label "Government Entity".	Subject:serialNumber (2.5.4.5)
businessCategory (2.5.4.15)	This field MUST contain one of the following strings: "Private Organization", "Government Entity", "Business Entity", or "Non-Commercial Entity", depending on which Section of the EV Guidelines applies to the Subject.	Subject:businessCategory (2.5.4.15)
Number & street (optional)	subject:streetAddress (2.5.4.9)	
City or town	subject:localityName (2.5.4.7)	
State or province (if any)	subject:stateOrProvinceName (2.5.4.8)	
Country	subject:countryName (2.5.4.6)	
Postal code (optional)	subject:postalCode (2.5.4.17)	

Subject Public Key Information	2048-bit or 3072-bit RSA key modulus, rsaEncryption (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)	
Signature Algorithm	sha256RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)	
Extension	Value	
Authority Key Identifier	c=no; Octet String – Same as Issuer’s Subject Key Identifier	
Subject Key Identifier	c=no; Octet String – Same as calculated by CA from PKCS#10	
Extended Key Usage	c=no; Server Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)	
Certificate Policies	c=no; Certificate Policies; {1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.2.100.1.2 } Certificate Policies; { 2.23.140.1.1} [1,1] Policy Qualifier Info: Policy Qualifier Id=CPS Qualifier: http://www.quovadisglobal.com/repository [1,2] Policy Qualifier Info: Policy Qualifier Id=User Notice Qualifier: Notice Text= Any use of this Certificate constitutes acceptance of the QuoVadis Root CA 2 Certification Policies and Certificate Practice Statement.	
Certificate Transparency (optional)	(1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.4) This field may include two or more Certificate Transparency proofs from approved CT Logs.	
Subject Alternative Name	c=no; DNS = FQDN of Device (e.g., domain.com)	
Authority Information Access	c=no; Access Method= - id-ad-ocsp (On-line Certificate Status Protocol - 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1); URL = http://ocsp.quovadisglobal.com	
CRL Distribution Points	c = no; CRL HTTP URL = http://crl.quovadisglobal.com/QVSSLICA.crl or http://crl.quovadisglobal.com/qvsslg2.crl or http://crl.quovadisglobal.com/qvsslg3.crl	

cabfOrganizationIdentifier	cabfOrganizationIdentifier 2.23.140.3.1	Optional
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Purpose of EV TLS EV TLS Certificates are intended for use in establishing web-based data communication conduits via TLS protocols. The primary purposes of a EV TLS Certificate are to:

- Identify the legal entity that controls a website;
- Provide a reasonable assurance to the user of an Internet browser that the website the user is accessing is controlled by a specific legal entity identified in the EV Certificate by name, address of Place of Business, Jurisdiction of Incorporation, and Registration Number; and
- Facilitate the exchange of encryption keys in order to enable the encrypted communication of information over the Internet between the user of an Internet browser and a website.

EV TLS also help establish the legitimacy of a business claiming to operate a website by confirming its legal and physical existence; provide a vehicle that can be used to assist in addressing problems related to phishing and other forms of online identity fraud; and assist law enforcement in investigations including where appropriate, contacting, investigating, or taking legal action against the Subject.

DigiCert Europe Certificates focus only on the identity of the Subject named in the Certificate, and not on the behaviour of the Subject. As such, DigiCert Europe Certificates are not intended to provide any assurances, or otherwise represent or warrant:

- That the Subject named in the Certificate is actively engaged in doing business;
- That the Subject named in the Certificate complies with applicable laws;
- That the Subject named in the Certificate is trustworthy, honest, or reputable in its business dealings; or
- That it is “safe” to do business with the Subject named in the Certificate.

