

DigiCert Public Trust Certificate Policy/Certificate Practices Statement

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. OVERVIEW

This Certificate Policy/Certification Practices Statement (CP/CPS) defines the policies, principles and practices related to DigiCert's certification and time-stamping services. This document applies to all entities participating in or using DigiCert's Publicly Trusted PKI and specifically excludes participants in DigiCert's Private PKI services, which are not cross-certified or publicly trusted.

This CP/CPS governs certificates issued under the following policies, guidelines and standards:

- The Adobe Approved Trust List Technical Requirements (AATL) - https://helpx.adobe.com/content/dam/help/en/acrobat/kb/approved-trust-list2/_jcr_content/main-pars/download-section/download-1/aatl_technical_requirements_v2.0.pdf
- The CA/B Forum Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates (“TLS BRs”) - <https://cabforum.org/baseline-requirements-documents>
- The CA/B Forum Guidelines for Extended Validation Certificates (“EVGs”) - <https://cabforum.org/extended-validation>
- The CA/B Forum Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Code Signing Certificates (“CS BRs”) - <https://cabforum.org/baseline-requirements-code-signing>
- The CA/B Forum Network and Certificate System Security Requirements - <https://cabforum.org/network-security-requirements>
- The CA/B Forum S/MIME Baseline Requirements (“S/MIME BRs”) - <https://cabforum.org/smime-br>
- Microsoft Trusted Root Store (Program Requirements) - <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security/trusted-root/program-requirements>
- Mozilla Root Store Policy - <https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy>
- Apple Root Store Program - https://www.apple.com/certificateauthority/ca_program.html
- 360 Browser CA Policy - <https://caprogram.360.cn/#strategy>
- Chromium Project Root Store Certificate Policy - <https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/root-ca-policy>
- CCADB Policy - <https://www.ccadb.org/policy>

DigiCert's Public Trust CP/CPS is one of several documents that govern the certification services provided by DigiCert.

Other documents include but are not limited to specific agreements with customers, relying party agreements and DigiCert's Privacy Policy.

If any inconsistency exists between this document and the normative provisions of an applicable industry guideline or standard (“Applicable Requirements”), then the Applicable Requirements take precedence over this CP/CPS.

1.2. DOCUMENT NAME AND IDENTIFICATION

The name of this document is the DigiCert Public Trust Certificate Policy/Certification Practices Statement (CP/CPS). The document follows the framework outlined in RFC 3647.

The OID arc for DigiCert is joint-iso-ccitt (2) country (16) USA (840) US-company (1) DigiCert (114412).

1.2.1. Revisions

The table below is a record of all revisions to this document since its publication:

Table 1. Change Log

| Date | Changes | Version |
|------------|--|---------|
| 2024-07-29 | This document replaces the DigiCert Certificate Policy v6.06 and DigiCert Certification Practices Statement v6.06 | 7.0 |
| 2024-08-27 | Amend CAA identifiers in Section 4 | 7.01 |
| 2024-09-15 | Update CAA for S/MIME, clarify logging requirements, include linting process | 7.02 |
| 2024-09-25 | Fix typo in Section 4.2.2. | 7.03 |
| 2024-11-19 | Update Section 7.2.2 to clarify reasonCode usage for all certificate types, remove subsection referring to "Other Certificates" from 4.9.7, clarify revocation requirements, add audit scheme | 7.04 |
| 2025-02-27 | Add MPIC requirements and changes to domain validation in Section 3, add new definitions in Section 1, add .onion validation information and clarified re-use of documentation in Section 4. | 7.05 |
| 2025-05-14 | Add DigiCert Ombudsman contact information, add MPIC and Linting for S/MIME, add remediation timelines for vulnerabilities. | 7.06 |
| 2025-10-24 | Restructured subsections to align with TLS BRs where applicable, removed superfluous language and outdated references, added DNSSEC requirements, added reduced TLS certificate validity schedule and reduced domain re-use. | 7.07 |
| 2026-02-27 | Added CCADB policy, added deprecation timeline to DCV methods, added MPIC requirements timeline, added reduced TLS and CS certificate validity timeline, included new DCV method. | 7.08 |

1.3. PKI PARTICIPANTS

1.3.1. Certification Authorities

DigiCert operates Certification Authorities (CAs) and Time Stamping Authorities (TSA). These services are managed by the DigiCert Policy Authority (DCPA) which is composed of DigiCert management members appointed by DigiCert's executive management. The DCPA is responsible for approving this document and overseeing the conformance of CA practices with this document.

Policies and practices described within this document are designed to ensure DigiCert complies with the Applicable Requirements.

1.3.2. Registration Authorities

A Registration Authority is an entity that performs identification and authentication of certificate Applicants, initiates or passes along revocation requests for certificates for end-user certificates, and approves applications for renewal or re-keying certificates on behalf of an Issuer CA.

DigiCert and subordinate Issuer CAs may act as RAs for certificates they issue. Validation of domains and IP addresses in TLS and S/MIME Certificates cannot be delegated to a third party. Other obligations under this CP/CPS may be delegated to third party Registration Authorities (RA).

1.3.2.1. Enterprise Registration Authorities

DigiCert may also delegate the verification of certificate requests to Enterprise RAs. Enterprise RAs may only verify information for their own organization and may not verify domain or email information included in publicly trusted TLS or S/MIME certificates.

1.3.3. Subscribers

Subscribers to DigiCert's services may be natural persons or legal entities. Prior to issuance of a certificate, a Subscriber is an Applicant.

Subscribers utilize DigiCert products and services to support communications, transactions and other relevant functions. A Subscriber is not required to be the Subject of certificates under its control.

In some situations, the CA acts as an Applicant or Subscriber, for instance, when it generates and protects a Private Key, requests a Certificate, demonstrates control of a Domain, or obtains a Certificate for its own use.

1.3.4. Relying Parties

Relying Parties are natural persons, legal entities or organizations that rely on certificates and related services provided by DigiCert.

Relying parties must check the appropriate CRL or OCSP response prior to relying on information featured in a Certificate.

1.3.5. Other Participants

No stipulation

1.4. CERTIFICATE USAGE

Subscribers and Relying Parties must use certificates in accordance with the relevant agreements.

The sensitivity of the information which DigiCert's portfolio of publicly trusted certificates is used

to protect varies between subscribers and as such each relying party must assess the risk prior to relying on a certificate.

1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses

The appropriate use for a certificate issued pursuant to this CP/CPS depends on the product type which is specified by Key Usage and Extended Key Usage extensions in a certificate.

However, the sensitivity of the information processed or protected by a certificate varies greatly, and each Relying Party must evaluate the application environment and associated risks before deciding on whether to use the certificate.

1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses

Certificates do not guarantee that the subject is trustworthy, honest, reputable in its business dealings, safe to do business with, or compliant with any laws. A Certificate only establishes that the information in the certificate was verified in accordance with the Applicable Requirements when the certificate was issued.

Code Signing Certificates do not indicate that the signed code is safe to install or free from malware, bugs, or vulnerabilities.

Subscribers and relying parties must use certificates in accordance with any applicable laws, including any relevant export or import laws.

CA certificates subject to the Mozilla Root Store Policy shall not be used for any functions except CA functions. In addition, end-user subscriber certificates shall not be used as CA certificates.

Participants in the DigiCert Public PKI periodically change CA hierarchies to use different Intermediate CAs. Third party applications or platforms that have an Intermediate CA embedded as a root certificate may not operate as designed after the Intermediate CA has been changed.

DigiCert therefore does not warrant the use of Intermediate CAs as root certificates and recommends that Intermediate CAs not be embedded into applications and/or platforms as root certificates.

DigiCert strongly discourages key pinning and does not consider key pinning a reason to delay revocation. DigiCert counsels customers on the way pinning impacts the agility of the WebPKI (e.g., rotation of intermediate certificates) and always advises against it. Customers should also avoid mixing certificates trusted for the web with non-web PKI.

Subscribers are expected to comply with all requirements of all applicable browser root policies, including revocation periods of 24 hours and 5 days as specified herein.

1.5. POLICY ADMINISTRATION

1.5.1. Organization Administering the Document

The DigiCert Policy Authority (DCPA) maintains and enforces this CP/CPS.

1.5.2. Contact Person

DigiCert Policy Authority

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Lehi, UT 84048 USA

policy@digicert.com

1.5.2.1. Revocation Reporting Contact Person

DigiCert Technical Support

2801 N. Thanksgiving Way, Suite 500

Lehi, UT 84048 USA

revoke@digicert.com

Revocations can also be submitted through our Compromised Key Reporting and Revocation Service: <https://problemreport.digicert.com/>

1.5.2.2. DigiCert Ombudsman

The Ombudsman addresses DigiCert's conduct within the Bugzilla community relating to fairness and transparency matters. The Ombudsman can be contacted via email: transparency@digicert.com

1.5.3. Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy

The DCPA determines the suitability and applicability of this document.

1.5.4. CP/CPS Approval Procedures

The DigiCert Public Trust CP/CPS is reviewed at least annually. Amendments are made by posting an updated version to the online repository. Updates supersede any designated or conflicting provisions of the referenced version.

Controls are in place to reasonably ensure that it is not amended and published without the prior authorization of the DCPA.

1.6. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS

1.6.1. Definitions

| Definition | Description |
|--|--|
| Applicant | An entity applying for a Certificate. |
| Applicable Requirements | Requirements specified in Section 1.1 that DigiCert must follow. |
| Applicant Representative | <p>A Natural Person or human sponsor who is either the Applicant, employed by the Applicant, or an authorized agent who has express authority to represent the Applicant:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. who signs and submits, or approves a Certificate Request on behalf of the Applicant;2. who signs and submits a Subscriber Agreement on behalf of the Applicant; and/or3. who acknowledges the Terms of Use on behalf of the Applicant when the Applicant is an Affiliate of the CA or is the CA. |
| Application Software Vendor | A software developer whose software displays or uses DigiCert Certificates and distributes DigiCert's root Certificates. |
| Attestation Letter | A letter attesting that Subject Information is correct written by an accountant, lawyer, government official, or other reliable third party customarily relied upon for such information. |
| Authorization Domain Name | The FQDN used to obtain authorization for a given FQDN to be included in a Certificate. The Issuer CA may use the FQDN returned from a DNS CNAME lookup as the FQDN for the purposes of domain validation. If a Wildcard Domain Name is to be included in a Certificate, then the Issuer CA must remove "*" from the left-most portion of the Wildcard Domain Name to yield the corresponding FQDN. The Issuer CA may prune zero or more Domain Labels of the FQDN from left to right until encountering a Base Domain Name and may use any one of the values that were yielded by pruning (including the Base Domain Name itself) for the purpose of domain validation. |
| Certification Authority Authorization or CAA | From RFC 9495: "The Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) DNS resource record (RR) provides a mechanism for domains to express the allowed set of Certification Authorities that are authorized to issue certificates for the domain." CAA Resource Records allow a public CA to implement additional controls to reduce the risk of unintended certificate mis-issue. |
| CA/B Forum | Defined in Section 1.1. |

| Definition | Description |
|--------------------------------|--|
| Certificate | An electronic document, digitally signed by a Certificate Authority, that binds a Public Key to an identity. |
| Certificate Approver | Defined in the EV Guidelines. |
| Certificate Management Process | The policies, practices, and procedures governing the use of the Certificate Management System |
| Certificate Management System | The keys, software and hardware used to verify Certificate Data, maintain a Repository, and issue and revoke Certificates. |
| Certificate Problem Report | Complaint of suspected Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse, or inappropriate conduct related to Certificates. |
| Certificate Revocation List | A regularly updated time-stamped list of revoked Certificates that is created and digitally signed by DigiCert. |
| Certificate Requester | Defined in the EV Guidelines. |
| Contract Signer | Defined in the EV Guidelines. |
| Domain Contact | The Domain Name Registrant, technical contact, or administrative contact (or the equivalent under a ccTLD) as listed in the WHOIS record of the Base Domain Name or in a DNS SOA record, or as obtained through direct contact with the Domain Name Registrar. |
| Domain Name | An ordered list of one or more Domain Labels assigned to a node in the Domain Name System. |
| EV Guidelines | Defined in Section 1.1. |
| Fully-Qualified Domain Name | A Domain Name that includes the Domain Labels of all superior nodes in the Internet Domain Name System. |
| Hardware Crypto Module | A tamper-resistant device, with a cryptography processor, used for the specific purpose of protecting the lifecycle of cryptographic keys (generating, managing, processing, and storing). |
| Internal Name | A string of characters (not an IP address) in a Common Name or Subject Alternative Name field of a Certificate that cannot be verified as globally unique within the public DNS at the time of certificate issuance because it does not end with a Top Level Domain registered in IANA's Root Zone Database. |
| IP Address | A 32-bit or 128-bit number assigned to a device that uses the Internet Protocol for communication. |
| Issuer CA | Any CA issuing Certificates under this CP/CPS |
| Key Compromise | A Private Key is said to be compromised if its value has been disclosed to an unauthorized person, or an unauthorized person has had access to it. |
| Key Pair | A Private Key and associated Public Key. |

| Definition | Description |
|--|---|
| Linting | A process in which the content of digitally signed data such as a Precertificate [RFC 6962], Certificate, Certificate Revocation List, or OCSP response, or data-to-be-signed object such as a tbsCertificate (as described in RFC 5280, Section 4.1.1.1) is checked for conformance with the profiles and requirements defined in these Requirements. |
| Mailbox address | An Email Address as specified in Section 4.1.2 of RFC 5321 and amended by Section 3.2 of RFC 6532, with no additional padding or structure. |
| Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration | A process by which the determinations made during domain validation and CAA checking by the Primary Network Perspective are corroborated by other Network Perspectives before Certificate issuance. |
| Network Perspective | Related to Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration. A system (e.g., a cloud-hosted server instance) or collection of network components (e.g., a VPN and corresponding infrastructure) for sending outbound Internet traffic associated with a domain control validation method and/or CAA check. The location of a Network Perspective is determined by the point where unencapsulated outbound Internet traffic is typically first handed off to the network infrastructure providing Internet connectivity to that perspective. |
| OCSP Responder | An online software application operated under the authority of DigiCert and connected to its repository for processing certificate status requests. |
| Onion Domain Name | A Fully Qualified Domain Name ending with the RFC 7686 ".onion Special-Use Domain Name. For example, 2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion is an Onion Domain Name, whereas torproject.org is not an Onion Domain Name. |
| Private Key | The key of a Key Pair that is kept secret by the holder of the Key Pair, and that is used to create digital signatures and/or to decrypt electronic records or files that were encrypted with the corresponding Public Key. |
| Public Key | The key of a Key Pair that may be publicly disclosed by the holder of the corresponding Private Key and that is used by a Relying Party to verify digital signatures created with the holder's corresponding Private Key and/or to encrypt messages so that they can be decrypted only with the holder's corresponding Private Key. |
| Reliable Method of Communication | A method of communication, such as a postal/courier delivery address, telephone number, or email address, that was verified using a source other than the Applicant Representative. |
| Relying Party | An entity that relies upon either the information contained within a Certificate or a time-stamp token. |
| Relying Party Agreement | An agreement which must be read and accepted by the Relying Party prior to validating, relying on or using a Certificate or accessing or using DigiCert's Repository. The Relying Party Agreement is available for reference through a DigiCert online repository. |

| Definition | Description |
|------------------------------------|---|
| Reserved IP Address | An IPv4 or IPv6 address that is contained in the address block of any entry in either of the following IANA registries: https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv6-special-registry/iana-ipv6-special-registry.xhtml |
| Short-lived Subscriber Certificate | For Certificates issued on or after March 15, 2024 and prior to March 15, 2026, a Subscriber Certificate with a Validity Period less than or equal to 10 days (864,000 seconds). For Certificates issued on or after March 15, 2026, a Subscriber Certificate with a Validity Period less than or equal to 7 days (604,800 seconds). |
| Signing Service | An organization that generates the Key Pair and securely manages the Private Key associated with a Code Signing Certificate on behalf of a Subscriber. |
| Subject Identity Information | Information that identifies the Certificate Subject. Subject Identity Information does not include a Domain Name listed in the subjectAltName extension or the Subject commonName field. |
| Subscriber | A natural person or Legal Entity to whom a Certificate is issued and who is legally bound by a Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use. |
| Subscriber Agreement | An agreement that governs the issuance and use of a Certificate that the Applicant must read and accept before receiving a Certificate. |
| Suspect Code | Code that contains malicious functionality or serious vulnerabilities, including spyware, malware and other code that installs without the user’s consent and/or resists its own removal, code that compromises user security and/or code that can be exploited in ways not intended by its designers to compromise the trustworthiness of the Platforms on which it executes |
| WebTrust | The current version of CPA Canada’s WebTrust Program for Certification Authorities. |
| WHOIS | Information retrieved directly from the Domain Name Registrar or registry operator via the protocol, the Registry Data Access Protocol, or an HTTPS website. |

1.6.2. Acronyms

| Acronym | Description |
|---------|---|
| AATL | Adobe Approved Trust List |
| ADN | Authorization Domain Name |
| CA | Certificate Authority or Certification Authority |
| CAA | Certification Authority Authorization |
| CA/B | "CA/Browser" as in "CA/B Forum" |
| CMS | Certificate Management System |
| CP | Certificate Policy |
| CPS | Certification Practices Statement |
| CRL | Certificate Revocation List |
| CSR | Certificate Signing Request |
| CT | Certificate Transparency |
| DBA | Doing Business As (also known as "Trading As") |
| DCPA | DigiCert Policy Authority |
| DNS | Domain Name Service |
| DV | Domain Validated |
| ETSI | European Telecommunications Standards Institute EU |
| EV | Extended Validation |
| FIPS | (US Government) Federal Information Processing Standard |
| FQDN | Fully Qualified Domain Name |
| FTP | File Transfer Protocol |
| HSM | Hardware Security Module |
| HTTP | Hypertext Transfer Protocol |
| IANA | Internet Assigned Numbers Authority |
| ICANN | Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers |
| IdM | Identity Management System |
| IDN | Internationalized Domain Name |
| IETF | Internet Engineering Task Force |
| IGTF | International Grid Trust Federation |
| ITU | International Telecommunication Union |
| IV | Individual Validated |
| MICS | Member-Integrated Credential Service (IGTF) |
| MPIC | Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration |

| Acronym | Description |
|----------------|--|
| NIST | National Institute of Standards and Technology |
| OCSF | Online Certificate Status Protocol |
| OID | Object Identifier |
| OV | Organization Validated |
| PKI | Public Key Infrastructure |
| PKIX | IETF Working Group on Public Key Infrastructure |
| RA | Registration Authority |
| RFC | Request for Comments (at IETF.org) |
| SAN | Subject Alternative Name |
| SHA | Secure Hashing Algorithm |
| S/MIME | Secure MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) |
| SSL | Secure Sockets Layer |
| TLD | Top-Level Domain |
| TLS | Transport Layer Security |
| TSA | Time Stamping Authority |
| TST | Time-Stamp Token |
| TTL | Time To Live |
| UTC | Coordinated Universal Time |
| X.509 | The ITU-T standard for Certificates and their corresponding authentication framework |

1.6.3. References

1. WebTrust Program for Certification Authorities;
2. WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – SSL Baseline
3. WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – Network Security
4. WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – SSL Baseline with Network Security
5. WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – Extended Validation SSL;
6. WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – Code Signing Baseline Requirements
7. WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – S/MIME

1.6.4. Conventions

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this CP/CPS shall be interpreted in accordance with RFC 2119.

2. PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1. REPOSITORIES

Issuer CAs must publish in an online, publicly accessible, and regularly-available repository:

1. All publicly trusted CA Certificates and Cross-Certificates, issued to and from the Issuer CA,
2. Revocation data for issued digital certificates,
3. CP and CPS documents.

DigiCert also publishes its standard Relying Party Agreements and Subscriber Agreements. DigiCert's legal repository for most services is located at <https://www.digicert.com/legal-repository/>

2.2. PUBLICATION OF CERTIFICATION INFORMATION

DigiCert discloses its CP/CPS in a read-only format in the URI of issued certificates and in the Legal Repository: <https://www.digicert.com/legal-repository>.

CRLs and OCSP responses are published in accordance with Section 4.9.7 and Section 4.9.10 of this CP/CPS.

DigiCert shall host test web pages that allow Application Software Suppliers to test their software with subscriber certificates that chain up to each publicly trusted Root Certificate.

2.3. TIME OR FREQUENCY OF PUBLICATION

CA Certificates are published in a repository as soon as possible after issuance. DigiCert may publish new CRLs prior to the scheduled issuance of the next CRL. (See Section 4.9 for additional details.) CRLs for Subscriber Certificates that are subject to the TLS and S/MIME Baseline Requirements and that have CRL requirements are issued at least once every seven days. CRLs for CAs that only issue CA Certificates subject to the applicable Baseline Requirements are issued at least annually or within 24 hours of revoking the CA certificate. Code Signing and Timestamp Certificates are retained on the CRL for at least 10 years after expiration.

This CP/CPS is updated at least every 365 days to describe in detail how DigiCert complies with the Applicable Requirements. Those updates indicate conformance using version number control. Significant changes are added to the changelog in Section 1.2.1. New or modified versions of this document, Subscriber Agreements, or Relying Party Warranties are published within seven days after their approval.

2.4. ACCESS CONTROLS ON REPOSITORIES

Read-only access to the repository is unrestricted and continuous. Logical and physical controls prevent unauthorized write access to repositories.

3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

3.1. NAMING

3.1.1. Types of Names

The issuer and distinguished name fields of a certificate are populated in accordance with DigiCert's certificate profiles. Issuer CAs may require different profiles which align with the Applicable Requirements.

3.1.2. Need for Names to be Meaningful

Personal names included in certificates issued to individuals are a meaningful representation of the authenticated common name of the subscriber.

Issuer CAs may provide information as the User Principal Name (UPN) in the SubjectAltName extension of certificates at the request of an Applicant. UPN details are not independently validated.

3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers

Issuer CAs may issue pseudonymous subscriber certificates if they are not prohibited by policy and any applicable name space uniqueness requirements are met.

For S/MIME Certificates with the pseudonym attribute, the associated subject must be verified according to Section 3.2.4 of the S/MIME Baseline Requirements. The pseudonym shall be either a unique identifier selected by the Issuer CA for the subject of the certificate, or an identifier selected by the Enterprise RA which identifies the subject of the certificate within the organization.

3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms

Distinguished Names in certificates are interpreted using X.500 standards and ASN.1 syntax.

3.1.4.1. Non-ASCII Character Substitution

DigiCert may allow the conversion of identity information usually rendered in non-ASCII characters (for example é and à may be represented by e or a, and umlauts such as ö or ü may be represented by oe or ue, o or u respectively). DigiCert may use language variants (such as Munich or München) for geographic names.

For personal names, DigiCert may include an ASCII character name that is not a direct conversion of the Applicant's registered name after verifying the name using a Reliable Data Source or suitable Attestation.

3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names

Unique subject names are not enforced. Uniqueness between certificates is maintained by assigning unique certificate serial numbers.

3.1.6. Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks

Applicants are prohibited from using names in their certificate applications that infringe on the Intellectual Property Rights of others. Issuer CAs are entitled, without liability to any applicant, to reject or revoke any certificate application because of such dispute.

3.2. INITIAL IDENTITY VALIDATION

DigiCert may use any means of communication or investigation to ascertain the identity of an organizational or individual Applicant. The application for a certificate may be refused by an Issuer CA in its sole discretion.

Sources used for S/MIME and EV validation are publicly disclosed in our repository: <https://github.com/digicert/reports/tree/master/validation-sources>

DigiCert may request documents to assist with validating your certificate request in accordance with the Applicable Requirements. These documents will be used in accordance with Section 9.4 of this CP/CPS.

3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of Private Key

No stipulation

3.2.2. Authentication of Organization Identity

Issuer CAs shall maintain and regularly review internal policies and procedures that ensure compliance with the Applicable Requirements when vetting the identity of organizations.

3.2.2.1. Identity

3.2.2.1.1. Organization Validated

DigiCert relies on a QGIS, QTIS, Incorporating Agency, QIIS, Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) (S/MIME only), Reliable Data Source or attestation letter to verify the identity of a business or trade name of the applicant. DigiCert may also visit the site to verify identity. Organization verification is required for TLS, Code Signing, and S/MIME certificates that contain a value in the organizationName (O) field.

Address information is also verified whenever an Organization Name is present in the certificate subject.

The same documentation may be used to verify the address, telephone number or email address of the applicant. In addition to the above, DigiCert may accept a utility bill, bank statement, credit card statement or other form of identification determined reliable to verify the address, telephone number or email address.

3.2.2.1.2. Extended Validation (EV) and Extended Validation Code Signing (EVCS)

Private Organizations

Organizations are considered Private Organizations when they meet the following criteria or the information specified below has been obtained:

- The Private Organization must be a legally recognized entity whose existence was created by a filing with (or an act of) the Incorporating or Registration Agency in its Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration (e.g., by issuance of a certificate of incorporation) or is an entity that is chartered by a state or federal regulatory agency;
- The Private Organization should have a Registration (or similar) Number assigned to it by the Incorporating or Registration Agency in its Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration, as appropriate. If the Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration does not provide a Registration Number, then the date of Incorporation or Registration is used;
- The Private Organization must designate with the Incorporating or Registration Agency either a Registered Agent, or a Registered Office (as required under the laws of the Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration) or an equivalent facility;
- The Private Organization must not be designated on the records of the Incorporating or Registration Agency by labels such as “inactive,” “invalid,” “not current,” or the equivalent;
- The Private Organization, or their Affiliate’s, Parent Company’s, or Subsidiary Company’s date of formation is indicated by a QGIS as at least 3 years prior to the date of the certificate request, alternatively it is listed in QTIS or QIIS;
- The Private Organization must have a verifiable physical existence and business presence;
- The Private Organization’s Jurisdiction of Incorporation, Registration, Charter, or License, and/or its Place of Business must not be in any country where DigiCert is prohibited from doing business or issuing a certificate;
- Obtain the specific Registration Number assigned to the Applicant by the Incorporating or Registration Agency in the Applicant’s Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration. Where the Incorporating or Registration Agency does not assign a Registration Number, the Applicant’s date of Incorporation or Registration shall be obtained;
- Obtain the identity and address of the Applicant’s Registered Agent or Registered Office (as applicable in the Applicant’s Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration).

Government Entities

Government Entities are Organizations that meet the following criteria or the information specified below has been obtained:

- The legal existence of the Government Entity must be established by the political subdivision in which such Government Entity operates;
- DigiCert shall attempt to obtain the Applicant’s date of incorporation, registration or formation, or the identifier for the legislative act that created the Government Entity. For Government Entities that do not have a Registration Number or readily verifiable date of creation, the phrase “Government Entity” is used in its place.
- The Government Entity must not be in any country where DigiCert is prohibited from doing business or issuing a certificate by the laws of DigiCert’s jurisdiction;

Business Entity Subjects

Business Entities are organizations that do not qualify under the criteria listed for Private Organizations but that do satisfy the following requirements:

- The Business Entity must be a legally recognized entity whose formation included the filing of certain forms with the Registration Agency in its Jurisdiction, the issuance or approval by such Registration Agency of a charter, certificate, or license, and whose existence can be verified with that Registration Agency;
- For Business Entities, the Registration Number that was received by the Business Entity upon government registration is entered in this field. For those Business Entities that register with an Incorporating Agency or Registration Agency in a jurisdiction that does not issue numbers pursuant to government registration, the date of the registration is entered into this field;
- The Business Entity must have a verifiable physical existence and business presence;
- At least one Principal Individual associated with the Business Entity must be identified and validated;
- The identified Principal Individual must attest to the representations made in the Subscriber Agreement;
- Where the Business Entity represents itself under an assumed name, DigiCert verifies the Business Entity's use of the assumed name;
- The Business Entity and the identified Principal Individual associated with the Business Entity must not be located or residing in any country where the DigiCert is prohibited from doing business or issuing a certificate by the laws of the DigiCert's jurisdiction;

Non-Commercial Entities

Non-Commercial Entities are Organizations that meet the following criteria:

- The Applicant is an International Organization Entity, created under a charter, treaty, convention, or equivalent instrument that was signed by, or on behalf of, more than one country's government. The CA/Browser Forum may publish a listing of applicants who qualify as an International Organization for EV eligibility;
- For Non-Commercial Entities that do not have a Registration Number or readily verifiable date of creation, the phrase "International Organization Entity" is used in its place;
- The applicant is not headquartered in any country where DigiCert is prohibited from doing business or issuing a certificate.

3.2.2.1.3. S/MIME Organization Validation

The following requirements are fulfilled to authenticate Organization identity included in the Organization-validated and Sponsor-validated S/MIME profiles.

Attribute collection of organization identity

DigiCert collects and retains evidence supporting the following identity attributes for the Organization:

1. Formal name of the Legal Entity;

2. A registered Assumed Name for the Legal Entity (if included in the Subject);
3. An Affiliate of the Legal Entity as described in Section 7.1.4.2.2 (if included in the Subject as an `subject:organizationalUnitName`);
4. An address of the Legal Entity (if included in the Subject);
5. Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration of the Legal Entity; and
6. Unique identifier and type of identifier for the Legal Entity.

The unique identifier is included in the Certificate `subject:organizationIdentifier` as specified in Section 7.1.4.2.2 and Appendix A of the CA/B Forum *Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted S/MIME Certificates*.

If an Attestation is used as evidence for the validation of the attributes described in this section, then the Attestation shall be verified for authenticity as described in Section 3.2.12.2.

Verification of name, address, and unique identifier

The full legal name and address (if included in the Certificate Subject) of the Legal Entity Applicant are verified using documentation provided by, or through communication with, at least one of the following:

1. A government agency in the jurisdiction of the Legal Entity's creation, existence, or recognition;
2. A Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) data reference;
3. A site visit by the CA or a third party who is acting as an agent for the CA; or
4. An Attestation which includes a copy of supporting documentation used to establish the Applicant's legal existence (such as a certificate of registration, articles of incorporation, operating agreement, statute, or regulatory act) and its current status.

The Issuer CA may use the same documentation or communication described in 1 through 4 above to verify both the Applicant's identity and address.

In cases 1 and 4 above, the Issuer CA verifies that the status of the Applicant is not designated by labels such as "ceased," "inactive," "invalid," "not current," or the equivalent.

In case 2 above when LEI data reference is used, the Issuer CA verifies that the `RegistrationStatus` is `ISSUED` and the `EntityStatus` is `ACTIVE`. The CA only allows use of an LEI if the `ValidationSources` entry is `FULLY_CORROBORATED`. An LEI is not used if `ValidationSources` entry is `PARTIALLY_CORROBORATED`, `PENDING`, or `ENTITY_SUPPLIED_ONLY`.

3.2.2.1.4. Document Signing

DigiCert or an RA relies on a QGIS, QTIS, QIIS or Incorporating Agency to verify the identity of the Applicant. In addition to the above, DigiCert or the RA may rely on a utility bill, bank statement, credit card statement or other form of identification determined reliable to verify the address, telephone number and email address of the Applicant.

The authorized representative of an organization applicant is verified by appearing before a Third Party Validator (See Section 3.2.6 Third-Party Validators), a DigiCert representative or an RA. Other processes providing equivalent assurance of positive identification may be used.

3.2.2.2. DBA/Tradenname

Applicants may request an Assumed Name to be included in the Certificate. The Issuer CA verifies that:

1. The Applicant has registered its use of the Assumed Name with the appropriate government agency for such filings in the jurisdiction of its incorporation or registration; and
2. The Assumed Name filing continues to be valid.

The Issuer CA may rely on an Attestation that indicates the Assumed Name under which the Applicant conducts business, the government agency with which the Assumed Name is registered, and that such filing continues to be valid.

3.2.2.3. Verification of Country

DigiCert verifies the subject:countryName field of a certificate by verifying the address of the Applicant using the methods described in Section 3.2.2.1

3.2.2.4. Validation of Domain Authorization Control

For TLS, all domains listed in the certificate are verified using one of the following methods. For S/MIME, DigiCert either verifies the domain component of each email address listed in the certificate using one of the following methods or verifies control of the email address using a challenge/response process.

Unless described otherwise, Random Values referred to below shall be unique in each email, fax, SMS or postal mail. The Random Value shall remain valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

Effective March 15, 2026: DNSSEC validation back to the IANA DNSSEC root trust anchor must be performed on all DNS queries associated with the validation of domain authorization or control by the Primary Network Perspective. The DNS resolver used for all DNS queries associated with the validation of domain authorization or control by the Primary Network Perspective must:

- Perform DNSSEC validation using the algorithm defined in RFC 4035 Section 5; and
- Support NSEC3 as defined in RFC 5155; and
- Support SHA-2 as defined in RFC 4509 and RFC 5702; and
- Properly handle the security concerns enumerated in RFC 6840 Section 4.

Effective March 15, 2026: DigiCert must not use local policy to disable DNSSEC validation on any DNS query associated with the validation of domain authorization or control.

3.2.2.4.1. Validating the Applicant as a Domain Contact

This method is no longer allowed and DigiCert does not do this.

3.2.2.4.2. Email, Fax, SMS, or Postal Mail to Domain Contact

This method is no longer allowed and DigiCert does not do this.

3.2.2.4.3. Phone Contact with Domain Contact

This method is no longer allowed and DigiCert does not do this.

3.2.2.4.4. Constructed Email to Domain Contact

Confirm the Applicant's control over the FQDN by:

1. Sending an email to one or more addresses created by using 'admin', 'administrator', 'webmaster', 'hostmaster', or 'postmaster' as the local part, followed by the at-sign ("@"), followed by an Authorization Domain Name; and
2. including a Random Value in the email; and
3. receiving a confirming response utilizing the Random Value.

Each email may confirm control of multiple FQDNs, provided the Authorization Domain Name used in the email is an Authorization Domain Name for each FQDN being confirmed.

The Random Value shall be unique in each email. The email may be re-sent in its entirety, including the re-use of the Random Value, provided that its entire contents and recipient shall remain unchanged.

The Random Value shall remain valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

Note: Once the FQDN has been validated using this method, then DigiCert may also issue Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the domain labels of the validated FQDN. This method is suitable for validating Wildcard Domain Names.

By no later than March 15th, 2028, DigiCert will no longer rely on this method for the issuance of Subscriber Certificates.

DigiCert performs this validation method in accordance with Section 3.2.2.4.4 of the TLS BRs.

3.2.2.4.5. Domain Authorization Document

This method is no longer allowed and DigiCert does not do this.

3.2.2.4.6. Agreed-Upon Change to Website

This method is no longer allowed and DigiCert does not do this.

3.2.2.4.7. DNS Change

Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by confirming the presence of a Random Value or Request Token in a DNS CNAME, TXT or CAA record for either:

1. an Authorization Domain Name; or
2. an Authorization Domain Name that is prefixed with a domain label that begins with an underscore character.

If a Random Value is used, DigiCert shall provide a Random Value unique to the Certificate request

and shall not use the Random Value after 30 days.

When DigiCert performs validation using this method, it implements Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration as specified in Section 3.2.2.9. To count as corroborating, a Network Perspective must observe the same challenge information (i.e. Random Value or Request Token) as the Primary Network Perspective.

Note: Once the FQDN has been validated using this method, then DigiCert may also issue Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the domain labels of the validated FQDN. This method is suitable for validating Wildcard Domain Names.

DigiCert performs this validation method in accordance with Section 3.2.2.4.7 of the TLS BRs.

3.2.2.4.8. IP Address

DigiCert does not do this.

3.2.2.4.9. Test Certificate

This method is no longer allowed and DigiCert does not do this.

3.2.2.4.10. TLS Using a Random Value

This method is no longer allowed and DigiCert does not do this.

3.2.2.4.11. Any Other Method

This method is no longer allowed and DigiCert does not do this.

3.2.2.4.12. Validating Applicant as a Domain Contact

DigiCert does not do this.

3.2.2.4.13. Email to DNS CAA Contact

Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by sending a Random Value via email and then receiving a confirming response utilizing the Random Value. The Random Value must be sent to a DNS CAA email contact. The relevant CAA Resource Record Set must be found using the search algorithm defined in RFC 8659, Section 3.

Each email may confirm control of multiple FQDNs, provided that each email address is a DNS CAA Email Contact for each Authorization Domain Name being validated. The same email may be sent to multiple recipients as long as all recipients are DNS CAA Email Contacts for each Authorization Domain Name being validated.

The Random Value shall be unique in each email. The email may be re-sent in its entirety, including the re-use of the Random Value, provided that its entire contents and recipient(s) remain unchanged. The Random Value shall remain valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

When DigiCert performs validation using this method, it implements Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration as specified in Section 3.2.2.9. To count as corroborating, a Network Perspective must

observe the same selected contact address used for domain validation as the Primary Network Perspective.

Note: Once the FQDN has been validated using this method, then DigiCert may also issue Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the domain labels of the validated FQDN. This method is suitable for validating Wildcard Domain Names.

By no later than March 15th, 2028, DigiCert will no longer rely on this method for the issuance of Subscriber Certificates.

DigiCert performs this validation method in accordance with Section 3.2.2.4.13 of the TLS BRs.

3.2.2.4.14. Email to DNS TXT Contact

Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by sending a Random Value via email and then receiving a confirming response utilizing the Random Value. The Random Value must be sent to a DNS TXT Record Email Contact for the Authorization Domain Name selected to validate the FQDN.

Each email may confirm control of multiple FQDNs, provided that each email address is DNS TXT Record Email Contact for each Authorization Domain Name being validated. The same email may be sent to multiple recipients if all recipients are DNS TXT Record Email Contacts for each Authorization Domain Name being validated.

When DigiCert performs validation using this method, it implements Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration as specified in Section 3.2.2.9. To count as corroborating, a Network Perspective must observe the same selected contact address used for domain validation as the Primary Network Perspective.

Note: Once the FQDN has been validated using this method, then DigiCert may also issue Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the domain labels of the validated FQDN. This method is suitable for validating Wildcard Domain Names.

By no later than March 15th, 2028, DigiCert will no longer rely on this method for the issuance of Subscriber Certificates.

DigiCert performs this validation method in accordance with Section 3.2.2.4.14 of the TLS BRs.

3.2.2.4.15. Phone Contact with Domain Contact

This method is no longer allowed and DigiCert does not do this.

3.2.2.4.16. Phone Contact with DNS TXT Record Phone Contact

DigiCert does not do this.

3.2.2.4.17. Phone Contact with DNS CAA Phone Contact

DigiCert does not do this.

3.2.2.4.18. Agreed-Upon Change to Website v2

Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by verifying that the Request Token or Random

Value is contained in the contents of a file.

1. The entire Request Token or Random Value must not appear in the request used to retrieve the file, and
2. DigiCert must receive a successful HTTP response from the request (meaning a 2xx HTTP status code must be received).

