

# DigiCert

## Certification Practices Statement



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# Table of Contents

1.	INTRODUCTION.....	7
1.1.	OVERVIEW.....	7
1.2.	DOCUMENT NAME AND IDENTIFICATION.....	8
1.3.	PKI PARTICIPANTS.....	10
1.3.1.	Certification Authorities.....	10
1.3.2.	Registration Authorities and Other Delegated Third Parties.....	11
1.3.3.	Subscribers.....	11
1.3.4.	Relying Parties.....	12
1.3.5.	Other Participants.....	12
1.4.	CERTIFICATE USAGE.....	12
1.4.1.	Appropriate Certificate Uses.....	12
1.4.2.	Prohibited Certificate Uses.....	13
1.5.	POLICY ADMINISTRATION.....	14
1.5.1.	Organization Administering the Document.....	14
1.5.2.	Contact Person.....	14
	Revocation Reporting Contact Person.....	14
1.5.3.	Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy.....	14
1.5.4.	CPS Approval Procedures.....	14
1.6.	DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS.....	15
1.6.1.	Definitions.....	15
1.6.2.	Acronyms.....	17
1.6.3.	References.....	18
2.	PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES.....	19
2.1.	REPOSITORIES.....	19
2.2.	PUBLICATION OF CERTIFICATION INFORMATION.....	19
2.3.	TIME OR FREQUENCY OF PUBLICATION.....	19
2.4.	ACCESS CONTROLS ON REPOSITORIES.....	20
3.	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION.....	21
3.1.	NAMING.....	21
3.1.1.	Type of Names.....	21
3.1.2.	Need for Names to be Meaningful.....	21
3.1.3.	Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers.....	21
3.1.4.	Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms.....	21
3.1.5.	Uniqueness of Names.....	21
3.1.6.	Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks.....	22
3.2.	INITIAL IDENTITY VALIDATION.....	22
3.2.1.	Method to Prove Possession of Private Key.....	22
3.2.2.	Authentication of Organization Identity and Domain/Email Control.....	23
3.2.2.1.	Verification of IP Address.....	27
3.2.2.2.	Wildcard Domain Validation.....	28
3.2.2.3.	Verification of Country.....	28
3.2.3.	Authentication of Individual Identity.....	29
3.2.3.1.	Authentication for Role-based Client Certificates.....	32
3.2.3.2.	Authentication of Devices with Human Sponsors.....	33
3.2.4.	Non-verified Subscriber Information.....	33
3.2.5.	Validation of Authority.....	33
3.2.6.	Criteria for Interoperation.....	34
3.3.1.	Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-key.....	34
3.4.	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR REVOCATION REQUEST.....	35
4.	CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS.....	36
4.1.	CERTIFICATE APPLICATION.....	36
4.1.1.	Who Can Submit a Certificate Application.....	36
4.1.2.	Enrollment Process and Responsibilities.....	36
4.2.	CERTIFICATE APPLICATION PROCESSING.....	36
4.2.1.	Performing Identification and Authentication Functions.....	36
4.2.2.	Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications.....	37
4.2.3.	Time to Process Certificate Applications.....	38
4.3.	CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE.....	38
4.3.1.	CA Actions during Certificate Issuance.....	38
4.3.2.	Notifications to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate.....	38
4.4.	CERTIFICATE ACCEPTANCE.....	38
4.4.1.	Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance.....	38
4.4.2.	Publication of the Certificate by the CA.....	38
4.4.3.	Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities.....	38

4.5.	KEY PAIR AND CERTIFICATE USAGE.....	38
4.5.1.	Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage .....	38
4.5.2.	Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage .....	39
4.6.	CERTIFICATE RENEWAL.....	39
4.6.1.	Circumstance for Certificate Renewal.....	39
4.6.2.	Who May Request Renewal .....	39
4.6.3.	Processing Certificate Renewal Requests .....	39
4.6.4.	Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber .....	40
4.6.5.	Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate .....	40
4.6.6.	Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA.....	40
4.6.7.	Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities .....	40
4.7.	CERTIFICATE RE-KEY .....	40
4.7.1.	Circumstance for Certificate Re-Key.....	40
4.7.2.	Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key .....	40
4.7.3.	Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests.....	40
4.7.4.	Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber .....	40
4.7.5.	Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Keyed Certificate .....	40
4.7.6.	Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA .....	41
4.7.7.	Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities .....	41
4.8.	CERTIFICATE MODIFICATION .....	41
4.8.1.	Circumstances for Certificate Modification .....	41
4.8.2.	Who May Request Certificate Modification .....	41
4.8.3.	Processing Certificate Modification Requests.....	41
4.8.4.	Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber.....	41
4.8.5.	Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate.....	41
4.8.6.	Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA.....	41
4.8.7.	Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities .....	41
4.9.	CERTIFICATE REVOCATION AND SUSPENSION .....	41
4.9.1.	Circumstances for Revocation .....	41
4.9.2.	Who Can Request Revocation .....	43
4.9.3.	Procedure for Revocation Request .....	44
4.9.4.	Revocation Request Grace Period .....	44
4.9.5.	Time within which CA Must Process the Revocation Request.....	44
4.9.6.	Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties .....	45
4.9.7.	CRL Issuance Frequency.....	45
4.9.8.	Maximum Latency for CRLs.....	45
4.9.9.	On-line Revocation/Status Checking Availability .....	45
4.9.10.	On-line Revocation Checking Requirements .....	45
4.9.11.	Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available .....	46
4.9.12.	Special Requirements Related to Key Compromise .....	46
4.9.13.	Circumstances for Suspension.....	47
4.9.14.	Who Can Request Suspension.....	47
4.9.15.	Procedure for Suspension Request.....	47
4.9.16.	Limits on Suspension Period.....	47
4.10.	CERTIFICATE STATUS SERVICES.....	47
4.10.1.	Operational Characteristics .....	47
4.10.2.	Service Availability .....	47
4.10.3.	Operational Features .....	48
4.11.	END OF SUBSCRIPTION.....	48
4.12.	KEY ESCROW AND RECOVERY .....	48
4.12.1.	Key Escrow and Recovery Policy and Practices.....	48
4.12.2.	Session Key Encapsulation and Recovery Policy and Practices .....	48
5.	FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS.....	49
5.1.	PHYSICAL CONTROLS.....	49
5.1.1.	Site Location and Construction .....	49
5.1.2.	Physical Access.....	49
5.1.2.1.	Data Centers .....	49
5.1.2.2.	RA Operations Areas.....	49
5.1.2.3.	Offline CA Key Storage Rooms.....	49
5.1.2.4.	CA Key Generation and Signing Rooms.....	49
5.1.3.	Power and Air Conditioning.....	50
5.1.4.	Water Exposures.....	50
5.1.5.	Fire Prevention and Protection .....	50
5.1.6.	Media Storage .....	50
5.1.7.	Waste Disposal .....	50
5.1.8.	Off-site Backup .....	50

5.19. Certificate Status Hosting, CMS and External RA Systems .....	50
5.2. PROCEDURAL CONTROLS .....	50
5.2.1. Trusted Roles .....	50
5.2.1.1. CA Administrators .....	50
5.2.1.2. Registration Officers – CMS, RA, Validation and Vetting Personnel.....	50
5.2.1.3. System Administrators/ System Engineers (Operator).....	50
5.2.1.4. Internal Auditors .....	50
5.2.1.5. RA Administrators .....	51
5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task.....	51
5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for each Role .....	51
5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties .....	51
5.3. PERSONNEL CONTROLS .....	51
5.3.1. Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements.....	51
5.3.2. Background Check Procedures.....	51
5.3.3. Training Requirements .....	52
5.3.4. Retraining Frequency and Requirements.....	52
5.3.5. Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence.....	52
5.3.6. Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions .....	52
5.3.7. Independent Contractor Requirements.....	53
5.3.8. Documentation Supplied to Personnel .....	53
5.4. AUDIT LOGGING PROCEDURES .....	53
5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded .....	53
5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log.....	54
5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log.....	54
5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log.....	54
5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures.....	54
5.4.6. Audit Collection System (Internal vs. External).....	54
5.4.7. Notification to Event-Causing Subject .....	55
5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments .....	55
5.5. RECORDS ARCHIVAL.....	55
5.5.1. Types of Records Archived.....	55
5.5.2. Retention Period for Archive.....	56
5.5.3. Protection of Archive .....	56
5.5.4. Archive Backup Procedures.....	56
5.5.5. Requirements for Time-Stamping of Records .....	56
5.5.6. Archive Collection System (Internal or External) .....	57
5.5.7. Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information .....	57
5.6. KEY CHANGEOVER.....	57
5.7. COMPROMISE AND DISASTER RECOVERY.....	57
5.7.1. Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures.....	57
5.7.2. Computing Resources, Software, and/or Data Are Corrupted.....	57
5.7.3. Entity Private Key Compromise Procedures .....	57
5.7.4. Business Continuity Capabilities after a Disaster.....	58
5.8. CA OR RA TERMINATION .....	58
6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS.....	59
6.1. KEY PAIR GENERATION AND INSTALLATION .....	59
6.1.1. Key Pair Generation.....	59
6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber .....	59
6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer.....	60
6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties.....	60
6.1.5. Key Sizes .....	60
6.1.6. Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking.....	60
6.2. PRIVATE KEY PROTECTION AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE ENGINEERING CONTROLS.....	61
6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls.....	61
6.2.2. Private Key (n out of m) Multi-Person Control.....	63
6.2.3. Private Key Escrow .....	63
6.2.4. Private Key Backup.....	63
6.2.5. Private Key Archival .....	63
6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module.....	63
6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module .....	63
6.2.8. Method of Activating Private Keys .....	64
6.2.9. Method of Deactivating Private Keys .....	64
6.2.10. Method of Destroying Private Keys .....	64
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating.....	64
6.3. OTHER ASPECTS OF KEY PAIR MANAGEMENT .....	64
6.3.1. Public Key Archival .....	64

6.3.2.	Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods.....	64
6.4.	ACTIVATION DATA.....	65
6.4.1.	Activation Data Generation and Installation .....	65
6.4.2.	Activation Data Protection .....	65
6.4.3.	Other Aspects of Activation Data.....	66
6.5.	COMPUTER SECURITY CONTROLS .....	66
6.5.1.	Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements .....	66
6.5.2.	Computer Security Rating.....	66
6.6.	LIFE CYCLE TECHNICAL CONTROLS.....	66
6.6.1.	System Development Controls .....	66
6.6.2.	Security Management Controls .....	67
6.6.3.	Life Cycle Security Controls .....	67
6.7.	NETWORK SECURITY CONTROLS .....	67
6.8.	TIME-STAMPING.....	67
7.	CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES .....	69
7.1.	CERTIFICATE PROFILE.....	69
7.1.1.	Version Number(s) .....	69
7.1.2.	Certificate Extensions.....	69
7.1.3.	Algorithm Object Identifiers .....	70
7.1.4.	Name Forms.....	70
7.1.5.	Name Constraints.....	71
7.1.5.1.	Name-Constrained serverAuth CAs.....	71
7.1.5.2.	Name-Constrained emailProtection CAs.....	71
7.1.6.	Certificate Policy Object Identifier .....	72
7.1.7.	Usage of Policy Constraints Extension.....	72
7.1.8.	Policy Qualifiers Syntax and Semantics.....	72
7.1.9.	Processing Semantics for the Critical Certificate Policies Extension .....	72
7.2.	CRL PROFILE .....	72
7.2.1.	Version number(s).....	75
7.2.2.	CRL and CRL Entry Extensions .....	75
7.3.	OCSP PROFILE .....	76
7.3.1.	Version Number(s) .....	76
7.3.2.	OCSP Extensions .....	76
8.	COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS .....	77
8.1.	FREQUENCY AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF ASSESSMENT .....	77
8.2.	IDENTITY/QUALIFICATIONS OF ASSESSOR.....	77
8.3.	ASSESSOR'S RELATIONSHIP TO ASSESSED ENTITY .....	77
8.4.	TOPICS COVERED BY ASSESSMENT .....	77
8.5.	ACTIONS TAKEN AS A RESULT OF DEFICIENCY .....	77
8.6.	COMMUNICATIONS OF RESULTS .....	77
8.7.	SELF-AUDITS .....	78
9.	OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS .....	79
9.1.	FEEES .....	79
9.1.1.	Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees.....	79
9.1.2.	Certificate Access Fees.....	79
9.1.3.	Revocation or Status Information Access Fees .....	79
9.1.4.	Fees for Other Services .....	79
9.1.5.	Refund Policy.....	79
9.2.	FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY .....	79
9.2.1.	Insurance Coverage .....	79
9.2.2.	Other Assets .....	79
9.2.3.	Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities .....	79
9.3.	CONFIDENTIALITY OF BUSINESS INFORMATION .....	79
9.3.1.	Scope of Confidential Information .....	79
9.3.2.	Information Not Within the Scope of Confidential Information.....	80
9.3.3.	Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information .....	80
9.4.	PRIVACY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION .....	80
9.4.1.	Privacy Plan.....	80
9.4.2.	Information Treated as Private .....	80
9.4.3.	Information Not Deemed Private.....	80
9.4.4.	Responsibility to Protect Private Information.....	80
9.4.5.	Notice and Consent to Use Private Information.....	80
9.4.6.	Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process.....	80
9.4.7.	Other Information Disclosure Circumstances.....	80
9.5.	INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS.....	80
9.5.1.	Property Rights in Certificates and Revocation Information .....	81

9.5.2. Property Rights in the CP .....	81
9.5.3. Property Rights in Names .....	81
9.5.4. Property Rights in Keys and Key Material.....	81
9.5.5. Violation of Property Rights.....	81
9.6.    REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES .....	81
9.6.1. CA Representations and Warranties .....	81
9.6.2. RA Representations and Warranties.....	82
9.6.3. Subscriber Representations and Warranties .....	82
9.6.4. Relying Party Representations and Warranties.....	83
9.6.5. Representations and Warranties of Other Participants.....	83
9.7.    DISCLAIMERS OF WARRANTIES .....	83
9.8.    LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY .....	83
9.9.    INDEMNITIES .....	84
9.9.1. Indemnification by DigiCert.....	84
9.9.2. Indemnification by Subscribers .....	84
9.9.3. Indemnification by Relying Parties.....	84
9.10.   TERM AND TERMINATION.....	85
9.10.1. Term .....	85
9.10.2. Termination.....	85
9.10.3. Effect of Termination and Survival .....	85
9.11.   INDIVIDUAL NOTICES AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH PARTICIPANTS.....	85
9.12.   AMENDMENTS.....	85
9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment.....	85
9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period.....	85
9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID Must Be Changed .....	85
9.13.   DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVISIONS .....	85
9.14.   GOVERNING LAW .....	85
9.15.   COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAW.....	86
9.16.   MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS.....	86
9.16.1. Entire Agreement .....	86
9.16.2. Assignment.....	86
9.16.3. Severability .....	86
9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).....	86
9.16.5. Force Majeure .....	86
9.17.   OTHER PROVISIONS.....	86
APPENDIX A: SAMPLE OPINION LETTER .....	87

# 1. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1. OVERVIEW

This document is the DigiCert, Inc. (“DigiCert”) Certification Practices Statement (CPS) that outlines the principles and practices related to DigiCert’s certification and time-stamping services. This CPS applies to all entities participating in or using DigiCert’s certificate and time-stamping services, excluding participants in DigiCert’s Private PKI services, which are not cross-certified or publicly trusted. This CPS only addresses the actions of DigiCert and not those of third parties operating with cross certificates issued by DigiCert. Specific requirements regarding those Certificates are set forth in the individual agreements with the appropriate DigiCert customer and in that third party’s own CPS.

This CPS describes the practices used to comply with the current versions of the following policies, guidelines, and requirements:

<b>Name of Policy/Guideline/ Requirement Standard</b>	<b>Location of Source Document/Language</b>
DigiCert Certificate Policy	<a href="https://www.digicert.com/legal-repository/">https://www.digicert.com/legal-repository/</a>
The Adobe Approved Trust List Technical Requirements	<a href="https://helpx.adobe.com/content/dam/help/en/acrob at/kb/approved-trust-list2/ jcr_content/main- pars/download- section/download- 1/aatl technical requirements v2.0.pdf">https://helpx.adobe.com/content/dam/help/en/acrob at/kb/approved-trust-list2/ jcr_content/main- pars/download- section/download- 1/aatl technical requirements v2.0.pdf</a>
The Certification Authority / Browser Forum (“CAB Forum”) Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates (“Baseline Requirements”)	<a href="https://cabforum.org/baseline-requirements- document/">https://cabforum.org/baseline-requirements- document/</a>
The CAB Forum Guidelines for Extended Validation Certificates (“EV Guidelines”)	<a href="https://cabforum.org/extended-validation/">https://cabforum.org/extended-validation/</a>
The CAB Forum Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Code Signing Certificates	<a href="https://cabforum.org/baseline- requirements- code-signing/">https://cabforum.org/baseline- requirements- code-signing/</a>
The CAB Forum Network and Certificate System Security Requirements	<a href="https://cabforum.org/network-security-requirements/">https://cabforum.org/network-security-requirements/</a>
The CAB Forum S/MIME Baseline Requirements	<a href="https://cabforum.org/smime-br/">https://cabforum.org/smime-br/</a>
Microsoft Trusted Root Store (Program Requirements)	<a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security/trusted- root/program-requirements">https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security/trusted- root/program-requirements</a>
Mozilla Root Store Policy	<a href="https://www.mozilla.org/en- US/about/governance/policies/security- group/certs/policy/">https://www.mozilla.org/en- US/about/governance/policies/security- group/certs/policy/</a>
Apple Root Store Program	<a href="https://www.apple.com/certificateauthority/ca_prog ram.html">https://www.apple.com/certificateauthority/ca_prog ram.html</a>
360 Browser CA Policy	<a href="https://caprogram.360.cn/#strategy">https://caprogram.360.cn/#strategy</a>
Chromium Project Root Store Certificate Policy	<a href="https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium- security/root-ca- policy">https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium- security/root-ca- policy</a>

If any inconsistency exists between this CPS and the normative provisions of the foregoing policies, guidelines, and requirements (“Applicable Requirements”), then the Applicable Requirements take precedence over this CPS.

This CPS is only one of several documents that control DigiCert’s certification services. Other important documents include both private and public documents, such as the Certificate Policy (CP), DigiCert’s agreements with its customers, Relying Party agreements, and DigiCert’s privacy policy. DigiCert may provide additional certificate policies or certification practice statements. These supplemental policies and statements are available to applicable users or relying parties.

Pursuant to the IETF PKIX RFC 3647 CP/CPS framework, this CPS is divided into nine parts that cover the security controls and practices and procedures for certificate and time-stamping services within the DigiCert PKI. To preserve the outline specified by RFC 3647, section headings that do not apply are accompanied with the statement “Not applicable” or “No stipulation.”

## **1.2. DOCUMENT NAME AND IDENTIFICATION**

This document is the DigiCert Certification Practices Statement and was first approved for publication on 9 August 2010 by the DigiCert Policy Authority (DCPA). The following revisions have been made to the original document:

<b>Date</b>	<b>Changes</b>	<b>Version</b>
16-August-2023	Amend sections 4 and 7 to further clarify requirements. Updated contact information for DigiCert policy authority. Include S/MIME baseline requirements.	6.00
30-May-2023	Update to include security officers	5.16
13-April-2023	Amend sections 3 and 7 to further align with requirements in 1.1	5.15
16-March-2023	Amend section 6.2 to clarify codesigning requirements.	5.14
6-March-2023	Modified section 3 to clarify methods we use for validation and removed methods we no longer use. Section 4 specifies acceptable algorithms for compromised key revocation requests and includes revocation codes.	5.13
31-October-2022	Modified section 4 to clarify key escrow policies. Specified in section 3 that DigiCert may request documents for validation. Updated dates for upcoming codesigning changes.	5.12
19-July-2022	Modified references to CABF guidelines in sections 3 and 4. Included upcoming changes to codesigning. Updated section 6 for key length and token requirements. Added revocation code descriptions.	5.11
7-February-2022	Requested changes to section 4.9 for certificate suspension that applies only to medium assurance EPCS certificates relying upon the FBCA. Modifying section 7 to include a public GitHub repository for the OIDs.	5.10
21-January-2022	Modifications in sections 3, 4, 7, and 9 to clarify adherence to Mozilla Root Store Policy.	5.9
8-December-2021	Modifications in section 7.2 and 7.3 to clarify extensions used and clarification added in section 6.1.2 for private key secure delivery in alignment with requirements.	5.8
14-September-2021	Additions in section 7 and 3 for clarity.	5.7
12-April-2021	Implementing changes from CAB/Forum Baseline Requirement updates version 1.7.3 and 1.7.4.	5.6
11-March-2021	Changes throughout the document in sections 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 9 to reflect current practices. Updates to section 4.9.12 to reflect Mozilla 2.7.1 updates for private key compromise.	5.5
8-October-2020	Minor editorial updates to formatting and fixing spelling errors.	5.4.1
29-September-2020	Updates to remove the FBCA requirements due to deprecation from public trust. Updates to include SC30, SC31, and SC33 requirements and practices from the CABF.	5.4



16-July-2020	Changes made to section 5 and correlating sections to align closer with requirements and WebTrust audit criterion and controls. Additional changes made to language for prohibiting certificate pinning and use of web PKI certificates in non-web applications.	5.3
22-May-2020	Several small editorial changes made throughout the document.	5.2
27-March-2020	Added modifications to include the Level 3 NIST LOA certificates in accordance with NIST 800-63-3. Added new validation methods introduced with CABF B.R. 1.6.8 and deprecated one method. Added modifications to table 6.3.2.	5.1
06-February-2020	Consolidated legacy Certificate Policies to include OID arcs into the CPS from the DigiCert CP (2.16.840.1.113733.1.7, 2.23.140.1.1, 1.3.6.1.4.1.14370, 1.3.6.1.4.1.14370.1, and 2.16.840.1.113733.1.7.48.). Updated the document to meet requirements of version 2.35 of the FBCA CP.	5.0
21-November-2019	Minor editorial changes throughout the document for consistency and accuracy.	4.20
25-July-2019	Added reference to AATL 2.0 to section 1.6.3 for continuity. Modifications added to sections 3.2.2 and 7.1.4 to include details about information source review. Added security policy reference to section 6.4.2.	4.19
17-April-2019	Edited sections 3.1.6, 3.2.1, 6.1.3, and 7.1.4 to clarify naming and proof-of-possession practices.	4.18
01-March-2019	Added Class 2 Authentication-Only OID, clarified Legacy OIDs, updated validation practices for compliance with Baseline Requirements, clarified physical security control areas, modified archive procedures, and updated certificate validity table in section 6.3.2.	4.17
09-October-2018	Clarification to email validation methods and Mozilla CA Root Policy 2.6.1 updates made throughout the document. Removed frequent password changing practice from section 6.4.1 to comply with NIST Special Publication 800-63-3: Digital Authentication Guidelines. Changes made to section 3.2.2 to clarify differences between Levels 1-4 and Class 1-3 Certificate issuance practices. Added sections 1.5.2.1 for Revocation Reporting Contact Person and additions/revisions to section 4.9 to meet the revocation requirements for CABF ballot SC6.	4.16
24-August-2018	Updates throughout for Adobe AATL 2.0, added Class 1-3 OIDs, removed unused definitions and references to EU Qualified Certificates, updated sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 regarding email validation, added language in section 6.1.1 to specify that DigiCert does not create key pairs for publicly trusted end- entity TLS Certificates, amended limitation of liability in section 9.8 to address Netsure Extended Warranty and Relying Party Agreement, and removed line 9 in Appendix A	4.15
25-January-2018	Added language based on the CAB Forum's Baseline Requirements, as indicated by Mozilla's Self-Assessment process	4.14
8-November-2017	Added Symantec CAA identifying domains	4.13
8-September-2017	Added CAA processing provisions, removed references to PIV-I, revised descriptions of processes used for validating identity, updated description of physical access and security, added trusted role of RA Administrator and removed "conflict-of-interest" prohibition from trusted roles.	4.12

23-February-2017	Updated address, made revisions related to the Minimum Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates, and made other changes to update the CPS.	4.11
9-September-2016	Updated to include Cybertrust CAs acquired from Verizon, clarify identity verification process, update document in accordance with FBCA CP v. 2.29 and sec. 9.6.3 of Baseline Requirements.	4.10
1-June-2015	Updated CPS to conform to practices for backup, archival, CA key generation, and certificate acceptance.	4.09
1-April-2015	Minor changes made to update with CA/Browser Forum guidelines and for consistency with DigiCert CP v. 4.08	4.08
7-October-2014	Updated for consistency with DigiCert CP v. 4.07	4.07
14-May-2014	Updated practices to comply with new policy requirements and changes to the DirectTrust CP, Baseline Requirements, EV Guidelines, and EV Code Signing Guidelines.	4.06
2-May-2013	Updated mailing address. Also updated practices to comply with new policy requirements, the DirectTrust CP, changes to the Adobe program, and CAB Forum guidelines.	4.05
10-May-2012	Updated to include practices set forth in the Baseline Requirements, the current Mozilla CA Policy, EV Code Signing, the IGTF, and other policy bodies.	4.04
3-May-2011	IGTF Certificates added and minor updates made to several sections.	4.03
29-October-2010	Changes made in response to comments from the FPKI CPWG regarding certificate status services, trusted roles, and off-site backup of archive.	4.02
26-August-2010	Updated the process used to authenticate the certificate requester's authority under section 3.2.5 for code signing Certificates issued to organizations	4.01
9-August-2010	This version 4.0 replaces the DigiCert Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Statement, Version 3.08, dated May 29, 2009, and the DigiCert Certification Practice Statement for Extended Validation Certificates, Version 1.0.4, May 29, 2009.	4.0

The OID arc for DigiCert is joint-iso-ccitt (2) country (16) USA (840) US-company (1) DigiCert (114412).