Eligible Applicants

DigiCert Europe issues EV Certificates to Private Organisations, Government Entities, Business Entities and NonCommercial Entities satisfying the requirements specified below:

1. Private Organisation Subjects

- The Private Organisation MUST be a legally recognised entity whose existence was created by a filing with (or an act of) the Incorporating or Registration Agency in its Jurisdiction of Incorporation (e.g., by issuance of a Certificate of incorporation) or is an entity that is chartered by a state or federal regulatory agency;
- The Private Organisation MUST have designated with the Incorporating Agency either a Registered Agent or Registered Office (as required under the laws of the Jurisdiction of Incorporation) or equivalent;
- The Private Organisation MUST NOT be designated on the records of the Incorporating Agency by labels such as
- “inactive,” “invalid,” “not current,” or an equivalent facility;

- The Private Organisation MUST have a verifiable physical existence and business presence.
- The Private Organisation's Jurisdiction of Incorporation, Registration, Charter, or License and/or its Place of Business MUST NOT be in any country where DigiCert Europe is prohibited from doing business or issuing a Certificate by the laws of the United States; and
- The Private Organisation MUST NOT be listed on any government denial list or prohibited list (e.g., trade embargo) under the laws of the United States.

2. Government Entity Subjects

- The legal existence of the Government Entity MUST be established by the political subdivision in which it operates;
- The Government Entity MUST NOT be in any country where DigiCert Europe is prohibited from doing business or issuing a Certificate by the laws of the United States; and
- The Government Entity MUST NOT be listed on any government denial list or prohibited list (e.g., trade embargo) under the laws of the United States.

3. Business Entity Subjects Business Entities are entities that do not qualify as Private Organisations as defined in subSection (a) but do satisfy the following requirements. Business Entities may include general partnerships, unincorporated associations, sole proprietorships, and individuals (natural persons).

- The Business Entity MUST be a legally recognised entity whose formation included the filing of certain forms with the Registration Agency in its Jurisdiction, the issuance or approval by such Registration Agency of a charter, Certificate, or license, and whose existence can be verified with that Registration Agency;
- The Business Entity MUST have a verifiable physical existence and business presence;
- At least one Principal Individual associated with the Business Entity MUST be identified and validated;
- The identified Principal Individual MUST attest to the representations made in the Subscriber Agreement;
- Where the Business Entity represents itself under an assumed name, DigiCert Europe MUST verify the Business Entity's use of the assumed name;
- The Business Entity and the identified Principal Individual associated with the Business Entity MUST NOT be located or residing in any country where DigiCert Europe is prohibited from doing business or issuing a Certificate under the laws of the United States; and
- The Business Entity and the identified Principal Individual associated with the Business Entity MUST NOT be listed on any government denial list or prohibited list (such as a trade embargo) under the laws of the United States.

4. Non-Commercial Entity Subjects Non-Commercial Entities are entities who do not qualify under subSections (a), (b) or (c) above, but that do satisfy the following requirements:

- The Applicant is an International Organisation Entity, created under a charter, treaty, convention or equivalent instrument that was signed by, or on behalf of, more than one country's government. The CA/Browser Forum may publish a listing of International Organizations that have been approved for EV eligibility; and
- The International Organisation Entity MUST NOT be headquartered in any country where

the CA is prohibited from doing business or issuing a certificate by the laws of the United States; and

- The International Organisation Entity MUST NOT be listed on any government denial list or prohibited list (e.g., trade embargo) under the laws of the United States.
- Subsidiary organisations or agencies of qualified International Organisations may also qualify for EV Certificates issued in accordance with the EV Guidelines.

Additional Warranties and Representations for EV Certificates

DigiCert Europe makes the following EV Certificate Warranties solely to Subscribers, Certificate Subjects, Application Software Vendors with whom DigiCert Europe has entered into a contract for inclusion of its Root Certificate in software distributed by such Application Software Vendors, and all Relying Parties that actually rely on such EV Certificate during the period when it is valid, that it followed the requirements of the EV Guidelines and this CP/CPS in issuing the EV Certificate and in verifying the accuracy of the information contained in the EV Certificate (EV Certificate Warranties).