The file containing the Request Token or Random Value:

1. Must be located on the Authorization Domain Name, and
2. Must be located under the “/.well-known/pki-validation” directory, and
3. Must be retrieved via either the “http” or “https” scheme, and
4. Must be accessed over an Authorized Port.

If DigiCert follows redirects, the following apply:

1. Redirects must be initiated at the HTTP protocol layer. Redirects must be the result of a 301, 302, or 307 HTTP status code response, as defined in RFC 7231, Section 6.4, or a 308 HTTP status code response, as defined in RFC 7538, Section 3. Redirects must be to the final value of the location HTTP response header, as defined in RFC 7231, Section 7.1.2.
2. Redirects must be to resource URLs with either the “http” or “https” scheme.
3. Redirects must be to resource URLs accessed via Authorized Ports.

If a Random Value is used, then:

1. DigiCert must provide a Random Value unique to the certificate request.
2. The Random Value must remain valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

DigiCert implements Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration as specified in Section 3.2.2.9. when using this method. To count as corroborating, a Network Perspective must observe the same challenge information (i.e. Random Value or Request Token) as the Primary Network Perspective.

Note: This method is not suitable for validating Wildcard Domain Names.

DigiCert performs this validation method in accordance with Section 3.2.2.4.18 of the TLS BRs.

3.2.2.4.19. Agreed-Upon Change to Website - ACME

Confirming the Applicant’s control over a FQDN by validating domain control of the FQDN using the ACME HTTP Challenge method defined in Section 8.3 of RFC 8555. The following are additive requirements to RFC 8555.

DigiCert receives a successful HTTP response from the request (meaning a 2xx HTTP status code must be received).

The token (as defined in RFC 8555, Section 8.3) must not be used for more than 30 days from its creation.

If DigiCert follows redirects, the following apply:

1. Redirects must be initiated at the HTTP protocol layer. Redirects must be the result of a 301, 302, or 307 HTTP status code response, as defined in RFC 7231, Section 6.4, or a 308 HTTP status code response, as defined in RFC 7538, Section 3. Redirects must be to the final value of the location HTTP response header, as defined in RFC 7231, Section 7.1.2.
2. Redirects must be to resource URLs with either the “http” or “https” scheme.
3. Redirects must be to resource URLs accessed via Authorized Ports.

DigiCert implements Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration as specified in Section 3.2.2.9 when using this method. To count as corroborating, a Network Perspective must observe the same challenge information (i.e. Random Value or Request Token) as the Primary Network Perspective.

Note: This method is not suitable for validating Wildcard Domain Names.

DigiCert performs this validation method in accordance with Section 3.2.2.4.19 of the TLS BRs.

3.2.2.4.20. TLS Using ALPN

DigiCert does not do this.

3.2.2.4.21. DNS Labeled with Account ID - ACME

DigiCert does not do this.

3.2.2.4.22. DNS TXT Record with Persistent Value

Confirming the Applicant’s control over a FQDN by verifying the presence of a Persistent DCV TXT Record identifying the Applicant. The record must be placed at the “_validation-persist” label prepended to the Authorization Domain Name being validated (i.e., “_validation-persist.[Authorization Domain Name]”). For this method, DigiCert must not use the FQDN returned from a DNS CNAME lookup as the FQDN for the purposes of domain validation. This prohibition overrides the Authorization Domain Name definition. CNAME records may be followed when resolving the Persistent DCV TXT Record.

DigiCert must confirm the Persistent DCV TXT Record’s RDATA value fulfills the following requirements:

1. The RDATA value must conform to the issue-value syntax as defined in RFC 8659, Section 4.2; and
2. The issuer-domain-name value must be an Issuer Domain Name disclosed in Section 4.2 of this CP/CPS; and
3. The issue-value must contain an accounturi parameter, where the parameter value is a unique URI (as described by RFC 8657, Section 3) identifying the account of the Applicant which requested validation for this FQDN; and
4. The issue-value may contain a persistUntil parameter. If present, the parameter value must be a base-10 encoded integer representing a UNIX timestamp (the number of seconds since 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z ignoring leap seconds); and

5. The issue-value may contain additional parameters, but unknown parameters will be ignored

If the `persistUntil` parameter is present, the DigiCert must evaluate its value. If the time of the check is after the time specified in the `persistUntil` parameter value, DigiCert must not use the record as evidence of the Applicant's control over the FQDN.

The maximum reuse period for this method is 10 days.

DigiCert implements Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration as specified in Section 3.2.2.9 when using this method. To count as corroborating, a Network Perspective must observe a Persistent DCV TXT Record that demonstrates the Applicant's control over the domain and contains the same `accounturi` parameter as the Primary Network Perspective.

DigiCert performs this validation method in accordance with Section 3.2.2.4.22 of the TLS BRs.

3.2.2.4.23. Email Challenge Response Procedure

If the domain component of an email address is not verified, DigiCert verifies the requester's control over the email address.

Control of an email address included in a Certificate may be verified by sending a random value via email and then receiving a confirming response utilizing the random value. The random value is valid for no more than 24 hours and is reset whenever the email is resent.

3.2.2.5. Authentication for an IP Address

This section defines the permitted processes and procedures for validating the Applicant's ownership or control of an IP Address listed in a Certificate.

Prior to issuance, DigiCert has validated each IP Address listed in the Certificate using at least one of the methods specified in this section.

3.2.2.5.1. Agreed-Upon Change to Website

Confirming the Applicant's control over the requested IP Address by confirming the presence of a Request Token or Random Value contained in the content of a file or webpage in the form of a meta tag under the `/.well-known/pki-validation` directory, or another path registered with IANA for the purpose of validating control of IP Addresses, on the IP Address that is accessible by DigiCert via HTTP/HTTPS over an Authorized Port. The Request Token or Random Value must not appear in the request.

If a Random Value is used, the DigiCert shall provide a Random Value unique to the certificate request and shall not use the Random Value after 30 days.

When DigiCert performs validation using this method, it implements Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration as specified in Section 3.2.2.9. To count as corroborating, a Network Perspective must observe the same challenge information (i.e. Random Value or Request Token) as the Primary Network Perspective.

DigiCert performs this validation method in accordance with Section 3.2.2.5.1 of the TLS BRs.

3.2.2.5.2. Email, Fax, SMS, or Postal Mail to IP Address Contact

DigiCert does not use this method.

3.2.2.5.3. Reverse Address Lookup

DigiCert does not use this method.

3.2.2.5.4. Any Other Method

This method is no longer allowed and DigiCert does not do this.

3.2.2.5.5. Phone Contact with IP Address Contact

Confirming the Applicant's control over the IP Address by calling the IP Address Contact's phone number and obtaining a response confirming the Applicant's request for validation of the IP Address. DigiCert must place the call to a phone number identified by the IP Address Registration Authority as the IP Address Contact. Each phone call shall be made to a single number.

If someone other than an IP Address Contact is reached, DigiCert may request to be transferred to the IP Address Contact. In the event of reaching voicemail, DigiCert may leave the Random Value and the IP Address(es) being validated. The Random Value must be returned to DigiCert to approve the request.

The Random Value shall remain valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

By no later than March 15th, 2027, DigiCert will no longer rely on this method for the issuance of Subscriber Certificates.

DigiCert performs this validation method in accordance with Section 3.2.2.5.5 of the TLS BRs.

3.2.2.5.6. ACME "http-01" method for IP Addresses

Confirming the Applicant's control over the IP Address by performing the procedure documented for an "http-01" challenge in RFC 8738.

When DigiCert performs validation using this method, it implements Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration as specified in Section 3.2.2.9. To count as corroborating, a Network Perspective must observe the same challenge information (i.e. Random Value or Request Token) as the Primary Network Perspective.

DigiCert performs this validation method in accordance with Section 3.2.2.5.6 of the TLS BRs.

3.2.2.5.7. ACME "tls-alpn-01" method for IP Addresses

DigiCert does not do this.

3.2.2.6. Wildcard Domain Validation

Before issuing a Wildcard Certificate, DigiCert establishes and follows a documented procedure that determines if the FQDN portion of any Wildcard Domain Name in the Certificate is "registry-

controlled” or is a “public suffix” (e.g. “.com”, “.co.uk”, see RFC 6454 Section 8.2 for further explanation).

If the FQDN portion of any Wildcard Domain Name is “registry-controlled” or is a “public suffix”, DigiCert must refuse issuance unless the Applicant proves its rightful control of the entire Domain Namespace.

3.2.2.5.8 DNS TXT Record with Persistent Value in the Reverse Namespace

DigiCert does not use this method.

3.2.2.7. Data Source Accuracy

For EV and S/MIME, data sources are evaluated on:

- The age of the information provided,
- The frequency of updates to the information source,
- The data provider and purpose of the data collection,
- The public accessibility of the data availability, and
- The relative difficulty in falsifying or altering the data.

3.2.2.8. CAA Records

As part of the Certificate issuance process, DigiCert must retrieve and process CAA records in accordance with RFC 8659 for each `dnsName` in the `subjectAltName` extension that does not contain an Onion Domain Name. See Section 4.2 for more information.

3.2.2.8.1. DNSSEC Validation of CAA Records

Effective March 15, 2026: DNSSEC validation back to the IANA DNSSEC root trust anchor must be performed on all DNS queries associated with CAA record lookups performed by the Primary Network Perspective.

The DNS resolver used for all DNS queries associated with CAA record lookups performed by the Primary Network Perspective must:

- Perform DNSSEC validation using the algorithm defined in RFC 4035 Section 5; and
- Support NSEC3 as defined in RFC 5155; and
- Support SHA-2 as defined in RFC 4509 and RFC 5702; and
- Properly handle the security concerns enumerated in RFC 6840 Section 4.

Effective March 15, 2026: DigiCert must not use local policy to disable DNSSEC validation on any DNS query associated CAA record lookups.

Effective March 15, 2026: DNSSEC-validation errors observed by the Primary Network Perspective (e.g., `SERVFAIL`) must not be treated as permission to issue.

DNSSEC validation back to the IANA DNSSEC root trust anchor may be performed on all DNS

queries associated with CAA record lookups performed by Remote Network Perspectives as part of Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration.

DNSSEC validation back to the IANA DNSSEC root trust anchor is considered outside the scope of self-audits performed to fulfill the requirements in Section 8.7.

3.2.2.9. Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration

Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration attempts to corroborate the determinations (i.e., domain validation pass/fail, CAA permission/prohibition) made by the Primary Network Perspective from multiple remote Network Perspectives before Certificate issuance.

DigiCert uses either the same set, or different sets of Network Perspectives when performing Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration for the required:

1. Domain Authorization or Control and
2. CAA Record checks

The set of responses from the relied upon Network Perspectives provides DigiCert with the necessary information to allow it to affirmatively assess:

- The presence of the expected:
 1. Random Value;
 2. Request Token;
 3. IP Address;
 4. Contact Address; or
 5. Persistent DCV TXT Record, as required by the relied upon validation method specified in Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5 of this CP/CPS; and
- DigiCert's authority to issue to the requested domain(s), as specified in Section 4.2.1.1.

Results or information obtained from one Network Perspective will not be reused or cached when performing validation through subsequent Network Perspectives (e.g., different Network Perspectives cannot rely on a shared DNS cache to prevent an adversary with control of traffic from one Network Perspective from poisoning the DNS cache used by other Network Perspectives). The network infrastructure providing Internet connectivity to a Network Perspective may be administered by the same organization providing the computational services required to operate the Network Perspective.

All communications between a remote Network Perspective and DigiCert will take place over an authenticated and encrypted channel relying on modern protocols (e.g., over HTTPS).

A Network Perspective can use a recursive DNS resolver that is not co-located with the Network Perspective. However, the DNS resolver used by the Network Perspective will fall within the same Regional Internet Registry service region as the Network Perspective relying upon it. Furthermore, for any pair of DNS resolvers used on a Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration attempt, the straight-line distance between the two DNS resolvers will be at least 500 km. The location of a DNS resolver is determined by the point where unencapsulated outbound DNS queries are typically first

handed off to the network infrastructure providing Internet connectivity to that DNS resolver.

DigiCert may immediately retry Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration using the same validation method or an alternative method (e.g., DigiCert can immediately retry validation using “Email to DNS TXT Contact” if “Agreed-Upon Change to Website - ACME” does not corroborate the outcome of Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration).

When retrying Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, DigiCert must not rely on corroborations from previous attempts. There is no stipulation regarding the maximum number of validation attempts that may be performed in any period of time.

The "Quorum Requirements" Table describes quorum requirements related to Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration. If DigiCert does not rely on the same set of Network Perspectives for both Domain Authorization or Control and CAA Record checks, the quorum requirements will be met for both sets of Network Perspectives (i.e., the Domain Authorization or Control set and the CAA record check set). Network Perspectives are considered distinct when the straight-line distance between them is at least 500 km. Network Perspectives are considered "remote" when they are distinct from the Primary Network Perspective and the other Network Perspectives represented in a quorum.

DigiCert may reuse corroborating evidence for CAA record quorum compliance for a maximum of 398 days. After issuing a Certificate to a domain, remote Network Perspectives may omit retrieving and processing CAA records for the same domain or its subdomains in subsequent Certificate requests from the same Applicant for up to a maximum of 398 days.

Quorum Requirements Table

| # of Distinct Remote Network Perspectives Used | # of Allowed non-Corroboration |
|--|--------------------------------|
| 2-5 | 1 |
| 6+ | 2 |

Remote Network Perspectives performing Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration must rely upon networks (e.g., Internet Service Providers or Cloud Provider Networks) implementing measures to mitigate BGP routing incidents in the global Internet routing system for providing internet connectivity to the Network Perspective.

For TLS and S/MIME Certificates, DigiCert will require Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration using at least two (2) remote Network Perspectives. DigiCert must ensure that the requirements defined in Quorum Requirements Table are satisfied. If the requirements are not satisfied, then the Certificate cannot be issued.

For TLS and S/MIME Certificates, DigiCert will increase remote Network Perspectives as per the schedule outlined in Section 3.2.2.9 of the TLS Baseline Requirements. By no later than December 15th, 2026, DigiCert will perform MPIC using at least five (5) Network Perspectives. If these requirements and the requirements described in the Quorum Requirements Table are not satisfied, then the Certificate cannot be issued.

3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity

Individuals specified in a S/MIME or TLS certificate are verified using a legible copy, which

discernibly shows the Applicant's face, of at least one currently valid government issued photo ID (passport, driver's license, military ID, national ID or equivalent document type).

The named individual's address is verified using a government issued photo ID described above, a QIIS or a QGIS. DigiCert may also physically mail an access code to an address provided by the certificate requester.

For Code Signing, the request is verified as authentic by having the requestor submit a photo of themselves holding their government issued photo ID, performing secure face to face video communication where the requestor presents their ID or obtain an executed Declaration of Identity of the requester that includes at least one unique biometric identifier.

For EV, face to face verification of a principal individual of a Business Entity is carried out via attestation before a Third Party Validator such as a Notary, Latin Notary, Attorney or Accountant, or via video with a DigiCert representative.

For Document Signing, the applicant is verified by appearing before a Third Party Validator (See section 3.2.7 Third-Party Validators) or a DigiCert representative. Other processes providing equivalent assurance of positive identification may be used.

3.2.4. Non-Verified Subscriber Information

Contents of the certificate are verified in accordance with the Applicable Requirements.

3.2.5. Validation of Authority

When an organization is named in a Certificate, the authority of the requester is verified using a Reliable Method of Communication. A Reliable Method of Communication is any source of communication that originates from an entity other than the applicant representative.

Extended Validation

For EV, an Acceptable Method of Communication is a telephone number, fax number, email address or postal delivery address verified for the Applicant, their parent, subsidiary, or affiliate. The address must be verified using a QGIS, QTIS, QIIS or Legal Opinion Letter.

The Acceptable Method of Communication will be used to reach a representative of the applicant and confirm the name, title, agency and authority of Contract Signer and Certificate Approver as described in the EV Guidelines.

In all EV certificates, DigiCert may rely on other methods described in the EV Guidelines to complete this step such as the Legal Opinion Letter, a corporate resolution, or the Contract Signer and/or the Certificate Approver listed in a QIIS/QGIS as a corporate officer, sole proprietor, or other senior official of the applicant.

S/MIME

Before commencing to issue Organization-validated and Sponsor-validated Certificates for an Applicant, DigiCert shall use a Reliable Method of Communication to verify the authority and approval of an Applicant Representative to perform one or more of the following:

- To act as an Enterprise RA;
- To request issuance or revocation of Certificates; or
- To assign responsibilities to others to act in these roles.

DigiCert may establish a process that allows an Applicant to specify the individuals who may act as Applicant Representatives on an ongoing basis.

DigiCert may use the sources listed in Section 3.2.2.1.3 to verify the Reliable Method of Communication. Provided that the CA or RA uses a Reliable Method of Communication, the CA or RA may establish the authenticity of the Certificate Request directly with the Applicant Representative or with an authoritative source within the Applicant's organization.

3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation

Interoperation with DigiCert PKI is permitted pursuant to this CP/CPS. All cross certified Subordinate CA certificates that identify DigiCert as the subject are disclosed in the applicable repository.

3.2.7. Third-Party Validators

Certain documents or steps requested as part of the validation process, such as Legal Opinion Letters, Attestation Letters or face to-face validation must be performed before a third-party validator such as a notary (or equivalent in the Applicant's jurisdiction), lawyer or accountant.

Prior to relying on any of these documents, these parties are verified as active with the relevant licensing authority in the Applicant's jurisdiction.

Contact information is verified through the licensing authority, a QGIS or QIIS to verify the authenticity of the document in a similar manner to what is described in Section 3.2.5.

3.2.8. Onion Domain Validation

The Domain Name contains at least two Domain Labels, where the rightmost Domain Label is "onion", and the Domain Label immediately preceding the rightmost "onion" Domain Label is a valid Version 3 Onion Address.

DigiCert verifies the Applicant's control over the .onion service by having the Applicant provide a Certificate Request signed using the .onion service's private key if the Attributes section of the certificationRequestInfo contains:

- A caSigningNonce attribute that contains a Random Value that is generated by the CA; and
- An applicantSigningNonce attribute that contains a single value. DigiCert will recommend to Applicants that the applicantSigningNonce value should contain at least 64 bits of entropy.

3.3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR RE-KEY REQUESTS

3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-key

The same procedures as described in Section 3.2 are required for a re-key request.

3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for Re-key After Revocation

The same procedures as described in Section 3.2 are required for a re-key request.

3.4. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR REVOCATION REQUEST

The procedure for identification and authentication of a revocation request is described throughout Section 4.9.

4. CERTIFICATE LIFECYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

4.1. CERTIFICATE APPLICATION

4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application

Applicants are responsible for any data supplied to DigiCert.

EV certificate requests must be submitted by an authorized Certificate Requester and approved by a Certificate Approver. A Certificate Requestor is a natural person who is either the Applicant, employed by the Applicant or an authorized agent of the Applicant.

DigiCert does not issue certificates to entities on a government denied list maintained by the United States, or which are in a country with which the laws of the United States prohibit doing business.

4.1.2. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities

Prior to the issuance of a certificate, DigiCert obtains a certificate request, and executed Subscriber Agreement, Terms of Use and/or Master Services Agreement, in accordance with the relevant CA/B Forum requirements.

In no particular order the enrollment process may include:

- Submitting a certificate application;
- Generating a key pair;
- Delivering the public key of the key pair to DigiCert;
- Agreeing to the applicable Subscriber Agreement, Terms of Use and/or Master Services Agreement; and
- Paying any applicable fees.