OIDs found in Certificates reliant upon CAB Forum requirements and guidelines include the designated reserved policy identifiers in the Certificate Policy extension as of September 30, 2020 as specified in section 7.1.6 of the CAB Forum Baseline Requirements. Certificates issued before that date include other OIDs that are designated in section 7.1.6 of this document.

### **1.3. PKI PARTICIPANTS**

#### **1.3.1. Certification Authorities**

DigiCert operates certification authorities (CAs) that issue digital certificates. As the operator of several CAs, DigiCert performs functions associated with Public Key operations, including receiving certificate requests, issuing, revoking, rekeying, and renewing a digital Certificate, and maintaining, issuing, and publishing CRLs and OCSP responses. General information about DigiCert's products and services are available at [www.digicert.com](http://www.digicert.com).

In limited circumstances, root CAs owned by DigiCert are used to issue cross Certificates to external third parties operating their own PKIs. An external Issuer CA is an unaffiliated third party that is issued a subordinate CA Certificate by DigiCert where the Private Key associated with that CA Certificate is not

maintained under the physical control of DigiCert.

All external subordinate CAs are prohibited, either technically or contractually, from issuing Certificates to domain names or IP addresses that a Subscriber does not legitimately own or control (i.e. issuance for purposes of “traffic management” is prohibited), and external subordinate CAs are required to implement procedures that are at least as restrictive as those found herein.

DigiCert is also a time stamping authority (TSA) and provides proof-of-existence for data at an instant in time as described herein.

### **1.3.2. Registration Authorities and Other Delegated Third Parties**

A Registration Authority is an entity that performs identification and authentication of certificate Applicants for end-user certificates, initiates or passes along revocation requests for certificates for end-user certificates, and approves applications for renewal or re-keying certificates on behalf of an Issuer CA on identity management systems (IdMs). DigiCert and subordinate Issuer CAs may act as RAs for certificates they issue. Affiliates do not perform domain or IP address validation. Validation of domains for S/MIME Certificates cannot be delegated to a third party and is only validated by the RA of the Issuer CA.

Except for the authentication of domain control or IP address verification performed solely by DigiCert in accordance with Section 3.2.2, DigiCert may delegate the performance of certain functions to third party Registration Authorities (RA) if it meets the requirements of the DigiCert CP and the relevant requirements listed in sections 1.1 and 1.6.3 of this CPS and the DigiCert CP. The specific role of an RA or Delegated Third Party varies greatly between entities, ranging from simple translation services to actual assistance in gathering and verifying Applicant information. For IGTF Certificates, designated RAs are responsible for vetting the identity of each certificate applicant.

DigiCert contractually obligates each Delegated Third Party to abide by the policies and industry standards that are applicable to that Delegated Third Party’s delegated responsibilities. RA personnel involved in the issuance of publicly-trusted SSL/TLS Server Certificates and S/MIME Certificates must undergo the skills and training required under Section 5.3 of the CP, this CPS and meet the qualifications requirement of section 5.3.1 of the aforementioned documents.

DigiCert may delegate the responsibility to verify certificate requests to an Enterprise RA for the Enterprise RA’s own organization. The Enterprise RA must meet the requirements set out in section 1.3.2.1 of the S/MIME Baseline Requirements.<sup>1</sup>

### **1.3.3. Subscribers**

Subscribers use DigiCert’s services and PKI to support transactions and communications. Subscribers under this CPS include all end users (including entities) of certificates issued by an Issuer CA. A Subscriber is the entity named as the end-user Subscriber of a certificate. End-user Subscribers may be individuals, organizations or, infrastructure components such as firewalls, routers, trusted servers or other devices used to secure communications within an Organization.

Subscribers are not always the party identified in a Certificate, such as when Certificates are issued to an organization’s employees. The *Subject* of a Certificate is the party named in the Certificate. A *Subscriber*, as used herein, may refer to the Subject of the Certificate and the entity that contracted with DigiCert for the Certificate’s issuance. Prior to verification of identity and issuance of a Certificate, a Subscriber is an *Applicant*.

CAs are technically also subscribers of certificates within the DigiCert Public PKI, either as the primary Certificate Authority issuing a self- signed Certificate to itself, or as an Issuer CA issued a Certificate by a superior CA. References to “end entities” and “subscribers” in this CPS, however, apply only to end-user Subscribers.

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<sup>1</sup> DigiCert will comply with the S/MIME Baseline Requirements as of September 1st, 2023.

### **1.3.4. Relying Parties**

Relying Parties are entities that act in reliance on a Certificate and/or digital signature issued by DigiCert. Relying parties must check the appropriate CRL or OCSP response prior to relying on information featured in a Certificate. The location of the CRL distribution point is detailed within the Certificate. A Relying party may, or may not also be a Subscriber of the DigiCert Public PKI hierarchy.

### **1.3.5. Other Participants**

Other participants include Accreditation Authorities (such as Policy Management Authorities, Application Software Vendors, and applicable Community-of-Interest sponsors); Bridge CAs and CAs cross-certified with DigiCert's CAs that serve as trust anchors in other PKI communities; and Time Source Entities, Time Stamp Token Requesters, and Time Stamp Verifiers involved in trusted time stamping.

Accreditation Authorities are granted an unlimited right to re-distribute DigiCert's root Certificates and related information in connection with the accreditation.

## **1.4. CERTIFICATE USAGE**

A *digital Certificate* (or *Certificate*) is formatted data that cryptographically binds an identified subscriber with a Public Key. A digital Certificate allows an entity taking part in an electronic transaction to prove its identity to other participants in such transaction. Digital Certificates are used in commercial environments as a digital equivalent of an identification card. A *time-stamp token (TST)* cryptographically binds a representation of data to a particular time stamp, thus establishing evidence that the data existed at a certain point in time.

Individual Certificates are normally used by individuals to sign and encrypt e-mail and to authenticate to applications (client authentication). While an individual certificate may be used for other purposes, provided that a Relying Party is able to reasonably rely on that certificate and the usage is not otherwise prohibited by law, by the CP, by any CPS under which the certificate has been issued and any agreements with Subscribers.

Organizational Certificates are issued to organizations after authentication that the Organization legally exists and that other Organization attributes included in the certificate (excluding non-verified subscriber information) are authenticated e.g. ownership of an Internet or e-mail domain. It is not the intent of this CPS to limit the types of usages for Organizational Certificates. An organizational certificate may be used for other purposes, provided that a Relying Party is able to reasonably rely on that certificate and the usage is not otherwise prohibited by law, by the DigiCert CP, by any CPS (including this one) under which the certificate has been issued and any agreements with Subscribers.

### **1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses**

Certificates issued pursuant to this CPS may be used for all legal authentication, encryption, access control, and digital signature purposes, as designated by the key usage and extended key usage fields found within the Certificate as specified by the requirements in section 1.1. However, the sensitivity of the information processed or protected by a Certificate varies greatly, and each Relying Party must evaluate the application environment and associated risks before deciding on whether to use a Certificate issued under this CPS.

This CPS covers several different types of end entity Certificates/tokens with varying levels of assurance. The following table provides a brief description of the appropriate uses of each. The descriptions are for guidance only and are not binding.

<b>Certificate</b>	<b>Appropriate Use</b>
DV SSL/TLS Server Certificates	Used to secure online communication where the risks and consequences of data compromise are low, including non-monetary transactions or transactions with little risk of fraud or malicious access.
OV SSL/TLS Server Certificates	Used to secure online communication where the risks and consequences of data compromise are moderate, including transactions having substantial monetary value or risk of fraud or involving access to private information where the likelihood of malicious access is substantial.
EV SSL/TLS Server Certificates	Used to secure online communication where risks and consequences of data compromise are high, including transactions having high monetary value, risk of fraud, or where involving access to private information where the likelihood of malicious access is high.
Code Signing Certificates, including EV Code Signing	Establishes the identity of the Subscriber named in the Certificate and that the signed code has not been modified since signing.
S/MIME Certificates	Used to provide reasonable assurance to recipients of email messages that the Subject identified in an S/MIME Certificate has control of the domain or Mailbox Address being asserted.
Rudimentary Level 1 Client Certificates – Personal	Provides the lowest degree of assurance concerning identity of the individual and is generally used only to provide data integrity to the information being signed. These Certificates should only be used where the risk of malicious activity is low and if an authenticated transaction is not required.

#### **14.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses**

Certificates do not guarantee that the Subject is trustworthy, honest, reputable in its business dealings, safe to do business with, or compliant with any laws. A Certificate only establishes that the information in the Certificate was verified in accordance with this CPS when the Certificate issued. Code signing Certificates do not indicate that the signed code is safe to install or free from malware, bugs, or vulnerabilities.

Certificates shall be used only to the extent the use is consistent with applicable law, and in particular shall be used only to the extent permitted by applicable export or import laws.

CA Certificates subject to the Mozilla Root Store Policy will not be used for any functions except CA functions. In addition, end-user Subscriber Certificates cannot be used as CA Certificates.

Participants in the DigiCert Public PKI periodically rekey Intermediate CAs. Third party applications or platforms that have an Intermediate CA embedded as a root certificate may not operate as designed after the Intermediate CA has been rekeyed. DigiCert therefore does not warrant the use of Intermediate CAs as root certificates and recommends that Intermediate CAs not be embedded into applications and/or platforms as root certificates.

DigiCert strongly discourages key pinning and does not consider it a sufficient reason to delay revocation. DigiCert continually researches and implements technological processes in order to detect pinned applications and other prohibited uses so we can counsel customers on the way pinning impacts the agility of the WebPKI (e.g., rotation of intermediate certificates). Customers should also take care in not mixing certificates trusted for the web with non-web PKI. Any certificates trusted by the browsers must comply with all requirements of all applicable browser root policies, including revocation periods of 24 hours and 5 days as asserted in the relevant policies, obligations, and requirements of the CP and this CPS.

## **1.5. POLICY ADMINISTRATION**

### **1.5.1. Organization Administering the Document**

This CPS and the relevant documents referenced herein are maintained by the DCPA, which can be contacted at:

DigiCert Policy Authority  
Suite 500  
2801 N. Thanksgiving Way  
Lehi, UT 84043 USA  
Tel: 1-801-701-9600  
Fax: 1-801-705-0481  
policy@digicert.com

### **1.5.2. Contact Person**

Attn: Legal Counsel  
DigiCert Policy Authority  
Suite 500  
2801 N. Thanksgiving Way  
Lehi, UT 84043 USA  
www.digicert.com policy@digicert.com

### **Revocation Reporting Contact Person**

Attn: Support  
DigiCert Technical Support  
Suite 500  
2801 N. Thanksgiving Way  
Lehi, UT 84043 USA  
revoke@digicert.com

For anyone listed in section 4.9.2 of this CPS and the CAB Forum Baseline Requirements that needs assistance with revocation or an investigative report, DigiCert provides this page for reporting and submitting requests with all of the necessary information as outlined in section 4.9: <https://problemreport.digicert.com/>

If the problem reporting page is unavailable, there is a system outage, you have questions, or you believe our findings are incorrect please contact [revoke@digicert.com](mailto:revoke@digicert.com).

Entities submitting certificate revocation requests must list their identity and explain the reason for requesting revocation. DigiCert or an RA will authenticate and log each revocation request according to section 4.9 of the DigiCert CP and this CPS. DigiCert will always revoke a Certificate if the request is authenticated as originating from the Subscriber or the Affiliated Organization listed in the Certificate. If revocation is requested by someone other than an authorized representative of the Subscriber or Affiliated Organization, DigiCert or an RA will investigate the alleged basis for the revocation request prior to taking action in accordance with section 4.9.1 and 4.9.3.

### **1.5.3. Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy**

The DCPA determines the suitability and applicability of this CPS based on the results and recommendations received from an independent auditor (see section 8). The DCPA is also responsible for evaluating and acting upon the results of compliance audits.

### **1.5.4. CPS Approval Procedures**

The DCPA approves the CPS and any amendments. Amendments are made after the DCPA has reviewed the amendments' consistency with the CP, by either updating the entire CPS or by publishing an addendum. The DCPA determines whether an amendment to this CPS is consistent with the CP, requires notice, or an OID

change. See also section 9.10 and section 9.12 below.

## **1.6. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS**

### **1.6.1. Definitions**

**“Applicant”** means an entity applying for a Certificate.

**“Application Software Vendor”** means a software developer whose software displays or uses DigiCert Certificates and distributes DigiCert’s root Certificates.

**“Attestation Letter”** A letter attesting that Subject Information is correct written by an accountant, lawyer, government official, or other reliable third party customarily relied upon for such information.

**“CAA”** From RFC 8659 (<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8659>): “The Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) DNS Resource Record allows a DNS domain name holder to specify one or more Certification Authorities (CAs) authorized to issue certificates for that domain name. CAA Resource Records allow a public CA to implement additional controls to reduce the risk of unintended certificate mis-issue.”

**“CAB Forum”** is defined in section 1.1.

**“Certificate”** means an electronic document that uses a digital signature to bind a Public Key and an identity.

**“Certificate Approver”** is defined in the EV Guidelines.

**“Certificate Management Process”** Processes, practices, and procedures associated with the use of keys, software, and hardware, by which the CA verifies Certificate Data, issues Certificates, maintains a Repository, and revokes Certificates.

**“Certificate Requester”** is defined in the EV Guidelines.

**“Contract Signer”** is defined in the EV Guidelines.

**“Direct Address”** means an email address conforming to the Applicability Statement for Secure Health Transport.

**“Direct Address Certificate”** means a Certificate containing an entire Direct Address.

**“Direct Organizational Certificate”** means a Certificate containing only the domain name portion of a Direct Address.

**“Domain Name”** An ordered list of one or more Domain Labels assigned to a node in the Domain Name System.

**“EV Guidelines”** is defined in section 1.1.

**“Hardware Crypto Module”** A tamper-resistant device, with a cryptography processor, used for the specific purpose of protecting the lifecycle of cryptographic keys (generating, managing, processing, and storing).

**“Internal Name”** A string of characters (not an IP address) in a Common Name or Subject Alternative Name field of a Certificate that cannot be verified as globally unique within the public DNS at the time of certificate issuance because it does not end with a Top Level Domain registered in IANA’s Root Zone Database.

**“IP Address”** A 32-bit or 128-bit number assigned to a device that uses the Internet Protocol for communication.

**“Key Compromise”** A Private Key is said to be compromised if its value has been disclosed to an unauthorized person, or an unauthorized person has had access to it.

**“Key Pair”** means a Private Key and associated Public Key.

“Mailbox address” means an Email Address as specified in Section 4.1.2 of RFC 5321 and amended by Section 3.2 of RFC 6532, with no additional padding or structure.

“**OCSP Responder**” means an online software application operated under the authority of DigiCert and connected to its repository for processing certificate status requests.

“**Onion Domain Name**” A Fully Qualified Domain Name ending with the RFC 7686 “.onion” Special-Use Domain Name. For example, 2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion is an Onion Domain Name, whereas torproject.org is not an Onion Domain Name.

“**Private Key**” means the key of a Key Pair that is kept secret by the holder of the Key Pair, and that is used to create digital signatures and/or to decrypt electronic records or files that were encrypted with the corresponding Public Key.

“**Public Key**” means the key of a Key Pair that may be publicly disclosed by the holder of the corresponding Private Key and that is used by a Relying Party to verify digital signatures created with the holder's corresponding Private Key and/or to encrypt messages so that they can be decrypted only with the holder's corresponding Private Key.

“**Relying Party**” means an entity that relies upon either the information contained within a Certificate or a time-stamp token.

“**Relying Party Agreement**” means an agreement which must be read and accepted by the Relying Party prior to validating, relying on or using a Certificate or accessing or using DigiCert's Repository. The Relying Party Agreement is available for reference through a DigiCert online repository.

“**Reserved IP Address**” An IPv4 or IPv6 address that is contained in the address block of any entry in either of the following IANA registries:

<https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml>  
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv6-special-registry/iana-ipv6-special-registry.xhtml>

“**Subject Identity Information**” Information that identifies the Certificate Subject. Subject Identity Information does not include a Domain Name listed in the subjectAltName extension or the Subject commonName field.

“**Subscriber**” means either the entity identified as the subject in the Certificate or the entity that is receiving DigiCert's time-stamping services.

“**Subscriber Agreement**” means an agreement that governs the issuance and use of a Certificate that the Applicant must read and accept before receiving a Certificate.

“**Suspect Code**” Code that contains malicious functionality or serious vulnerabilities, including spyware, malware and other code that installs without the user's consent and/or resists its own removal, code that compromises user security and/or code that can be exploited in ways not intended by its designers to compromise the trustworthiness of the Platforms on which it executes

“**WebTrust**” means the current version of CPA Canada's WebTrust Program for Certification Authorities.

“**WHOIS**” Information retrieved directly from the Domain Name Registrar or registry operator via the protocol, the Registry Data Access Protocol, or an HTTPS website.



## 1.6.2. Acronyms

AATL	Adobe Approved Trust List
CA	Certificate Authority or Certification Authority
CAA	Certification Authority Authorization
CAB	"CA/Browser" as in "CAB Forum"
CP	Certificate Policy
CPS	Certification Practice Statement
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CSR	Certificate Signing Request
CT	Certificate Transparency
DBA	Doing Business As (also known as "Trading As")
DCPA	DigiCert Policy Authority
DNS	Domain Name Service
DV	Domain Validated
ETSI	European Telecommunications Standards Institute
EU	European Union
EV	Extended Validation
FIPS	(US Government) Federal Information Processing Standard
FQDN	Fully Qualified Domain Name
FTP	File Transfer Protocol
HSM	Hardware Security Module
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IANA	Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
ICANN	Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
IdM	Identity Management System
IDN	Internationalized Domain Name
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IGTF	International Grid Trust Federation
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
IV	Individual Validated
MICS	Member-Integrated Credential Service (IGTF)
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
OID	Object Identifier
OV	Organization Validated
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PKIX	IETF Working Group on Public Key Infrastructure
RA	Registration Authority
RFC	Request for Comments (at IETF.org)
SAN	Subject Alternative Name
SHA	Secure Hashing Algorithm
S/MIME	Secure MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions)
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
TLD	Top-Level Domain
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TSA	Time Stamping Authority
TST	Time-Stamp Token
TTL	Time To Live
UTC	Coordinated Universal Time
X.509	The ITU-T standard for Certificates and their corresponding authentication framework

### **1.6.3. References**

If not listed in section 1.1:

WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities

WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – SSL Baseline with Network Security

WebTrust for Certification Authorities – Extended Validation SSL

WebTrust for Certification Authorities – Publicly Trusted Code Signing Certificates

WebTrust for Certification Authorities – S/MIME Certificates

## **2. PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES**

### **2.1. REPOSITORIES**

DigiCert makes its root Certificates, revocation data for issued digital Certificates, CPs, CPSs, Relying Party Agreements, and standard Subscriber Agreements available in public repositories. DigiCert develops, implements, enforces, and updates this CPS at least every 365 days to meet the compliance standards of the documents listed in Sections 1.1 and 1.6.3. These updates also describe how the latest version of the Baseline Requirements are implemented. As Baseline Requirements are updated, DigiCert reviews the changes to determine their impact on these practices. Each section impacted by the Baseline Requirements will be updated and provided to the DCPA for approval and implementation. If an SSL/TLS Server Certificate is intended to be trusted in Chrome, it is published by posting it in a Certificate Transparency log.

DigiCert's legal repository for most services is located at <https://www.digicert.com/legal-repository/>. DigiCert's publicly trusted root Certificates and its CRLs and OCSP responses are regularly accessible online with systems described in section 5 to minimize downtime.

### **2.2. PUBLICATION OF CERTIFICATION INFORMATION**

The DigiCert certificate services, business practices (as required by section 8 of this CPS and the CP), and the repository are accessible through several means of communication:

1. On the web: <https://www.digicert.com> (and via URIs included in the certificates themselves)
2. By email to [admin@digicert.com](mailto:admin@digicert.com)
3. By mail addressed to: DigiCert, Inc., Suite 500, 2801 N. Thanksgiving Way, Lehi, Utah 84043
4. By telephone Tel: 1-801-877-2100
4. By fax: 1-801-705-0481

As specified in section 1.1, this CPS and the corresponding CP is structured in accordance with RFC 3647 and includes all material required by RFC 3647.

DigiCert hosts test Web pages that allow Application Software Suppliers to test their software with Subscriber Certificates that chain up to each publicly trusted Root Certificate.

### **2.3. TIME OR FREQUENCY OF PUBLICATION**

CA Certificates are published in a repository as soon as possible after issuance. CRLs for end-user Certificates are issued at least once per day. CRLs for CA Certificates are issued at least every 6 months and also within 24 hours if a CA Certificate is revoked. Under special circumstances, DigiCert may publish new CRLs prior to the scheduled issuance of the next CRL. (See section 4.9 for additional details.)

For Certificates subject to the TLS and S/MIME <sup>2</sup>Baseline Requirements, CRLs for end-user Subscriber Certificates are issued at least once every seven days. CRLs for CAs that only issue CA Certificates subject to the Baseline Requirements are generally issued at least annually, and also whenever a CA Certificate is revoked. CRLs for Authenticated Content Signing (ACS) Root CAs are published annually and also whenever a CA Certificate is revoked. If a Certificate listed in a CRL expires, it may be removed from later issued CRLs after the Certificate's expiration.

DigiCert develops, implements, enforces, and annually updates this CPS to describe in detail how DigiCert complies with the CAB Forum Baseline Requirements and other documents as listed in section 1.1 and 1.6.3 of this CPS. Those updates indicate conformance by incrementing the version number and adding a dated changelog entry even if no other changes are made to the document as specified in section 1.2 of this CPS.

New or modified versions of the CP, this CPS, Subscriber Agreements, or Relying Party Warranties are typically published within seven days after their approval.

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<sup>2</sup> DigiCert will comply with the S/MIME Baseline Requirements as of September 1st, 2023.

#### **2.4. ACCESS CONTROLS ON REPOSITORIES**

Read-only access to the repository is unrestricted and continuous. Logical and physical controls prevent unauthorized write access to repositories.

### 3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

#### 3.1. NAMING

##### 3.1.1. Type of Names

TLS and S/MIME Certificates are issued with a non-null subject Distinguished Name (DN) that complies with ITU X.500 standards except that DigiCert may issue a Level 1 Certificate with a null subject DN if it includes at least one alternative name form that is marked critical.

DigiCert issues EV SSL/TLS Certificates to .onion domains in accordance with Appendix B of the Baseline Requirements and as specified in section 3.2.2.2.

DigiCert issues EV SSL/TLS Certificates in compliance with the EV Guidelines section 11.