The EV Certificate Warranties specifically include, but are not limited to, warranties that:

- **Legal Existence:** DigiCert Europe has confirmed with the Incorporating or Registration Agency in the Subject's Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration that, as of the date the EV Certificate was issued, the Subject named in the EV Certificate legally exists as a valid organisation or entity in the Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration;
- **Identity:** DigiCert Europe has confirmed that, as of the date the EV Certificate was issued, the legal name of the Subject named in the EV Certificate matches the name on the official government records of the Incorporating or Registration Agency in the Subject's Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration, and if an assumed name is also included, that the assumed name is properly registered by the Subject in the jurisdiction of its Place of Business;
- **Right to Use Domain Name:** DigiCert Europe has taken all steps reasonably necessary to verify that, as of the date the EV Certificate was issued, the Subject named in the EV Certificate has the exclusive right to use the domain name(s) listed in the EV Certificate;
- **Authorisation for EV Certificate:** DigiCert Europe has taken all steps reasonably necessary to verify that the Subject named in the EV Certificate has authorised the issuance of the EV Certificate;
- **Accuracy of Information:** DigiCert Europe has taken all steps reasonably necessary to verify that all of the other information in the EV Certificate is accurate, as of the date the EV Certificate was issued;
- **Subscriber Agreement:** The Subject named in the EV Certificate has entered into a legally valid and enforceable Subscriber Agreement with DigiCert Europe that satisfies the requirements of the EV Guidelines or the Applicant Representative has acknowledged and accepted the Terms of Use;
- **Status:** DigiCert Europe will follow the requirements of the EV Guidelines and maintains a 24/7 online accessible Repository with current information regarding the status of the EV Certificate as Valid or Revoked; and
- **Revocation:** DigiCert Europe will follow the requirements of the EV Guidelines and revoke the

EV Certificate upon the occurrence of any revocation event as specified in the EV Guidelines.

Verification Requirements

Before issuing an EV Certificate, DigiCert Europe ensures that all Subject organisation information in the EV Certificate conforms to the requirements of, and has been verified in accordance with, the EV Guidelines and matches the information confirmed and documented by the CA pursuant to its verification processes. Such verification processes are intended to accomplish the following:

1. Verify Applicant's existence and identity, including;
 - Verify Applicant's legal existence and identity (as established with an Incorporating Agency),
 - Verify Applicant's physical existence (business presence at a physical address), and
 - Verify Applicant's operational existence (business activity).
2. Verify Applicant (or a corporate parent/subsidiary) is a registered holder or has exclusive control of the domain name to be included in the EV Certificate;
3. Verify Applicant's authorisation for the EV Certificate, including;
 - Verify the name, title, and authority of the Contract Signer, Certificate Approver, and Certificate Requester;
 - Verify that Contract Signer signed the Subscriber Agreement; and
 - Verify that a Certificate Approver has signed or otherwise approved the EV Certificate request.

The vetting regime of the EV Guidelines includes detailed verification procedures, which vary by Subscriber, and may include direct confirmation with Incorporating Agencies as well as correlation of information from certain qualified commercial data providers, site visits, and independent confirmations from senior officers of the Applicant. Verified opinion letters from attorneys and accountants representing the Applicant, as well as bank account verifications, may also be used to fulfil aspects of the vetting process.

Applicant Contacts

The EV Guidelines specify a number of Applicant roles involved in the EV verification process. All must be filled by natural persons (i.e., specific individuals as opposed to generic titles or automated systems). The Applicant may authorise one individual to occupy two or more of these roles. The Applicant may authorise more than one individual to occupy any of these roles. DigiCert Europe requires Applicants for EV Certificates to execute an EV Authority Letter to identify and authorise the various Applicant contacts, as well as to enable the use of online confirmations and approvals for various aspects of the EV process.