4.2. CERTIFICATE APPLICATION PROCESSING

4.2.1. Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

After receiving a certificate application, the RA authenticates Subject information using the procedures described in Section 3.2.

4.2.1.1. CAA Checking

Prior to issuing a TLS certificate, Issuer CAs check the DNS for the existence of a CAA record in accordance with RFC8659 for each DNSName in the subjectAltName extension that does not contain an Onion Domain Name.

DigiCert processes the “issue” and “issuewild” property tags.

Prior to issuing an S/MIME certificate, Issuer CAs check the DNS for the existence of a CAA record in accordance with RFC 9495 for each Mailbox Address in the subjectAltName extension of the S/MIME certificate to be issued. DigiCert processes the “issuemail” property tag.

Certificates passing the CAA check are issued within the Time to Live (TTL) of the CAA record, or 8 hours, whichever is greater. DigiCert logs actions taken based on CAA records, and documents issuance prevented by CAA for feedback to the CA/B Forum. DigiCert may dispatch reports of issuance requests to the contact(s) listed in an “iodef” property tag. CAA checking is optional for certificates issued by a Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate.

DigiCert may treat a record lookup failure as permission to issue if:

- The failure is outside the DigiCert’s infrastructure; and
- The lookup has been retried at least once; and
- The domain’s zone does not have a DNSSEC validation chain to the ICANN root.

The CA identifiers that DigiCert recognizes are:

- www.digicert.com
- digicert.com
- digicert.ne.jp
- cybertrust.ne.jp
- thawte.com
- geotrust.com
- rapidssl.com
- symantec.com
- volusion.digitalcertvalidation.com
- stratossll.digitalcertvalidation.com
- intermediatecertificate.digitalcertvalidation.com
- 1and1.digitalcertvalidation.com
- amazon.com
- amazontrust.com
- awstrust.com
- amazonaws.com
- digitalcertvalidation.com
- quovadisglobal.com
- pkioverheid.nl

4.2.1.2. EV TLS and Code Signing

Once verification is complete, the Issuer CA evaluates the corpus of information and decides whether or not to issue the certificate.

4.2.1.3. S/MIME

Validation of mailbox control according to Section 3.2.2.4. must be completed within 30 days of certificate issuance. Validation of mailbox authorization or control in accordance with Section 3.2.2.4.22 must be completed within 398 days of certificate issuance.

Authentication of organizational entity or Individual Identity must be completed within 825 days prior to certificate issuance.

4.2.1.4. Requirements for Re-use of Existing Documentation

Except for reissuance of an EV TLS or EV Code Signing Certificate for existing Subscribers, the age of all data used to support issuance (before revalidation is required) shall not exceed the limits described below.

The period specified shall begin to run on the date the information was collected.

Organization Validation, S/MIME and Document Signing

1. Legal existence and identity – 825 days;
2. Assumed name – 825 days;
3. Address of Place of Business – 825 days;
4. Verified Method of Communication – 825 days;
5. Face to face verification - 825 days.

Note: TLS Certificates issued on or after March 15, 2026 may not rely on subject identity validation older than 398 days.

Extended Validation

1. Legal existence and identity – 398 days;
2. Assumed name – 398 days;
3. Address of Place of Business – 398 days;
4. Verified Method of Communication – 398 days;
5. Operational existence – 398 days;
6. Name, Title, Agency, and Authority – 398 days, unless a contract between the CA and the Applicant specifies a different term, in which case, the term specified in such contract controls. For example, the contract may include the perpetual assignment of EV roles until revoked by the Applicant or CA, or until the contract expires or is terminated.

DigiCert may reuse a previously submitted EV Request, Subscriber Agreement, or Terms of Use, including use of a single EV Certificate Request in support of multiple EV Certificates containing the same Subject to the extent permitted under the relevant agreement.

If an Applicant has a currently valid EV Certificate issued by DigiCert, DigiCert may rely on its prior authentication and verification of:

1. The Principal Individual, if the individual is the same person as verified in connection with the Applicant's previously issued and currently valid EV Certificate;
2. The Applicant's Place of Business;
3. The Applicant's Verified Method of Communication but must still confirm the Verified Method of Communication by using it to obtain an affirmative response sufficient to enable a reasonable person to conclude that the Applicant, or a Parent/Subsidiary or Affiliate of Applicant, can be contacted reliably by using the Verified Method of Communication.
4. The Applicant's Operational Existence;
5. The Name, Title, Agency and Authority of the Contract Signer, and Certificate Approver.

DigiCert may rely on a previously verified certificate request to issue a replacement certificate, so long as the certificate being referenced was not revoked due to fraud or other illegal conduct, if:

1. The expiration date of the replacement certificate is the same as the expiration date of the EV Certificate that is being replaced, and
2. The Subject Information of the Certificate is the same as the Subject in the EV Certificate that is being replaced.

Domain Validation

Domain validation may be re-used for 398 days unless otherwise specified in Section 3.2.2.4.

TLS Certificates issued on or after March 15, 2026 may not rely on existing domain validation older than 200 days.

TLS Certificates issued on or after March 15, 2027 may not rely on existing domain validation older than 100 days.

TLS Certificates issued on or after March 15, 2029 may not rely on existing domain validation older than 10 days.

4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications

Issuer CAs can reject certificate applications for any reason. Issuer CAs must reject any certificate application that does not comply with the Applicable Requirements, including certificate applications that include internal names, reserved IP addresses or gTLD's under consideration.

DigiCert may reject a certificate application if it believes issuance could damage DigiCert's business or reputation.

4.2.2.1. EV TLS and Code Signing

Unless issued by an Enterprise RA, EV certificates are validated and approved by two separate validation specialists. The second validation specialist cannot be the same individual who collected the documentation and validated the information contained in the EV Certificate. The second validation specialist reviews the collected information and determines if it is in order and ready for issuance. If any discrepancies are found, the application is sent back for additional information and documentation. If satisfactory explanations and/or additional documents are not received within a

reasonable time, DigiCert rejects the certificate application.

Enterprise RAs may perform the final cross-correlation and due diligence described herein using a single person representing the Enterprise RA.

4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications

DigiCert uses reasonable efforts to process certificate applications. Other than as specified in the relevant Subscriber Agreement/Master Services Agreement, DigiCert does not stipulate when the validation process will be complete.

DigiCert may reject an application if the applicant is unable to provide all required documentation within a reasonable time frame.

4.3. CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE

4.3.1. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance

RAs verify certificate requests prior to issuance. Issuer CAs and RAs must protect databases under their control from unauthorized modification or use. All parties must perform their obligations under this CP/CPS in a secure manner.

TLS pre-certificates and final certificates may be logged to Certificate Transparency databases.

4.3.1.1. Manual authorization of certificate issuance for Root CAs

DigiCert requires two individuals in trusted roles (i.e. the CA system operator, system officer, or PKI administrator) act to issue certificates signed by a Root CA. One of these individuals must deliberately command the Root CA to perform a certificate signing operation.

4.3.1.2. Linting of to-be-signed Certificate content

TLS and S/MIME Certificates follow a Linting process to test the technical conformity of each to-be-signed artifact prior to signing it. Other certificate types may also follow a Linting process, at DigiCert's discretion.

4.3.1.3. Linting of issued Certificates

DigiCert may use a Linting process to test each issued Certificate.

4.3.2. Notifications to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate

DigiCert delivers certificates using the email address designated by the subscriber during enrolment. DigiCert may use other methods deemed at least equally secure.

4.4. CERTIFICATE ACCEPTANCE

4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance

Certificates are considered accepted if not revoked by the subscriber within 30 days of issuance.

4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA

CA Certificates are published in the Issuer CA's repository. End-entity certificates are published by delivering them to the subscriber.

4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

RAs, partners, and other entities involved in the enrollment process may be informed of issuance. The public receives notice of certificates intended for the WebPKI via publication of pre-certificates to a Certificate Transparency log.

4.5. KEY PAIR AND CERTIFICATE USAGE

4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage

Subscribers must use issued certificates in accordance with applicable laws, the relevant Subscriber Agreement, and requirements in this CP/CPS.

Subscribers are required to protect their Private Keys from unauthorized use or disclosure, discontinue using a Private Key after revocation of the associated certificate, and use certificates in accordance with their intended purpose.

4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage

Relying Parties must adhere to the Relying Party agreement available in DigiCert's legal repository.

4.6. CERTIFICATE RENEWAL

4.6.1. Circumstance for Certificate Renewal

DigiCert allows subscribers to renew Certificates through its automation tools, GUIs, and API. DigiCert uses reasonable efforts to notify Subscribers of Certificate expiration dates using the contact details provided by the subscriber.

4.6.2. Who May Request Renewal

See Section 4.1.1.

4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests

Renewals are processed the same way as new certificates as described in Sections 4.1.2 and 4.2.

4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

See Section 4.3.2.

4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate

See Section 4.4.1.

4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA

See Section 4.4.2.

4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

See Section 4.4.3.

4.7. CERTIFICATE RE-KEY

Re-keying a certificate reissues the certificate with a new key pair. Re-keyed certificates have a new serial number but the same subject and validity period.

4.7.1. Circumstance for Certificate Re-Key

DigiCert's subscribers may request a re-key through its online portals, automation solutions, and APIs. Subscribers may request a re-key for any reason, including when a key is compromised.

4.7.2. Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key

See Section 4.1.1.

4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests

See Section 4.1.2.

4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

See Section 4.3.2.

4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Keyed Certificate

See Section 4.4.1.

4.7.6. Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA

See Section 4.4.2.

4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

See Section 4.4.3

4.8. CERTIFICATE MODIFICATION

4.8.1. Circumstances for Certificate Modification

Certificate modification requests are treated as a request for a new certificate. Modified information is validated as described in Section 4.2.1.

4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification

See Section 4.1.1.

4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests

See Section 4.2.

4.8.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

See Section 4.3.2.

4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate

See Section 4.4.1.

4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA

See Section 4.4.2.

4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

See Section 4.4.3.

4.9. CERTIFICATE REVOCATION AND SUSPENSION

Certificate revocation ends the operational period of the certificate prior to the certificate's expiration date. DigiCert may revoke for any reason, including if DigiCert believes that any one of the reasons in this section occurred.

4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation

4.9.1.1. Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate

Circumstances for revocation within 24 hours

Apart from Short-lived Subscriber Certificates, Issuer CAs will revoke a certificate within 24 hours and for TLS use the corresponding CRL Reason confirming one or more of the following occurred:

1. The subscriber requests in writing that the Issuer CA revoke the certificate but does not specify a reason (CRLReason, "unspecified (0)"). Selecting this option omits the reasonCode extension

from the CRL);

2. The subscriber notifies the Issuer CA that the original certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
3. The Issuer CA obtains evidence that the subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the certificate suffered a Key Compromise (CRLReason #1, keyCompromise);
4. The Issuer CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can easily compute the subscriber's Private Key based on the Public Key in the certificate including but not limited to those identified in Section 6.1.1.2. (CRLReason #1, keyCompromise);or
5. The Issuer CA obtains evidence that the validation of domain authorization or control for any FQDN or IP address or mailbox control for any email address in the certificate should not be relied upon (CRLReason #4, superseded).
6. The Issuer CA has reasonable assurance that a code signing certificate was used to sign suspect code.

Circumstances for revocation within 5 days

Apart from Short-lived Subscriber Certificates, Issuer CAs may revoke a certificate within 24 hours and will revoke a certificate within 5 days after receipt and for TLS use the corresponding CRL Reason confirming one or more of the following occurred:

1. The certificate no longer complies with the requirements of Section 6.1.5 and Section 6.1.6 of the applicable Baseline Requirements or any section of the Mozilla Root Store Policy (CRLReason #4, superseded);
2. The Issuer CA obtains evidence that the certificate was misused and/or used outside the intended purpose as indicated by the relevant agreement (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
3. The subscriber or the Cross-Certified CA breached a material obligation under the DigiCert Public Trust CP/CPS, the applicable CPS, or another relevant agreement that requires revocation (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
4. The Issuer CA confirms any circumstance indicating that use of a FQDN, IP address, or email address in the certificate is no longer legally permitted (e.g. a court or arbitrator has revoked a domain name registrant's right to use the Domain Name, a relevant licensing or services agreement between the domain name registrant and the applicant has terminated, or the domain name registrant has failed to renew the Domain Name) (CRLReason #5, cessationOfOperation)
5. For code signing, the Application Software Supplier requests revocation and the Issuer CA does not intend to pursue an alternative course of action;
6. The Issuer CA confirms that a Wildcard Certificate has been used to authenticate a fraudulently misleading subordinate FQDN (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
7. The Issuer CA confirms a material change in the information contained in the certificate (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
8. The Issuer CA confirms that the certificate was not issued in accordance with the CAB/Forum requirements or relevant browser policy (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
9. The Issuer CA determines or confirms that any of the information appearing in the certificate is

inaccurate (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);

10. The Issuer CA's right to issue certificates under the CAB/Forum requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the Issuer CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository (CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL);
11. Revocation is required by the DigiCert Public Trust CP/CPS and/or the applicable CPS for a reason that is not otherwise required to be specified by this section (CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL); or
12. The Issuer CA confirms a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the subscriber's Private Key to compromise or if there is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed (CRLReason #1, keyCompromise).
13. The certificate no longer complies with the requirements of Section 6.1.5 and Section 6.1.6 of the Code Signing Baseline Requirements.

For Code Signing Certificates, Application Software Suppliers may request the Issuer CA delays revocation where immediate revocation has a potentially large negative impact to the ecosystem.

Other Revocation Considerations

The Issuer CA may revoke any certificate in its sole discretion, including if the Issuer CA believes that:

1. Either the subscriber's or the Issuer CA's obligations under the DigiCert Public Trust CP/CPS or the applicable CPS are delayed or prevented by circumstances beyond the party's reasonable control, including computer or communication failure, and, as a result, another entity's information is materially threatened or compromised;
2. The Issuer CA received a lawful and binding order from a government or regulatory body to revoke the certificate;
3. The Issuer CA ceased operations and did not arrange for another Certificate Authority to provide revocation support for the certificates;
4. The technical content or format of the certificate presents an unacceptable risk to Application Software Suppliers, Relying Parties, or others;
5. The subscriber was added as a denied party or prohibited person to a blocklist or is operating from a destination prohibited under the laws of the United States;
6. For Document Signing Certificates, Adobe has requested revocation; or
7. For Code Signing Certificates, the certificate was used to sign, publish, or distribute malware, code that is downloaded without user consent, or other harmful content.

4.9.1.2. Reasons for Revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate

The Issuer CA will revoke a Subordinate CA Certificate within seven (7) days after receiving and confirming one or more of the following occurred:

1. The Subordinate CA requests revocation in writing;
2. The Subordinate CA notifies DigiCert that the original certificate request was not authorized

and does not retroactively grant authorization;

3. The Issuer CA obtains evidence that the Subordinate CA's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the certificate suffered a Key Compromise or no longer complies with the requirements of Sections 6.1.5 and 6.1.6 of the applicable Baseline Requirements or any section of the Mozilla Root Store Policy;
4. The Issuer CA obtains evidence that the CA Certificate was misused and/or used outside the intended purpose as indicated by the relevant agreement;
5. The Issuer CA confirms that the CA Certificate was not issued in accordance with or that Subordinate CA has not complied with the DigiCert Public Trust CP/CPS or the applicable CPS;
6. The Issuer CA determines that any of the information appearing in the CA Certificate is inaccurate or misleading;
7. The Issuer CA or the Subordinate CA ceases operations for any reason and has not made arrangements for another CA to provide revocation support for the CA Certificate;
8. The Issuer CA's or the Subordinate CA's right to issue certificates under the Baseline Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless DigiCert has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository;
9. Revocation is required by the DigiCert Public Trust CP/CPS and/or the applicable CPS; or
10. The technical content or format of the CA Certificate presents an unacceptable risk to Application Software Suppliers or Relying Parties.

DigiCert will revoke a cross-certificate if the cross-certified entity or cross-certificate no longer meets the Applicable Requirements.

4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation

Any appropriately authorized party, such as a recognized representative of a subscriber or cross-signed partner, may request revocation of a certificate.

Third parties may request certificate revocation for problems related to fraud, non-compliance, misuse, or compromise. Certificate revocation requests must identify the entity requesting revocation and specify the reason for revocation. An example certificate is required to research any allegations of non-compliance with the Applicable Requirements. DigiCert does not require a revocation request to revoke a certificate and may revoke a certificate for any reason.

All Issuer CAs that issue Code Signing Certificates must provide Anti-Malware Organizations, subscribers, Relying Parties, Application Software Suppliers, and other third parties with clear instructions on how they can report suspected Private Key Compromise, certificate misuse, certificates used to sign suspect code, takeover attacks, or other types of possible fraud, compromise, misuse, inappropriate conduct, or any other matter related to certificates. Issuer CAs must publicly disclose the instructions on its website.

DigiCert allows for certificates to be reported for the aforementioned reasons via the certificate reporting tool: <https://problemreport.digicert.com/> Other contact methods are specified in Section 1.5.2.1.

4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request

Issuer CAs provide a process for subscribers to request revocation of their own certificates and describe this in their CPS.

DigiCert processes a revocation request as follows:

1. DigiCert logs the request or problem report, including contact information of the requestor. DigiCert may also include its own reasons for revocation in the log.
2. DigiCert may request confirmation of the revocation from a known administrator, where applicable, via out-of-band communication (e.g., telephone, fax, etc.).
3. If the request is authenticated as originating from the Subscriber or an authorized party, DigiCert revokes the Certificate according to the timelines listed in 4.9.1.1 and 4.9.1.2.
4. For requests from third parties, DigiCert personnel begin investigating the request within 24 hours after receipt and decide whether revocation is appropriate based on the following criteria:
 - the nature of the alleged problem,
 - the number of reports received about a particular certificate or website,
 - the identity of the complainants (for example, complaints from a law enforcement official that a website is engaged in illegal activities have more weight than a complaint from a consumer alleging they never received the goods they ordered), and
 - relevant legislation.
5. If DigiCert determines that revocation is appropriate, DigiCert personnel revoke the certificate and update the Certificate Status.

If DigiCert deems appropriate, DigiCert may forward the revocation reports to law enforcement.

DigiCert maintains a continuous 24/7 ability to internally respond to any high priority revocation requests and certificate problem reports on the following website: <https://problemreport.digicert.com/> and other resources as indicated in Section 1.5.2.1 of this CP/CPS.

4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period

Certificates revoked through a subscriber's account are processed immediately. DigiCert processes all other revocation requests within 24 hours of receipt of the request. Actual revocation timelines depend on the reasons for revocation as described in this section.

4.9.5. Time within which CA Must Process the Revocation Request

DigiCert investigates all Certificate Problem Reports and provides a preliminary report on its findings within 24 hours. The period from receipt of when DigiCert determines revocation is required and when a certificate is revoked will match the time frame set forth in Section 4.9.1. while also considering:

1. The nature of the alleged problem (scope, context, severity, magnitude, risk of harm);

2. The consequences of revocation (direct and collateral impacts to subscribers and Relying Parties);
3. The number of Certificate Problem Reports received about a particular certificate or subscriber;
4. The entity making the complaint (for example, a complaint from a law enforcement official that a website is engaged in illegal activities should carry more weight than a complaint from a consumer alleging that they didn't receive the goods they ordered); and
5. Relevant legislation.

Under normal operating circumstances, DigiCert will revoke certificates as quickly as practical after validating the revocation request following the guidelines of this section and Section 4.9.1.