##### 3.1.2. Need for Names to be Meaningful

DigiCert uses distinguished names that identify both the entity (i.e. person, organization, device, or object) that is the subject of the Certificate and the entity that is the issuer of the Certificate. DigiCert only allows directory information trees that accurately reflect organization structures.

Personal Names included in Certificates issued to individuals shall be a meaningful representation of the authenticated common name of the Subscriber.

##### 3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers

DigiCert may issue pseudonymous end- entity Certificates if they are not prohibited by policy and any applicable name space uniqueness requirements are met.

For S/MIME Certificates with the pseudonym attribute, the associated Subject must be verified according to Section 3.2.4 of the S/MIME Baseline Requirements. <sup>3</sup>The pseudonym shall be either a unique identifier selected by DigiCert for the Subject of the Certificate, or an identifier selected by the Enterprise RA which identifies the Subject of the Certificate within the organization.

##### 3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms

Distinguished Names in Certificates are interpreted using X.500 standards and ASN.1 syntax. DigiCert may allow the conversion of Identity information usually rendered in non-ASCII characters (for example é and à may be represented by e or a, and umlauts such as ö or ü may be represented by oe or ue, o or u respectively). DigiCert may use language variants (such as Munich or München) for geographic names. For Personal Names, DigiCert may include an ASCII character name that is not a direct Conversion of the Applicant's registered name provided that it is verified in a Reliable Data Source or suitable Attestation.

##### 3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names

The uniqueness of each subject name in a Certificate is enforced as follows:

SSL/TLS Server Certificates	Inclusion of the domain name in the Certificate. Domain name uniqueness is controlled by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).
Client Certificates	Requiring a unique email address or a unique organization name combined/associated with a unique serial integer.
Document Signing Certificates	Requiring a unique email address or a unique organization name combined/associated with a unique serial integer.

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<sup>3</sup> DigiCert will comply with the S/MIME Baseline Requirements as of September 1st, 2023.

IGTF and Grid-only Device Certificates	For device Certificates, an FQDN is included in the appropriate fields. For other Certificates, DigiCert may append a unique ID to a name listed in the Certificate.
Code Signing Certificates (including CDS Certificates)	Requiring a unique organization name and address or a unique organization name combined/associated with a unique serial integer.
Time Stamping	Requiring a unique hash and time or unique serial integer assigned to the time stamp
S/MIME Certificates	A unique email address and/or serial integer.

The names of Subscribers shall be unique within a subordinate Issuer CA's and Customer's Sub-domain for a specific type of Certificate. Name uniqueness is not violated when multiple certificates are issued to the same entity.

For IDNs, DigiCert may include the Punycode version of the IDN as a subject name.

### 3.1.6. Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks

For publicly-trusted TLS/SSL and EV Certificates, DigiCert implements a process that prevents Certificates from including a name, DBA, tradename, trademark, address, location, or other text that refers to a specific natural person or Legal Entity unless DigiCert has verified this information in accordance with the following:

Publicly-trusted OV/DV TLS/SSL:

- CAB Forum Baseline Requirements; and
- Section 3.2 of the CP and this CPS.

Publicly-trusted EV TLS/SSL:

- EV Guidelines section 11; and
- Section 3.2 of the CP and this CPS.

This includes other subject attribute information as per section 9.2 of the EV Guidelines. These attributes will be validated in line with section 11 of the EV Guidelines.

For all other Certificates, unless otherwise specifically stated in this CPS, DigiCert does not verify an Applicant's right to use a trademark and does not resolve trademark disputes. DigiCert may reject any application or require revocation of any Certificate that is part of a trademark dispute.

### 3.2. INITIAL IDENTITY VALIDATION

DigiCert may use any legal means of communication or investigation to ascertain the identity of an organizational or individual Applicant. DigiCert may refuse to issue a Certificate in its sole discretion.

Digicert may request documents to assist with validating your certificate request in accordance with the standards listed in 1.1. These documents will be used in accordance with 9.4 of this CPS.

#### 3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of Private Key

No stipulation.

### 3.2.2. Authentication of Organization Identity and Domain/Email Control

DV SSL/TLS Server Certificates	<p>DigiCert validates the Applicant's right to use or control each domain name that will be listed in the Subject Alternative Name field of a Certificate by using at least one of the following procedures from section 3.2.2.4 of the Baseline Requirements:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. This method (BR section 3.2.2.4.1) is no longer used because it is deprecated as of 1-August-2018;</li><li>2. Email, Fax, SMS, or Postal Mail to the Domain Contact by sending a unique Random Value (valid for no more than 30 days from its creation) through email, fax, SMS, or postal mail, to the Domain Contact and receiving confirmation by their use of the Random Value, performed in accordance with BR section 3.2.2.4.2;</li><li>3. (BR section 3.2.2.4.3) is no longer used because it is deprecated as of 31-May-2019;</li><li>4. Constructed Email to Domain Contact establishing the Applicant's control over the FQDN by sending an email created by using 'admin', 'administrator', 'webmaster', 'hostmaster' or 'postmaster' as the local part followed by the ("@" sign, followed by an Authorization Domain name, including a Random Value in the email, and receiving a</li></ol>
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	<p>response using the Random Value, performed in accordance with BR section 3.2.2.4.4;</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. (BR section 3.2.2.4.5) is no longer used because it is deprecated as of 1-August-2018;</li> <li>6. (BR section 3.2.2.4.6) is no longer used because it is deprecated as of 24-April-2020 and not allowed after June 2020<sup>4</sup></li> <li>7. Domain Name Service (DNS) Change by confirming the presence of a Random Value or Request Token in a DNS CNAME, TXT, or CAA record for either an Authorization Domain Name or an Authorization Domain Name prefixed with a label that begins with an underscore character, performed in accordance BR section 3.2.2.4.7;</li> <li>8. IP Address - by confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN through control of an IP address returned from a DNS lookup for A or AAAA records for the FQDN, performed in accordance with BR sections 3.2.2.5 and 3.2.2.4.8;</li> <li>9. (BR section 3.2.2.4.9) is no longer used because it was deprecated upon publication of v.4.16 of this CPS;</li> <li>10. (BR section 3.2.2.4.10) is no longer used because it was deprecated upon publication of v.4.16 of this CPS;</li> <li>11. (BR section 3.2.2.4.11) is no longer used because it is deprecated as of 5-February-2018;</li> <li>12. (BR section 3.2.2.4.12) is not used by DigiCert to validate domains.</li> <li>13. Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by sending a Random Value via email and then receiving a confirming response utilizing the Random Value. The Random Value will be sent to a DNS CAA Email Contact. The relevant CAA Resource Record Set is found using the search algorithm defined in RFC 8659 performed in accordance with BR section 3.2.2.4.13;</li> <li>14. Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by sending a Random Value via email to the DNS TXT Record Email Contact for the Authorization Domain Name for the FQDN and then receiving a confirming response utilizing the Random Value, performed in accordance with BR section 3.2.2.4.14;</li> <li>15. Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by calling the Domain Contact's phone number and obtaining a confirming response to validate the authorized Domain Name. Each phone call can confirm control of multiple authorized Domain Names provided that the same Domain Contact phone number is listed for each authorized Domain Name being verified and they provide a confirming response</li> </ol>
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<sup>4</sup> DigiCert may continue to re-use information and validations for domains validated under this method per the applicable certificate data reuse periods in section 4.2.1.



	<p>for each authorized Domain Name, performed in accordance with BR section 3.2.2.4.15;</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>16. Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by calling the DNS TXT Record Phone Contact's phone number and obtaining a confirming response to validate the authorized Domain Name. Each phone call can confirm control of multiple authorized Domain Names provided that the same DNS TXT Record Phone Contact phone number is listed for each authorized Domain Name being verified and they provide a confirming response for each authorized Domain Name, performed in accordance with BR section 3.2.2.4.16;</li><li>17. Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by calling the DNS CAA Phone Contact's phone number and obtain a confirming response to validate the ADN. Each phone call can confirm control of multiple ADNs provided that the same DNS CAA Phone Contact phone number is listed for each ADN being verified and they provide a confirming response for each ADN, performed in accordance with BR section 3.2.2.4.17;</li><li>18. Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by verifying that the Request Token or Random Value is contained in the contents of a file (such as a Request Token, Random Value that does not appear in the request used to retrieve the file and receipt of a successful HTTP 2xx status code response from the request) performed in accordance with BR section 3.2.2.4.18; and</li><li>19. Confirming the Applicant's control over a FQDN by validating domain control of the FQDN using the ACME HTTP Challenge method defined in section 8.3 of RFC 8555, performed in accordance with BR section 3.2.2.4.19 and section 8.3 of RFC 8555 as prescribed.</li><li>20. (BR section 3.2.2.4.20) is not used by Digicert to validate domains.</li></ol> <p>Wildcard Certificate Domain Name validation is completed using the above list as permitted by the CAB Forum Baseline Requirements along with current best practice of consulting a public suffix list.</p>
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<p>IV and OV SSL/TLS Server, Object Signing, and Device Certificates (excluding device Certificates issued under the Grid-only arc)</p>	<p>DigiCert validates the Applicant’s right to use or control the Domain Name(s) and the country code that will be listed in the Certificate using the DV SSL/TLS Server Certificate validation procedures above.</p> <p>DigiCert also verifies the identity and address of the Applicant using the procedures found in section 3.2.2 or section 3.2.3 of the Baseline Requirements.</p> <p>DigiCert verifies any DBA included in a Certificate using a third party or government source, attestation letter, or reliable form of identification in accordance with section 3.2.2 of the Baseline Requirements.</p>
<p>Device Certificates issued under the Grid-only arc</p>	<p>An RA or Trusted Agent validates the applicant’s information in accordance with an RPS (or similar document) applicable to the community of interest.</p>
<p>EV SSL/TLS Server and EV Code Signing Certificates</p>	<p>Information concerning organization identity related to the issuance of EV SSL/TLS Server Certificates is validated in accordance with the EV Guidelines including the following sections:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Section 9.2.1, 11.2 and 11.3 for the O field<sup>5</sup>;</li> <li>• Section 9.2.4 and 11.2 for the jurisdiction of incorporation/registration; and</li> <li>• Section 9.2.6 and 11.4 for verification of the physical address.</li> </ul> <p>DigiCert also validates the EV SSL/TLS and EV Code Signing Applicant’s right to use or control the Domain Name(s) and the country code that will be listed in the Certificate using the DV SSL/TLS Server Certificate validation procedures above.</p>
<p>S/MIME Certificates<sup>6</sup></p>	<p>DigiCert will comply with the S/MIME Baseline Requirements as of September 1st, 2023.</p> <p>Organization identity is validated according to Section 3.2.3 of the S/MIME Baseline Requirements.</p> <p>For Certificates where Individual Vetting is required it shall be done in accordance with Section 3.2.4 of the S/MIME Baseline Requirements.</p> <p>DigiCert verifies an applicant’s right to use or control over the email address by verifying domain control over the email domain using one of the procedures listed in Section 3.2.2 of this CPS under the “DV SSL/TLS Server Certificates” table.</p> <p>Alternatively, in accordance with Section 3.2.2.2 of the S/MIME BR’s, DigiCert verifies the applicant’s right to use or control over the email address by sending a unique random value to the email address being validated. The random value shall be unique in each email and shall remain valid for no more than 24 hours from its creation.</p>

<sup>5</sup> DigiCert confirms the legal existence of an Organization in accordance with the EV Guidelines section 11.2.2 per the required information databases per the certificate type category.

<sup>6</sup> DigiCert and its subordinate Issuer CAs do not delegate validation of the domain portion of an e-mail address in S/MIME certificates. DigiCert and the subordinate Issuer CAs may rely upon validation the root CA has performed for an Authorized Domain Name as being valid domain names. If DigiCert is verifying the domain portion, then DigiCert will use a process the CAB forum authorized to meet this requirement as listed in this section.

DigiCert maintains and utilizes a scoring system to flag certificate requests that potentially present a higher risk of fraud. Those certificate requests that are flagged “high risk” receive additional scrutiny or verification prior to issuance, which may include obtaining additional documentation from or additional communication with the Applicant.

Before issuing an SSL/TLS Server Certificate with a domain name that has not been previously verified as within the scope of an RA’s or other Delegated Third Party’s allowed domain names, DigiCert establishes that the RA or Delegated Third Party has the right to use the Domain Name by independently verifying the authorization with the domain owner, as described and allowed by the above.

DigiCert uses a documented internal process to check the accuracy of information sources and databases to ensure the data is acceptable, including reviewing the database provider’s terms of use. Prior to using any data source as a Reliable Data Source, DigiCert evaluates the source for its reliability, accuracy, and resistance to alteration or falsification. For SSL/TLS, EV, EVCS, S/MIME and other Certificates under the requirements of the CAB Forum, the criteria in sections BR 3.2.2.7 and EVG 11.11.5 are included in the process to determine the database and information sources.

For Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) numbers listed in Certificates, DigiCert may include the value after verification, through the appropriate mechanism, such as mechanisms provided by Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation (GLEIF), that the LEI is associated with entity information provided. LEI lookups are treated as information from a source described above, but not currently relied upon as a primary source of information for verification. Instead, this information is treated as additional correlation of identity information found in the certificate and provided in the certificate for the convenience and use of data researchers and the legal entities operating the certificates.

For EV and S/MIME, the approved sources from this process are published publicly on a readily accessible GitHub repository available here in a file link on the page: <https://github.com/digicert/reports/tree/master/validation-sources>.

### **3.2.2.1 Verification of IP Address**

For each IP Address listed in a publicly-trusted TLS Certificate, DigiCert confirms that, as of the date the Certificate was issued, the Applicant controlled the IP Address by:

1. Having the Applicant demonstrate practical control over the IP Address by confirming the presence of a Request Token or Random Value contained in the content of a file or webpage in the form of a meta tag under the “/.well-known/pki-validation” directory on the IP Address, performed in accordance with BRs section 3.2.2.5.1;
2. Confirming the Applicant’s control over the IP Address by sending a Random Value via email, fax, SMS, or postal mail and then receiving a confirming response utilizing the Random Value, performed in accordance with BR section 3.2.2.5.2;
3. Performing a reverse-IP address lookup and then verifying control over the resulting Domain Name, as set forth above and in accordance with BR section 3.2.2.5.3;
4. After July 31, 2019, DigiCert will not perform IP Address validations using the any-other-method method of BR section 3.2.2.5.4;
5. Confirming the Applicant’s control over the IP Address by calling the IP Address Contact’s phone number, as identified by the IP Address Registration Authority, and obtaining a response confirming the Applicant’s request for validation of the IP Address, performed in accordance with BR Section 3.2.2.5.5;
6. Confirming the Applicant’s control over the IP Address by performing the procedure documented for an “http-01” challenge in draft 04 of “ACME IP Identifier Validation Extension,” available at <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-ip-04#section-4>, performed in accordance with BR Section 3.2.2.5.6.

### **3.2.2.2 Wildcard Domain Validation**

Before issuing a certificate with a wildcard character (\*) in a CN or subjectAltName of type DNS-ID, DigiCert follows a documented procedure that determines if the wildcard character occurs in the first label position to the left of a “registry-controlled” label or “public suffix” (e.g. “.com”, “.co.uk”, see RFC 6454 section 8.2 for further explanation).

If a wildcard would fall within the label immediately to the left of a registry-controlled /1 or public suffix, DigiCert refuses issuance unless the applicant proves its rightful control of the entire Domain Namespace. (e.g. DigiCert will not issue “.co.uk” or “.local”, but MAY issue “.example.com” to Example Co.).

For EV Certificates, DigiCert may include a Wildcard Domain Name in the Subject Alternative Name extension and Subject Common Name field provided that “onion” is the right-most Domain Label of the FQDN portion of the Wildcard Domain Name and the inclusion of the Wildcard Domain Name complies with section 3.2.2.6 of the CAB Forum Baseline Requirements. In all other cases, DigiCert will not include a Wildcard Domain Name in the Subject Alternative Name extension or Subject Common Name field of an EV Certificate.

### **3.2.2.3 Verification of Country**

For publicly-trusted TLS, if the Applicant requests a Certificate that will contain Subject Identity Information comprised only of the countryName field, then DigiCert or the RA verifies the country associated with the Subject using a verification process meeting the requirements of section 3.2.2.3 in the CAB Forum Baseline Requirements and meets the requirements of this section.

If the Applicant requests a Certificate that will contain the countryName field and other Subject Identity Information, then DigiCert verifies the identity of the Applicant, and the authenticity of the Applicant Representative’s certificate request using a verification process meeting the requirements of section 3.2.2.1 in the CAB Forum Baseline Requirements and this section. DigiCert carefully inspects any document relied upon for alteration or falsification.

When the subject:countryName field is present, then DigiCert or the RA verifies the country associated with the Subject using one of the following:

1. The IP Address range assignment by country for either
  - a. The web site’s IP address, as indicated by the DNS record for the web site or
  - b. The Applicant’s IP address;
2. The ccTLD of the requested Domain Name;
3. Information provided by the Domain Name Registrar; or
4. A method identified in section 3.2.2.1.

DigiCert may implement a process to screen proxy servers in order to prevent reliance upon IP addresses assigned in countries other than where the Applicant is actually located.

### 3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity

If a Certificate will contain the identity of an individual, then DigiCert or an RA validates the identity of the individual using the following procedures:

Certificate	Validation
IV (Individual Validated) SSL/TLS Server Certificates and Object Signing Certificates (issued to an individual)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. DigiCert or the RA obtains and reviews a legible copy, which discernibly shows the Applicant’s face, of at least one currently valid government-issued photo ID (passport, driver’s license, military ID, national ID, or equivalent document type). DigiCert or the RA inspects the copy for any indication of alteration or falsification.</li> <li>b. For Object Signing Certificates, a validation specialist also engages in a video conference call with the Applicant, who must present their photo ID and sign a Declaration of Identity, witnessed by the validation specialist, which is recorded as evidence.</li> </ol> </li> <li>2. DigiCert may additionally cross-check the Applicant’s name and address for consistency with available third-party data sources.</li> <li>3. If further assurance is required, then the Applicant must provide an additional form of identification, such as recent utility bills, financial account statements, credit card, an additional ID credential, or equivalent document type.</li> <li>4. DigiCert shall verify the Applicant’s address using a form of identification determined to be reliable, such as a government ID, utility bill, or bank or credit card statement. DigiCert may rely on the same government-issued ID that was used to verify the Applicant’s name.</li> <li>5. DigiCert or the RA confirms that the Applicant is able to receive communication by telephone, postal mail/courier, or fax in order to verify the certificate request.</li> </ol> <p>If DigiCert cannot verify the Applicant’s identity using the procedures described above, then the Applicant must submit a Declaration of Identity that is witnessed and signed by a Registration Authority, Trusted Agent, notary, lawyer, accountant, postal carrier, or any entity certified by a State or National Government as authorized to confirm identities.</p>
Device Certificate Sponsors	See section 3.2.3.3
EV Certificates issued to a business entity	As specified and required in section 11.2.1(3), 11.4, 11.5 and 11.2.2 (3-4) of the EV Guidelines including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Verification of the name and title of contract signers and certificate approvers; and</li> <li>• Verification of signatures on the subscriber agreement and certificate request.</li> </ul>

Grid-only Certificates	Either the RA responsible for the grid community or a Trusted Agent obtains an identity document during a face-to-face meeting with the Applicant, or a Trusted Agent attests that the Applicant is personally known to the Trusted Agent. The RA must retain sufficient information about the applicant's identity to prove upon DigiCert's request that the applicant was properly identified.
Adobe Document Signing Certificates for Individuals	In-person appearance before a person performing identity proofing for a Registration Authority or a Trusted Agent per section ICA5(a) of the AATL 2.0 requirements. This can be performed either physically or digitally per the stated standards.  RAs must retain sufficient information about the applicant's identity to prove upon DigiCert's request that the Applicant was properly identified.
Adobe Document Signing Certificates for Organizations	In-person appearance (either physically or digitally) before a person performing identity proofing for a Registration Authority or a Trusted Agent; and  Evidence of association with, and proofs of entitlement to represent, that organization per methods described for Applicants for a Level 2, 3, or 4 Client Certificate.  RAs must retain sufficient information about the applicant's identity to prove upon DigiCert's request that the Applicant was properly identified.
S/MIME Certificates	For S/MIME Certificates that require validation of an individual, it must be done in accordance with section 3.2.4 of the S/MIME Baseline Requirements. <sup>7</sup>
Level 1 Client Certificates – Personal (email Certificates)	As specified in section 3.2.2 (no identity verification other than control of the email address listed in the Certificate).
Level 1 Client Certificates Enterprise (email certificates)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. For a certificate capable of being used for digitally signing or encrypting email messages, DigiCert takes reasonable measures to verify that the Applicant submitting the request controls the email account associated with the email address referenced in the certificate or has been authorized by the email account holder to act on the account holder's behalf.</li> <li>2. DigiCert may rely on validation performed for an Authorization Domain Name (as specified in the Baseline Requirements and section 3.2.2 of this CPS) as being valid for subdomains of that Authorization Domain Name.</li> </ol>

<sup>7</sup> DigiCert will comply with the S/MIME Baseline Requirements as of September 1st, 2023.

<p>Level 3 Client Certificates</p>	<p>In-person proofing<sup>4</sup> before an RA, Trusted Agent, or an entity certified by a state, federal, or national entity that is authorized to confirm identities<sup>5</sup>. The information must be collected and stored in a secure manner. Required identification consists of one unexpired Federal/National Government-issued Picture I.D. (e.g. a passport), a REAL ID, or two unexpired Non-Federal Government I.D.s, one of which must be a photo I.D. Acceptable forms of government ID include a driver's license, state-issued photo ID card, passport, national identity card, permanent resident card, trusted traveler card, tribal ID, military ID, or similar photo identification document. See e.g. USCIS Form I-9.</p> <p>The person performing identity proofing examines the credentials and determines whether they are authentic and unexpired and checks the provided information (name, date of birth, and current address) to ensure legitimacy.</p> <p>DigiCert also employs the in-person antecedent process to meet this in-person identity proofing requirement. Under this definition, historical in-person identity proofing is sufficient if (1) it meets the thoroughness and rigor of in-person proofing described above, (2) supporting ID proofing artifacts exist to substantiate the antecedent relationship, and (3) mechanisms are in place that bind the individual to the asserted identity.</p> <p>In one use case, the Applicant (e.g. an employee) has been identified previously by an employer using USCIS Form I-9 and is bound to the asserted identity remotely through the use of known attributes or shared secrets.</p> <p>In another use case, DigiCert uses a third party Identity Verification Provider that constructs a real-time, five-question process, based on multiple historic antecedent databases.</p> <p>The identity of the Applicant must be established no earlier than 90 days prior to initial certificate issuance.</p>
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<p>Level 4 Client Certificates (Biometric ID Certificates)</p>	<p>In-person proofing before an RA, Trusted Agent, or an entity certified by a state, federal, or national entity that is authorized to confirm identities. A certified entity must forward the collected information directly to an RA in a secure manner. The Applicant must supply one unexpired Federal/National Government-issued Picture I.D. (e.g. a passport), a REAL ID, or two unexpired Non-Federal Government I.D.s, one of which must be a photo I.D.. Acceptable forms of government ID include a driver's license, state-issued photo ID card, passport, national identity card, permanent resident card, trusted traveler card, tribal ID, military ID, or similar photo identification document. See e.g. USCIS Form I-9. The entity collecting the credentials must also obtain at least one form of biometric data (e.g. photograph or fingerprints) to ensure that the Applicant cannot repudiate the application.</p> <p>The person performing identity verification for DigiCert or the RA examines the credentials for authenticity and validity. The Applicant signs a Declaration of Identity, defined below, to which the person performing identity proofing attests. DigiCert or the RA reviews and keeps a record of the Declaration of Identity.</p> <p>Use of an in-person antecedent is not allowed. The identity of the Applicant must be established by in-person proofing no earlier than 90 days prior to initial certificate issuance. Level 4 Client Certificates are issued in a manner that confirms the Applicant's address.</p>
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If in-person identity verification is required and the Applicant cannot participate in face-to-face registration alone (e.g. because Applicant is a network device, minor, or person not legally competent), then the Applicant may be accompanied by a person already certified by the PKI or who has the required identity credentials for a Certificate of the same type applied for by the Applicant. The person accompanying the Applicant (i.e. the "Sponsor") will present information sufficient for registration at the level of the Certificate being requested, for himself or herself, and for the Applicant.