- **Certificate Requester:** The initial contact that submits the Certificate Application to QV on behalf of the Applicant. This person does NOT need to be an employee of the Applicant, but must be an authorised agent with express authority to represent the Applicant. Certificate Requesters are formally recognised by DigiCert Europe only after DigiCert Europe has confirmed their appointment with the Applicant.
- **Certificate Approver:** MUST be either the Applicant, employed by the Applicant, or an authorised agent who has express authority to represent the Applicant to (i) act as a Certificate

Requester and to authorise other employees or third parties to act as a Certificate Requester, and (ii) to approve EV Certificate requests submitted by other Certificate Requesters.

- **Contract Signer:** MUST be either the Applicant, employed by the Applicant, or an authorised agent who has express authority to represent the Applicant, and who has authority on behalf of the Applicant to sign Subscriber Agreements.
- **Confirming Person:** Must be a senior officer of the Applicant (e.g., Secretary, President, CEO, CFO, COO, CIO, CSO, Director, etc.) able to sign the QV Authority Letter on behalf of the Applicant.

Subscriber Agreement

Each Applicant must enter into a Subscriber Agreement with DigiCert Europe which specifically names both the Applicant and the individual Contract Signer signing the Agreement on the Applicant's behalf, and contains provisions imposing on the Applicant the following obligations and warranties:

- **Accuracy of Information:** An obligation and warranty to provide accurate and complete information at all times to the DigiCert Europe, both in the EV Certificate request and as otherwise requested by the DigiCert Europe in connection with the issuance of the EV Certificate(s) to be supplied by the DigiCert Europe;
- **Protection of Private Key:** An obligation and warranty by the Subscriber or a subcontractor (e.g. hosting provider) to take all reasonable measures necessary to maintain sole control of, keep confidential, and properly protect at all times the Private Key that corresponds to the Public Key to be included in the requested EV Certificate(s) (and any associated access information or device – e.g., password or token);
- **Acceptance of EV Certificate:** An obligation and warranty that it will not install and use the EV Certificate(s) until it has reviewed and verified the accuracy of the data in each EV Certificate;
- **Use of EV Certificate:** An obligation and warranty to install the EV Certificate only on the server accessible at a domain name listed on the EV Certificate, and to use the EV Certificate solely in compliance with all applicable laws, solely for authorised company business, and solely in accordance with the Subscriber Agreement;
- **Reporting and Revocation Upon Compromise:** An obligation and warranty to promptly cease using an EV Certificate and its associated Private Key, and promptly request the DigiCert Europe to revoke the EV Certificate, in the event that:
 - (a) any information in the EV Certificate is or becomes incorrect or inaccurate, or (b) there is any actual or suspected misuse or compromise of the Subscriber's Private Key associated with the Public Key listed in the EV Certificate; and
- **Termination of Use of EV Certificate:** An obligation and warranty to promptly cease all use of the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key listed in an EV Certificate upon expiration or revocation of that EV Certificate.

Application Process

During the Certificate approval process, DigiCert Europe Validation Specialists employ controls to validate the identity of the Subscriber and other information featured in the Certificate Application to ensure compliance with the Guidelines.

Step 1: The Certificate Requester provides a signed Certificate Application to DigiCert Europe, which includes information about the Applicant, personnel within the organisation who have authority to approve the request and also agreement to the Subscriber Agreement. In addition, the Certificate Requester provides a PKCS#10 CSR as well as billing information for processing the request and issuing the EV Certificate.

Step 2: DigiCert Europe independently verifies all information that is required to be verified by the EV Guidelines using a variety of sources.

Step 3: DigiCert Europe requests and receives a signed EV Authority Letter from the Applicant (unless a valid EV Authority Letter from the Applicant is already in its possession). Alternate procedures may also be used to authenticate the identity and authority of individuals involved in the Certificate Application.

Step 4: The Certificate Approver is contacted to obtain approval of Certificate issuance.

Step 5: All signatures by Certificate Requesters, Certificate Approvers and Contract Signers are verified through follow-up procedures or telephone calls.