DigiCert follows the revocation time frames specified for malware in the Baseline Requirements for Issuance and Management of Publicly Trusted Code Signing Certificates in Section 4.9.5.

4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirements for Relying Parties

Prior to relying on a certificate, a Relying Party must confirm the validity of each certificate in the certificate chain using the CRL or OCSP responder listed in the certificate.

4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency

Subscriber certificates

Updated CRLs are issued at least once every seven days, and the value of the nextUpdate field is not more than ten days beyond the value of the thisUpdate field. A new CRL is published within 24 hours of revoking a certificate.

Subordinate CA and Timestamp

DigiCert updates and reissues CRLs at least once every twelve months and within 24 hours after revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate, and the value of the nextUpdate field is not more than twelve months beyond the value of the thisUpdate field.

4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs

No stipulation.

4.9.9. On-line Revocation/Status Checking Availability

OCSP responses must conform to RFC 6960 and/or RFC 5019. OCSP responses must either:

1. Be signed by the CA that issued the certificates whose revocation status is being checked, or
2. Be signed by an OCSP Responder whose certificate is signed by the CA that issued the certificate whose revocation status is being checked.

In the latter case, the OCSP signing certificate must contain an extension of type id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck, as defined by RFC 6960.

If the OCSP responder receives a request for the status of a certificate serial number that is “unassigned”, then the responder should not respond with a “good” status. If the OCSP responder is for a CA that is not Technically Constrained in line with Section 7.1.2.3 or Section 7.1.2.5 of the TLS Baseline Requirements, the responder must not respond with a “good” status for such requests.

4.9.10. On-line Revocation Checking Requirements

A certificate serial number within an OCSP request is one of the following three options:

1. “assigned” if a certificate with that serial number has been issued by the Issuing CA, using any current or previous key associated with that CA subject; or
2. “reserved” if a Precertificate [RFC 6962] with that serial number has been issued by
 - (a) the Issuing CA; or
 - (b) a Precertificate Signing Certificate [RFC 6962] associated with the Issuing CA; or
3. “unused” if neither of the previous conditions are met. For “unused” serial numbers, the OCSP responder will not provide a “good” response.

Subscriber Certificates

1. An authoritative OCSP response must be available (i.e. the responder must not respond with the “unknown” status) starting no more than 15 minutes after the Certificate or Precertificate is first published or otherwise made available.
2. OCSP responses have a validity interval greater than or equal to eight hours;
3. OCSP responses have a validity interval less than or equal to ten days;
4. For OCSP responses with validity intervals less than sixteen hours, then DigiCert updates the information provided via an Online Certificate Status Protocol prior to one-half of the validity period before the nextUpdate; and
5. For OCSP responses with validity intervals greater than or equal to sixteen hours, then DigiCert updates the information provided via an Online Certificate Status Protocol at least eight hours prior to the nextUpdate, and no later than four days after the thisUpdate.

Code Signing Certificates

1. OCSP responses are updated at least every four days with a maximum validity of ten days.
2. OCSP responses for code signing and timestamp certificates may be available for up to 10 years after the expiration of the certificate.

Subordinate CA, Intermediate CA and Timestamp Certificates

OCSP information for Intermediate CAs is updated:

1. At least every twelve months;
2. Within 24 hours after revoking the Certificate.

4.9.11. Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available

Issuer CAs may use other methods to publicize revoked certificates, provided that:

1. The alternative method is described in its CPS,
2. The alternative method provides authentication and integrity services commensurate with the assurance validation level of the certificate being verified, and
3. The alternative method meets the issuance and latency requirements for CRLs stated in Sections 4.9.5, 4.9.7, and 4.9.8.

4.9.12. Special Requirements Related to Key Compromise

DigiCert uses commercially reasonable efforts to notify impacted parties when a Private Key is compromised. Previously revoked certificates are updated with the reasonCode of “key compromise” if a key is discovered as compromised after certificate revocation. Issuer CAs are required to revoke all certificates with a compromised key within 24 hours after receiving proof of the Key Compromise.

Key Compromise reports must include:

1. Proof of Key Compromise in either of the following formats:
 - A CSR signed by the compromised private key with the Common Name “Proof of Key Compromise for DigiCert”; or
 - The private key itself.
2. If a CSR is provided, the Issuer CA will only accept proof of Key Compromise, if one of the following algorithms are used to sign the CSR:

```
SHA256WithRSA  
SHA384WithRSA  
SHA512WithRSA  
ECDSAWithSHA256  
ECDSAWithSHA384  
ECDSAWithSHA512  
SHA256WithRSAPSS  
SHA384WithRSAPSS  
SHA512WithRSAPSS  
PureEd25519
```

3. A valid email address that is monitored for follow-up questions and investigations related to the Key Compromise report.

If the entity requesting revocation for keyCompromise can demonstrate possession of the certificate’s Private Key, then DigiCert will revoke all instances of that key across all subscribers.

If the entity requesting revocation cannot demonstrate possession of the certificate’s Private Key, then DigiCert may revoke all certificates associated with that subscriber that contain that Public Key.

4.9.13. Circumstances for Suspension

Suspension is not available for publicly trusted certificates.

4.9.14. Who Can Request Suspension

Suspension is not available for publicly trusted certificates.

4.9.15. Procedure for Suspension Request

Suspension is not available for publicly trusted certificates.

4.9.16. Limits on Suspension Period

Suspension is not available for publicly trusted certificates.

4.10. CERTIFICATE STATUS SERVICES

4.10.1. Operational Characteristics

Certificate validity information is available via either CRL and/or an OCSP responder for TLS, S/MIME, and Code Signing certificates. Revocation entries on a CRL or OCSP response must not be removed until after the expiry date of the revoked Certificate. Revocation entries for Code Signing remain for 10 years after it has expired.

4.10.2. Service Availability

DigiCert operates its CRL and OCSP services in a manner that provides response times of ten seconds or less under normal operating conditions.

All Issuer CAs must maintain a 24/7 ability to respond internally to a high-priority certificate problem report, and where appropriate, forward such a complaint to law enforcement authorities, and/or revoke a certificate that is the subject of such a complaint.

4.10.3. Optional Features

No stipulation.

4.11. END OF SUBSCRIPTION

Subscribers may end their subscription to certificate services by revoking all issued certificates or by allowing their certificates or applicable Subscriber Agreement to expire without renewal. Some terms of the Subscriber Agreement and this CP/CPS may survive termination of the subscription service.

4.12. KEY ESCROW AND RECOVERY

4.12.1. Key Escrow and Recovery Policy and Practices

Issuer CAs are not permitted to escrow CA Private Keys.

Issuer CAs may escrow subscriber key management keys to provide key recovery services provided:

1. The Issuer CA encrypts all Private Keys,
2. The Issuer CA stores escrowed Private Keys with at least the level of security used to generate and deliver the Private Key, and
3. The Issuer CA protects Private Keys from unauthorized disclosure.

Enterprise customers utilizing key escrow services provided by DigiCert may escrow keys within their infrastructure. Enterprise customers must notify subscribers when keys are escrowed.

Subscribers and other authorized entities may request recovery of an escrowed (decryption) Private Key. Keys are recovered at the request of the subscriber, contracting entity, or as required by law.

Entities escrowing Private Keys must have controls in place that prevent unauthorized access to Private Keys.

4.12.2. Session Key Encapsulation and Recovery Policy and Practices

Issuer CAs that support session key encapsulation and recovery shall describe their practices in their CPS.

5. FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS

5.1. PHYSICAL CONTROLS

5.1.1. Site Location and Construction

DigiCert performs its CA and TSA operations from secure data centers.

Certificate management systems are housed in secure facilities that are protected by multiple tiers of physical security, video monitoring, and where required by the Applicable Requirements, dual access.

5.1.2. Physical Access

Data centers are equipped with logical and physical controls that make DigiCert's CA and TSA operations inaccessible to non-trusted personnel. DigiCert operates under a security policy designed to detect, deter, and prevent unauthorized access to DigiCert's operations.

Access to the data centers are continuously monitored.

5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning

Data centers have primary and secondary power supplies that ensure continuous and uninterrupted access to electric power. Uninterrupted power supplies (UPS) and generators provide redundant backup power.

5.1.4. Water Exposures

Reasonable precautions are taken to minimize the impact of water exposure to CA systems.

5.1.5. Fire Prevention and Protection

Data centers are equipped with fire suppression mechanisms.

5.1.6. Media Storage

Media is protected from accidental damage, environmental hazards, and unauthorized physical access.

5.1.7. Waste Disposal

All unnecessary copies of printed sensitive information are shredded on-site before disposal. Sensitive data on magnetic or other digital media are permanently erased before disposal.

5.1.8. Off-site Backup

DigiCert performs weekly system backups that are used to recover from system failure. Backups, including one full backup, are stored in offsite locations that have procedural and physical controls that are commensurate with its operational location.

5.2. PROCEDURAL CONTROLS

5.2.1. Trusted Roles

Functions and duties performed by persons in trusted roles are distributed so that one person alone cannot circumvent security measures or subvert the security and trustworthiness of the PKI or TSA operations.

The following six trusted roles are defined by this CP/CPS, although Issuer CAs may define additional roles:

5.2.1.1. CA Administrators

CA Administrators install and configure the CA software, including key generation, key backup, and key management. CA Administrators perform and securely store regular CA system backups. Administrators do not issue certificates to subscribers.

5.2.1.2. Registration Officers – Validation and Vetting Personnel

Registration Officers collect and validate data included in certificates. Registration Officers approve and revoke certificates.

5.2.1.3. System Administrators / System Engineers (Operator)

Operators install and configure system hardware, including servers, routers, firewalls, and network configurations. Operators also keep critical systems updated with software patches and perform other maintenance as needed.

5.2.1.4. Internal Auditors

Internal Auditors review, maintain, and archive audit logs and oversee compliance audits to determine if the CA is operating in accordance with this CP/CPS and other applicable documents.

5.2.1.5. RA Administrators

RA Administrators manage and use RA software.

5.2.1.6. Security Officers

Security Officers administer and implement security practices.

5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task

Policy and control procedures are used to segment job responsibilities. DigiCert requires that at

least two people acting in a trusted role take action for the most sensitive tasks, such as activating CA Private Keys, generating a CA Key Pair, or creating a backup of a CA Private Key.

An Internal Auditor may participate as a trusted role in granting physical access to the CA system but cannot fulfill the requirement of multiparty control for logical access.

5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for each Role

DigiCert personnel authenticate themselves to the certificate management system before they are allowed access to the systems necessary to perform their trusted roles.

5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties

Individuals are specifically designated to the roles defined in Section 5.2.1. Individuals designated as Registration Officer or Administrator may also assume the Operator role. An Internal Auditor may not assume any other role.

DigiCert enforces separation of duties using physical, logical, or procedural controls. The CA and RA software and hardware identifies and authenticates users and ensures that an identity cannot assume multiple identities at the same time.

5.3. PERSONNEL CONTROLS

5.3.1. Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements

The identity and trustworthiness of each person acting in a trusted role must be verified before engaging in the Certificate Management Process, regardless of whether the person is an employee, agent, or an independent contractor.

Managerial personnel involved in time-stamping operations must possess experience with information security and risk assessment, security procedures, knowledge of time-stamping technology, digital signature technology, and mechanisms for calibration of time stamping clocks with UTC.

5.3.2. Background Check Procedures

Background checks and identity verification are completed before appointing an individual to a trusted role. Identity verification requires a government-issued photo (e.g., passports and/or driver's licenses reviewed pursuant to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, or comparable procedure for the jurisdiction in which the individual's identity is being verified).

Background checks may include the following:

- Checks for criminal activity over the last five years,
- Checks of previous residences are over the past three years, and
- Verification of the highest education degree obtained.

All background checks are restricted to the applicable legal limits allowed. If a check cannot be completed, DigiCert will substitute another investigative technique permitted by law that provides substantially similar information.

5.3.3. Training Requirements

DigiCert provides skills training for trusted roles. This training may include:

1. Basic Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) knowledge;
2. Software versions used by the CA;
3. Authentication and verification policies and procedures, including this document;
4. Security principles and mechanisms;
5. Disaster recovery and business continuity procedures;
6. Common threats to the validation process, including phishing and other social engineering tactics; and
7. The Applicable Requirements.

DigiCert maintains a record of trainings. Registration Officers must have the minimum skills required to perform the validation process and must demonstrate those skills by passing an exam on the EV Guidelines, TLS Baseline Requirements and the S/MIME Baseline Requirements before validating and approving the issuance of the corresponding certificates.

5.3.4. Retraining Frequency and Requirements

Personnel must maintain their skill levels in order to continue acting in trusted roles. When operations change, DigiCert provides documented training to impacted trusted roles.

5.3.5. Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence

No stipulation.

5.3.6. Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions

Employees and agents failing to comply with this CP/CPS are subject to administrative or disciplinary actions. This may include termination of contract, termination of employment and civil and/or criminal sanctions.

5.3.7. Independent Contractor Requirements

Independent contractors assigned to perform trusted roles must meet the requirements of Sections 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3 and are held to the sanctions stated in Section 5.3.6.

5.3.8. Documentation Supplied to Personnel

Documentation is provided to trusted roles as needed to perform their duties.

5.4. AUDIT LOGGING PROCEDURES

5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded

CA systems require identification and authentication at system logon. Important system actions are logged to ensure the accountability of the operators who initiate such actions.

Essential event auditing capabilities of the CA and RA applications are enabled and record all events related to the security of the Certificate Systems, Certificate Management Systems, Root CA Systems, and Registration Authority Systems. A message from any source requesting action related to the operational state of the CA is an auditable event. If the system owner's applications cannot automatically record an event, the system owner implements manual procedures to satisfy these requirements. For each event, the system owner records the:

1. Date and time;
2. Type of event;
3. Success or failure; and
4. User or system that caused the event or initiated the action.

The system owner must make all event records available to its auditors as proof of its practices. Logs are maintained as per the requirements of the relevant policies and programs.

System owners must record at least the following events:

1. CA Certificate and key lifecycle events, including:
 - Key generation, backup, storage, recovery, archival, and destruction;
 - Certificate requests, renewal, and re-key requests, and revocation;
 - Approval and rejection of certificate requests and
 - Cryptographic device lifecycle management events.
 - Generation of Certificate Revocation Lists
 - Signing of OCSP responses (as described in Sections 4.9 and 4.10); and
 - Introduction of new Certificate Profiles and retirement of existing Certificate Profiles
2. CA and Subscriber Certificate lifecycle management events, including:
 - Certificate requests, renewal, and re-key requests, and revocation;
 - All verification activities stipulated in the CA/Browser Forum Requirements, the DigiCert Public Trust CP/CPS and the Issuer CA's CPS;
 - Approval and rejection of certificate requests;
 - Issuance of certificates;
 - Generation of Certificate Revocation Lists
 - Signing of OCSP Responses (as described in Sections 4.9 and 4.10)
 - Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration attempts from each Network Perspective, minimally recording the following information:

- an identifier that uniquely identifies the Network Perspective used;
 - the attempted domain name and/or IP address; and
 - the result of the attempt (e.g., “domain validation pass/fail”, “CAA permission/prohibition”).
- Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration quorum results for each attempted domain name or IP address represented in a Certificate request (i.e., “3/4” which should be interpreted as “Three (3) out of four (4) attempted Network Perspectives corroborated the determinations made by the Primary Network Perspective).

3. Security events, including:

- Successful and unsuccessful PKI system access attempts;
- PKI and security system actions performed;
- Security profile changes;
- Installation, update and removal of software on a certificate System;
- System crashes, hardware failures, and other anomalies;
- Relevant firewall and router activities; and
- Entries to and exits from the CA facility.

4. Log entries must include at least the following elements:

- Date and time of event;
- Identity of the person making the journal record (when applicable); and
- Description of the event.

5.4.1.1 Router and Firewall Activities Logs

Logging of router and firewall activities necessary to meet the requirements of Section 5.4.1, must at a minimum include:

1. Successful and unsuccessful login attempts to routers and firewalls; and
2. Logging of all administrative actions performed on routers and firewalls, including configuration changes, firmware updates, and access control modifications; and
3. Logging of all changes made to firewall rules, including additions, modifications, and deletions; and
4. Logging of all system events and errors, including hardware failures, software crashes, and system restarts.

5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log

DigiCert periodically performs system and file integrity checks and runs vulnerability assessments. Integrity checks verify that logs were not tampered with. DigiCert examines any statistically significant set of security audit data generated since the last review and searches for evidence of malicious activity. Any anomalies or irregularities found are investigated. Any actions taken are documented. DigiCert makes a summary of the review available to its auditors upon request.

5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log

Logs are retained for at least two (2) years, in accordance with Sections 5.5.2 and 4.10.1, or as otherwise specified herein or in the log documentation. DigiCert makes all audit logs available to auditors upon request. Retained records include:

1. CA certificate and key lifecycle management event records as set forth in Section 5.4.1 (1) of the TLS Baseline Requirements, which includes:
 - Destruction of the CA Private Key; or
 - Revocation or expiration of the final CA Certificate;
2. Subscriber certificate lifecycle management as set forth in Section 5.4.1 (2) of the TLS Baseline Requirements;
3. Security event records as set forth in Section 5.4.1 (3) of the TLS Baseline Requirements.

5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log

Audit logs are protected from destruction prior to the end of the audit log retention period and are retained securely until transferred to a backup site.

Both current and archived logs are maintained in a form that prevents unauthorized modification, substitution or destruction.

5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures

Audit logs are backed up periodically.

5.4.6. Audit Collection System (internal vs. external)

Audit processes are often automated. Automated logs are invoked at system startup and end only at system shutdown.

5.4.7. Notification to Event-causing Subject

No stipulation.

5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments

DigiCert's security program must include an annual risk assessment that includes the following:

1. Identifies foreseeable internal and external threats that could result in unauthorized access, disclosure, misuse, alteration, or destruction of any Certificate Data or Certificate Management Processes;
2. Assesses the likelihood and potential damage of these threats, taking into consideration the sensitivity of the Certificate Data and Certificate Management Processes; and
3. Assesses the sufficiency of the policies, procedures, information systems, technology, and other arrangements in place to counter such threats.

5.5. RECORDS ARCHIVAL

Archived records must include sufficient detail to show that a certificate was issued in accordance with the relevant CP/CPS.

5.5.1. Types of Records Archived

In addition to the logs described in Section 5.4.1, the following records are archived:

1. Documentation related to the security of their Certificate Systems, Certificate Management Systems, Root CA Systems, and Delegated Third Party Systems; and
2. Documentation related to their verification, issuance, and revocation of certificate requests and certificates.

5.5.2. Retention Period for Archive

All records described in Section 5.5.1 are retained for at least two (2) years.

5.5.3. Protection of Archive

All archived records are stored at a secure location in a way that prevents unauthorized modification, substitution, or destruction.

5.5.4. Archive Backup Procedures

Archives are regularly backed up and copies are maintained at separate locations.

5.5.5. Requirements for Time-stamping of Records

Archive records are time-stamped as they are created.

5.5.6. Archive Collection System (internal or external)

No stipulation.

5.5.7. Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information

No stipulation.

5.6. KEY CHANGEOVER

When rolling over a CA, DigiCert generates a new Key Pair and begins using the new certificate. The old CA Private Keys are still protected, and the old CA certificate is still made available to verify signatures until all certificates signed with the Private Key expire. Towards the end of a CA Private Key's lifetime, whether due to expiration or due to unilateral change by DigiCert, DigiCert ceases using the expiring CA Private Key to sign certificates and a new CA signing Key Pair is commissioned. All subsequently issued Certificates and CRLs are signed with the new private signing key.