For in-person identity proofing at Levels 3 and 4, DigiCert may rely on an entity certified by a state, federal, or national entity as authorized to confirm identities may perform the authentication on behalf of the RA. The certified entity should forward the information collected from the applicant directly to the RA in a secure manner.

**3.2.3.1. Authentication for Role-based Client Certificates**

DigiCert may issue Certificates that identify a specific role that the Subscriber holds, if the role identifies a specific individual within an organization (e.g., *Chief Information Officer* is a unique individual whereas *Program Analyst* is not). These role-based Certificates are used when non-repudiation is desired. DigiCert only issues role-based Certificates to Subscribers who first obtain an individual Subscriber Certificate that is at the same or higher assurance level as the requested role-based Certificate. DigiCert may issue Certificates with the same role to multiple Subscribers. However, DigiCert requires that each Certificate have a unique Key Pair. Individuals may not share their issued role-based Certificates and are required to protect the role-based Certificate in the same manner as individual Certificates.

DigiCert verifies the identity of the individual requesting a role-based Certificate (the sponsor) in accordance with section 3.2.3 before issuing a role-based Certificate. The sponsor must hold a DigiCert-issued client individual Certificate at the same or higher assurance level as the role-based Certificate.

Regarding the issuance of role-based Certificates, this CPS requires compliance with all provisions of DigiCert's CP regarding key generation, private key protection, and Subscriber obligations.

IGTF Certificates are not issued as role-based Certificates.



### 3.2.3.2. Authentication of Devices with Human Sponsors

DigiCert issues Level 1, 2, 3 or 4 Client Certificates for use on computing or network devices, provided that the entity owning the device is listed as the subject. In all cases, the device has a human sponsor who provides:

1. Equipment identification (e.g., serial number) or service name (e.g., DNSname);
2. Equipment Public Keys;
3. Equipment authorizations and attributes (if any are to be included in the Certificate); and
4. Contact information.

If the Certificate’s sponsor changes, the new sponsor is required to review the status of each device to ensure it is still authorized to receive Certificates. Each sponsor is required to provide proof that the device is still under the sponsor’s control or responsibility on request. Sponsors are contractually obligated to notify DigiCert if the equipment is no longer in use, no longer under their control or responsibility, or no longer requires a Certificate. All registration is verified commensurate with the requested certificate type.

### 3.2.4. Non-verified Subscriber Information

DigiCert verifies all certificate information in accordance with industry standards.

### 3.2.5. Validation of Authority

The authorization of a certificate request is verified as follows:

<b>Certificate</b>	<b>Verification</b>
DV SSL/TLS Server Certificate	The authority of the requester is verified by using one or more of the procedures listed in section 3.2.2.4. of the Baseline Requirements.
OV SSL/TLS Server Certificates	The request is verified using a Reliable Method of Communication, in accordance with section 3.2.5 of the Baseline Requirements.
EV Certificates	The request is verified in accordance with section 11.8 of the EV Guidelines.
Object Signing Certificates	If the Certificate names an organization, the requester’s contact information is verified with an authoritative source within the applicant’s organization using a Reliable Method of Communication. The contact information is then used to confirm the authenticity of the certificate request.
Adobe Signing Certificates	If the Certificate names an organization, the requester’s contact information is verified with an authoritative source within the applicant’s organization using a Reliable Method of Communication. The contact information is then used to confirm the authenticity of the certificate request.
S/MIME Certificates	Validation of authority is completed according to section 3.2.6 and section 3.2.2 of the S/MIME Baseline Requirements. <sup>8</sup>
Level 1 Client Certificates Personal (email Certificates) and Enterprise (email Certificates)	The authority of the request is verified through the email address listed in the Certificate or with a person who has technical or administrative control over the domain or the email address to be listed in the Certificate.
Client Certificates Levels 2, 3 and 4 Certificates	The organization named in the Certificate confirms to DigiCert or an RA that the individual is authorized to obtain the Certificate. The organization is required to request revocation of the Certificate when that affiliation ends.

<sup>8</sup> DigiCert will comply with the S/MIME Baseline Requirements as of September 1st, 2023.

IGTF Certificates	An authorized individual approves the certificate request. For device Certificates, the RA retains contact information for each device’s registered owner. The device owner is required to notify the RA and request revocation if the device sponsor is no longer authorized to use the device or the FQDN in the Certificate.
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An organization may limit who is authorized to request Certificates by sending a request to DigiCert. A request to limit authorized individuals is not effective until approved by DigiCert. DigiCert will respond to an organization’s verified request for DigiCert’s list of its authorized requesters.

### 3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation

Interoperation with DigiCert PKI is permitted pursuant to the CP.

## 3.3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR RE-KEY REQUESTS

### 3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-key

Subscribers may request re-key of a Certificate prior to a Certificate’s expiration. After receiving a request for re-key, DigiCert creates a new Certificate with the same certificate contents except for a new Public Key and, optionally, an extended validity period. If the Certificate has an extended validity period, DigiCert may perform some revalidation of the Applicant but may also rely on information previously provided or obtained.

Subscribers re-establish their identity as follows:

<b>Certificate</b>	<b>Routine Re-Key Authentication</b>	<b>Re-Verification Required</b>
DV and OV SSL/TLS Server and Device Certificates	Username and password	According to the Baseline Requirements
EV SSL/TLS Certificates	Username and password	According to the EV Guidelines
Subscriber Code Signing Certificates (Minimum Requirements and EV)	Username and password	According to the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates
Signing Authority EV Code Signing Certificates	Username and password	According to the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates
Timestamp EV Code Signing Certificates	Username and password	According to the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates
S/MIME Certificates	Username and password	According to the S/MIME Baseline Requirements <sup>9</sup>
Object Signing Certificates	Username and password	At least every six years
Adobe Signing Certificates	Username and password	At least every six years
Level 1 Client Certificates	Username and password or a challenge phrase	At least every nine years

<sup>9</sup> DigiCert will comply with the S/MIME Baseline Requirements as of September 1<sup>st</sup>, 2023.

Level 2 Client Certificates	Current signature key or multi-factor authentication meeting NIST SP 800-63 Level 3 or a challenge phrase	At least every nine years
Level 3 and 4 Client Certificates	Current signature key or multi-factor authentication meeting NIST SP 800-63 Level 3	At least every nine years
IGTF Certificates	Username and password, RA attestation after comparison of identity documents, re-authenticate through an approved IdM, or through associated Private Key	At least every 13 months. However, Certificates associated with a Private Key restricted solely to a hardware token may be rekeyed or renewed for a period of up to 5 years

### **3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for Re-key After Revocation**

DigiCert does not re-key after revocation. The Subscriber must undergo initial validation as specified in section 3.2.

### **3.4. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR REVOCATION REQUEST**

DigiCert or an RA authenticates all revocation requests. DigiCert may authenticate revocation requests by referencing the Certificate's Public Key, regardless of whether the associated Private Key is compromised.

## **4. CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS**

### **4.1. CERTIFICATE APPLICATION**

#### **4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application**

Either the Applicant or an individual authorized to request Certificates on behalf of the Applicant may submit certificate requests. Applicants are responsible for any data that the Applicant or an agent of the Applicant supplies to DigiCert.

EV Certificate requests must be submitted by an authorized Certificate Requester and approved by a Certificate Approver. The certificate request must be accompanied by a signed (in writing or electronically) Subscriber Agreement from a Contract Signer.

DigiCert does not issue Certificates to entities on a government denied list maintained by the United States or that is located in a country with which the laws of the United States prohibit doing business.

In accordance with section 5.5.2, DigiCert maintains an internal database of all previously revoked Certificates and previously rejected certificate requests due to suspected phishing or other fraudulent usage or concerns. DigiCert uses this information to identify subsequent suspicious certificate requests in accordance with section 3.2 of this CPS and the CP.

#### **4.1.2. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities**

In no particular order, the enrollment process includes:

- Submitting a certificate application;
- Generating a Key Pair;
- Delivering the Public Key of the Key Pair to DigiCert;
- Agreeing to the applicable Subscriber Agreement; and
- Paying any applicable fees.

DigiCert obtain any additional documentation determined necessary to meet the CP, this CPS, and items listed in section 1.2.

A CSR is not required for the application process.

Prior to the issuance of a Publicly Trusted Certificate, DigiCert obtains from the Applicant a certificate request from the Applicant and that complies with the CP and this CPS. For publicly-trusted TLS, the certificate request may be used for multiple Certificates to be issued to the same Applicant, subject to the aging and updating requirement in section 4.2.1 of the Baseline Requirements, provided that each Certificate is supported by a valid, current certificate request signed by the appropriate Applicant Representative on behalf of the Applicant. The certificate request contains a request from, or on behalf of, the Applicant for the issuance of a Certificate, and a certification by, or on behalf of, the Applicant that all of the information contained therein is correct.

### **4.2. CERTIFICATE APPLICATION PROCESSING**

#### **4.2.1. Performing Identification and Authentication Functions**

After receiving a certificate application, DigiCert or an RA verifies the application information and other information in accordance with section 3.2. In cases where the certificate request does not contain all the necessary information about the Applicant, DigiCert or the RAs obtain the remaining information from the Applicant or, having obtained it from a reliable, independent, third-party data source, confirm it with the Applicant. DigiCert and its RAs follow a documented procedure for verifying all data requested for inclusion in the Certificate by the Applicant.

For TLS/SSL Certificates, DigiCert may use the documents and data provided in section 3.2 to verify certificate information, or may reuse previous validations themselves, provided that DigiCert obtained the data or document from a source specified under section 3.2 or completed the validation itself no more than 825 days prior to issuing the Certificate.

Effective 2021-10-01, for validation of Domain Names and IP Addresses according to section 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5 of the CAB Forum Baseline Requirements, any reused data, document, or completed validation is obtained no more than 398 days prior to issuing the Certificate.

For S/MIME Certificates, validation of mailbox control according to section 3.2.2.2 must be obtained no more than 30 days prior to issuing the Certificate. Validation of mailbox authorization or control in accordance with section 3.2.2.1 or 3.2.2.3 must be obtained no more than 398 days prior to issuing the Certificate. Authentication of organizational entity or Individual Identity must be obtained no more than 825 days prior to issuing the Certificate.<sup>10</sup>

Prior to issuing a publicly-trusted SSL/TLS Server Certificate, DigiCert checks the DNS for the existence of a CAA record for each dNSName in the subjectAltName extension of the certificate to be issued, as specified in RFC 8659, and in accordance with section 3.2.2.8 of the Baseline Requirements (for publicly issued TLS Certificates).

If the Certificate is issued, it will be issued within the Time to Live (TTL) of the CAA record, or 8 hours, whichever is greater.

DigiCert logs actions taken based on CAA records, and documents issuance prevented by CAA for feedback to the CAB Forum. DigiCert processes the “issue” and “issuwild” property tags and may not dispatch reports of issuance requests to the contact(s) listed in an “iodef” property tag. CAA checking is optional for Certificates issued by a Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate as set out in Baseline Requirements section 7.1.4 and section 3.2.2.5 in this CPS.

The Certification Authority CAA identifying domains for CAs that DigiCert recognizes: are “digicert.com”, “digicert.ne.jp”, “cybertrust.ne.jp”, “symantec.com”, “thawte.com”, “geotrust.com”, “quovadisglobal.com”, “rapidssl.com”, “digitalcertvalidation.com”, “amazon.com”, “amazontrust.com”, “awstrust.com”, “amazonaws.com”, and any domain containing those identifying domains as suffixes (e.g. example.digicert.com) or registered country jurisdictions (e.g., digicert.de).

If an RA assists in the verification, the RA must create and maintain records sufficient to establish that it has performed its required verification tasks and communicate the completion of such performance to DigiCert.

For EV SSL Certificates, after verification is complete, DigiCert evaluates the corpus of information and decides whether or not to issue the Certificate. If some or all of the documentation used to support an application is in a language other than English, a DigiCert employee, RA, or agent skilled in the language performs the final cross-correlation and due diligence.

DigiCert develops, maintains, and implements documented procedures that identify and require additional verification activity for High Risk Certificate Requests prior to the Certificate’s approval, as reasonably necessary to ensure that such requests are properly verified under the CAB Forum Baseline Requirements. DigiCert considers a source’s availability, purpose, and reputation when determining whether a third-party source is reasonably reliable. For TLS DigiCert does not consider a database, source, or form of identification reasonably reliable if DigiCert is the sole source of the information.

#### **4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications**

DigiCert rejects any certificate application that DigiCert or an RA cannot verify. DigiCert does not issue Certificates containing a new gTLD under consideration by ICANN until the gTLD has been approved. DigiCert may also reject a certificate application if DigiCert believes that issuing the Certificate could damage or diminish DigiCert’s reputation or business. DigiCert does not issue publicly trusted TLS/SSL certificates containing unregistered TLD’s or when domain control cannot be verified.

Except for Enterprise EV Certificates, EV Certificate issuance approval requires two separate DigiCert validation specialists. The second validation specialist cannot be the same individual who collected the documentation and originally approved the EV Certificate. The second validation specialist reviews the collected information and documents any discrepancies or details that require further explanation. The second validation specialist may require additional explanations and documents prior to authorizing the

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<sup>10</sup> DigiCert will comply with the S/MIME Baseline Requirements as of September 1st, 2023.

Certificate's issuance. Enterprise RAs may perform the final cross-correlation and due diligence described herein using a single person representing the Enterprise RA. If satisfactory explanations and/or additional documents are not received within a reasonable time, DigiCert will reject the EV Certificate request and notify the Applicant accordingly.

If the certificate application is not rejected and is successfully validated in accordance with this CPS, DigiCert will approve the certificate application and issue the Certificate. DigiCert is not liable for any rejected Certificate and is not obligated to disclose the reasons for a rejection. Rejected Applicants may re-apply.

Subscribers are required to check the Certificate's contents for accuracy prior to using the certificate.

### **4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications**

Under normal circumstances, DigiCert verifies an Applicant's information and issues a digital Certificate within a reasonable time frame. Issuance time frames are greatly dependent on when the Applicant provides the details and documentation necessary to complete validation. For non-EV SSL/TLS Server Certificates, DigiCert will usually complete the validation process and issue or reject a certificate application within two working days after receiving all of the necessary details and documentation from the Applicant, although events outside of the control of DigiCert can delay the issuance process.

## **4.3. CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE**

### **4.3.1. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance**

DigiCert confirms the source of a certificate request before issuance. For TLS certificates, DigiCert does not issue end entity Certificates directly from its root Certificates. DigiCert logs those SSL/TLS Server Certificates intended to be trusted in Chrome in two or more Certificate Transparency databases. See RFC 6962.

Certificate issuance by the Root CA requires at least two individuals authorized by DigiCert (i.e. the CA system operator, system officer, or PKI administrator), one of whom deliberately commands the Root CA to perform a certificate signing operation. Databases and CA processes occurring during certificate issuance are protected from unauthorized modification.

### **4.3.2. Notifications to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate**

DigiCert may deliver Certificates in any secure manner within a reasonable time after issuance. Generally, DigiCert delivers Certificates via email to the email address designated by the Subscriber during the application process.

## **4.4. CERTIFICATE ACCEPTANCE**

### **4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance**

Subscribers are solely responsible for installing the issued Certificate on the Subscriber's computer or hardware security module. Certificates are considered accepted 30 days after the Certificate's issuance, or earlier upon use of the Certificate when evidence exists that the Subscriber used the Certificate.

### **4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA**

DigiCert publishes all CA Certificates in its repository or according to the requirements in section 1.1. DigiCert publishes end-entity Certificates by delivering them to the Subscriber.

### **4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

RAs may receive notification of a Certificate's issuance if the RA was involved in the issuance process.

## **4.5. KEY PAIR AND CERTIFICATE USAGE**

### **4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage**

The certificate shall be used lawfully in accordance with DigiCert's Subscriber Agreement, the terms of the CP and this CPS.

Subscribers are obligated to protect their Private Keys from unauthorized use or disclosure, discontinue using a Private Key after expiration or revocation of the associated Certificate, and use Certificates in accordance with their intended purpose.

#### **4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage**

Relying Parties may only use software that is compliant with X.509, IETF RFCs, and other applicable standards. DigiCert does not warrant that any third-party software will support or enforce the controls and requirements found herein.

A Relying Party should use discretion when relying on a Certificate and should consider the totality of the circumstances and risk of loss prior to relying on a Certificate. If the circumstances indicate that additional assurances are required, the Relying Party must obtain such assurances before using the Certificate. Any warranties provided by DigiCert are only valid if a Relying Party's reliance was reasonable and if the Relying Party adhered to the Relying Party Agreement set forth in the DigiCert repository.

A Relying Party should rely on a digital signature or SSL/TLS handshake only if:

1. The digital signature or SSL/TLS session was created during the operational period of a valid Certificate and can be verified by referencing a valid Certificate;
2. The Certificate is not revoked and the Relying Party checked the revocation status of the Certificate prior to the Certificate's use by referring to the relevant CRLs or OCSP responses; and
3. The Certificate is being used for its intended purpose and in accordance with this CPS.

Before relying on a time-stamp token, a Relying Party must:

1. Verify that the time-stamp token has been correctly signed and that the Private Key used to sign the time-stamp token has not been compromised prior to the time of the verification;
2. Take into account any limitations on the usage of the time-stamp token indicated by the time-stamp policy; and
3. Take into account any other precautions prescribed in this CPS or elsewhere.

## **4.6. CERTIFICATE RENEWAL**

### **4.6.1. Circumstance for Certificate Renewal**

DigiCert may renew a Certificate if:

1. The associated Public Key has not reached the end of its validity period,
2. The Subscriber and attributes are consistent, and
3. The associated Private Key remains uncompromised.

DigiCert may also renew a Certificate if a CA Certificate is re-keyed or as otherwise necessary to provide services to a customer. DigiCert may notify Subscribers prior to a Certificate's expiration date. Certificate renewal requires payment of additional fees. DigiCert may renew a certificate after expiration if the relevant industry permits such practices.

Prior to the expiration of an existing Subscriber's Certificate, it is necessary for the Subscriber to renew the expiring certificate to maintain continuity of Certificate usage.

### **4.6.2. Who May Request Renewal**

Only the certificate subject or an authorized representative of the certificate subject may request renewal of the Subscriber's Certificates. DigiCert may renew a Certificate without a corresponding request if the signing Certificate is re-keyed.

### **4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests**

Renewal application requirements and procedures are generally the same as those used during the Certificate's original issuance, but DigiCert may use previously collected information that is still considered fresh under applicable industry standards. DigiCert will refresh any information that is older

than the periods allowed under applicable standards. DigiCert may refuse to renew a Certificate if it cannot verify any rechecked information. Some device platforms, e.g. Apache, allow renewed use of the Private Key. If the Private Key and domain information have not changed, the Subscriber may renew the SSL/TLS Server Certificate using a previously issued Certificate or provided CSR.

#### **4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber**

DigiCert may deliver the Certificate in any secure fashion, typically by email or by providing the Subscriber a hypertext link to a user id/password-protected location where the subscriber may log in and download the Certificate.

#### **4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate**

Renewed Certificates are considered accepted 30 days after the Certificate's renewal, or earlier upon use of the Certificate when evidence exists that the Subscriber used the Certificate.

#### **4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA**

DigiCert publishes a renewed Certificate by delivering it to the Subscriber. All renewed CA Certificates are published in DigiCert's repository.

#### **4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

RAs may receive notification of a Certificate's renewal if the RA was involved in the issuance process.

### **4.7. CERTIFICATE RE-KEY**

Re-keying a Certificate consists of creating a new Certificate with a new Public Key and serial number while keeping the subject information the same.

#### **4.7.1. Circumstance for Certificate Re-Key**

Subscribers requesting re-key should identify and authenticate themselves as permitted by section 3.3.1.

After re-keying a Certificate, DigiCert may revoke the old Certificate but may not further re-key, renew, or modify the previous Certificate. Subscribers requesting re-key should identify and authenticate themselves as permitted by section 3.3.1.

#### **4.7.2. Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key**

DigiCert will only accept re-key requests from the subject of the Certificate, an authorized representative for an Organizational certificate, or the PKI sponsor. DigiCert may initiate a certificate re-key at the request of the certificate subject or at DigiCert's own discretion.

#### **4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests**

DigiCert will only accept re-key requests from the subject of the Certificate, an authorized representative for an Organizational certificate, or the PKI sponsor. If the Private Key and any identity and domain information in a Certificate have not changed, then DigiCert can issue a replacement Certificate using a previously issued Certificate or previously provided CSR.

DigiCert re-uses existing verification information unless re-verification and authentication is required under section 3.3.1 or if DigiCert believes that the information has become inaccurate.

#### **4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber**

DigiCert notifies the Subscriber within a reasonable time after the Certificate issues.

#### **4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Keyed Certificate**

Conduct constituting Acceptance of a re-keyed certificate is in accordance with section 4.4.1.

Issued Certificates are considered accepted 30 days after the Certificate is rekeyed, or earlier upon use of the



Certificate when evidence exists that the Subscriber used the Certificate.

#### **4.7.6. Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA**

DigiCert publishes rekeyed Certificates by delivering them to Subscribers.

#### **4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

RAs may receive notification of a Certificate's rekey if the RA was involved in the issuance process.

### **4.8. CERTIFICATE MODIFICATION**

#### **4.8.1. Circumstances for Certificate Modification**

Modifying a Certificate means creating a new Certificate for the same subject with authenticated information that differs slightly from the old Certificate (e.g., changes to email address or non-essential parts of names or attributes) provided that the modification otherwise complies with this CPS. The new Certificate may have the same or a different subject Public Key.

#### **4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification**

DigiCert modifies Certificates at the request of certain certificate subjects or in its own discretion. DigiCert does not make certificate modification services available to all Subscribers.

#### **4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests**

After receiving a request for modification, DigiCert verifies any information that will change in the modified Certificate. DigiCert will only issue the modified Certificate after completing the verification process on all modified information. DigiCert will not issue a modified Certificate that has a validity period that exceeds the applicable time limits found in section 3.3.1 or 6.3.2.

RAs are required to perform identification and authentication of all modified Subscriber information in terms of section 3.2.

#### **4.8.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber**

DigiCert notifies the Subscriber within a reasonable time after the Certificate issues.

#### **4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate**

Modified Certificates are considered accepted 30 days after the Certificate is modified, or earlier upon use of the Certificate when evidence exists that the Subscriber used the Certificate.

#### **4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA**

DigiCert publishes modified Certificates by delivering them to Subscribers.

#### **4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

RAs may receive notification of a Certificate's modification if the RA was involved in the issuance process.

### **4.9. CERTIFICATE REVOCATION AND SUSPENSION**

Revocation of a Certificate permanently ends the operational period of the Certificate prior to the Certificate reaching the end of its stated validity period. Prior to revoking a Certificate, DigiCert and Issuer CAs verify that a revocation request was initiated by Subscribers, an RA, an Issuing CA, and other entities listed in section 4.9.2 of this CPS and the CP. Other parties may submit Certificate Problem Reports to DigiCert to report reasonable cause to revoke the Certificate. Issuer CAs are required to provide evidence of the revocation authorization to DigiCert upon request.

#### **4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation**

DigiCert will revoke a Certificate within 24 hours and use the corresponding CRL Reason as per section 7.2, confirming one or more of the following occurred:

1. The Subscriber requests in writing that DigiCert revoke the Certificate but does not specify a reason

(CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL);

2. The Subscriber notifies DigiCert that the original Certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
3. DigiCert obtains evidence that the Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise (CRLReason #1, keyCompromise);
4. DigiCert is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can easily compute the Subscriber's Private Key based on the Public Key in the Certificate (such as a Debian weak key, see <https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys>) (CRLReason #1, keyCompromise);or
5. DigiCert obtains evidence that the validation of domain authorization or control for any FDQN or IP address or mailbox control for any email address in the Certificate should not be relied upon (CRLReason #4, superseded).
6. DigiCert has reasonable assurance that a codesigning certificate was used to sign suspect code.