Step 6: DigiCert Europe obtains and documents further explanation or clarification from the Applicant, Certificate Approver, Certificate Requester, and/or other sources of information as necessary to resolve discrepancies or details requiring further explanation. DigiCert Europe procedures ensure that a second Validation Specialist who is not responsible for the collection and review of information reviews all of the information and documentation assembled in support of the EV Certificate and looks for discrepancies or other details requiring further explanation. Two DigiCert Europe Validation Specialists must approve issuance of the Certificate.

Step 7: DigiCert Europe creates the EV Certificate.

Step 8: The EV Certificate is delivered to the Certificate Requester.

DigiCert Europe may not issue an EV Certificate until the entire corpus of information and documentation assembled in support of the EV Certificate is such that issuance of the EV Certificate will not communicate inaccurate factual information that DigiCert Europe knows, or by the exercise of due diligence should discover, from the assembled information and documentation. If satisfactory explanation and/or additional documentation are not received within a reasonable time, DigiCert Europe will decline the EV Certificate request and notify the Applicant accordingly.

Renewal

Under the EV Guidelines, renewal requirements and procedures are generally the same as those employed for the validation and issuance for new Applicants. The maximum validity period for validated data that can be used to support issuance of an EV Certificate (before revalidation is required) is thirteen months, except for the identity and authority of individuals identified in the EV Authority Letter.

In the case of outdated information, DigiCert Europe repeats the verification processes required by the EV Guidelines. If a company is no longer in good standing, or if any of the other required information cannot be verified, the Certificate is not renewed.

10.10. CODE SIGNING

Field	Value	Comments
Validity Period	1, 2, or 3 years expressed in UTC format	
Subject Distinguished Name		
Organisation Name	subject:organisationName (2.5.4.10)	Required field. The Subject's verified legal name.
Organisation Unit	subject:organisationUnit (2.5.6.5)	Optional field. Must not include a name, DBA, tradename, trademark, address, location, or other text that refers to a specific natural person or Legal Entity unless DigiCert Europe has verified this information
Common Name	subject:commonName (2.5.4.3)	Required field. The Subject's verified legal name.
State or province (if any)	subject:stateOrProvinceName (2.5.4.8)	Required if the subject:localityName field is absent. Optional if the subject:localityName fields is present.
Locality	subject:locality (2.5.4.6)	Required if the subject:stateOrProvinceName field is absent. Optional if the subject:stateOrProvinceName field is present.
Country	subject:countryName (2.5.4.6)	Required field.
Subject Public Key Information	2048-bit RSA key modulus, rsaEncryption (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)	
Signature Algorithm	sha256RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)	
Extension	Value	
Authority Key Identifier	c=no; Octet String	
Subject Key Identifier	c=no; Octet String	
Key Usage	c=yes; digitalSignature (80)	

Field	Value	Comments
Extended Key Usage	c=no; 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3 (codeSigning)	
Field	Value	Comments
Certificate Policies	c=no; Certificate Policies; {1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.2.200.1.1 } Certificate Policies; { 2.23.140.1.4.1 } [1,1] Policy Qualifier Info: Policy Qualifier Id=CPS Qualifier: http://www.quovadisglobal.com/ repository	1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.2.200.1.1 is the QuoVadis Code Signing OID. 2.23.140.1.2.3 is the Code Signing Baseline Requirements OID.
Authority Information Access	c=no; Access Method= - id-ad-ocsp (On-line Certificate Status Protocol - 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1); URL =http://ocsp.quovadisglobal.com - id-ad-caIssuers (CA Issuer - 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2); URL = <a href="http://trust.quovadisglobal.com/<CANAME>.crl">http://trust.quovadisglobal.com/ <CANAME>.crl	
CRL Distribution Points	c = no; CRL HTTP URL =http://crl.quovadisglobal.com/<CANAME>.crl	

Purposes of Code Signing

The primary purpose of DigiCert Europe Code Signing Certificates is to establish that executable code originates from a source identified by DigiCert Europe. DigiCert Europe Certificates focus only on the identity of the Subject named in the Certificate, and not on the behaviour of the Subject. As such, Certificates are not intended to provide any assurances, or otherwise represent or warrant:

- That the Subject named in the Certificate is actively engaged in doing business;
- That the Subject named in the Certificate complies with applicable laws;
- That the Subject named in the Certificate is trustworthy, honest, or reputable in its business dealings; or
- That it is “safe” to do business with the Subject named in the Certificate.