Both the old and new Key Pairs may be concurrently active. This key changeover process helps minimize any adverse effects from CA Certificate expiration. The new CA Public Key Certificate is provided to subscribers and relying parties through the delivery methods detailed in Section 6.1.4.

Where a cross-certified CA performs a key rollover, DigiCert obtains a new CA Public Key or new CA Certificate from the other CA and distributes a new CA Cross Certificate as specified herein.

5.7. COMPROMISE AND DISASTER RECOVERY

5.7.1. Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures

5.7.1.1. Incident Response and Disaster Recovery Plans

DigiCert and any cross-signed partners must each have a documented incident response plan that includes procedures for addressing serious security incidents or system compromise. Required CA emergency documentation includes an Incident Response Plan, a Disaster Recovery, or Business Continuity Plan (DR/BCP), and related resources. DR/BCP documentation must be tested annually on a calendar basis. The documentation includes how DigiCert will notify and reasonably protect Application Software Suppliers, subscribers, and Relying Parties if a disaster, security compromise, or business failure occurs.

5.7.1.2. Mass Revocation Plans

Beginning September 1, 2025, DigiCert maintains a mass revocation plan to ensure a rapid, consistent, and reliable response to large-scale certificate revocation events. The Mass Revocation Plan is tested, reviewed, and updated at least annually.

The Mass Revocation Plan is made available to DigiCert's auditors upon request.

5.7.2. Computing Resources, Software, and/or Data Are Corrupted

DigiCert makes regular back-up copies of its Private Keys and stores them in a secure separate location. All CAs are required to make regular system back-ups on at least a weekly basis.

If a disaster causes DigiCert's operations to become inoperative, then DigiCert will ensure the integrity of its systems and re-initiate its operations on replacement hardware using backup copies of its software, data, and Private Keys at a secure facility. DigiCert prioritizes reestablishing the generation of certificate status information. If the Private Keys are destroyed, DigiCert will reestablish operations as quickly as possible, giving priority to generating new Key Pairs.

5.7.3. Entity Private Key Compromise Procedures

If the Issuer CA suspects that a CA Private Key is compromised or lost then the Issuer CA shall follow its Incident Response Plan and take appropriate action.

Following revocation of a CA Certificate and implementation of the Issuer CA's Incident Response Plan, the Issuer CA shall generate a new CA Key Pair and sign a new CA Certificate in accordance with its CPS. The Issuer CA shall distribute the new self-signed certificate in accordance with Section 6.1.4.

5.7.4. Business Continuity Capabilities after a Disaster

DigiCert maintains a secure facility in at least one secondary, geographically diverse location to ensure that its directory and on-line status servers remain operational if a physical disaster impairs DigiCert's main site.

DigiCert will provide reasonable notice to interested parties if a disaster physically damages the CA equipment or destroys all copies of the a CA's signature keys.

5.8. CA OR RA TERMINATION

When a CA terminates operations, the CA may provide notice to interested parties and may transfer its responsibilities and records to successor entities. A successor may re-issue certificates if the successor has all relevant permissions to do so and has operations that are at least as secure as the transferring CA. Any requirements of this section that vary by contract apply only to the contracting parties and supersede this section.

6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS

6.1. KEY PAIR GENERATION AND INSTALLATION

6.1.1. Key Pair Generation

6.1.1.1 CA Key Pair Generation

CA Key Pairs are generated in and protected by hardware security modules certified to at least FIPS 140-2 Level 3, FIPS 140-3 Level 3 or higher.

Key Pair generation requires the following process:

1. Prepare and follow a Key Pair generation script;
2. Have a qualified auditor witness the CA Key Pair generation process;
3. Have a qualified auditor issue a report opining that the CA followed its CA Key Pair generation ceremony and that appropriate controls are in place to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the CA Key Pair;
4. Generate the CA Key Pair in a physically secured environment;
5. Generate the CA Key Pair using personnel in trusted roles under the principles of multiple person control and split knowledge;
6. Generate the CA Key Pair within cryptographic modules meeting the applicable requirements of Section 6.2.11;
7. Log its CA Key Pair generation activities; and
8. Maintain effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the Private Key was generated and protected in conformance with the procedures described in the applicable CPS and the CA Key Pair generation script

6.1.1.2. RA Key Pair Generation

No stipulation

6.1.1.3 Subscriber Key Pair Generation

The Issuer CA shall reject a certificate request if one or more of the following conditions are met:

1. The Key Pair does not meet the requirements set forth in Section 6.1.5 and/or Section 6.1.6;
2. There is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed;
3. The Issuer CA is aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Applicant's Private Key to compromise;
4. The Issuer CA has previously been notified that the applicant's Private Key has suffered a Key Compromise using the Issuer CA's procedure for revocation request as described in Section 4.9.3 and Section 4.9.12;
5. The Public Key corresponds to an industry-demonstrated weak Private Key. The following

precautions shall be implemented:

- a. In the case of Debian weak keys vulnerability (<https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys>), the Issuer CA shall reject all keys found at <https://github.com/cabforum/Debian-weak-keys/> for each key type (e.g. RSA, ECDSA) and size listed in the repository. For all other keys meeting the requirements of Section 6.1.5, except for RSA key sizes greater than 8192 bits, the Issuer CA shall reject Debian weak keys.
- b. In the case of ROCA vulnerability, the Issuer CA shall reject keys identified by the tools available at <https://github.com/crocs-muni/roca> or equivalent.
- c. In the case of Close Primes vulnerability (<https://fermatattack.secvuln.info/>), the Issuer CA shall reject weak keys which can be factored within 100 rounds using Fermat's factorization method.

Issuer CAs must not generate the key pair on behalf of a subscriber if the certificate request has an `extendedKeyUsage` extension containing either the values `id-kp-serverAuth` [RFC 5280] or `anyExtendedKeyUsage` [RFC 5280].

For Document Signing Certificates, subscribers must generate their Key Pairs in a medium that prevents exportation or duplication and that meets or exceeds FIPS 140-2 Level 3 certification standards.

6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber

If a key is generated by a CA system for a subscriber, then the CA must deliver the Private Key securely to the subscriber. The CA may deliver keys electronically (such as through secure email or stored in a cloud-based system) or on a hardware cryptographic module.

In all cases:

- Except where escrow/backup services are authorized and permitted, the key generator must not retain access to the subscriber's Private Key after delivery,
- The key generator must protect the Private Key from activation, compromise, or modification during the delivery process,
- The subscriber must acknowledge receipt of the Private Key(s), typically by having the Subscriber use the related certificate, and
- The key generator delivers the Private Key in a way that ensures that the correct tokens and activation data are provided to the correct Subscribers securely.

If the Issuer CA or an Enterprise RA becomes aware that a subscriber's Private Key has been communicated to a person or organization not authorized by the subscriber, then the Issuer CA must revoke all certificates associated with that Private Key.

6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

Subscribers generate Key Pairs and deliver Public Keys to the Issuing CA in a secure and trustworthy manner.

6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties

CA Public Keys are provided to Relying Parties as specified in a certificate validation or path discovery policy file, as trust anchors in commercial browsers and operating system root store, and/or as roots signed by other CAs.

DigiCert permits redistribution of their root anchors by application software providers and accreditation authorities. DigiCert may also distribute Public Keys that are part of an updated signature Key Pair as a self-signed certificate, as a new CA Certificate, or in a key roll-over certificate.

Relying Parties may obtain DigiCert's self-signed CA Certificates from its website or by email.

6.1.5. Key Sizes

6.1.5.1. Root and Subordinate CA Key Sizes

The minimum key size for new CA Certificates which issue Code Signing and Time-stamping Certificates are outlined below:

- If the Key is RSA, then the modulus must be at least 4096 bits in length.
- If the Key is ECDSA, then the curve must be one of NIST P-256, P-384, or P-521.
- If the Key is DSA, then the key parameter options must be a Key length (L) of 2048 bits and modulus length (N) of 224 bits or 256 bits.

Additional specifications for new CA Certificates which issue TLS and S/MIME Certificates are the same as described for Subscriber certificates in Section 6.1.5.2.

6.1.5.2 Subscriber Key Sizes

For RSA key pairs:

- The modulus size, when encoded, is at least 2048 bits, and
- The modulus size, in bits, is evenly divisible by 8.

For ECDSA key pairs:

- The key represents a valid point on the NIST P-256, NIST P-384, or NIST P-521 elliptic curve.

S/MIME Only

For ECDSA key pairs:

- The key represents a valid point on NIST P-256, P-384, or P-521.

For EdDSA key pairs:

- The key represents a valid point on the curve25519 or curve 448 elliptic curve.

For ML-DSA key pairs:

- The Key uses one of the following parameter sets:
 - ML-DSA-44 (OID: 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.17), or
 - ML-DSA-65 (OID: 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.18), or
 - ML-DSA-87 (OID: 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.19).

For ML-KEM key pairs:

- The Key uses one of the following parameter sets:
 - ML-KEM-512 (OID: 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.4.1), or
 - ML-KEM-768 (OID: 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.4.2), or
 - ML-KEM-1024 (OID: 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.4.3).

Codesigning and Timestamp Authority Only

- If the Key is RSA, then the modulus must be at least 3072 bits in length.
- If the Key is ECDSA, then the curve must be one of NIST P-256, P-384, or P-521.
- If the Key is DSA, then one of the following key parameter options must be used:
 - Key length (L) of 2048 bits and modulus length (N) of 224 bits
 - Key length (L) of 2048 bits and modulus length (N) of 256 bits

6.1.6. Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking

DigiCert shall confirm the value of the public exponent in an RSA key is an odd number equal to 3 or more.

6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

Private Keys corresponding to Root Certificates must not be used to sign certificates except in the following cases:

1. Self-signed Certificates to represent the Root CA itself;
2. Certificates for Subordinate CAs and Cross-Certified Subordinate CA Certificates;
3. Certificates for infrastructure purposes (administrative role certificates, internal CA operational device certificates); and
4. Certificates for OCSP Response verification.

The use of a specific key is determined by the key usage extension in the X.509 certificate.

6.2. PRIVATE KEY PROTECTION AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE ENGINEERING CONTROLS

6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls

CAs and systems that sign OCSP responses or CRLs use cryptographic hardware modules validated to at least FIPS 140-2 Level 3 or FIPS 140-3 Level 3.

Cryptographic module minimum requirements for subscribers and registration authorities are as follows:

| Assurance Level | Subscriber | Registration Authority |
|-----------------|---|---|
| EV Code Signing | FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+ (Hardware) | FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4 (Hardware) |
| OV Code Signing | FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+ (Hardware) | FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+ (Hardware) |
| Adobe Signing | FIPS 140-2 Level 2 (Hardware) | FIPS 140-2 Level 3 (Hardware) |

For OV or EV Code Signing Certificates, subscribers must protect all Private Keys in a Hardware Crypto Module conforming to at least FIPS 140-2 level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+. DigiCert verifies this key protection via:

1. Use of an HSM, verified by means of a manufacturer's certificate;
2. A cloud-based key generation and protection solution with the following requirements:
 - a. Key creation, storage, and usage of Private Key must remain within the security boundaries of the cloud solution's Hardware Crypto Module that conforms to the specified requirements;
 - b. Subscription at the level that manages the Private Key must be configured to log all access, operations, and configuration changes on the resources securing the Private Key.
 - c. A Hardware Crypto Module provided by the Issuing CA;
 - d. Contractual terms in the Subscriber Agreement requiring the subscriber to protect the Private Key to a standard of at least FIPS 140-2 level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+ and with compliance being confirmed by means of an audit.

6.2.2. Private Key (n out of m) Multi-person Control

Multiple trusted personnel are required to act before accessing and using a CA's Private Keys, including any Private Key backups.

6.2.3. Private Key Escrow

CAs may not escrow subscriber keys for TLS certificates.

6.2.4. Private Key Backup

CA and certificate status Private Keys are backed up under multi-person control.

DigiCert stores the backup in a secure location. DigiCert protects all copies of its CA, CRL, and certificate status Private Keys in the same manner as the originals.

6.2.5. Private Key Archival

DigiCert does not archive its CA Private Keys.

6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module

All keys must be generated by and in a cryptographic module. CA and RA Private Keys are not permitted to exist in plain text outside of the cryptographic module.

Private Keys are only exported from a cryptographic module to perform CA key backup procedures. When transported between cryptographic modules, the Private Key is encrypted. The encryption key is protected from disclosure.

If DigiCert becomes aware that a Subordinate CA's Private Key has been communicated to an unauthorized person or an organization not affiliated with the Subordinate CA, then DigiCert will mandate revocation of all certificates that include the Public Key corresponding to the communicated Private Key.

Issuer CAs pre-generating private keys and transferring them into a hardware token, for example transferring generated end-user subscriber private keys into a smart card, must securely transfer such private keys into the token to the extent necessary to prevent loss, theft, modification, unauthorized disclosure, or unauthorized use of such private keys.

6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module

All CA Private Keys are stored on a cryptographic module which has been evaluated to at least FIPS 140-2 level 3, FIPS 140-3 level 3, or an appropriate Common Criteria Protection Profile or Security Target, EAL 4 (or higher), which includes requirements to protect the Private Key and other assets against known threats.

CA and RA private keys held on hardware cryptographic modules are stored in encrypted form.

6.2.8. Method of Activating Private Key

CAs must activate Private Keys in accordance with the specifications of the cryptographic module manufacturer.

Subscribers are solely responsible for protecting their Private Keys in a manner commensurate with the certificate type. At a minimum, Subscribers must authenticate themselves to the cryptographic module before activating their Private Keys. Entry of activation data shall be protected from disclosure. Subscribers should also take commercially reasonable measures for the physical protection of their workstation to prevent use of the workstation and its associated private key without the subscriber's authorization. When deactivated, Private Keys shall be kept in

encrypted form only and secured.

6.2.9. Method of Deactivating Private Key

CAs must deactivate their Private Keys and store cryptographic modules in secure containers when not in use. CAs must prevent unauthorized access to any activated cryptographic modules.

Subscribers should deactivate their Private Keys via logout and removal procedures when not in use.

6.2.10. Method of Destroying Private Key

CA and status server Private Keys are destroyed by individuals in trusted roles when the keys are no longer needed. Subscribers shall destroy their Private Keys when the corresponding certificate is revoked or expired or if the Private Key is no longer needed.

For software cryptographic modules, DigiCert may destroy the Private Keys by overwriting the data. For hardware cryptographic modules, DigiCert may destroy the Private Keys by executing a “zeroize” command. Physical destruction of hardware is not required.

6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating

See Section 6.2.1.

6.3. OTHER ASPECTS OF KEY PAIR MANAGEMENT

6.3.1. Public Key Archival

DigiCert archives a copy of each Public Key.

6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods

DigiCert certificates have maximum validity periods of:

Table 2. Maximum Validity Periods

| Type | Private Key Use | Certificate Term |
|---|-----------------|--|
| Publicly Trusted Root CAs | No stipulation | 25 years |
| Root CAs Not Otherwise Restricted | No stipulation | 100 years |
| Publicly Trusted Sub CAs / Issuer CAs | No stipulation | 15 years |
| IGTF Cross-certified Sub CA | 6 years | 15 years |
| CRL and OCSP responder signing | 3 years | No stipulation |
| DV TLS | No stipulation | 398 days (200 days for Certificates issued on or after March 15th, 2026) |
| OV TLS | No stipulation | 398 days (200 days for Certificates issued on or after March 15th, 2026) |
| EV TLS | No stipulation | 398 days (200 days for Certificates issued on or after March 15th, 2026) |
| S/MIME | No stipulation | 825 days |
| Time Stamping Authority | 15 months | 135 months |
| Document Signing | No stipulation | 39 months |
| Code Signing Certificate or EV Code Signing Certificate issued to subscriber under the Minimum Requirements for Code Signing Certificates | No stipulation | 39 months (460 days for Certificates issued on or after March 1st, 2026) |
| EV Code Signing Certificate issued to Signing Authority | 135 months | 135 months |
| IGTF End Entity Client used for signatures | 36 months | 36 months |
| IGTF Client used for key management | 36 months | 36 months |
| IGTF on hardware | 60 months | 13 months |

Participants shall cease all use of their key pairs after their usage periods have expired. Relying parties may still validate signatures generated with these keys after expiration of the Certificate.

For the purpose of calculations, a day is measured as 86,400 seconds. Any amount of time greater than this, including fractional seconds and/or leap seconds, represents an additional day. For purposes of calculating time periods in this document, increments are rounded down subject to the

imposed maximum requirements listed in Section 1.1 as applicable.

CA Private Keys may retire before the periods listed above. CAs must not issue Subscriber Certificates with an expiration date that exceeds the CA's public key term stated in the table above or that exceeds the routine re-key identification requirements specified in Section 3.1.1.

6.3.2.1. Reduced Validity for TLS Certificates

Subscriber Certificates issued before March 15, 2026 should not have a Validity Period greater than 397 days and must not have a Validity Period greater than 398 days.

Subscriber Certificates issued on or after March 15, 2026 and before March 15, 2027 should not have a Validity Period greater than 199 days and must not have a Validity Period greater than 200 days.

Subscriber Certificates issued on or after March 15, 2027 and before March 15, 2029 should not have a Validity Period greater than 99 days and must not have a Validity Period greater than 100 days.

Subscriber Certificates issued on or after March 15, 2029 should not have a Validity Period greater than 46 days and must not have a Validity Period greater than 47 days.

6.4. ACTIVATION DATA

6.4.1. Activation Data Generation and Installation

CAs use activation data that has sufficient strength to protect Private Keys from loss, theft, modification, unauthorized disclosure, or unauthorized use. DigiCert activates the cryptographic module containing its CA Private Keys according to the specifications of the hardware manufacturer. For roots and public issuing CAs, this method was evaluated as meeting at least the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 3 or FIPS 140-3 Level 3.

Activation data may only be transmitted via an appropriately protected channel and at a time and place that is distinct from the delivery of the associated cryptographic module.

When passwords are required, DigiCert enforces passwords that meet the requirements specified by the CA/B Forum's Network Security Requirements.

6.4.2. Activation Data Protection

Data used to unlock private keys from disclosure is protected using a combination of cryptographic and physical access control mechanisms. These procedures are described in internal policies.

Subscribers shall protect the activation data for their private keys, if any, to the extent necessary to prevent the loss, theft, modification, unauthorized disclosure, or unauthorized use of such private keys.

6.4.3. Other Aspects of Activation Data

No stipulation.

6.5. COMPUTER SECURITY CONTROLS

6.5.1. Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements

All CA systems are configured to:

1. Authenticate the identity of users before permitting access to the system or applications;
2. Manage the privileges of users and limit users to their assigned roles;
3. Generate and archive audit records for all transactions;
4. Enforce domain integrity boundaries for security critical processes; and
5. Support recovery from key or system failure.

CA operators protect the network from internal and external intrusion and limit the nature and source of activities that may access such systems and information.

Passwords require a minimum character length and a combination of alphanumeric and special characters. Password procedures are described in internal documentation. Multi-factor authentication is enforced for all accounts capable of directly causing certificate issuance.

6.5.2. Computer Security Rating

No stipulation.

6.6. LIFE CYCLE TECHNICAL CONTROLS

6.6.1. System Development Controls

Issuer CAs may only use:

1. Commercial off-the-shelf software that was designed and developed under a formal and documented development methodology,
2. Hardware and software developed specifically for the CA by verified personnel, using a structured development approach and a controlled development environment,
3. Open source software that meets security requirements through software verification and validation, and a documented software development life cycle process,
4. Hardware and software purchased and shipped in a fashion that reduces the likelihood of tampering, and
5. For CA operations, hardware and software is dedicated only to performing the CA functions.