DigiCert may revoke a certificate within 24 hours and will revoke a Certificate within 5 days after receipt and confirming that one or more of the following occurred:

1. The Certificate no longer complies with the requirements of sections 6.1.5 and 6.1.6 of the CAB forum baseline requirements or any section of the Mozilla Root Store policy (CRLReason #4, superseded);
2. DigiCert obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused and/or used outside the intended purpose as indicated by the relevant agreement (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
3. The Subscriber or the cross-certified CA breached a material obligation under the CP, this CPS, or the relevant agreement (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
4. DigiCert confirms any circumstance indicating that use of a FQDN, IP address, or email address in the Certificate is no longer legally permitted (e.g. a court or arbitrator has revoked a Domain Name registrant's right to use the Domain Name, a relevant licensing or services agreement between the Domain Name registrant and the Applicant has terminated, or the Domain Name registrant has failed to renew the Domain Name) (CRLReason #5, cessationOfOperation)
5. For code signing, the Application Software Supplier requests revocation and DigiCert does not intend to pursue an alternative course of action;
6. DigiCert confirms that a Wildcard Certificate has been used to authenticate a fraudulently misleading subordinate FQDN (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
7. DigiCert confirms a material change in the information contained in the Certificate (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
8. DigiCert confirms that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with the CAB Forum requirements or relevant browser policy (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
9. DigiCert determines or confirms that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
10. DigiCert's right to issue Certificates under the CAB Forum requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless DigiCert has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository (CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL);
11. Revocation is required by the DigiCert CP and/or this CPS for a reason that is not otherwise required to be specified by this section 4.9.1 (CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL); or
12. DigiCert confirms a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Subscriber's Private Key to compromise or if there is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed (CRLReason #1, keyCompromise).
13. The Certificate no longer complies with the requirements of Section 6.1.5 and Section 6.1.6 of the Codesigning Baseline Requirements.

For codesigning certificates, Application Software Suppliers may request the Issuer CA delays revocation where immediate revocation has a potentially large negative impact to the ecosystem.

DigiCert may revoke any Certificate in its sole discretion, including if DigiCert believes that:

1. Either the Subscriber's or DigiCert's obligations under the CP or this CPS are delayed or prevented by circumstances beyond the party's reasonable control, including computer or communication failure, and, as a result, another entity's information is materially threatened or compromised;
2. DigiCert received a lawful and binding order from a government or regulatory body to revoke the Certificate;
3. DigiCert ceased operations and did not arrange for another Certificate authority to provide revocation support for the Certificates;
4. The technical content or format of the Certificate presents an unacceptable risk to application software vendors, Relying Parties, or others;
5. The Subscriber was added as a denied party or prohibited person to a blacklist or is operating from a destination prohibited under the laws of the United States;
6. For Adobe Signing Certificates, Adobe has requested revocation; or
7. For code signing Certificates, the Certificate was used to sign, publish, or distribute malware, code that is downloaded without user consent, or other harmful content.

DigiCert always revokes a Certificate if the binding between the subject and the subject's Public Key in the certificate is no longer valid or if an associated Private Key is compromised.

DigiCert will revoke a Subordinate CA Certificate within seven (7) days after receiving and confirming one or more of the following occurred:

1. The Subordinate CA requests revocation in writing;
2. The Subordinate CA notifies DigiCert that the original Certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization;
3. DigiCert obtains evidence that the Subordinate CA's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a key compromise or no longer complies with the requirements of sections 6.1.5 and 6.1.6 of the CAB forum baseline requirements or any section of the Mozilla Root Store policy;
4. DigiCert obtains evidence that the CA Certificate was misused and/or used outside the intended purpose as indicated by the relevant agreement;
5. DigiCert confirms that the CA Certificate was not issued in accordance with or that Subordinate CA has not complied with this document or the applicable Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement;
6. DigiCert determines that any of the information appearing in the CA Certificate is inaccurate or misleading;
7. DigiCert or the Subordinate CA ceases operations for any reason and has not made arrangements for another CA to provide revocation support for the CA Certificate;
8. DigiCert's or the Subordinate CA's right to issue Certificates under the Baseline Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless DigiCert has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository;
9. Revocation is required by DigiCert's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement; or
10. The technical content or format of the CA Certificate presents an unacceptable risk to application software suppliers or Relying Parties.

DigiCert will revoke a cross-Certificate if the cross-certified entity (including DigiCert) no longer meets the stipulations of the corresponding policies, as indicated by policy OIDs listed in the policy mapping extension of the cross-Certificate.

#### **4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation**

Any appropriately authorized party, such as a recognized representative of a subscriber or cross-signed partner, may request revocation of a Certificate. DigiCert may revoke a Certificate without receiving a request and without reason. Third parties may request certificate revocation for problems related to fraud, misuse, or compromise. Certificate revocation requests must identify the entity requesting revocation and specify the reason for revocation.

DigiCert provides Anti-Malware Organizations, Subscribers, Relying Parties, Application Software

Suppliers, and other third parties with clear instructions on how they can report suspected Private Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, Certificates used to sign Suspect Code, Takeover Attacks, or other types of possible fraud, compromise, misuse, inappropriate conduct, or any other matter related to Certificates on the following website: <https://problemreport.digicert.com/> and other resources as indicated in section 1.5.2 of this CPS.

### **4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request**

DigiCert processes a revocation request as follows:

1. DigiCert logs the request or problem report and the reason for requesting revocation based on the list in section 4.9.1, including contact information of the requestor. DigiCert may also include its own reasons for revocation in the log.
2. DigiCert may request confirmation of the revocation from a known administrator, where applicable, via out-of-band communication (e.g., telephone, fax, etc.).
3. If the request is authenticated as originating from the Subscriber or an authorized party, DigiCert revokes the Certificate based on the timeframes listed in 4.9.1 as listed for the reason for revocation.
4. For requests from third parties, DigiCert personnel begin investigating the request within 24 hours after receipt and decide whether revocation is appropriate based on the following criteria:
  - a. the nature of the alleged problem,
  - b. the number of reports received about a particular Certificate or website,
  - c. the identity of the complainants (for example, complaints from a law enforcement official that a web site is engaged in illegal activities have more weight than a complaint from a consumer alleging they never received the goods they ordered), and
  - d. relevant legislation.
5. If DigiCert determines that revocation is appropriate, DigiCert personnel revoke the Certificate and update the Certificate Status.

If DigiCert deems appropriate, DigiCert may forward the revocation reports to law enforcement. DigiCert maintains a continuous 24/7 ability to internally respond to any high priority revocation requests and certificate problem reports on the following website: <https://www.digicert.com/certificate-revocation.htm> and other resources as indicated in section 1.5.2 of this CPS.

### **4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period**

Subscribers are required to request revocation within one day after detecting the loss or compromise of the Private Key. DigiCert may grant and extend revocation grace periods on a case-by-case basis. DigiCert reports the suspected compromise of its CA Private Key and requests revocation to both the policy authority and operating authority of the superior issuing CA within one hour of discovery.

### **4.9.5. Time within which CA Must Process the Revocation Request**

DigiCert will revoke a CA Certificate within one hour after receiving clear instructions from the DCPA.

Within 24 hours after receiving a Certificate problem report or a revocation request, DigiCert investigates the facts and circumstances involved with the report and will provide a preliminary report on its findings to both the Subscriber and the entity who filed the Certificate problem report.

After reviewing the facts and circumstances, DigiCert works with the Subscriber and any entity reporting the Certificate problem report or other revocation-related notice to establish whether or not the certificate will be revoked, and if so, a date which DigiCert will revoke the certificate. The period from receipt of the Certificate problem report or revocation-related notice to published revocation must not exceed the time frame set forth in section 4.9.1. The date selected by DigiCert will consider the following criteria:

1. The nature of the alleged problem (scope, context, severity, magnitude, risk of harm);
2. The consequences of revocation (direct and collateral impacts to Subscribers and Relying Parties);
3. The number of Certificate problem reports received about a particular Certificate or Subscriber;
4. The entity making the complaint (for example, a complaint from a law enforcement official that a Web site is engaged in illegal activities should carry more weight than a complaint from a consumer alleging that she didn't receive the goods she ordered); and

## 5. Relevant legislation.

Under normal operating circumstances, DigiCert will revoke Certificates as quickly as practical after validating the revocation request following the guidelines of this section and section 4.9.1.

DigiCert follows the revocation timeframes specified for malware in the Baseline Requirements for Issuance and Management of Publicly Trusted Code Signing Certificates in section 4.9.5.

### **4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties**

Prior to relying on information listed in a Certificate, a Relying Party must confirm the validity of each Certificate in the certificate path in accordance with IETF PKIX standards, including checking for certificate validity, issuer-to-subject name chaining, policy and key use constraints, and revocation status through CRLs or OCSP responders identified in each Certificate in the chain.

### **4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency**

For publicly-trusted TLS and S/MIME Subscriber certificates:

DigiCert updates and reissues CRLs at least once every seven days, and the value of the nextUpdate field is not more than ten days beyond the value of the thisUpdate field.

For publicly-trusted TLS and S/MIME Subordinate CA certificates:

DigiCert updates and reissues CRLs at least (i) once every twelve months and (ii) within 24 hours after revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate, and the value of the nextUpdate field is not more than twelve months beyond the value of the thisUpdate field.

For all other Certificates in this CPS:

DigiCert uses its offline root CAs to publish CRLs for its intermediate CAs at least every 6 months. All other CRLs are published at least every seven days.

### **4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs**

CRLs for Certificates issued to end entity subscribers are posted automatically to the online repository within a commercially reasonable time after generation. Regularly scheduled CRLs are posted prior to the nextUpdate field in the previously issued CRL of the same scope.

### **4.9.9. On-line Revocation/Status Checking Availability**

DigiCert makes certificate status information available via OCSP for SSL/TLS Certificates. OCSP may not be available for other kinds of Certificates. Where OCSP support is required by the applicable requirements, OCSP responses are provided within a commercially reasonable time.

OCSP responses conform to RFC 5019 and/or RFC 6960. OCSP responses either:

1. Are signed by the CA that issued the Certificates whose revocation status is being checked, or
2. Are signed by an OCSP Responder whose Certificate is signed by the CA that issued the Certificate whose revocation status is being checked.

In the latter case, the OCSP signing Certificate contains an extension of type id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck, as defined by RFC 6960.

### **4.9.10. On-line Revocation Checking Requirements**

A relying party must confirm the validity of a Certificate in accordance with section 4.9.6 prior to relying on the Certificate.

DigiCert supports an OCSP capability using the GET method for Certificates issued in accordance with the Baseline Requirements. OCSP Responders under DigiCert's direct control will not respond with a "good" status for a certificate that has not been issued.

For Publicly Trusted SSLSubscriber Certificates:

1. OCSF responses have a validity interval greater than or equal to eight hours;
2. OCSF responses have a validity interval less than or equal to ten days;
3. For OCSF responses with validity intervals less than sixteen hours, then DigiCert updates the information provided via an Online Certificate Status Protocol prior to one-half of the validity period before the nextUpdate; and
4. For OCSF responses with validity intervals greater than or equal to sixteen hours, then DigiCert updates the information provided via an Online Certificate Status Protocol at least eight hours prior to the nextUpdate, and no later than four days after the thisUpdate.

For Publicly Trusted SSL Subordinate CA or Intermediate CA Certificates:

DigiCert updates information provided via an Online Certificate Status Protocol:

- (i) at least every twelve months; and
- (ii) within 24 hours after revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate.

If the OCSF responder receives a request for the status of a certificate serial number that is "unused", then the responder should not respond with a "good" status. If the OCSF responder is for a CA that is not Technically Constrained in line with section 7.1.5 of the Baseline Requirements, this CPS and the CP, the responder must not respond with a "good" status for such requests. "unused" if neither of the previous conditions are met.

DigiCert may monitor the OCSF responder for requests for "unused" serial numbers as part of its security response procedures.

The OCSF responder may provide definitive responses about "reserved" certificate serial numbers, as if there was a corresponding Certificate that matches the Precertificate [RFC6962]. A certificate serial number within an OCSF request is one of the following three options:

1. "assigned" if a Certificate with that serial number has been issued by the Issuing CA, using any current or previous key associated with that CA subject; or
2. "reserved" if a Precertificate [RFC6962] with that serial number has been issued by (a) the Issuing CA; or (b) a Precertificate Signing Certificate [RFC6962] associated with the Issuing CA; or
3. "unused" if neither of the previous conditions are met.

#### **4.9.11. Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available**

Not applicable.

#### **4.9.12. Special Requirements Related to Key Compromise**

DigiCert uses commercially reasonable efforts to notify potential Relying Parties if it discovers or suspects the compromise of a Private Key. DigiCert will transition any revocation reason code in a CRL to "key compromise" upon discovery of such reason or as required by an applicable CP.

Reports to DigiCert of key compromise must include:

- Proof of key compromise in either of the following formats:
  - A CSR signed by the compromised private key with the Common Name "Proof of Key Compromise for DigiCert"; or
  - The private key itself.
- If a CSR is provided, DigiCert will only accept proof of key compromise, if one of the following algorithms are used to sign the CSR:
  - SHA256WithRSA
  - SHA384WithRSA
  - SHA512WithRSA
  - ECDSAWithSHA256
  - ECDSAWithSHA384
  - ECDSAWithSHA512
  - SHA256WithRSAPSS
  - SHA384WithRSAPSS

- SHA512WithRSAPSS
- PureEd25519
- A valid email address so that you can receive confirmation of your problem report and associated certificate revocations.

DigiCert provides specific instructions and support for Key compromise on the following website: <https://problemreport.digicert.com/> and other resources as indicated in section 1.5.2 of this CPS.

#### **4.9.13. Circumstances for Suspension**

For FPKI FBCA certificates enrolled in the EPCS program, Certificate Suspension is allowed for Certificates that are not considered to fall under the circumstances of Key Compromise as listed in section 4.9.12 or other circumstances outlined as revocation in the FBCA CP. For all other Certificate types, not applicable.

#### **4.9.14. Who Can Request Suspension**

For FPKI FBCA certificates enrolled in the EPCS program, verified and authorized third parties and subscribers are allowed to request suspension of their certificates.

For all other Certificate types, not applicable.

#### **4.9.15. Procedure for Suspension Request**

For FPKI FBCA certificates enrolled in the EPCS program, a suspension request from verified parties requires the following:

- a request to suspend a certificate must identify the certificate to be suspended
- explain the reason for suspension, and
- the request must be digitally signed or verified by DigiCert to confirm the request.

The reason code CRL entry extension must be populated with “certificateHold”.

For all other Certificate types, not applicable.

#### **4.9.16. Limits on Suspension Period**

DigiCert sets the maximum time period an EPCS certificate may be in suspension to 30 days. If the Certificate remains in suspension throughout the period, the requestor has until the 30<sup>th</sup> day to confirm unsuspension or it will be revoked. DigiCert will maintain an internal policy and procedure to manually or programmatically review the certificate suspensions in this period in order to ensure the certificates do not pass the timeframe stated.

If the subscriber has not removed the certificate from hold (suspension) within that period, the certificate will be revoked for reason of “Key Compromise”.

### **4.10. CERTIFICATE STATUS SERVICES**

#### **4.10.1. Operational Characteristics**

Certificate status information is available via CRL and OCSP responder. For publicly-trusted TLS and S/MIME certificates, revocation entries on a CRL or OCSP Response are not removed until after the expiration of the revoked Certificate. The serial number of a revoked Certificate remains on the CRL until one additional CRL is published after the end of the Certificate’s validity period, except for revoked Code Signing Certificates and EV Code Signing Certificates, which remain on the CRL for at least 10 years following the Certificate’s validity period. OCSP information for subscriber Certificates is updated at least every four days. OCSP information for subordinate CA Certificates is updated at least every 12 months and within 24 hours after revoking the Certificate.

#### **4.10.2. Service Availability**

Certificate status services are available 24x7 for publicly-trusted TLS and generally for all other

services. This includes the online repository that application software can use to automatically check the current status of all unexpired Certificates issued by DigiCert. DigiCert operates and maintains its CRL and OCSP capability with resources sufficient to provide a response time of ten seconds or less under normal operating conditions.

DigiCert also maintains a 24x7 ability to respond internally to a high-priority Certificate Problem Report, and where appropriate, forward such a complaint to law enforcement authorities, and/or revoke a Certificate that is the subject of such a complaint.

### **4.10.3. Operational Features**

OCSP Responders may not be available for all certificate types.

## **4.11. END OF SUBSCRIPTION**

A Subscriber's subscription service ends if its Certificate expires or is revoked or if the applicable Subscriber Agreement expires without renewal.

## **4.12. KEY ESCROW AND RECOVERY**

### **4.12.1. Key Escrow and Recovery Policy and Practices**

DigiCert never escrows CA Private Keys under this CPS.

DigiCert may escrow Subscriber key management keys to provide key recovery services. If done, DigiCert encrypts and protects escrowed Private Keys using the same or a higher level of security as used to generate and deliver the Private Key. Enterprise customers utilizing key escrow software provided by DigiCert may escrow keys within their or DigiCert's infrastructure. Any entity utilizing key escrow must notify the subscriber about the key escrow services.

DigiCert or Issuer CAs allow Subscribers and other authorized entities to recover escrowed (decryption) Private Keys. DigiCert and Issuer CAs use trusted personnel vetted per section 5.3 of the CP and this CPS during key recovery to prevent unauthorized access to a Subscriber's escrowed Private Keys. DigiCert accepts key recovery requests:

1. From the Subscriber or Subscriber's organization, if the Subscriber has lost or damaged the private-key token;
2. From the Subscriber's organization, if the Subscriber is not available or is no longer part of the organization that contracted with DigiCert for Private Key escrow;
3. From an authorized investigator or auditor, if the Private Key is part of a required investigation or audit;
4. From a requester authorized by a competent legal authority to access the communication that is encrypted using the key;
5. From a requester authorized by law or governmental regulation; or
6. From an entity contracting with DigiCert for escrow of the Private Key when key recovery is mission critical or mission essential.

Entities using DigiCert's key escrow services are required to:

1. Notify Subscribers that their Private Keys are escrowed;
2. Protect escrowed keys from unauthorized disclosure;
3. Protect any authentication mechanisms that could be used to recover escrowed Private Keys;
4. Release an escrowed key only after making or receiving (as applicable) a properly authorized request for recovery; and
5. Comply with any legal obligations to disclose or keep confidential escrowed keys, escrowed key-related information, or the facts concerning any key recovery request or process.

### **4.12.2. Session Key Encapsulation and Recovery Policy and Practices**

Not applicable.



## **5. FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS**

### **5.1. PHYSICAL CONTROLS**

#### **5.1.1. Site Location and Construction**

DigiCert performs its CA and TSA operations from secure data centers. The data centers are equipped with logical and physical controls that make DigiCert's CA and TSA operations inaccessible to non-trusted personnel. DigiCert operates under a security policy designed to detect, deter, and prevent unauthorized access to DigiCert's operations.

#### **5.1.2. Physical Access**

##### **5.1.2.1. Data Centers**

Systems providing online certificate issuance (e.g. Issuer CAs) are located in secure data centers. DigiCert protects such online equipment (including certificate status servers and CMS equipment) from unauthorized access and implements physical controls to reduce the risk of equipment tampering. Access to the data centers housing the CA and TSA platforms requires two-factor authentication by DigiCert staff in trusted roles to meet two-person physical access control. Activation data must either be memorized or recorded and stored in a manner commensurate with the security afforded the cryptographic module. Activation data is never stored with the cryptographic module or removable hardware associated with equipment used to administer DigiCert's Private Keys. Cryptographic hardware includes a mechanism to lock the hardware after a certain number of failed login attempts.

The DigiCert data centers are continuously attended. However, if DigiCert ever becomes aware that a data center is to be left unattended or has been left unattended for an extended period of time, DigiCert personnel will perform a security check of the data center to verify that:

1. DigiCert's equipment is in a state appropriate to the current mode of operation,
2. Any security containers are properly secured,
3. Physical security systems (e.g., door locks) are functioning properly, and
4. The area is secured against unauthorized access.

DigiCert's administrators are responsible for making these checks and must sign off that all necessary physical protection mechanisms are in place and activated. The identity of the individual making the check is logged.

##### **5.1.2.2. RA Operations Areas**

DigiCert's RA operations are protected against access from non-authorized individuals. DigiCert securely stores all removable media and paper containing sensitive plain-text information related to its CA or RA operations in secure containers.

##### **5.1.2.3. Offline CA Key Storage Rooms**

DigiCert securely stores the cryptomodules used to generate and store offline CA Private Keys. Access to the rooms used for key storage is controlled and logged. When not in use during a key ceremony, CA cryptomodules are locked in a safe that provides two-person physical access control. Activation data is protected in accordance with section 6.4. Cryptomodule activation keys are stored under dual control in a secured environment when not in use.

##### **5.1.2.4. CA Key Generation and Signing Rooms**

CA key generation and signing occurs either in the secure storage room described in section 5.1.2.3 or in a room of commensurate security in close proximity thereto. DigiCert's CA Administrators retrieve cryptographic materials necessary to perform key generation and certificate signing. At no time are cryptographic materials left unattended by fewer than two persons serving in trusted roles as specified in section 5.2.2.

### **5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning**

Data centers have primary and secondary power supplies that ensure continuous and uninterrupted access to electric power. Uninterrupted power supplies (UPS) and generators provide redundant backup power.

### **5.1.4. Water Exposures**

The cabinets housing DigiCert's CA and TSA systems are designed to prevent and protect against water exposure.

### **5.1.5. Fire Prevention and Protection**

The data centers are equipped with fire suppression mechanisms.

### **5.1.6. Media Storage**

DigiCert protects its media from accidental damage, environmental hazards, and unauthorized physical access. Backup files are created on a daily basis. DigiCert's backup files are maintained separately from DigiCert's primary data operations facility.

### **5.1.7. Waste Disposal**

All unnecessary copies of printed sensitive information are shredded on-site before disposal. All electronic media are physically destroyed or are overwritten multiple times to prevent the recovery of the data.

### **5.1.8. Off-site Backup**

DigiCert makes regular backup copies of any information necessary to recover from a system failure. Backup copies of CA Private Keys and activation data are stored for disaster recovery purposes off-site and are accessible only by trusted personnel.

### **5.1.9. Certificate Status Hosting, CMS and External RA Systems**

All physical control requirements under section 5.1 apply equally to any Certificate Status Hosting, CMS, or external RA system.

## **5.2. PROCEDURAL CONTROLS**

### **5.2.1. Trusted Roles**

Personnel acting in trusted roles include CA, TSA, and RA system administration personnel, and personnel involved with identity vetting and the issuance and revocation of Certificates. The functions and duties performed by persons in trusted roles are distributed so that one person alone cannot circumvent security measures or subvert the security and trustworthiness of the PKI or TSA operations. A list of personnel appointed to trusted roles is maintained and reviewed annually.

#### **5.2.1.1. CA Administrators**

The CA Administrator installs and configures the CA software, including key generation, key backup, and key management. The CA Administrator performs and securely stores regular system backups of the CA system. Administrators do not issue Certificates to Subscribers.

#### **5.2.1.2. Registration Officers – CMS, RA, Validation and Vetting Personnel**

The Registration Officer role is responsible for issuing and revoking Certificates.

#### **5.2.1.3. System Administrators/ System Engineers (Operator)**

The System Administrator / System Engineer installs and configures system hardware, including servers, routers, firewalls, and network configurations. The System Administrator / System Engineer also keeps critical systems updated with software patches and other maintenance needed for system stability and recoverability.

#### **5.2.1.4. Internal Auditors**

Internal Auditors are responsible for reviewing, maintaining, and archiving audit logs and performing or overseeing internal compliance audits to determine if DigiCert is operating in accordance with this CPS or an RA's Registration Practices Statement.

### **5.2.1.5. RA Administrators**

RA Administrators are responsible for the RA software.

### **5.2.1.6. Security Officers**

The Security Officer is responsible for administering and implementing security practices.

### **5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task**

DigiCert requires that at least two people acting in a trusted role take action for the most sensitive tasks, such as activating DigiCert's Private Keys, generating a CA Key Pair, or backing up a DigiCert Private Key. The Internal Auditor may serve to fulfill the requirement of multiparty control for physical access to the CA system but not logical access. Physical access to the CAs does not constitute a task as defined in this section but is defined in section 5.1.

### **5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for each Role**

All personnel are required to authenticate themselves to CA, TSA, and RA systems before they are allowed access to systems necessary to perform their trusted roles.