Eligible Applicants

Eligible Applicants include Individual Applicants and Organisational Applicants.

An Individual Applicant is an Applicant that is an individual and requests a Certificate that will list the Applicant's legal name as the Certificate subject.

An Organisational Applicant is an Applicant that requests a Certificate subject other than the name of an individual. Organisational Applicants include private and public corporations, LLCs, partnerships, government entities, non-profit organisations, trade associations, and other entities.

Private Key Protection

Subscriber Key Pairs must be generated and protected in one of the following options:

- A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) that generates and secures a Key Pair and that can document the Certificate
- Holder's Private Key protection through a TPM key attestation
- A hardware cryptographic module with a unit design form factor certified as conforming to at least FIPS 140 Level 2, Common Criteria EAL 4+, or equivalent.
- Another type of hardware storage token with a unit design form factor of SD Card or USB token (not necessarily certified as conformant with FIPS 140 Level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+). The Subscriber MUST also warrant that it will keep the token physically separate from the device that hosts the code signing function until a signing session is begun.
- Verification Requirements*

Before issuing a Code Signing Certificate, DigiCert Europe performs limited procedures to verify that all Subject information in the Certificate is correct, and that the Applicant is authorised to sign code in the name to be included in the Certificate.

Prior to issuing a Code Signing Certificate to an Organisational Applicant, DigiCert Europe:

1. Verifies the Applicant's possession of the Private Key;
2. Verifies the Subject's legal identity, including any Doing Business As (DBA) as described in Section 3.2.2.2 of the TLS BR,
3. Verifies the Subject's address, and
4. Verifies the Certificate Requester's authority to request a Certificate and the authenticity of the Certificate request using a verified method of communication.

Prior to issuing a Code Signing Certificate to an Individual Applicant, the DigiCert Europe:

1. Verifies the Subject's identity using a government photo ID,
2. Verifies the Subject's address using reliable data sources,
3. Obtains a biometric associated with the Subject, such as a fingerprint or notarised handwritten Declaration of Identity,
4. Verifies the Certificate Requester's authority to request a Certificate and the authenticity of the Certificate request using a verified method of communication.

A Declaration of Identity is a written document that consists of the following:

1. the identity of the person performing the verification,
2. a signed declaration by the verifying person stating that they verified the identity of the Applicant,
3. a unique identifying number from an identification document of the verifier,
4. a unique identifying number from an identification document of the Applicant,
5. the date and time of the verification, and
6. a declaration of identity by the Applicant that is signed in handwriting in the presence of the person performing the verification.

Application Process

During the Certificate approval process, DigiCert Europe Validation Specialists employ controls to validate the identity of the Applicant and other information featured in the Certificate Application to ensure compliance with this CP/CPS.

Step 1: The Applicant provides a signed Certificate Application to DigiCert Europe, which includes identifying information to assist DigiCert Europe in processing the request and issuing the Certificate, along with a PKCS#10 CSR and billing details.

Step 2: DigiCert Europe independently verifies information using a variety of sources in accordance with the “Verification Requirements” Section above.

Step 3: The Applicant accepts the Subscriber Agreement and approves Certificate issuance.

Step 4: All signatures are verified through follow-up procedures or telephone calls.

Step 5: DigiCert Europe obtains and documents further explanation or clarification as necessary to resolve discrepancies or details requiring further explanation. If satisfactory explanation and/or additional documentation are not received within a reasonable time, DigiCert Europe will decline the Certificate request and notify the Applicant accordingly. Two DigiCert Europe Validation Specialists must approve issuance of the Certificate.

Step 6: DigiCert Europe creates the Code Signing Certificate.

Step 7: The Certificate is delivered to the Applicant.