CAs must have procedures that prevent malicious software from being loaded onto the CA equipment and must scan all hardware and software for malicious code on first use and

periodically thereafter. CAs use a formal configuration management methodology for installation and ongoing maintenance of any CMS. CAs must document and control modifications and upgrades to a CMS.

If the CA uses Linting software developed by third parties, it should monitor for updated versions of that software and plan for updates no later than 3 months from the release of the update.

6.6.2. Security Management Controls

CAs must document, control, monitor, and maintain the installation and configuration of its CA systems, including any modifications or upgrades. The CA verifies that all software is the correct version and is supplied by the vendor free of any modifications.

6.6.3. Life Cycle Security Controls

No stipulation.

6.7. NETWORK SECURITY CONTROLS

All CA and RA systems must be protected in accordance with the CA/Browser Forum's Network and Certificate System Security Requirements.

These protections include:

- Operating hardware firewalls for network perimeter control
- Continuously monitoring for system health and security events
- Performing periodic vulnerability scans and applying system security patches in a timely manner
- Managing logical access permissions in accordance with a formal procedure
- Enforcing multi-factor authentication
- Monitoring the configuration of access permissions
- Regular training of personnel in trusted roles

Additional procedures may be documented internally.

Vulnerability scans of networks are performed at least once a quarter, and penetration tests at least annually. Remediation timelines are governed by severity, with critical vulnerabilities addressed within 48 hours and high/medium issues resolved within 45 to 60 days. Exceptions are documented, assessed for risk, and recorded.

6.8. TIME-STAMPING

DigiCert operates a Timestamp Authority that complies with RFC 3161. DigiCert recommends that subscribers use the DigiCert Timestamp Authority to timestamp signed code.

DigiCert maintains clock synchronization when a leap second occurs. DigiCert synchronizes its

timestamp server at least every 24 hours with a UTC(k) time source. The timestamp server automatically detects and reports on clock drifts or jumps out of synchronization with UTC.

Clock adjustments of one second or greater are auditable events. Any changes to the timestamp server's process are auditable events.

The digest algorithm used to sign Timestamp tokens must match the digest algorithm used to sign the Timestamp certificate.

7. CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES

7.1. CERTIFICATE PROFILE

7.1.1 Version Number(s)

Publicly trusted certificates are X.509 version 3 certificates.

7.1.2. Certificate Extensions

IGTF Certificates comply with the Grid Certificate Profile as defined by the Open Grid Forum GFD.125.

Certificate extensions align with RFC 5280 as amended by the Applicable Requirements.

7.1.3 Algorithm Object Identifiers

Certificates are signed using an algorithm permitted by the Applicable Requirements.

These algorithms include:

Table 3. Signing Algorithms

| | |
|-------------------------|--|
| sha256WithRSAEncryption | { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi (113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 11 } |
| sha384WithRSAEncryption | [iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 12] |
| id-RSASSA-PSS | { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi (113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 10 } |
| ecdsa-with-SHA256 | [iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x962(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) ecdsa-with-SHA256(2)] |
| ecdsa-with-SHA256 | { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62 (10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2 (3) 2 } |
| ecdsa-with-SHA384 | { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62 (10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 } |
| ecdsa-with-SHA512 | { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62 (10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 } |

Certificates using RSA with PSS padding have an RSA signature with PSSpadding using the following algorithms and OIDs:

| | |
|-----------|--|
| id-sha256 | { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 } |
| id-sha512 | { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 } |

Key Pairs may be generated using the following:

| | |
|-------------------------|--|
| RsaEncryption | {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 1} |
| Dhpublicnumber | {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x942(10046) number-type(2) 1} |
| id-ecPublicKey | {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) id- publicKeyType(2) 1} |
| id-keyExchangeAlgorithm | {joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) algorithms(1) 22} |

Keys and hash algorithms for TLS certificates meet the requirement specified in the TLS Baseline Requirements in Section 7 and the Applicable Requirements.

7.1.4. Name Forms

Each Certificate includes a unique serial number. Optional subject fields in a certificate either contain verified information or are left empty.

Certificates cannot contain metadata such as ‘.’, ‘-’ and ‘ ’ characters and/or any other indication that the value or field is absent, incomplete, or not applicable.

S/MIME

Enterprise RAs may include optional attributes in the certificate as specified in Section 7.1.4.2.5 of the S/MIME Requirements. The Enterprise RA must validate this information using the process described in Section 3.

7.1.5. Name Constraints

Technically Constrained Subordinate CA certificates are issued with an extended key usage extension. The extension does not include the anyExtendedKeyUsage key usage purpose.

The extended key usage may contain values permitted by the Applicable Requirements but, in addition to other values, may only include one of the following: serverAuth, code signing, emailProtection or timestamping.

7.1.6. Certificate Policy Object Identifier

An object identifier (OID) is a unique number that identifies an object or policy. OIDs are included as appropriate in certificates, including the relevant OIDs required by the CA/Browser Forum.

Issuer CAs must disclose the OIDs included in publicly trusted certificates used in their CPS or a

publicly available document.

DigiCert maintains its OIDs in the following GitHub repository: https://github.com/digicert/digicert_official_oids

7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints Extension

No stipulation.

7.1.8. Policy Qualifiers Syntax and Semantics

Certificates may contain information in the Certificate Policy extension.

7.1.9. Processing Semantics for the Critical Certificate Policies Extension

No stipulation.

7.2. CRL PROFILE

DigiCert CRL profile conforms to RFC 5280 as amended by the Applicable Requirements. For TLS revocations the CRL profile conforms to the TLS Baseline Requirements.

7.2.1. Version number(s)

CRLs must be version 2 CRLs that conform to RFC 5280.

7.2.2. CRL and CRL Entry Extensions

CRLs must use CRL extensions that conform to RFC 5280 and other requirements as applicable. CRLs containing revocation information about TLS Certificates conform to the TLS BR.

If a CRL entry reasonCode extension is present, the reason must indicate the appropriate reason for revocation of the certificate.

If a CRL entry is for a Root CA or Subordinate CA Certificate, including Cross Certificates, the reasonCode extension SHALL be present and MUST NOT be unspecified (0) or certificateHold(6).

Certificates may be revoked with one of the following reason codes. The codes are arranged in order of preference and in cases where multiple reason codes are applicable the code of highest preference should be used.

cACompromise or aACompromise shall be used to indicate Key Compromise of Certificate Authority (CA) or Attribute Authority (AA) certificates respectively.

Table 4. Revocation Reason Code Usage by Certificate Type

| Code | Description | TLS Permitted | S/MIME Permitted | Code-Signing Permitted | All Others Permitted |
|------|--|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| 0 | Unspecified; If permitted, the reasonCode extension should just be omitted | Yes, but not for CA certificates | Yes, but not for CA certificates | Yes | Yes |
| 1 | keyCompromise | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 2 | cACompromise | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 10 | aACompromise | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 9 | privilegeWithdrawn | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 5 | cessationOfOperation | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 3 | affiliationChanged | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 4 | superseded | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 6 | certificateHold | No | No, as per TLS BR | No, as per TLS BR | No, as per TLS BR |
| 7 | Value 7 is not used | No | No | No | No |
| 8 | removeFromCRL | No | No | No | No |

7.2.3. CRL reasonCode Extension Entries

The following is a description of each of these reason codes and circumstances where DigiCert or a subscriber will be obligated to use it for their revocation circumstances:

7.2.3.1. keyCompromise

The CRLReason keyCompromise is used if:

- DigiCert obtains verifiable evidence that the certificate subscriber's private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate suffered a key compromise; or
- DigiCert is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the certificate subscriber's private key to compromise; or
- There is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the private key was flawed; or
- DigiCert is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can easily compute the certificate subscriber's private key based on the public key in the certificate (such as a Debian weak key, see <https://wiki.debian.org/TLSkeys>); or
- The certificate subscriber requests that DigiCert revoke the certificate for this reason, with the scope of revocation being described below.

If DigiCert obtains verifiable evidence of Private Key Compromise for a certificate whose CRL entry does not contain a reasonCode extension or has a reasonCode extension with a non-keyCompromise reason, DigiCert may update the CRL entry to enter keyCompromise as the CRLReason in the reasonCode extension.

Additionally, DigiCert may update the revocation date in a CRL entry when it is determined that the private key of the certificate was compromised prior to the revocation date that is indicated in the CRL entry for that certificate.

7.2.3.2. privilegeWithdrawn

The CRLReason privilegeWithdrawn is used for subscriber-side infractions that do not compromise the certificate's private key, such as when the certificate subscriber provided misleading information in their certificate request or has not upheld their material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use.

CRLReason privilegeWithdrawn is used when:

- DigiCert obtains evidence that the certificate was misused; or
- DigiCert is made aware that the certificate subscriber has violated one or more of its material obligations under the subscriber agreement or terms of use; or
- DigiCert is made aware that a wildcard certificate has been used to authenticate a fraudulently misleading subordinate fully-qualified domain name; or
- DigiCert is made aware of a material change in the information contained in the certificate; or
- DigiCert determines or is made aware that any of the information appearing in the certificate is inaccurate; or

- DigiCert is made aware that the original certificate request was not authorized and that the Subscriber does not retroactively grant authorization.

7.2.3.3. cessationOfOperation

The CRLReason cessationOfOperation is used when a website with the certificate is shut down prior to the expiration of the certificate or the subscriber no longer owns or controls the domain name in the certificate.

CRLReason cessationOfOperation is used when:

- The certificate subscriber will no longer be using the certificate because they are discontinuing their website; or
- DigiCert is made aware of any circumstance indicating that use of a fully-qualified domain name or IP address in the certificate is no longer legally permitted (e.g. a court or arbitrator has revoked a domain name registrant's right to use the domain name, a relevant licensing or services agreement between the domain name registrant and the applicant has terminated, or the domain name registrant has failed to renew the domain name).
- The certificate subscriber has requested that their certificate be revoked for this reason; or
- DigiCert received verifiable evidence that the certificate subscriber no longer controls, or is no longer authorized to use, all of the domain names in the certificate.

Otherwise, the cessationOfOperation CRLReason is not used.

7.2.3.4. affiliationChanged

CRLReason affiliationChanged indicates that the subject's name or other subject identity information in the certificate has changed but there is no evidence that the certificate's private key was compromised.

CRLReason affiliationChanged is used when:

- The certificate subscriber has requested that their certificate be revoked for this reason; or
- DigiCert replaced the certificate due to changes in the certificate's subject information and the CA has not replaced the certificate for the other reasons: keyCompromise, superseded, cessationOfOperation, or privilegeWithdrawn.

Otherwise, the affiliationChanged CRLReason must not be used.

7.2.3.5. superseded

The CRLReason superseded is used when:

- The certificate subscriber has requested a new certificate to replace an existing certificate; or
- DigiCert obtains reasonable evidence that the validation of domain authorization or control for any fully-qualified domain name or IP address in the certificate should not be relied upon; or
- DigiCert revoked the certificate for compliance reasons such as the certificate does not comply with the DigiCert Public Trust CP/CPS, the CA/B Forum's Baseline Requirements, or the Mozilla

Root Store Policy. Unless the keyCompromise CRLReason is being used, the CRLReason superseded must be used when:

- The certificate subscriber has requested that their certificate be revoked for this reason; or
- DigiCert revoked the certificate due to domain authorization or compliance issues other than those related to keyCompromise or privilegeWithdrawn.

Otherwise, the superseded CRLReason is not used.

7.3. OCSP PROFILE

OCSP services are operated in accordance with RFC 6960 and/or RFC 5019.

7.3.1. Version Number(s)

Issuing CAs shall configure OCSP responses in accordance with industry standards.

7.3.2. OCSP Extensions

The singleExtensions of an OCSP response shall not contain the reasonCode (OID 2.5.29.21) CRL entry extension.

8. COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS

The policies in the DigiCert Public Trust CP/CPS are designed to meet or exceed the requirements of the Applicable Requirements, including the latest versions of the WebTrust Programs for Certification Authorities as required by the Applicable Requirements in Section 1.1.

8.1. FREQUENCY OR CIRCUMSTANCES OF ASSESSMENT

On at least an annual basis, Issuer CAs and any other participants contractually requiring an audit must retain an independent auditor for a period in time audit. This audit assess the Issuer CA's and other parties' compliance with the applicable CPS. This audit must cover any CMSs, Sub CAs, RAs, and status server that is used in the WebPKI. Any independent entity interoperating within the DigiCert PKI must submit its practices statement and the results of its compliance audit on an annual basis for review and approval.

8.2. IDENTITY/QUALIFICATIONS OF ASSESSOR

Only a qualified auditor may perform the assessment described in Section 8.1. A qualified auditor means a natural person, legal entity, or group of natural persons or legal entities that collectively possess the following qualifications and skills:

1. Independence from the subject of the audit;
2. The ability to conduct an audit that addresses the criteria specified in an Eligible Audit Scheme;
3. Employs individuals who have proficiency in examining Public Key Infrastructure technology, information security tools and techniques, information technology and security auditing, and the third-party attestation function;
4. Licensed by WebTrust;
5. Bound by law, government regulation, or professional code of ethics; and
6. Except in the case of an Internal Government Auditing Agency, maintains Professional Liability/Errors & Omissions insurance with policy limits of at least one million US dollars in coverage.

8.3. ASSESSOR'S RELATIONSHIP TO ASSESSED ENTITY

Qualified auditors must not have a financial interest, business relationship, or course of dealing that could foreseeably create a significant bias for or against the audited party.

8.4. TOPICS COVERED BY ASSESSMENT

The audit covers the audited parties' business practices disclosure, the integrity of its PKI operations, and compliance with the relevant CP/CPS. At least one or a combination - as required by

CA/B Forum or applicable Root Programs - of the audit schemes below must be used:

1. WebTrust Program for Certification Authorities;
2. WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – SSL Baseline
3. WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – Network Security
4. WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – SSL Baseline with Network Security
5. WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – Extended Validation SSL;
6. WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – Code Signing Baseline Requirements
7. WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – S/MIME

8.5. ACTIONS TAKEN AS A RESULT OF DEFICIENCY

If an audit reports a material noncompliance with applicable law, the relevant CPS, or any other contractual obligations related to the audited party's services, then:

1. The auditor will document the discrepancy,
2. The auditor will promptly notify DigiCert and the Issuer CA, and
3. The Issuer CA will develop a plan to cure the noncompliance.

DigiCert submits all curative plans to the DCPA for approval. Curative plans are submitted to other parties as necessary to fulfill DigiCert's legal obligations.

8.6. COMMUNICATION OF RESULTS

The results of each audit are reported to the DCPA for review and approval. Other parties may also receive a copy of the audit results.

Annual Audit Reports are made publicly available no later than three (3) months after the end of the audit period. If there is a delay greater than three (3) months, DigiCert will provide an explanatory letter signed by the Qualified Auditor.

8.7. SELF-AUDITS

Internal Auditors perform regular internal audits of a CAs operations, personnel, and compliance with the DigiCert Public Trust CP/CPS. Internal audits of certificate issuance are performed using a randomly selected sample of certificates issued since the last internal audit. Internal Auditors must self-audit at least three percent of TLS, Code Signing certificates and S/MIME certificates on a quarterly basis. Audits of other certificate types will be at the discretion of the CA to gain reasonable assurance of compliance to applicable root program requirements. DigiCert may complete additional self-assessments as required by the root programs.

DigiCert may use a Linting process to verify the technical accuracy of Certificates within the selected sample set independently of previous Linting performed on the same Certificates.

9. OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS

9.1. FEES

9.1.1. Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees

DigiCert charges fees in connection to certificate issuance and renewal. DigiCert may change its pricing for future purchases at any time in accordance with the applicable customer agreement.

9.1.2. Certificate Access Fees

DigiCert may charge a reasonable fee for access to its certificate databases.

9.1.3. Revocation or Status Information Access Fees

DigiCert does not charge a certificate revocation fee or a fee for checking the validity status of an issued Certificate using a CRL.

DigiCert may charge a fee for providing customized CRLs, OCSP services, or other value-added revocation and status information services.

9.1.4. Fees for Other Services

DigiCert does not charge a fee for access to this CP/CPS.

Any use made for purposes other than simply viewing the document, such as reproduction, redistribution, modification, or creation of derivative works, shall be subject to a license agreement with the entity holding the copyright to the document.

9.1.5. Refund Policy

Subscribers must request refunds, in writing, within 30 days after the purchase of an entitlement to issue a Certificate. After receiving the refund request, DigiCert may revoke the certificate. Refunds are discretionary and may be subject to applicable application processing fees.

9.2. FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

9.2.1. Insurance Coverage

DigiCert maintains Commercial General Liability insurance with a policy limit of at least \$2 million in coverage and Professional Liability/Errors & Omissions insurance with a policy limit of at least \$5 million in coverage.

Insurance is carried through companies rated no less than A- as to Policy Holder's Rating in the current edition of Best's Insurance Guide (or with an association of companies, each of the members of which are so rated).

9.2.2. Other Assets

No stipulation.

9.2.3. Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities

DigiCert provides a warranty to Subscribers according to the terms of the Netsure Extended Warranty Protection Plan. DigiCert provides a limited warranty to Relying Parties in DigiCert's Relying Party Agreement.

9.3. CONFIDENTIALITY OF BUSINESS INFORMATION

9.3.1. Scope of Confidential Information

The following information is considered confidential and protected against disclosure using a reasonable degree of care:

1. Private Keys;
2. Activation data used to access Private Keys or to gain access to the CA system;
3. Business continuity, incident response, contingency, and disaster recovery plans;
4. Other security practices used to protect the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information;
5. Information held by DigiCert as private information in accordance with Section 9.4;
6. Audit logs and archive records; and
7. Transaction records, financial audit records, and external or internal audit trail records and any audit reports (with the exception of an auditor's letter confirming the effectiveness of the controls set forth in this CP/CPS).

9.3.2. Information Not Within the Scope of Confidential Information

Any information not listed as confidential is considered public information. Published certificate and revocation data is considered public information.

9.3.3. Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information

DigiCert's employees, agents, and contractors are responsible for protecting confidential information and are contractually obligated to do so. Employees receive training on how to handle confidential information.

9.4. PRIVACY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION

9.4.1. Privacy Plan

DigiCert follows the privacy policy posted on its website when handling personal information. Personal information is only disclosed when the disclosure is required by law or when requested

by the subject of the personal information. Such privacy policies shall conform to applicable local privacy laws. DigiCert follows the Privacy Notices posted on its website when handling personal information. See <https://www.digicert.com/digicert-privacy-policy>

9.4.2. Information Treated as Private

DigiCert treats all personal information about an individual that is not publicly available in the contents of a certificate or CRL as private information. DigiCert protects private information using appropriate safeguards and a reasonable degree of care.

9.4.3. Information Not Deemed Private

Subject to local laws, private information does not include certificates, CRLs, or their contents.

9.4.4. Responsibility to Protect Private Information

DigiCert employees and contractors are expected to handle personal information in strict confidence and meet the requirements outlined in DigiCert's Data Privacy Framework Policy. All sensitive information is securely stored and protected against accidental disclosure.

9.4.5. Notice and Consent to Use Private Information

Personal information obtained from an applicant during the application or identity verification process is considered private information if the information is not included in a certificate. DigiCert will only use private information after obtaining the subject's consent or as required by applicable law or regulation. All Subscribers must consent to the global transfer and publication of any personal data contained in a certificate.