### **5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties**

Roles requiring a separation of duties include:

1. Those performing authorization functions such as the verification of information in certificate applications and approvals of certificate applications and revocation requests,
2. Those performing backups, recording, and record-keeping functions;
3. Those performing audit, review, oversight, or reconciliation functions; and
4. Those performing duties related to CA/TSA key management or CA/TSA administration.

To accomplish this separation of duties, DigiCert specifically designates individuals to the trusted roles defined in section 5.2.1 above. Individuals designated as Registration Officer or Administrator may perform Operator duties, but an Internal Auditor may not assume any other role. DigiCert's systems identify and authenticate individuals acting in trusted roles, restrict an individual from assuming multiple roles at the same time.

## **5.3. PERSONNEL CONTROLS**

### **5.3.1. Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements**

The DCPA is responsible and accountable for DigiCert's PKI operations and ensures compliance with this CPS and the CP. Prior to the engagement of any person in the Certificate Management Process, whether as an employee, agent, or an independent contractor, DigiCert verifies the identity and trustworthiness of such person.

Management and operational support personnel involved in time-stamp operations possess experience with information security and risk assessment and knowledge of time-stamping technology, digital signature technology, mechanisms for calibration of time stamping clocks with UTC, and security procedures. DigiCert determines that all individuals assigned to trusted roles perform their prospective job responsibilities competently and satisfactorily as required.

### **5.3.2. Background Check Procedures**

DigiCert verifies the identity of each individual appointed to a trusted role and performs a background check prior to allowing such person to act in a trusted role. DigiCert's human resources department verifies the individual's identity using government-issued photo identification (e.g., passports and/or driver's licenses reviewed pursuant to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, or comparable procedure for the jurisdiction in which the individual's identity is being verified). Background checks may include a combination of the following as required; verification of

individual identity, employment history, education, character references, social security number, previous residences, driving records, professional references, and criminal background. Checks of previous residences are over the past three years. All other checks are for the previous five years. These procedures shall be subject to any limitations on background checks imposed by local law. To the extent one of the requirements imposed by this section cannot be met due to a prohibition or limitation in local law, the investigating entity shall utilize a substitute investigative technique permitted by law that provides substantially similar information, including but not limited to obtaining a background check performed by the applicable governmental agency.

The highest education degree obtained is verified regardless of the date awarded. Based upon the information obtained during the background check, the human resources department makes an adjudication decision, with the assistance of legal counsel when necessary, as to whether the individual is suitable for the position to which they will be assigned. Background checks are refreshed and re-adjudication occurs at least every five years.

These procedures are subject to any limitations on background checks imposed by local law. To the extent one of the requirements imposed by this section cannot be met by DigiCert due to a prohibition or limitation in local law, DigiCert utilizes a substitute investigative technique permitted by law that provides substantially similar information, including but not limited to obtaining a background check performed by the applicable governmental agency.

### **5.3.3. Training Requirements**

DigiCert provides relevant skills training in DigiCert's PKI and TSA operations for the personnel performing information verification duties including:

1. basic Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) knowledge;
2. software versions used by DigiCert;
3. authentication and verification policies and procedures;
4. DigiCert security principles and mechanisms;
5. disaster recovery and business continuity procedures;
6. common threats to the validation process, including phishing and other social engineering tactics; and
7. CAB forum guidelines and other applicable industry and government guidelines.

DigiCert maintains records of who received training. Registration Officers must have the minimum skills necessary to satisfactorily perform validation duties before being granted validation privileges. All Registration Officers are required to pass an internal examination on the EV Guidelines, the Baseline Requirements and the S/MIME Baseline Requirements <sup>11</sup>prior to validating and approving the issuance of such Certificates.

### **5.3.4. Retraining Frequency and Requirements**

Employees must maintain skill levels that are consistent with DigiCert industry-relevant training and performance programs in order to continue acting in trusted roles. DigiCert makes employees acting in trusted roles aware of any changes to DigiCert's operations as necessary for them to perform their role. If DigiCert's operations change, DigiCert will provide documented training, in accordance with an executed training plan, to all employees acting in relevant trusted roles to those changes.

### **5.3.5. Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence**

Not applicable.

### **5.3.6. Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions**

DigiCert employees and agents failing to comply with this CPS, whether through negligence or malicious intent, are subject to internally maintained processes specifying guidance on administrative or disciplinary actions, up to and including termination of employment or agency and criminal sanctions.

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<sup>11</sup> DigiCert will comply with the S/MIME Baseline Requirements as of September 1st, 2023.

### **5.3.7. Independent Contractor Requirements**

Independent contractors who are assigned to perform trusted roles are subject to the duties and requirements specified for such roles in this section 5.3 and are subject to sanctions stated above in section 5.3.6.

### **5.3.8. Documentation Supplied to Personnel**

Personnel in trusted roles are provided with the documentation necessary to perform their duties.

## **5.4. AUDIT LOGGING PROCEDURES**

### **5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded**

DigiCert's systems require identification and authentication at system logon. Important system actions are logged to establish the accountability of the operators who initiate such actions.

DigiCert enables all essential event auditing capabilities of its CA and TSA applications in order to record the events listed below. If DigiCert's applications cannot automatically record an event, DigiCert implements manual procedures to satisfy the requirements.

For each event, DigiCert records the relevant (i) date and time, (ii) type of event, (iii) success or failure, and (iv) user or system that caused the event or initiated the action. DigiCert records the precise time of any significant TSA events. All event records are available to auditors as proof of DigiCert's practices. Logs are maintained to the standard per the requirements of the relevant policies and programs.

DigiCert records at least the following events:

1. CA Certificate and key lifecycle events, including:
  - a. Key generation, backup, storage, recovery, archival, and destruction
  - b. Certificate requests, renewal, and re-key requests, and revocation;
  - c. Approval and rejection of certificate requests
  - d. Cryptographic device lifecycle management events;
  - e. Generation of Certificate Revocation Lists;
  - f. Signing of OCSP responses (as described in sections 4.9 and 4.10);
  - g. Introduction of new Certificate Profiles and retirement of existing Certificate Profiles.
2. CA and Subscriber Certificate lifecycle management events, including:
  - a. Certificate requests, renewal, and re-key requests, and revocation;
  - b. All verification activities stipulated in the various CAB Forum Requirements, the DigiCert CP, and this CPS;
  - c. Approval and rejection of certificate requests;
  - d. Issuance of Certificates; and
  - e. Generation of Certificate Revocation Lists;
  - f. Signing of OCSP Responses (as described in section 4.9 and 4.10).
3. Security events, including:
  - a. Successful and unsuccessful PKI system access attempts;
  - b. PKI and security system actions performed;
  - c. Security profile changes;
  - d. Installation, update and removal of software on a Certificate System;
  - e. System crashes, hardware failures, and other anomalies;
  - f. Firewall and router activities; and
  - g. Entries to and exits from the CA facility.
4. Log entries include the following elements:
  - a. Date and time of event;

- b. Identity of the person making the journal record; and
- c. Description of the event.

#### **5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log**

As required, generally within at least once every two months, a DigiCert administrator reviews the logs generated by DigiCert's systems, makes system and file integrity checks, and conducts a vulnerability assessment. The administrator may perform the checks using automated tools. During these checks, the administrator (1) checks whether anyone has tampered with the log, (2) scans for anomalies or specific conditions, including any evidence of malicious activity, and (3) (if necessary) prepares a written summary of the review. Any anomalies or irregularities found in the logs are investigated. The summaries include recommendations to DigiCert's operations management committee and are made available to DigiCert's auditors upon request. DigiCert documents any actions taken as a result of a review.

#### **5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log**

Audit logs related to publicly trusted Certificates are retained for at least two (2) years or in accordance with section 5.5.2 and 4.10.1. DigiCert retains audit logs on-site until after they are reviewed. DigiCert makes the audit logs available to auditors, as defined in section 8, available upon request.

1. CA certificate and key lifecycle management event records (as set forth in section 5.4.1 (1)) of the CAB Forum Baseline Requirements after the later occurrence of:
  - the destruction of the CA Private Key; or
  - the revocation or expiration of the final CA Certificate in that set of Certificates that have an X.509v3 basicConstraints extension with the cA field set to true and which share a common Public Key corresponding to the CA Private Key;

2. Subscriber Certificate lifecycle management event records (as set forth in section 5.4.1 (2)) of the CAB Forum Baseline Requirements after the revocation or expiration of the Subscriber Certificate;

3. Any security event records (as set forth in section 5.4.1 (3)) of the CAB Forum Baseline Requirements after the event occurred.

#### **5.4.4 Protection of Audit Log**

CA audit log information is retained on equipment until after it is copied by a system administrator. DigiCert's CA and TSA systems are configured to ensure that (i) only authorized people have read access to logs, (ii) only authorized people may archive audit logs, and (iii) audit logs are not modified. Audit logs are protected from destruction prior to the end of the audit log retention period and are retained securely on-site until transferred to a backup site. DigiCert's off-site storage location is a safe and secure location.

DigiCert makes time-stamping records available when required to prove in a legal proceeding that DigiCert's time-stamping services are operating correctly. Audit logs are made available to auditors upon request.

#### **5.4.5 Audit Log Backup Procedures**

DigiCert makes regular backup copies of audit logs and audit log summaries and saves a copy of the audit log to a secure, off-site location on at least a monthly basis.

Where required, DigiCert creates incremental backups of audit logs daily and full backups weekly.

#### **5.4.6 Audit Collection System (Internal vs. External)**

Automatic audit processes begin on system startup and end at system shutdown. If an automated audit system fails and the integrity of the system or confidentiality of the information protected by the system is at risk, DigiCert's Administrators and the DCPA shall be notified and the DCPA will consider suspending the CA's or RA's operations until the problem is remedied.

#### **5.4.7 Notification to Event-Causing Subject**

No stipulation.

#### **5.4.8 Vulnerability Assessments**

To meet requirements of the CAB Forum baseline requirements section 5. DigiCert performs, at the minimum, an annual risk assessment that identifies and assesses reasonably foreseeable internal and external threats that could result in unauthorized access, disclosure, misuse, alteration, or destruction of any certificate data or certificate issuance process. These assessments include external and internal pen testing activities as well as vulnerability scanning done per the requirements in section 1.1, contractual requirements, and audit requirements.

DigiCert also routinely Assesses the sufficiency of the policies, procedures, information systems, technology, and other arrangements that DigiCert has in place to counter such threats.

DigiCert's Internal Auditors review the security audit data checks for continuity. DigiCert's audit log monitoring tools alert the appropriate personnel of any events, such as repeated failed actions, requests for privileged information, attempted access of system files, and unauthenticated responses.

### **5.5 RECORDS ARCHIVAL**

DigiCert complies with all record retention policies that apply by law and retrieved as necessary by request of authorized parties. DigiCert includes sufficient detail in all archived records to show that a Certificate or time-stamp token was issued in accordance with this CPS.

#### **5.5.1 Types of Records Archived**

DigiCert archives records related to the security of their Certificate Systems, Certificate Management Systems, Root CA Systems, and Delegated Third Party Systems, including event records and documentation related to their verification, issuance, and revocation of certificate requests and Certificates.

DigiCert archives records relating to:

1. CA certificate and key lifecycle management event records (as set forth in section 5.4.1)
2. Subscriber Certificate lifecycle management event records (as set forth in section; and
3. Security event records (as set forth in section 5.4.1)

DigiCert retains the following information in its archives (as such information pertains to DigiCert's CA / TSA operations):

1. Accreditations of DigiCert,
2. CP and CPS versions,
3. Contractual obligations and other agreements concerning the operation of the CA /TSA,
4. System and equipment configurations, modifications, and updates,
5. Rejection or acceptance of a certificate request,
6. Certificate issuance, rekey, renewal, and revocation requests,
7. Sufficient identity authentication data to satisfy the identification requirements of section 3.2, including information about telephone calls made for verification purposes,
8. Any documentation related to the receipt or acceptance of a Certificate or token,
9. Subscriber Agreements,
10. Issued Certificates,
11. A record of certificate re-keys,
12. Data or applications necessary to verify an archive's contents,
13. Compliance auditor reports,
14. Changes to DigiCert's audit parameters,
15. Any attempt to delete or modify audit logs,
16. CA Key generation and destruction,
17. Access to Private Keys for key recovery purposes,
18. Changes to trusted Public Keys,
19. Export of Private Keys,

20. Approval or rejection of a revocation request,
21. Appointment of an individual to a trusted role,
22. Destruction of a cryptographic module,
23. Certificate compromise notifications,
24. Remedial action taken as a result of violations of physical security, and
25. Violations of the CP or CPS.

### **5.5.2 Retention Period for Archive**

For publicly trusted certificates, DigiCert retains, for at least two (2) years:

1. CA certificate and key lifecycle management event records (as set forth in section 5.4.1) ; after the later occurrence of:
  1. the destruction of the CA Private Key; or
  2. the revocation or expiration of the final CA Certificate in that set of Certificates that have an X.509v3 `basicConstraints` extension with the `cA` field set to true and which share a common Public Key corresponding to the CA Private Key;
2. Subscriber Certificate lifecycle management event records (as set forth in section 5.4.1 after the expiration of the Subscriber Certificate;
3. All security event records (as set forth in [section 5.4.1 after the event occurred;
4. All archived records and documentation related to the security of Certificate Systems, Certificate Management Systems, Root CA Systems and Delegated Third Party Systems (as set forth in section 5.5.1); and
5. All archived records and documentation relating to the verification, issuance, and revocation of certificate requests and Certificates after the later occurrence of:
  1. such records and documentation were last relied upon in the verification, issuance, or revocation of certificate requests and Certificates; or
  2. the expiration of the Subscriber Certificates relying upon such records and documentation.

DigiCert, or the RA supporting issuance, archives data for other certificate types for at least 2 years or according to their respective requirements and as contractually agreed upon.

### **5.5.3 Protection of Archive**

Archive records are stored at a secure location and are maintained in a manner that prevents unauthorized modification, substitution, or destruction. Archives are not released except as allowed by the DCPA or as required by law. DigiCert maintains any software application required to process the archive data until the data is either destroyed or transferred to a newer medium.

If DigiCert needs to transfer any media to a different archive site or equipment, DigiCert will maintain both archived locations and/or pieces of equipment until the transfer are complete. All transfers to new archives will occur in a secure manner.

### **5.5.4 Archive Backup Procedures**

On at least an annual basis, DigiCert creates an archive of the data listed in section 5.5.1. Each archive is stored separately and available for integrity verification at a later date. DigiCert stores the archive in a secure location for the duration of the set retention period.

### **5.5.5 Requirements for Time-Stamping of Records**

DigiCert automatically time-stamps archived records with system time (non-cryptographic method) as they are created. DigiCert synchronizes its system time at least every eight hours using a real time value distributed by a recognized UTC(k) laboratory or National Measurement Institute.



## **5.5.6 Archive Collection System (Internal or External)**

Archive information is collected internally by DigiCert.

## **5.5.7 Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information**

Details concerning the creation and storage of archive information are found in section 5.5.4. After receiving a request made for a proper purpose by a Customer, its agent, or a party involved in a dispute over a transaction involving the DigiCert PKI, DigiCert may elect to retrieve the information from archival. The integrity of archive information is verified by comparing a hash of the archive disk with the hash originally stored for that disk, as described in section 5.5.4. DigiCert may elect to transmit the relevant information via a secure electronic method or courier, or it may also refuse to provide the information in its discretion and may require prior payment of all costs associated with the data.

## **5.6 KEY CHANGEOVER**

Key changeover procedures enable the smooth transition from expiring CA Certificates to new CA Certificates. Towards the end of a CA Private Key's lifetime, DigiCert ceases using the expiring CA Private Key to sign Certificates and uses the old Private Key only to sign CRLs and OCSP responder Certificates. A new CA signing Key Pair is commissioned and all subsequently issued Certificates and CRLs are signed with the new private signing key. Both the old and the new Key Pairs may be concurrently active. This key changeover process helps minimize any adverse effects from CA certificate expiration. The corresponding new CA Public Key Certificate is provided to subscribers and relying parties through the delivery methods detailed in section 6.1.4. Where DigiCert has cross-certified another CA that is in the process of a key rollover, DigiCert obtains a new CA Public Key (PKCS#10) or new CA Certificate from the other CA and distributes a new CA cross Certificate following the procedures described above.

## **5.7 COMPROMISE AND DISASTER RECOVERY**

### **5.7.1 Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures**

DigiCert maintains internal procedures to guide personnel in response to security incidents, natural disasters, and similar events that may give rise to system compromise. These include, but are not limited to the following internally maintained documents:

- Incident Response Plan,
- Disaster Recovery Plan,
- Business Continuity Plan (DR/BCP); and
- Other internal documented process and procedure resources

DigiCert specifies in these internal procedures how it will notify and reasonably protect Application Software Suppliers, Subscribers, and Relying Parties in the event of a disaster, security compromise, or business failure.

DigiCert reviews, tests, and updates its incident response plans and procedures on at least an annual basis.

### **5.7.2 Computing Resources, Software, and/or Data Are Corrupted**

DigiCert makes regular system backups weekly basis and maintains backup copies of its CA Private Keys, which are stored in a secure, separate location. If DigiCert discovers that any of its computing resources, software, or data operations have been compromised, DigiCert assesses the threats and risks that the compromise presents to the integrity or security of its operations or those of affected parties. If DigiCert determines that a continued operation could pose a significant risk to Relying Parties or Subscribers, DigiCert suspends such operation until it determines that the risk is mitigated.

### **5.7.3 Entity Private Key Compromise Procedures**

If DigiCert suspects that one of its CA Private Keys has been compromised or lost then an emergency response team will convene and assess the situation to determine the degree and scope of the incident and take appropriate action. Specifically, DigiCert will meet the requirements of 1.1 , but those steps generally include the following:

1. Collect information related to the incident;
2. Begin investigating the incident and determine the degree and scope of the compromise;

3. Have its incident response team determine and report on the course of action or strategy that should be taken to correct the problem and prevent reoccurrence;
4. If appropriate, contact government agencies, law enforcement, and other interested parties and activate any other appropriate additional security measures;
5. Notify any cross-certified entities of the compromise so that they can revoke their cross-Certificates;
6. Incorporate lessons learned into the implementation of long term solutions and the Incident Response Plan.

DigiCert may generate a new Key Pair and sign a new Certificate. If a disaster physically damages DigiCert's equipment and destroys all copies of DigiCert's signature keys then DigiCert will provide notice to affected parties at the earliest feasible time.

#### **5.7.4 Business Continuity Capabilities after a Disaster**

To maintain the integrity of its services, DigiCert implements data backup and recovery procedures as part of its Business Continuity Management Plan (BCMP). Stated goals of the BCMP are to ensure that certificate status services be only minimally affected by any disaster involving DigiCert's primary facility and that DigiCert be capable of maintaining other services or resuming them as quickly as possible following a disaster. DigiCert reviews, tests, and updates the BCMP and supporting procedures at least annually.

DigiCert's systems are redundantly configured at its primary facility and are mirrored at a separate, geographically diverse location for failover in the event of a disaster. If a disaster causes DigiCert's primary CA or TSA operations to become inoperative, DigiCert will re-initiate its operations at its secondary location giving priority to the provision of certificate status information and time stamping capabilities, if affected.

#### **5.8 CA OR RA TERMINATION**

Unless otherwise addressed in an applicable agreement between DigiCert and a counterparty, before terminating its CA or TSA activities, DigiCert may:

1. Provide notice and information about the termination by sending notice by email to its customers, Application Software Vendors, and cross-certifying entities and by posting such information on DigiCert's web site; and
2. Transfer all responsibilities to a qualified successor entity.

Unless otherwise addressed in an applicable agreement between DigiCert and a counterparty, if a qualified successor entity does not exist, DigiCert may:

1. transfer those functions capable of being transferred to a reliable third party and arrange to preserve all relevant records with a reliable third party or a government, regulatory, or legal body with appropriate authority;
2. revoke all Certificates that are still un-revoked or un-expired on a date as specified in the notice and publish final CRLs;
3. destroy all Private Keys; and
4. make other necessary arrangements that are in accordance with this CPS.

DigiCert has made arrangements to cover the costs associated with fulfilling these requirements in case DigiCert becomes bankrupt or is unable to cover the costs. Any requirements of this section that are varied by contract apply only the contracting parties.

## **6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS**

### **6.1. KEY PAIR GENERATION AND INSTALLATION**

#### **6.1.1. Key Pair Generation**

All keys must be generated using a FIPS-approved method or equivalent international standard.

DigiCert's CA Key Pairs are generated by multiple trusted individuals acting in trusted roles and using a cryptographic hardware device as part of scripted key generation ceremony in the environments described in section 5.1 and logged in accordance with section 5.4. The cryptographic hardware is evaluated to FIPS 140-2 Level 3 or higher. Activation of the hardware requires the use of two-factor authentication tokens.

DigiCert creates auditable evidence during the key generation process to prove that the CPS was followed and role separation was enforced during the key generation process. DigiCert requires that an external auditor witness the generation of or review a recording of any CA keys to be used as publicly trusted root Certificates or to sign EV Certificates. For other CA key pair generation ceremonies, an Internal Auditor, external auditor, or independent third party attends the ceremony, or an external auditor examines the signed and documented record of the key generation ceremony, as allowed by applicable policy.

Subscribers must generate their keys in a manner that is appropriate for the certificate type. DigiCert never creates key pairs for publicly trusted SSL/TLS Server Certificates and will not accept a certificate request using a Key Pair previously generated by DigiCert. Certificates issued at Level 3 Hardware or at Level 4 Biometric must be generated on validated hardware cryptographic modules using a FIPS-approved method.

For publicly-trusted TLS and S/MIME Certificates, DigiCert rejects a certificate request if the requested Public Key does not meet the requirements set forth in sections 6.1.5 and 6.1.6 of CAB Forum Baseline Requirements, DigiCert has been made aware that the Applicant's Private Key has suffered a Key Compromise, such as through the provisions of section 4.9.1.1 of the CAB Forum Baseline Requirements, if it has a known weak Private Key that is easily computed (such as a Debian weak key, see <http://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys>) or there is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed.

DigiCert will not generate the key pair on behalf of the Subscriber if the Subscriber Certificate request has an extendedKeyUsage extension containing either the values id-kp-serverAuth [RFC5280] or anyExtendedKeyUsage [RFC5280].

For Adobe Signing Certificates, Subscribers must generate their Key Pairs in a medium that prevents exportation or duplication and that meets or exceeds FIPS 140-2 Level 3 certification standards.

#### **6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber**

If DigiCert, a CMS, or an RA generates a key for a Subscriber, then it must deliver the Private Key securely to the Subscriber. Keys may be delivered electronically (such as through secure email or stored in a cloud-based system) or on a hardware cryptographic module. In all cases:

1. Except where escrow/backup services are authorized and permitted, the key generator must not retain access to the Subscriber's Private Key after delivery,
2. The key generator must protect the Private Key from activation, compromise, or modification during the delivery process,
3. The Subscriber must acknowledge receipt of the Private Key(s), typically by having the Subscriber use the related Certificate, and

The key generator delivers the Private Key in a way that ensures that the correct tokens and activation data are provided to the correct Subscribers securely.

If DigiCert or an Enterprise RA becomes aware that a Subscriber's Private Key has been communicated to a person or organization not authorized by the Subscriber, then DigiCert will revoke all certificates associated with that Private Key.

### **6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer**

Not Applicable.

### **6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties**

DigiCert's Public Keys are provided to Relying Parties as specified in a certificate validation or path discovery policy file, as trust anchors in commercial browsers and operating system root store, and/or as roots signed by other CAs. All accreditation authorities supporting DigiCert Certificates and all application software providers are permitted to redistribute DigiCert's root anchors.

DigiCert may also distribute Public Keys that are part of an updated signature Key Pair as a self-signed Certificate, as a new CA Certificate, or in a key roll-over Certificate. Relying Parties may obtain DigiCert's self-signed CA Certificates from DigiCert's web site or by email.

### **6.1.5. Key Sizes**

DigiCert generally follows the NIST timelines in using and retiring signature algorithms and key sizes.

DigiCert generates and uses at least the following minimum key sizes, signature algorithms, and hash algorithms for signing Certificates, CRLs, and certificate status server responses for policy OID arcs of 2.16.840.1.114412.1, 2.16.840.1.114412.2, and under specific circumstances the legacy arcs described in the OID repository.

- 2048-bit or greater RSA Key (with a modulus size in bits divisible by 8);
- 256-bit ECDSA Key or greater with the matching Secure Hash Algorithm as required and a valid point on the elliptic curve; or
- a hash algorithm that is equally or more resistant to a collision attack allowed by the references in sections 1.1 and 1.6.3.

Signatures on CRLs, OCSP responses, and OCSP responder Certificates that provide status information for Certificates that were generated using SHA-1 may continue to be generated using the SHA-1 algorithm if it is compliant with all applicable programs listed in section 1.1.

All other signatures on CRLs, OCSP responses, and OCSP responder Certificates must use the SHA-256 hash algorithm or one that is equally or more resistant to collision attack.

DigiCert requires end-entity Certificates to contain a key size that is at least 2048 bits for RSA, DSA, or Diffie-Hellman and 224 bits for elliptic curve algorithms.

DigiCert may require higher bit keys in its sole discretion if it is compliant with references in section 1.1 and 1.6.3.

Any Root Certificates participating in the AATL program issued after July 1, 2017 must be at least 3072-bit for RSA and 384-bit for ECDSA.

DigiCert and Subscribers may fulfill the transmission security requirements under the CP and this CPS using TLS or another protocol that provides similar security, provided the protocol requires at least AES 128 bits or equivalent for the symmetric key and at least 2048-bit RSA or equivalent for the asymmetric keys.

### **6.1.6. Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking**

DigiCert uses a cryptomodule that conforms to current FIPS 186 requirements and provides random value generation and on-board generation of Public Keys and a wide range of ECC curves.

### 6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key Usage Field)

DigiCert's Certificates include key usage extension fields that specify the intended use of the Certificate and technically limit the Certificate's functionality in X.509v3-compliant software.

The use of a specific key is determined by the key usage extension in the X.509 Certificate.

Private Keys corresponding to Root CA Certificates are not used to sign Certificates except in the following cases:

1. Self-signed Certificates to represent the Root CA itself;
2. Certificates for Subordinate CAs and Cross Certificates;
3. Certificates for infrastructure purposes (e.g. administrative role certificates, internal CA operational device certificates; and
4. Certificates for OCSP Response verification

Subscriber Certificates assert key usages based on the intended application of the Key Pair and cannot include anyExtendedKeyUsage.

Key usage bits and extended key usages are specified in the certificate profile for each type of Certificate. DigiCert's CA Certificates have at least two key usage bits set: keyCertSign and cRLSign, and for signing OCSP responses, the digitalSignature bit is also set.

Except for legacy applications using Level 1-3 and requiring a single key for dual use with both encryption and signature, DigiCert does not issue Certificates with key usage for both signing and encryption. Instead, DigiCert issues Subscribers two Key Pairs—one for key management and one for digital signature and authentication. For Certificates at Levels 1, 2 and 3 that are used for signing and encryption in support of legacy applications, they must:

1. be generated and managed in accordance with their respective signature certificate requirements, except where otherwise noted in this CPS,
2. never assert the non-repudiation key usage bit, and
3. not be used for authenticating data that will be verified on the basis of the dual-use Certificate at a future time.

No Level 4 Certificates may have such dual-use Key Pairs.

## 6.2. PRIVATE KEY PROTECTION AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE ENGINEERING CONTROLS

### 6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls

DigiCert's cryptographic modules for all of its CA and OCSP responder Key Pairs are validated to the FIPS 140-2 Level 3. IGTF Certificate Subscribers must protect their Private Keys in accordance with the applicable Guidelines on Private Key Protection, including the use of strong pass phrases to protect Private Keys.

Cryptographic module requirements for subscribers and registration authorities are shown in the table below.

Assurance Level	Subscriber	Registration Authority
EV Code Signing	FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+ (Hardware)	FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+ (Hardware)
OV Code Signing	FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+ (Hardware)	FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+ (Hardware)

<b>Adobe Signing</b>	FIPS 140-2 Level 2 (Hardware)	FIPS 140-2 Level 2 (Hardware)
<b>Rudimentary</b>	N/A	FIPS 140-2 Level 1 (Hardware or Software)
<b>Level 1 - Rudimentary</b>	N/A	FIPS 140-2 Level 1 (Hardware or Software)
<b>Level 2 - Basic</b>	FIPS 140-2 Level 1 (Hardware or Software)	FIPS 140-2 Level 1 (Hardware or Software)
<b>Level 3 - Medium</b>	FIPS 140-2 Level 1 (Software) FIPS 140-2 Level 2 (Hardware)	FIPS 140-2 Level 2 (Hardware)
<b>Medium</b>	FIPS 140-2 Level 1 (Software) FIPS 140 Level 2 (Hardware)	FIPS 140-2 Level 2 (Hardware)
<b>Medium Hardware, Biometric /Hardware Authentication</b>	FIPS 140-2 Level 2 (Hardware)	FIPS 140-2 Level 2 (Hardware)

Before June 1<sup>st</sup>, 2023: DigiCert ensures that the Private Key of an EV Code Signing Certificate is properly generated, used, and stored in a cryptomodule that meets or exceeds the requirements of FIPS 140-2 level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+ by:

- shipping conforming cryptomodules with preinstalled Key Pairs,
- communicating via PKCS#11 crypto APIs of cryptomodules that DigiCert has verified meet or exceed requirements, or
- obtaining a suitable IT audit from the Subscriber that indicates compliance with FIPS 140-2 level 2, Common Criteria EAL 4+, or the equivalent.

For Non-EV Code Signing Certificates issued prior to June 1, 2023, the subscriber **MUST** use one of the following options to generate and protect their Code Signing Certificate Private Keys:

1. A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) that generates and secures a Key Pair and that can document the Subscriber's Private Key protection through a TPM key attestation.
2. A suitable Hardware Crypto Module with a unit design form factor certified as conforming to at least FIPS 140-2 Level 2, Common Criteria EAL 4+, or equivalent.
3. Another type of hardware storage token with a unit design form factor of SD Card or USB token (not necessarily certified as conformant with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+). The Subscriber **MUST** also warrant that it will keep the token physically separate from the device that hosts the code signing function until a signing session is begun.

DigiCert recommends subscribers use method 2 as soon as possible to ensure compliance with requirements in effect from June 1<sup>st</sup>, 2023.

Effective June 1<sup>st</sup>, 2023: DigiCert ensures that the Private Key of an OV or EV Code Signing Certificate is

properly generated, used, and stored in a cryptomodule that meets or exceeds the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+ by:

- Subscriber uses a Hardware Crypto Module meeting the specified requirements in this section; or
- Subscriber uses a cloud-base key generation and protection solution with the following requirements:
  - Key creation, storage, and usage of Private Key must remain within the security boundaries of the cloud solution's Hardware Crypto Module that conforms to the specified requirements in this section;
  - Subscription at the level that manages the Private Key must be configured to log all access, operations, and configuration changes on the resources securing the Private Key.
  - Subscriber uses DigiCert's Signing Service.

### **6.2.2. Private Key (n out of m) Multi-Person Control**

DigiCert's authentication mechanisms are protected securely when not in use and may only be accessed by actions of multiple trusted persons.

Backups of CA Private Keys are securely stored off-site and require two-person access. Re-activation of a backed-up CA Private Key (unwrapping) requires the same security and multi-person control as when performing other sensitive CA Private Key operations.

### **6.2.3. Private Key Escrow**

DigiCert does not escrow its CA signature keys. DigiCert may provide escrow services in order to provide key recovery as described in section 4.12.1.

### **6.2.4. Private Key Backup**

DigiCert's CA Private Keys are generated and operated inside DigiCert's cryptographic module, which has been evaluated to at least FIPS 140-2 Level 3. When keys are transferred to other media for backup and disaster recovery purposes, the keys are transferred and stored in an encrypted form. DigiCert's CA Key Pairs are backed up by multiple trusted individuals using a cryptographic hardware device as part of scripted and video-recorded key backup process as described in section 5.2.

DigiCert may provide backup services for Private Keys that are not required to be kept on a hardware device. Access to back up Certificates is protected in a manner that only the Subscriber can control the Private Key. Backed up keys are never stored in a plain text form outside of the cryptographic module.

### **6.2.5. Private Key Archival**

DigiCert does not archive CA Private Keys.

### **6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module**

All keys must be generated by and in a cryptographic module. Private Keys are exported from the cryptographic module into backup tokens only for HSM transfer, offline storage, and backup purposes. The Private Keys are encrypted when transferred out of the module and never exist in plaintext form. When transported between cryptographic modules, DigiCert encrypts the Private Key and protects the keys used for encryption from disclosure. Private Keys used to encrypt backups are securely stored and require two-person access. If DigiCert becomes aware that a Subordinate CA's Private Key has been communicated to an unauthorized person or an organization not affiliated with the Subordinate CA, then DigiCert will revoke all certificates that include the Public Key corresponding to the communicated Private Key.

If DigiCert pre-generates private keys and transfers them into a hardware token, for example transferring generated end-user Subscriber private keys into a smart card, it will securely transfer such private keys into the token to the extent necessary to prevent loss, theft, modification, unauthorized disclosure, or unauthorized use of such private keys.

### **6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module**

DigiCert's Private Keys are generated and stored inside DigiCert's cryptographic module, which has been evaluated to at least FIPS 140-2 Level 3, which includes requirements to protect the Private Key and other

assets against known threats as described in section 5. Root Private Keys are stored offline in cryptographic modules or backup tokens as described above in sections 6.2.2, 6.2.4, and 6.2.6.

### **6.2.8. Method of Activating Private Keys**

DigiCert's Private Keys are activated according to the specifications of the cryptographic module manufacturer. Activation data entry is protected from disclosure.

Subscribers are solely responsible for protecting their Private Keys in a manner commensurate with the Certificate type. Subscribers should use a strong password or equivalent authentication method to prevent unauthorized access or use of the Subscriber's Private Key. Subscribers should also take commercially reasonable measures for the physical protection of their workstation to prevent use of the workstation and its associated private key without the Subscriber's authorization. When deactivated, private keys shall be kept in encrypted form only and secured. At a minimum, Subscribers are required to authenticate themselves to the cryptographic module before activating their Private Keys. *See also* section 6.4.

### **6.2.9. Method of Deactivating Private Keys**

DigiCert's Private Keys are deactivated via logout procedures on the applicable HSM device when not in use. DigiCert never leaves its HSM devices in an active unlocked or unattended state.

Subscribers should deactivate their Private Keys via logout and removal procedures when not in use.

### **6.2.10. Method of Destroying Private Keys**

DigiCert personnel, acting in trusted roles, destroy CA, RA, and status server Private Keys when no longer needed. Subscribers shall destroy their Private Keys when the corresponding Certificate is revoked or expired or if the Private Key is no longer needed.

DigiCert may destroy a Private Key by deleting it from all known storage partitions. DigiCert also zeroizes the HSM device and associated backup tokens according to the specifications of the hardware manufacturer. This reinitializes the device and overwrites the data with binary zeros. If the zeroization or re-initialization procedure fails, DigiCert will crush, shred, and/or incinerate the device in a manner that destroys the ability to extract any Private Key.

### **6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating**

See section 6.2.1.

## **6.3. OTHER ASPECTS OF KEY PAIR MANAGEMENT**

### **6.3.1. Public Key Archival**

DigiCert archives copies of Public Keys in accordance with section 5.5.

### **6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods**

DigiCert Certificates have maximum validity periods of:

Type	Private Key Use <sup>12</sup>	Certificate Term
Publicly Trusted Root CAs	No stipulation	25 years
Root CAs Not Otherwise Restricted	No stipulation	100 years
Publicly Trusted Sub CAs / Issuer CAs	No stipulation	15 years
IGTF Cross-certified Sub CA <sup>13</sup>	6 years	15 years
CRL and OCSP responder signing	3 years	No Stipulation <sup>14</sup>
DV SSL/TLS Server	No stipulation	398 days
OV SSL/TLS Server	No stipulation	398 days

<sup>12</sup> CA Private Keys may continue to be used to sign CRLs and OCSP responses.

<sup>13</sup> IGTF signing Certificates must have a lifetime that is at least twice the maximum lifetime of an end entity Certificate.

<sup>14</sup> Restrictions will be based on program requirements as listed in section 1.1 of this CPS.



EV SSL/TLS Server	No stipulation	398 days
S/MIME	No stipulation	1185 days
Time Stamping Authority	15 months	135 months
Object Signing Certificate and Document Signing	No stipulation	123 months
Code Signing Certificate or EV Code Signing Certificate issued to Subscriber under the Minimum Requirements for Code Signing Certificates	No stipulation	39 months
EV Code Signing Certificate issued to Signing Authority	123 months	123 months
Adobe Signing Certificate	39 months	5 years
IGTF End Entity Client used for signatures	36 months	36 months
IGTF Client used for key management.	36 months	36 months
End Entity Client for all other purposes (FBCA or IGTF compliant)	36 months	36 months
End Entity / Client for all other purposes (non-IGTF certs)	No Stipulation	123 months
IGTF on hardware	60 months	13 months

Relying parties may still validate signatures generated with these keys after expiration of the Certificate.

For the purpose of calculations, a day is measured as 86,400 seconds. Any amount of time greater than this, including fractional seconds and/or leap seconds, represents an additional day. For purposes of calculating time periods in this document, increments are rounded down subject to the imposed maximum requirements listed in section 1.1 as applicable.

DigiCert may voluntarily retire its CA Private Keys before the periods listed above to accommodate key changeover processes. DigiCert does not issue Subscriber Certificates with an expiration date that exceeds the Issuer CA's public key term stated in the table above or that exceeds the routine re-key identification requirements specified in section 3.1.1.

## **6.4. ACTIVATION DATA**

### **6.4.1. Activation Data Generation and Installation**

DigiCert activates the cryptographic module containing its CA Private Keys according to the specifications of the hardware manufacturer. For roots and public issuing CAs, this method has been evaluated as meeting the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 3. The cryptographic hardware is held under two-person control as explained in section 5.2.2 and elsewhere in this CPS. DigiCert will only transmit activation data via an appropriately protected channel and at a time and place that is distinct from the delivery of the associated cryptographic module.

All DigiCert personnel and Subscribers are instructed to use strong passwords and to protect PINs and passwords that meet the requirements specified by the CAB forum network security requirements and other relevant requirements to meet best practices. If DigiCert uses passwords as activation data for a signing key, DigiCert will change the activation data change upon rekey of the CA Certificate.

### **6.4.2. Activation Data Protection**

DigiCert protects data used to unlock Private Keys from disclosure using a combination of cryptographic and physical access control mechanisms. Protection mechanisms include keeping activation mechanisms secure using role-based physical control. All DigiCert personnel are instructed to memorize and not to write down their password or share it with another individual. DigiCert locks accounts used to access secure CA processes if a certain number of failed password attempts occur as specified in the internal security policies, procedures, and relevant requirements in references listed in section 1.6.3.

End-user Subscribers shall protect the activation data for their private keys, if any, to the extent necessary to prevent the loss, theft, modification, unauthorized disclosure, or unauthorized use of such private keys.

### **6.4.3. Other Aspects of Activation Data**

Not applicable.

## **6.5. COMPUTER SECURITY CONTROLS**

### **6.5.1. Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements**

DigiCert secures its CA systems and authenticates and protects communications between its systems and trusted roles. DigiCert's CA servers and support-and-vetting workstations run on trustworthy systems that are configured and hardened using industry best practices. All CA systems are scanned for malicious code and protected against spyware and viruses. Inactivity log out timeframes are set and enforced through internal information security policies and procedures to ensure security.

RAs must ensure that the systems maintaining RA software and data files are trustworthy systems secure from unauthorized access, which can be demonstrated by compliance with audit criteria applicable under section 5.4.1.

RAs must logically separate access to these systems and this information from other components. This separation prevents access except through defined processes. RAs must use firewalls to protect the network from internal and external intrusion and limit the nature and source of activities that may access such systems and information. RAs must require the use of passwords with a minimum character length and a combination of alphanumeric and special characters.

DigiCert's CA systems are configured to:

1. authenticate the identity of users before permitting access to the system or applications;
2. manage the privileges of users and limit users to their assigned roles;
3. generate and archive audit records for all transactions;
4. enforce domain integrity boundaries for security critical processes; and
5. support recovery from key or system failure.

All Certificate Status Servers:

1. authenticate the identity of users before permitting access to the system or applications,
2. manage privileges to limit users to their assigned roles,
3. enforce domain integrity boundaries for security critical processes, and
4. support recovery from key or system failure.

DigiCert enforces multi-factor authentication on any account capable of directly causing Certificate issuance.

### **6.5.2. Computer Security Rating**

No stipulation.

## **6.6. LIFE CYCLE TECHNICAL CONTROLS**

### **6.6.1. System Development Controls**

DigiCert has mechanisms in place to control and monitor the acquisition and development of its CA systems. Change requests require the approval of at least one administrator who is different from the person submitting the request. DigiCert only installs software on CA systems if the software is part of the CA's operation. CA hardware and software are dedicated to performing operations of the CA.

Vendors are selected based on their reputation in the market, ability to deliver quality product, and likelihood of remaining viable in the future. Management is involved in the vendor selection and purchase decision process. Non-PKI hardware and software is purchased without identifying the purpose for which the component will be used. All hardware and software are shipped under standard conditions to ensure delivery of the component directly to a trusted employee who ensures that the equipment is installed without opportunity for tampering.

Some of the PKI software components used by DigiCert are developed in-house or by consultants using standard software development methodologies. All such software is designed and developed in a controlled environment and subjected to quality assurance review. Other software is purchased commercial off-the-shelf (COTS). Quality assurance is maintained throughout the process through testing and documentation or by purchasing from trusted vendors as discussed above.

Updates of equipment and software are purchased or developed in the same manner as the original equipment or software and are installed and tested by trusted and trained personnel. All hardware and software essential to DigiCert's operations is scanned for malicious code on first use and periodically thereafter.

### **6.6.2. Security Management Controls**

DigiCert has mechanisms in place to control and monitor the security-related configurations of its CA systems. When loading software onto a CA system, DigiCert verifies that the software is the correct version and is supplied by the vendor free of any modifications.

### **6.6.3. Life Cycle Security Controls**

No stipulation.

## **6.7. NETWORK SECURITY CONTROLS**

DigiCert and RA functions are performed using networks secured in accordance with the standards documented in the DigiCert CP to prevent unauthorized access, tampering, and denial-of-service attacks. Communications of sensitive information shall be protected using point-to-point encryption for confidentiality and digital signatures for non-repudiation and authentication.

DigiCert documents and controls the configuration of its systems, including any upgrades or modifications made. DigiCert's CA system is connected to one internal network and is protected by firewalls and Network Address Translation for all internal IP addresses (e.g., 192.168.x.x). DigiCert's customer support and vetting workstations are also protected by firewall(s) and only use internal IP addresses. Root Keys are kept offline and brought online only when necessary to sign Certificate-issuing subordinate CAs, OCSP Responder Certificates, or periodic CRLs. Firewalls and boundary control devices are configured to allow access only by the addresses, ports, protocols and commands required for the trustworthy provision of PKI services by such systems.

DigiCert's security policy is to block all ports and protocols and open only ports necessary to enable CA functions. All CA equipment is configured with a minimum number of services and all unused network ports and services are disabled. DigiCert's network configuration is available for review on-site by its auditors and consultants under an appropriate non-disclosure agreement.

## **6.8. TIME-STAMPING**

The system time on DigiCert's computers is updated using the Network Time Protocol (NTP) to synchronize system clocks at least once every eight hours (Windows default). All times are traceable to a real time value distributed by a UTC(k) laboratory or National Measurement Institute and are updated when a leap second occurs as notified by the appropriate body. DigiCert maintains an internal NTP server that synchronizes with cellular telephone networks and maintains the accuracy of its clock within one second or less. However, Relying Parties should be aware that all times included in a time-stamp token are synchronized with UTC within the accuracy defined in the time-stamp token itself, if present.

DigiCert will not issue a time-stamp token using any clock that is detected as inaccurate.

TST Requesters request time-stamp tokens by sending a request to DigiCert. After the TST Requester receives a response from DigiCert, it must verify the status error returned in the response. If an error was not returned, the TST Requester must then verify the fields contained in the time-stamp token and the validity of the time-stamp token's digital signature. In particular, the TST Requester must verify that the time-stamped data corresponds to what was requested and that the time-stamp token contains the correct certificate identifier, the correct data imprint, and the correct hash algorithm OID. The TST Requester must also verify

the timeliness of the response by verifying the response against a local trusted time reference. The TST Requester is required to notify DigiCert immediately if any information cannot be verified.

Time Stamp Verifiers shall verify the digital signature on the time-stamp token and confirm that the data corresponds to the hash value in the time-stamp token.

## **7. CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES**

DigiCert uses the ITU X.509, version 3 standard to construct digital Certificates for use within the DigiCert PKI. DigiCert adds certain certificate extensions to the basic certificate structure for the purposes intended by X.509v3 as per Amendment 1 to ISO/IEC 9594-8, 1995.

DigiCert meets the technical requirements set forth in sections 2.2, 6.1.5, and 6.1.6 of the CAB Forum Baseline Requirements, the CP, and this CPS for publicly-trusted TLS certificates.

DigiCert generates non-sequential Certificate serial numbers (positive numbers greater than zero) that contain at least 64 bits of output from a CSPRNG.

### **7.1. CERTIFICATE PROFILE**

#### **7.1.1. Version Number(s)**

All Certificates are X.509 version 3 Certificates.

#### **7.1.2. Certificate Extensions**

IGTF Certificates comply with the Grid Certificate Profile as defined by the Open Grid Forum GFD.125.

For Root CA, Subordinate CA, and Subscriber certificates used for publicly-trusted Certificates, DigiCert abides by the relevant Baseline Requirements and configures the Certificate extensions to those requirements.

Subordinate CA Certificates created after January 1, 2019 for publicly trusted certificates, with the exception of cross- certificates that share a private key with a corresponding root certificate: will contain an EKU extension; and cannot include the anyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeId, and DigiCert no longer includes both the id-kp- serverAuth and id-kp-emailProtection KeyPurposeIds in the same certificate.

For TLS certificates, the subjectAltName extension is populated in accordance with RFC 5280. For all web server certificates, the SubjectAltName extension is populated with the authenticated value in the Common Name field of the subject DN (domain name or public IP address). The SubjectAltName extension may contain additional authenticated domain names or public IP addresses. The name forms and extensions will abide by section 7.1.4 of the CP, this CPS, and the CAB Forum Requirements.

For internationalized domain names, the Common Name is represented as a puny-code value and that Common Name will be represented in the Subject Alternative Name extension as a puny-coded A-label value. These different encodings of the same name are treated as equal values for the purposes of Common Name to Subject Alternative Name duplication requirements.

For S/MIME Certificates, the subjectAltName extension must contain at least one GeneralName entry Rfc822Name and/or an otherName of type id-on-SmtpUTF8Mailbox, encoded in accordance with RFC 8398. All Mailbox Addresses in the Subject or SAN entries of type dirName are repeated as Rfc822Name and/or an otherName of type id-on-SmtpUTF8Mailbox in the SAN.

DigiCert's Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificates include an Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension specifying all extended key usages for which the Subordinate CA Certificate is authorized to issue certificates. The anyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeId does not appear in the EKU extension of publicly trusted certificates.

### 7.1.3. Algorithm Object Identifiers

DigiCert Certificates are signed using relevant algorithms approved by the requirements listed in section 1.1. Some of those include one of the following:

sha-1WithRSAEncryption	[iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 5]
sha256WithRSAEncryption <sup>15</sup>	[iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 11]
sha384WithRSAEncryption	[iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 12]
sha512WithRSAEncryption	[iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) sha512WithRSAEncryption(13)]
ecdsa-with-SHA256 <sup>16</sup>	[iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62 (10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2 (3) 2 ]
ecdsa-with-SHA384 <sup>17</sup>	[iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62 (10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3]

DigiCert does not currently sign Certificates using RSA with PSS padding. SSL/TLS Server Certificates and OCSP Certificates are not signed with sha-1WithRSAEncryption.