9.4.6. Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process

DigiCert may disclose private information, without notice, if DigiCert believes the disclosure is required by law or regulation.

9.4.7. Other Information Disclosure Circumstances

No stipulation.

9.5. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

DigiCert and/or its business partners own the intellectual property rights in DigiCert's services, including the certificates, trademarks used in providing the services, and this CP/CPS. "DigiCert" is a registered trademark of DigiCert, Inc.

DigiCert retains all intellectual property rights in and to the certificates and revocation information that they issue. DigiCert and customers shall grant permission to reproduce and distribute Certificates on a nonexclusive royalty-free basis, provided that they are reproduced in full and that use of certificates is subject to the Relying Party Agreement.

Subscribers and Applicants retain all rights it has (if any) in any trademark, service mark, or trade

name contained in any certificate and distinguished name within any certificate issued to such Subscriber or Applicant. DigiCert does not verify an applicant's right to use a trademark and does not resolve trademark disputes. DigiCert may reject any application or require revocation of any certificate that is part of a trademark dispute.

DigiCert shall not knowingly violate the intellectual property rights of any third party.

9.6. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES

9.6.1. CA Representations and Warranties

Except as expressly stated in this CP/CPS or in a separate agreement with a subscriber, DigiCert does not make any representations regarding its products or services. DigiCert represents, to the extent specified in this CP/CPS, that:

1. DigiCert complies, in all material aspects, with the DigiCert Public Trust CP/CPS, and all applicable laws and regulations,
2. DigiCert publishes and updates CRLs and OCSP responses on a regular basis,
3. All Certificates issued under this CP/CPS will be verified in accordance with this CP/CPS and meet the minimum requirements found herein and in the Applicable Requirements, and
4. DigiCert will maintain a repository of public information on its website.

To the extent allowed under EU law, DigiCert:

1. Does not warrant the accuracy, authenticity, completeness, or fitness of any unverified information, including name verification for (1) Certificates intended for email and intranet use, (2) Multi-SAN Certificates, and (3) other certificates issued to individuals and intranets.
2. Is not responsible for information contained in a certificate except as stated in this CP/CPS,
3. Does not warrant the quality, function, or performance of any software or hardware device, and
4. Is not responsible for failing to comply with this CP/CPS because of circumstances outside of DigiCert's control.

For EV Certificates, DigiCert represents to Subscribers, Subjects, Application Software Vendors that distribute DigiCert's Root Certificates, and Relying Parties that use a DigiCert Certificate while the Certificate is valid that DigiCert followed the EV Guidelines when verifying information and issuing EV Certificates.

This representation is limited solely to DigiCert's compliance with the EV Guidelines (e.g., DigiCert may rely on erroneous information provided in an attorney's opinion or accountant's letter that is checked in accordance with the Guidelines).

Subscriber Agreements may include additional representations and warranties that do not contradict or supersede this CP/CPS.

9.6.2. RA Representations and Warranties

RAs represent that:

1. The RA's certificate issuance and management services conform to the DigiCert Public Trust CP/CPS,
2. Information provided by the RA does not contain any false or misleading information,
3. Translations performed by the RA are an accurate translation of the original information, and
4. All Certificates requested by the RA meet the requirements of the DigiCert Public Trust CP/CPS.

DigiCert's agreement with the RA may contain additional representations.

9.6.3. Subscriber Representations and Warranties

Prior to being issued and receiving a certificate, subscribers are solely responsible for any misrepresentations they make to third parties and for all transactions that use subscriber's Private Key, regardless of whether such use was authorized. Subscribers are required to notify DigiCert and any applicable RA if a change occurs that could affect the status of the certificate. DigiCert requires, as part of the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use for TLS, that the Applicant make the commitments and warranties in this section for the benefit of DigiCert and the Certificate Beneficiaries.

Prior to the issuance of a Certificate, DigiCert will obtain, for the express benefit of DigiCert and the Certificate Beneficiaries, either:

1. The Applicant's agreement to the Subscriber Agreement with DigiCert, or
2. The Applicant's acknowledgement of the Terms of Use.

Subscribers represent to DigiCert, Application Software Vendors, and Relying Parties that, for each certificate, the subscriber will:

1. Securely generate its Private Keys and protect its Private Keys from compromise,
2. Provide accurate and complete information when communicating with DigiCert,
3. Confirm the accuracy of the certificate data prior to using the Certificate,
4. Promptly (i) request revocation of a Certificate, cease using it and its associated Private Key, and notify DigiCert if there is any actual or suspected misuse or compromise of the Private Key associated with the Public Key included in the Certificate, and (ii) request revocation of the Certificate, and cease using it, if any information in the Certificate is or becomes incorrect or inaccurate,
5. Ensure that individuals using certificates on behalf of an organization have received security training appropriate to the Certificate,
6. Use the certificate only for authorized and legal purposes, consistent with the certificate purpose, this CP/CPS, any other applicable CP, and the relevant Subscriber Agreement, including only installing TLS certificates on servers accessible at the domain listed in the certificate and not using code signing certificates to sign malicious code or any code that is downloaded without a user's consent, and

7. Promptly cease using the certificate and related Private Key after the certificate's expiration.

Subscriber Agreements may include additional representations and warranties.

9.6.4. Relying Party Representations and Warranties

Each Relying Party represents that, prior to relying on a DigiCert Certificate, it:

1. Obtained sufficient knowledge on the use of digital certificates and PKI,
2. Studied the applicable limitations on the usage of certificates and agrees to DigiCert's limitations on liability related to the use of certificates,
3. Has read, understands, and agrees to the DigiCert Relying Party Agreement and the DigiCert Public Trust CP/CPS,
4. Verified both the DigiCert Certificate and the certificates in the certificate chain using the relevant CRL or OCSP,
5. Will not use a DigiCert Certificate if the certificate has expired or been revoked and
6. Will take all reasonable steps to minimize the risk associated with relying on a digital signature, including only relying on a DigiCert Certificate after considering:
 - Applicable law and the legal requirements for identification of a party, protection of the confidentiality or privacy of information, and enforceability of the transaction;
 - The intended use of the certificate as listed in the certificate or this CP/CPS,
 - The data listed in the certificate,
 - The economic value of the transaction or communication,
 - The potential loss or damage that would be caused by an erroneous identification or a loss of confidentiality or privacy of information in the application, transaction, or communication,
 - The Relying Party's previous course of dealing with the Subscriber,
 - The Relying Party's understanding of trade, including experience with computer-based methods of trade, and
 - Any other indicia of reliability or unreliability pertaining to the subscriber and/or the application, communication, or transaction.

Any unauthorized reliance on a certificate is at a party's own risk.

Relying Party Agreements may include additional representations and warranties.

9.6.5. Representations and Warranties of Other Participants

No stipulation.

9.7. DISCLAIMERS OF WARRANTIES

EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY STATED IN SECTION 9.6.1, ALL CERTIFICATES AND ANY RELATED SOFTWARE AND SERVICES ARE PROVIDED "AS IS" AND "AS AVAILABLE". TO THE MAXIMUM

EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, DIGICERT DISCLAIMS ALL EXPRESS AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING ALL WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. DIGICERT DOES NOT WARRANT THAT ANY SERVICE OR PRODUCT WILL MEET ANY EXPECTATIONS OR THAT ACCESS TO CERTIFICATES WILL BE TIMELY OR ERROR-FREE. DigiCert does not guarantee the availability of any products or services and may modify or discontinue any product or service offering at any time.

9.8. LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY

NOTHING HEREIN LIMITS LIABILITY RELATED TO (I) DEATH OR PERSONAL INJURY RESULTING FROM DIGICERT'S NEGLIGENCE OR (II) FRAUD COMMITTED BY DIGICERT. EXCEPT AS STATED ABOVE, ANY ENTITY USING A DIGICERT CERTIFICATE OR SERVICE WAIVES ALL LIABILITY OF DIGICERT RELATED TO SUCH USE, PROVIDED THAT DIGICERT HAS MATERIALLY COMPLIED WITH THIS CP/CPS IN PROVIDING THE CERTIFICATE OR SERVICE. DIGICERT'S LIABILITY FOR CERTIFICATES AND SERVICES THAT DO NOT MATERIALLY COMPLY WITH THIS CP/CPS IS LIMITED AS SET FORTH IN THE NETSURE EXTENDED WARRANTY PROTECTION PLAN AND THE DIGICERT RELYING PARTY AGREEMENT.

All liability is limited to actual and legally provable damages. DigiCert is not liable for:

1. Any indirect, consequential, special, or punitive damages or any loss of profit, revenue, data, or opportunity, even if DigiCert is aware of the possibility of such damages;
2. Liability related to fraud or willful misconduct of the Applicant;
3. Liability related to use of a Certificate that exceeds the limitations on use, value, or transactions as stated either in the Certificate or this CP/CPS;
4. Liability related to the security, usability, or integrity of products not supplied by DigiCert, including the subscriber's and Relying Party's hardware; or
5. Liability related to the compromise of a subscriber's Private Key.

The limitations in this section apply to the maximum extent permitted by law and apply regardless of (i) the reason for or nature of the liability, including tort claims, (ii) the number of claims of liability, (iii) the extent or nature of the damages, (iv) whether DigiCert failed to follow any provision of this CP/CPS, or (v) whether any provision of this CP/CPS was proven ineffective. The disclaimers and limitations on liabilities in this CP/CPS are fundamental terms to the use of DigiCert's Certificates and services.

To the extent DigiCert has issued and managed the certificate(s) at issue in compliance with this CP/CPS, DigiCert shall have no liability to the subscriber, any Relying Party, or any other third parties for any damages or losses suffered as a result of the use or reliance on such certificate(s). To the extent permitted by applicable law, Subscriber Agreements and Relying Party Agreements shall limit DigiCert's and the applicable Affiliates' liability outside the context of any extended warranty protection program. Limitations of liability shall include an exclusion of indirect, special, incidental, and consequential damages.

The liability (and/or limitation thereof) of subscribers shall be as set forth in the applicable Subscriber Agreements.

The liability (and/or limitation thereof) of Enterprise RAs and the applicable CA shall be set out in the agreement(s) between them.

The liability (and/or limitation thereof) of Relying Parties shall be as set forth in the applicable Relying Party Agreements.

9.9. INDEMNITIES

9.9.1. Indemnification by DigiCert

To the extent permitted by applicable law, DigiCert shall indemnify each Application Software Vendor against any claim, damage, or loss suffered by an Application Software Vendor related to an EV Certificate issued by DigiCert, regardless of the cause of action or legal theory involved, except where the claim, damage, or loss suffered by the Application Software Vendor was directly caused by the Application Software Vendor's software displaying either (1) a valid and trustworthy EV Certificate as not valid or trustworthy or (2) displaying as trustworthy (i) an EV Certificate that has expired or (ii) a revoked EV Certificate where the revocation status is available online but the Application Software Vendor's software failed to check or ignored the status.

9.9.2. Indemnification by Subscribers

To the extent permitted by law, each Subscriber shall indemnify DigiCert, its partners, and any cross-signed entities, and their respective directors, officers, employees, agents, and contractors against any loss, damage, or expense, including reasonable attorney's fees, related to (i) any misrepresentation or omission of material fact by Subscriber, regardless of whether the misrepresentation or omission was intentional or unintentional; (ii) Subscriber's breach of the Subscriber Agreement, this CP/CPS, or applicable law; (iii) the compromise or unauthorized use of a Certificate or Private Key caused by the Subscriber's negligence or intentional acts; or (iv) Subscriber's misuse of the Certificate or Private Key.

The applicable Subscriber Agreement may include additional indemnity obligations.

9.9.3. Indemnification by Relying Parties

To the extent permitted by law, each Relying Party shall indemnify DigiCert, its partners, and any cross-signed entities, and their respective directors, officers, employees, agents, and contractors against any loss, damage, or expense, including reasonable attorney's fees, related to the Relying Party's (i) breach of the Relying Party Agreement, an End-User License Agreement, this CP/CPS, or applicable law; (ii) unreasonable reliance on a Certificate; or (iii) failure to check the Certificate's status prior to use.

9.10. TERM AND TERMINATION

9.10.1. Term

This CP/CPS and any amendments to the CP/CPS are effective when published to DigiCert's online repository and remain in effect until replaced with a newer version.

9.10.2. Termination

This CP/CPS as amended from time to time, shall remain in effect until replaced by a newer version.

9.10.3. Effect of Termination and Survival

DigiCert will communicate the conditions and effect of this CP/CPS's termination via the DigiCert Repository. The communication will specify which provisions survive termination. At a minimum, all responsibilities related to protecting confidential information will survive termination. All Subscriber Agreements remain effective until the certificate is revoked or expired, even if this CP/CPS terminates.

9.11. INDIVIDUAL NOTICES AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH PARTICIPANTS

DigiCert accepts notices related to this CP/CPS at the locations specified in Section 2.2. Notices are deemed effective after the sender receives a valid and digitally signed acknowledgment of receipt from DigiCert. If an acknowledgment of receipt is not received within five days, the sender must resend the notice in paper form to the street address specified in Section 2.2 using either a courier service that confirms delivery or via certified or registered mail with postage prepaid and return receipt requested. DigiCert may allow other forms of notice in its Subscriber Agreements.

Notices to Application Software Vendors are sent out in accordance with the respective requirements.

9.12. AMENDMENTS

9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment

The DigiCert Public Trust CP/CPS is reviewed annually. Amendments are made by posting an updated version of the CP/CPS to the online repository. Updates supersede any designated or conflicting provisions of the referenced version of the CP/CPS. Controls are in place to reasonably ensure that this CP/CPS is not amended and published without the prior authorization of the DCPA.

9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period

DigiCert posts revisions of this CP/CPS to its website. DigiCert does not guarantee or set a notice-and-comment period and may make changes to this CP/CPS without notice and without changing the version number. Major changes affecting accredited Certificates are announced and approved by the accrediting agency prior to becoming effective. The DCPA is responsible for determining what constitutes a material change of the CP/CPS.

9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID Must Be Changed

The DCPA is solely responsible for determining whether an amendment to the CP/CPS requires an OID change.

9.13. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVISIONS

For dispute resolution, to the extent permitted by law, before a Participant files suit or initiates an arbitration claim with respect to a dispute involving any aspect of this Agreement, Participant shall notify DigiCert, and any other party to the dispute for the purpose of seeking business resolution. Both Participant and DigiCert shall make good faith efforts to resolve such dispute via business discussions. If the dispute is not resolved within sixty (60) days after the initial notice, then a party may proceed as permitted under applicable law and as specified under this CP/CPS and other relevant agreements.

1. Arbitration: In the event a dispute is allowed or required to be resolved through arbitration, the parties will maintain the confidential nature of the existence, content, or results of any arbitration hereunder, except as may be necessary to prepare for or conduct the arbitration hearing on the merits, or except as may be necessary in connection with a court application for a preliminary remedy, a judicial confirmation or challenge to an arbitration award or its enforcement, or unless otherwise required by law or judicial decision.
2. Class Action and Jury Trial Waiver: THE PARTIES EXPRESSLY WAIVE THEIR RESPECTIVE RIGHTS TO A JURY TRIAL FOR THE PURPOSES OF LITIGATING DISPUTES HEREUNDER. Each party agrees that any dispute must be brought in the respective party's individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class, collective, representative, multiple plaintiffs, or similar proceeding ("Class Action"). The parties expressly waive any ability to maintain any Class Action in any forum in connection with any dispute. If the dispute is subject to arbitration, the arbitrator will not have authority to combine or aggregate similar claims or conduct any Class Action nor make an award to any person or entity not a party to the arbitration. Any claim that all or part of this Class Action waiver is unenforceable, unconscionable, void, or voidable may be determined only by a court of competent jurisdiction and not by an arbitrator.

9.14. GOVERNING LAW

The (i) laws that govern the interpretation, construction, and enforcement of this Agreement and all matters, claims or disputes related to it, including tort claims, and (ii) the courts or arbitration bodies that have exclusive jurisdiction over any of the matters, claims or disputes contemplated in sub-Section (i) above, will each depend on where Customer is domiciled as set forth in the table below; provided, for clarity, that rights and obligations arising from other applicable local laws continue to be governed by such laws.

In instances where the International Chamber of Commerce is designated below as the court or arbitration body with exclusive jurisdiction of such matters, claims or disputes, then the parties hereby agree that (x) all matters, claims or disputes arising out of or in connection with this Agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (Rules) by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the Rules, (y) judgment on the award rendered by such arbitration may be entered in any court having jurisdiction, and (z) this arbitration clause shall not preclude parties from seeking provisional remedies in aid of arbitration from a court of appropriate jurisdiction.

| Customer is Domiciled in or the Services are: | Governing Law is laws of: | Court or arbitration body with exclusive jurisdiction: |
|---|--|--|
| The United States of America, Canada, Mexico, Central America, South America, the Caribbean, or any other country not otherwise included in the rest of the table below | Utah state law and United States federal law | State and Federal courts located in Salt Lake County, Utah |
| Europe, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Russia, the Middle East or Africa | England | International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration, with seat of arbitration in the below city corresponding to the DigiCert Europe contracting entity listed in the Order Form. For CH: Zurich For NL: Amsterdam For DE: Munich For BE/DigiCert Europe: Brussels For UK: London |
| Japan | Japan | International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration, with seat of arbitration in Tokyo |
| Australia or New Zealand | Australia | International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration, with seat of arbitration in Melbourne |
| A Country in Asia or the Pacific region, other than Japan, Australia or New Zealand | Singapore | International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration, with seat of arbitration in Singapore |

9.15. COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAW

The DigiCert Public Trust CP/CPS is subject to all applicable laws and regulations, including United States restrictions on the export of software and cryptography products. Subject to Section 9.4.5's Notice and Consent to Use Private Information contained in Certificates, DigiCert meets the requirements of the European data protection laws and has established appropriate technical and organization measures against unauthorized or unlawful processing of personal data and against

the loss, damage, or destruction of personal data.

9.16. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

9.16.1. Entire Agreement

DigiCert contractually obligates each RA to comply with this CP/CPS and applicable industry guidelines. DigiCert also requires each party using its products and services to enter into an agreement that delineates the terms associated with the product or service. If an agreement has provisions that differ from this CP/CPS, then the agreement with that party controls, but solely with respect to that party. Third parties may not rely on or bring action to enforce such agreement.

9.16.2. Assignment

Any entities operating under this CP/CPS may not assign their rights or obligations without the prior written consent of DigiCert. Unless specified otherwise in a contact with a party, DigiCert does not provide notice of assignment.

9.16.3. Severability

If any provision of this CP/CPS is held invalid or unenforceable by a competent court or tribunal, the remainder of the CP/CPS will remain valid and enforceable. Each provision of this CP/CPS that provides for a limitation of liability, disclaimer of a warranty, or an exclusion of damages is severable and independent of any other provision.

9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)

DigiCert may seek indemnification and attorneys' fees from a party for damages, losses, and expenses related to that party's conduct. DigiCert's failure to enforce a provision of this CP/CPS does not waive DigiCert's right to enforce the same provision later or right to enforce any other provision of this CP/CPS. To be effective, waivers must be in writing and signed by DigiCert.

9.16.5. Force Majeure

DigiCert is not liable for any delay or failure to perform an obligation under this CP/CPS to the extent that the delay or failure is caused by an occurrence beyond DigiCert's reasonable control. The operation of the Internet is beyond DigiCert's reasonable control.

To the extent permitted by applicable law, Subscriber Agreements and Relying Party Agreements shall include a force majeure clause protecting DigiCert.

9.17. OTHER PROVISIONS

No stipulation.