DigiCert and Subscribers may generate Key Pairs using the following:

id-dsa	[iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9cm(4) 1]
RsaEncryption	[iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 1]
Dhpublicnumber	[iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x942(10046) number-type(2) 1]
id-keyExchangeAlgorithm	[joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) algorithms(1) 22]
id-ecPublicKey	[ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) id-publicKeyType(2) 1 ]

Elliptic curve Public Keys submitted to DigiCert for inclusion in end entity Certificates should all be based on NIST “Suite B” curves.

As described in section 1.2 DigiCert uses the keys and hash algorithms specified in the CAB forum Baseline Requirements and other requirements. DigiCert does not issue publicly trusted Certificates to a Reserved IP address or an FQDN where domain control cannot be verified.

### 7.1.4. Name Forms

Each Certificate includes a unique serial number. Optional subfields in the subject of any publicCertificate must either contain information verified by DigiCert or be left empty. SSL/TLS and S/MIME Certificates cannot contain metadata such as ‘, ‘-’ and ‘ ‘ characters or and/or any other indication that the value/field is absent, incomplete, or not applicable.

For CAB Forum requirements as listed in section 1.1 DigiCert has a process that limits information in OU fields from including a name, DBA, tradename, trademark, address, location, or other text that refers to a specific natural person or Legal Entity unless DigiCert has verified this information in accordance with section 3.2 and the Certificate also contains subject:organizationName, subject:givenName, subject:surname, subject:localityName, and subject:countryName attributes, also verified in accordance

<sup>15</sup> Legacy applications include the following algorithm ObjectIdentifier: {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 11}

<sup>16</sup> Legacy applications include the following algorithm ObjectIdentifier: {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)ansi-X9- 62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with- SHA2 (3)2}

<sup>17</sup> Legacy applications include the following algorithm ObjectIdentifier: {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)ansi-X9- 62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa- with-SHA2 (3) 3}

with section 3.2. DigiCert doesn't issue public SSL/TLS or S/MIME Certificates with an OU attribute.

For CA certificates, the commonName attribute is present and the contents is an identifier that uniquely identifies the CA and distinguishes it from other CAs.

Certificates are populated with the Issuer Name and Subject Distinguished Name required under section 3.1.1. Issuer DNs meet the requirements in the CAB forum baseline requirements.

The contents of the fields in EV Certificates must meet the requirements in section 9 of the EV Guidelines.

The content of S/MIME Certificates are validated according to Section 3 of the CP, this CPS, and the S/MIME Baseline Requirements.<sup>18</sup> Enterprise RA's may include optional attributes in the certificate as specified in Section 7.1.4.2.5 of the S/MIME Requirements and are responsible for validating them to the requirements of Section 3.

### **7.1.5. Name Constraints**

DigiCert may include name constraints in the nameConstraints field when appropriate.

For publicly-trusted TLS certificates, DigiCert will follow the requirements of section 7.1.5 of the Baseline Requirements and as the following sections specify. For publicly-trusted S/MIME Certificates, DigiCert will follow the requirements of section 7.1.5 of the S/MIME Baseline Requirements.

#### **7.1.5.1. Name-Constrained serverAuth CAs**

If the Subordinate CA Certificate includes the id-kp-serverAuth extended key usage, then a technically constrained Subordinate CA Certificate includes the Name Constraints X.509v3 extension with constraints on dNSName, iPAddress and DirectoryName as follows:

- (a) For each dNSName in permittedSubtrees, the DigiCert confirms that the Applicant has registered the dNSName or has been authorized by the domain registrant to act on the registrant's behalf in line with the verification practices of Baseline Requirements section 3.2.2.4.
- (b) For each iPAddress range in permittedSubtrees, DigiCert confirms that the Applicant has been assigned the iPAddress range or has been authorized by the assigner to act on the assignee's behalf.
- (c) For each DirectoryName in permittedSubtrees the DigiCert confirms the Applicant's and/or Subsidiary's Organizational name(s) and location(s) such that end entity certificates issued from the subordinate CA Certificate will comply with section 7.1.2.4 and 7.1.2.5 of the Baseline Requirements.

If the Subordinate CA Certificate is not allowed to issue certificates with an iPAddress, then the Subordinate CA Certificate specifies the entire IPv4 and IPv6 address ranges in excludedSubtrees. The Subordinate CA Certificate includes within excludedSubtrees an iPAddress GeneralName of 8 zero octets (covering the IPv4 address range of 0.0.0.0/0). The Subordinate CA Certificate also includes within excludedSubtrees an iPAddress GeneralName of 32 zero octets (covering the IPv6 address range of ::0/0). Otherwise, the Subordinate CA Certificate includes at least one iPAddress in permittedSubtrees.

If the Subordinate CA is not allowed to issue certificates with dNSNames, then the Subordinate CA Certificate includes a zero-length dNSName in excludedSubtrees. Otherwise, the Subordinate CA Certificate includes at least one dNSName in permittedSubtrees.

#### **7.1.5.2. Name-Constrained emailProtection CAs**

If the technically constrained Subordinate CA certificate includes the id-kp-emailProtection extended key usage, it also includes the Name Constraints X.509v3 extension with constraints on rfc822Name, with at least one name in permittedSubtrees, each such name having its ownership validated according to section 7.1.5 of the S/MIME Baseline Requirements.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> DigiCert will comply with the S/MIME Baseline Requirements as of September 1st, 2023.

<sup>19</sup> DigiCert will comply with the S/MIME Baseline Requirements as of September 1st, 2023.

### **7.1.6. Certificate Policy Object Identifier**

An object identifier (OID) is a unique number that identifies an object or policy and are included as appropriate in the certificate.

OIDs required by CAB Forum are implemented in accordance with those specifications.

DigiCert maintains its OIDs in the follow GitHub repository available publicly:

[https://github.com/digicert/digicert\\_official\\_oids](https://github.com/digicert/digicert_official_oids)

DigiCert may include other OIDs as appropriate.

OIDs in this list and in DigiCert certificates belong to their respective owners.

### **7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints Extension**

Not applicable.

### **7.1.8. Policy Qualifiers Syntax and Semantics**

DigiCert includes brief statements in Certificates about the limitations of liability and other terms associated with the use of a Certificate in the Policy Qualifier field of the Certificates Policy extension. Those Certificates may contain a CPS pointer qualifier that points to the applicable Relying Party Agreement or the applicable CPS.

### **7.1.9 Processing Semantics for the Critical Certificate Policies Extension**

No stipulation.

## **7.2 CRL PROFILE**

For revoked issuing CAs, the CRLReason indicated cannot be unspecified (0) or certificateHold(6). If the reason for revocation is unspecified, DigiCert will omit the reasonCode entry extension, when technically not capable of issuance.

If a reasonCode CRL entry extension is present, the CRLReason must indicate the most appropriate reason for revocation of the certificate unless the reason is unspecified. DigiCert specifies the following reason codes from RFC 5280, section 5.3.1 as appropriate for most instances when used in accordance with the practices in this section and this CPS:

- unspecified (0)<sup>20</sup>
- keyCompromise (1),
- cACompromise (2),
- affiliationChanged (3),
- superseded (4)<sup>21</sup>
- cessationOfOperation (5)<sup>22</sup>

For TLS Certificates issued on or after October 1, 2022, when an end entity TLS certificate (i.e. a certificate capable of being used for TLS-enabled servers) is revoked for one of the reasons below, the specified CRLReason must be included in the reasonCode extension of the CRL entry corresponding to the end entity TLS certificate. When the CRLReason code is not one of the following, then the reasonCode extension will not be provided:

- keyCompromise (RFC 5280 CRLReason #1);

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<sup>20</sup> Reason code (0) unspecified is only used if it is omitted from the CRL and OCSP in accordance with the baseline requirements

<sup>21</sup> When a reason code is not specified, DigiCert will log the revocation as (4) superseded or (5) Cessation of Operation.

<sup>22</sup> When a reason code is not specified, DigiCert will log the revocation as (4) superseded or (5) Cessation of Operation.



- `privilegeWithdrawn` (RFC 5280 CRLReason #9);<sup>23</sup>
- `cessationOfOperation` (RFC 5280 CRLReason #5);
- `affiliationChanged` (RFC 5280 CRLReason #3); or
- `superseded` (RFC 5280 CRLReason #4).

The following is a description of each of these reason codes and circumstances where DigiCert or a Subscriber will be obligated to use it for their revocation circumstances:

#### 1) `keyCompromise`

The CRLReason `keyCompromise` will be used when one or more of the following occurs:

- DigiCert obtains verifiable evidence that the certificate subscriber's private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate suffered a key compromise; or
- DigiCert is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the certificate subscriber's private key to compromise; or
- There is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the private key was flawed; or
- DigiCert is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can easily compute the certificate subscriber's private key based on the public key in the certificate (such as a Debian weak key, see <https://wiki.debian.org/TLSkeys>); or
- the certificate subscriber requests that DigiCert revoke the certificate for this reason, with the scope of revocation being described below.

If anyone requesting revocation for `keyCompromise` has previously demonstrated or can currently demonstrate possession of the private key of the certificate, then DigiCert will revoke all instances of that key across all subscribers.

If the certificate subscriber requests that DigiCert revoke the certificate for `keyCompromise`, and has not previously demonstrated and cannot currently demonstrate possession of the associated private key of that certificate, DigiCert may revoke all certificates associated with that subscriber that contain that public key.

When DigiCert obtains verifiable evidence of private key compromise for a certificate whose CRL entry does not contain a `reasonCode` extension or has a `reasonCode` extension with a non-`keyCompromise` reason, DigiCert may update the CRL entry to enter `keyCompromise` as the CRLReason in the `reasonCode` extension. Additionally, DigiCert may update the revocation date in a CRL entry when it is determined that the private key of the certificate was compromised prior to the revocation date that is indicated in the CRL entry for that certificate.

#### 2) `privilegeWithdrawn`

The CRLReason `privilegeWithdrawn` is intended to be used when there has been a subscriber-side infraction that has not resulted in `keyCompromise`, such as the certificate subscriber provided misleading information in their certificate request or has not upheld their material obligations under the subscriber agreement or terms of use.

Unless the `keyCompromise` CRLReason is being used, the CRLReason `privilegeWithdrawn` must be used when:

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<sup>23</sup> The `privilegeWithdrawn` reasonCode does not need to be made available to the certificate subscriber as a revocation reason option, because the use of this reasonCode is determined by the Issuer CA and not the subscriber.

- DigiCert obtains evidence that the certificate was misused; or
- DigiCert is made aware that the certificate subscriber has violated one or more of its material obligations under the subscriber agreement or terms of use; or
- DigiCert is made aware that a wildcard certificate has been used to authenticate a fraudulently misleading subordinate fully-qualified domain name; or
- DigiCert is made aware of a material change in the information contained in the certificate; or
- DigiCert determines or is made aware that any of the information appearing in the certificate is inaccurate; or
- DigiCert is made aware that the original certificate request was not authorized and that the Subscriber does not retroactively grant authorization.

### 3) cessationOfOperation

The CRLReason cessationOfOperation is intended to be used when the website with the certificate is shut down prior to the expiration of the certificate, or if the subscriber no longer owns or controls the domain name in the certificate. This revocation reason is intended to be used in the following circumstances:

- the certificate subscriber no longer controls, or is no longer authorized to use, all of the domain names in the certificate; or
- the certificate subscriber will no longer be using the certificate because they are discontinuing their website; or
- DigiCert is made aware of any circumstance indicating that use of a fully-qualified domain name or IP address in the certificate is no longer legally permitted (e.g. a court or arbitrator has revoked a domain name registrant's right to use the domain name, a relevant licensing or services agreement between the domain name registrant and the applicant has terminated, or the domain name registrant has failed to renew the domain name).

Unless the keyCompromise CRLReason is being used, the CRLReason cessationOfOperation must be used when:

- the certificate subscriber has requested that their certificate be revoked for this reason; or
- DigiCert received verifiable evidence that the certificate subscriber no longer controls, or is no longer authorized to use, all of the domain names in the certificate.

Otherwise, the cessationOfOperation CRLReason must not be used.

### 4) affiliationChanged

The CRLReason affiliationChanged is intended to be used to indicate that the subject's name or other subject identity information in the certificate has changed, but there is no cause to suspect that the certificate's private key has been compromised.

Unless the keyCompromise CRLReason is being used, the CRLReason affiliationChanged will be used when:

- the certificate subscriber has requested that their certificate be revoked for this reason; or
- DigiCert replaced the certificate due to changes in the certificate's subject information and the CA has not replaced the certificate for the other reasons: keyCompromise, superseded, cessationOfOperation, or privilegeWithdrawn.

Otherwise, the affiliationChanged CRLReason must not be used.

5) superseded

The CRLReason superseded is intended to be used to indicate when:

- the certificate subscriber has requested a new certificate to replace an existing certificate; or
- DigiCert obtains reasonable evidence that the validation of domain authorization or control for any fully-qualified domain name or IP address in the certificate should not be relied upon; or
- DigiCert revoked the certificate for compliance reasons such as the certificate does not comply with the DigiCert CP, this CPS, the CAB Forum's Baseline Requirements, or the Mozilla Root Store Policy.

Unless the keyCompromise CRLReason is being used, the CRLReason superseded must be used when:

- the certificate subscriber has requested that their certificate be revoked for this reason; or
- DigiCert revoked the certificate due to domain authorization or compliance issues other than those related to keyCompromise or privilegeWithdrawn.

Otherwise, the superseded CRLReason must not be used.

### 7.2.1 Version number(s)

DigiCert issues version 2 CRLs that may contain the following fields per requirements:

Field	Value
Issuer Signature Algorithm	sha-1WithRSAEncryption [1 2 840 113549 1 1 5] OR sha-256WithRSAEncryption [1 2 840 113549 1 1 11]; sha-384WithRSAEncryption [1 2 840 113549 1 1]; sha-512WithRSAEncryption [1 2 840 113549 1 1 13 ]; ecdsa-with-sha256 [1 2 840 10045 4 3 2 ]; OR ecdsa-with-sha384 [1 2 840 10045 4 3 3].
Issuer Distinguished Name	Full subject DN of the issuing CA
thisUpdate	CRL issue date in UTC format
nextUpdate	Date by when the next CRL will issue in UTC format.
Revoked Certificates List	List of revoked Certificates, including the serial number and revocation date
Issuer's Signature	[Signature]

### 7.2.2 CRL and CRL Entry Extensions

CRLs may have the following extensions per RFC 5280 and other requirements as needed:

Extension	Value
CRL Number	Never repeated monotonically increasing integer
Authority Key Identifier	Subject Key Identifier of the CRL issuer certificate
Invalidity Date	Optional date in UTC format
Reason Code	Specify reason for revocation in list of reason codes in section 7.2, if included.
Issuing Distribution Point	Configured per RFC 5280 requirements, if included.

### **7.3 OCSP PROFILE**

Effective 2020-09-30, if an OCSP response is for a Root CA or Subordinate CA Certificate, including Cross Certificates, and that certificate has been revoked, then the revocationReason field within the RevokedInfo of the CertStatus is present and asserted.

Effective 2020-09-30, the CRLReason indicated contains a value permitted for CRLs, as specified in section 7.2.2.

#### **7.3.1 Version Number(s)**

DigiCert configures OCSP responses in accordance with industry standards.

#### **7.3.2 OCSP Extensions**

Not Applicable.

The singleExtension of an OCSP response cannot contain the reasonCode (OID 2.5.29.21) CRL entry extension for TLS certificates.

## **8 COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS**

The practices in this CPS are designed to meet or exceed the requirements of generally accepted industry standards, including the latest versions of the WebTrust Programs for Certification Authorities as required by the Mozilla Root Store policy and other programs listed in section 1.1 and 1.6.3.

### **8.1 FREQUENCY AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF ASSESSMENT**

DigiCert receives an annual period in time audit by an independent external auditor to assess DigiCert's compliance with this CPS, referenced requirements, any applicable CPs, and the WebTrust for CA programs criteria.

### **8.2 IDENTITY/QUALIFICATIONS OF ASSESSOR**

WebTrust auditors must meet the requirements of section 8.2 of the CAB Forum Baseline Requirements, S/MIME Baseline Requirements, and section 3.1 of the Mozilla Root Store policy where applicable.

### **8.3 ASSESSOR'S RELATIONSHIP TO ASSESSED ENTITY**

DigiCert's WebTrust / Third Party auditors do not have a financial interest, business relationship, or course of dealing that could foreseeably create a significant bias for or against DigiCert.

### **8.4 TOPICS COVERED BY ASSESSMENT**

The audit covers DigiCert's business practices disclosure, the integrity of DigiCert's PKI operations, and DigiCert's compliance with this CPS and referenced requirements. The audit verifies that DigiCert is compliant with the CP, this CPS, and any MOA between it and any other PKI.

DigiCert undergoes an audit in accordance with one of the following schemes:

1. "WebTrust for CAs v2.2.2 or newer" AND "WebTrust for CAs SSL Baseline with Network Security v2.6 or newer"; or
2. ETSI EN 319 411-1 v1.2.2, which includes normative references to ETSI EN 319 401 (the latest version of the referenced ETSI documents should be applied).

Whichever scheme is chosen, it incorporates periodic monitoring and/or accountability procedures to ensure that its audits continue to be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the scheme. The audit is conducted by a Qualified Auditor, as specified in section 8.2.

### **8.5 ACTIONS TAKEN AS A RESULT OF DEFICIENCY**

If an audit reports a material noncompliance with applicable law, this CPS, the CP, or any other contractual obligations related to DigiCert's services, then (1) the auditor will document the discrepancy, (2) the auditor will promptly notify DigiCert, and (3) DigiCert will develop a plan to cure the noncompliance. DigiCert will submit the plan to the DCPA for approval and to any third party that DigiCert is legally obligated to satisfy. The DCPA may require additional action if necessary to rectify any significant issues created by the non-compliance, including requiring revocation of affected Certificates. DigiCert is entitled to suspend and/or terminate of services through revocation or other actions as deemed by the DCPA to address the non-compliant Issuer CA.

### **8.6 COMMUNICATIONS OF RESULTS**

The results of each audit are reported to the DCPA and to any third party entities which are entitled by law, regulation, or agreement to receive a copy of the audit results. Copies of DigiCert's conforming WebTrust for CAs audit reports can be found at: <https://www.digicert.com/webtrust-audits>. On an annual basis and within three months of completion, DigiCert submits copies of relevant audit compliance reports to various parties, such as Mozilla, Adobe, CA licensing bodies, etc.

## **8.7 SELF-AUDITS**

On at least a quarterly basis, DigiCert performs regular internal audits against a randomly selected sample of at least three percent of its SSL/TLS Server Certificates, S/MIME and Code Signing Certificates issued since the last internal audit. Self-audits on server and code signing Certificates are performed in accordance with Guidelines adopted by the CA B forum. Audits of other certificate types will be at the discretion of DigiCert to gain reasonable assurance of compliance to applicable root program requirements.

## **9. OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS**

### **9.1. FEES**

#### **9.1.1. Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees**

DigiCert charges fees for certificate issuance and renewal. DigiCert may change its fees at any time in accordance with the applicable customer agreement.

#### **9.1.2. Certificate Access Fees**

DigiCert may charge a reasonable fee for access to its certificate databases.

#### **9.1.3. Revocation or Status Information Access Fees**

DigiCert does not charge a certificate revocation fee or a fee for checking the validity status of an issued Certificate using a CRL.

DigiCert may charge a fee for providing customized CRLs, OCSP services, or other value-added revocation and status information services. DigiCert does not permit access to revocation information, Certificate status information, or time stamping in their repositories by third parties that provide products or services that utilize such Certificate status information without DigiCert's prior express written consent.

#### **9.1.4. Fees for Other Services**

DigiCert does not charge a fee for access to the DigiCert CP or this CPS. Any use made for purposes other than simply viewing the document, such as reproduction, redistribution, modification, or creation of derivative works, shall be subject to a license agreement with the entity holding the copyright to the document.

#### **9.1.5. Refund Policy**

Subscribers must request refunds, in writing, within 30 days after a Certificate issues. After receiving the refund request, DigiCert may revoke the Certificate and refund the amount paid by the Applicant, minus any applicable application processing fees.

### **9.2. FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY**

#### **9.2.1. Insurance Coverage**

DigiCert maintains Commercial General Liability insurance with a policy limit of at least \$2 million in coverage and Professional Liability/Errors & Omissions insurance with a policy limit of at least \$5 million in coverage. Insurance is carried through companies rated no less than A- as to Policy Holder's Rating in the current edition of Best's Insurance Guide (or with an association of companies, each of the members of which are so rated).

#### **9.2.2. Other Assets**

No stipulation.

#### **9.2.3. Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities**

DigiCert provides a warranty to Subscribers according to the terms of the Netsure Extended Warranty Protection Plan. DigiCert provides a limited warranty to Relying Parties in DigiCert's Relying Party Agreement.

### **9.3. CONFIDENTIALITY OF BUSINESS INFORMATION**

#### **9.3.1. Scope of Confidential Information**

The following information is considered confidential and protected against disclosure using a reasonable degree of care:

1. Private Keys;
2. Activation data used to access Private Keys or to gain access to the CA system;

3. Business continuity, incident response, contingency, and disaster recovery plans;
4. Other security practices used to protect the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information;
5. Information held by DigiCert as private information in accordance with section 9.4;
6. Audit logs and archive records; and
7. Transaction records, financial audit records, and external or internal audit trail records and any audit reports (with the exception of an auditor's letter confirming the effectiveness of the controls set forth in this CPS).

### **9.3.2. Information Not Within the Scope of Confidential Information**

Any information not listed as confidential is considered public information. Published Certificate and revocation data is considered public information.

### **9.3.3. Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information**

DigiCert's employees, agents, and contractors are responsible for protecting confidential information and are contractually obligated to do so. Employees receive training on how to handle confidential information.

## **9.4. PRIVACY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION**

### **9.4.1. Privacy Plan**

DigiCert follows the privacy policy posted on its website when handling personal information. Personal information is only disclosed when the disclosure is required by law or when requested by the subject of the personal information. Such privacy policies shall conform to applicable local privacy laws. DigiCert follows the Privacy Notices posted on its website when handling personal information. See <https://www.digicert.com/digicert-privacy-policy>

### **9.4.2. Information Treated as Private**

DigiCert treats all personal information about an individual that is not publicly available in the contents of a Certificate or CRL as private information. DigiCert protects private information using appropriate safeguards and a reasonable degree of care.

### **9.4.3. Information Not Deemed Private**

Subject to local laws, private information does not include Certificates, CRLs, or their contents.

### **9.4.4. Responsibility to Protect Private Information**

DigiCert employees and contractors are expected to handle personal information in strict confidence and meet the requirements of US and European law concerning the protection of personal data. All sensitive information is securely stored and protected against accidental disclosure.

### **9.4.5. Notice and Consent to Use Private Information**

Personal information obtained from an applicant during the application or identity verification process is considered private information if the information is not included in a Certificate. DigiCert will only use private information after obtaining the subject's consent or as required by applicable law or regulation. All Subscribers must consent to the global transfer and publication of any personal data contained in a Certificate.

### **9.4.6. Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process**

DigiCert may disclose private information, without notice, if DigiCert believes the disclosure is required by law or regulation.

### **9.4.7. Other Information Disclosure Circumstances**

No stipulation.

## **9.5. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS**

DigiCert and/or its business partners own the intellectual property rights in DigiCert's services, including the Certificates, trademarks used in providing the services, and this CPS. "DigiCert" is a registered trademark of DigiCert, Inc.



### **9.5.1. Property Rights in Certificates and Revocation Information**

DigiCert retains all intellectual property rights in and to the Certificates and revocation information that they issue. DigiCert and customers shall grant permission to reproduce and distribute Certificates on a nonexclusive royalty-free basis, provided that they are reproduced in full and that use of Certificates is subject to the Relying Party Agreement referenced in the Certificate. DigiCert, and customers shall grant permission to use revocation information to perform Relying Party functions subject to the applicable CRL usage agreement, Relying Party Agreement, or any other applicable agreements.

### **9.5.2. Property Rights in the CP**

Issuer CAs acknowledge that DigiCert retains all intellectual property rights in and to this CPS.

### **9.5.3. Property Rights in Names**

Subscribers and Applicants retain all rights it has (if any) in any trademark, service mark, or trade name contained in any Certificate and distinguished name within any Certificate issued to such Subscriber or Applicant.

### **9.5.4. Property Rights in Keys and Key Material**

Key Pairs corresponding to Certificates of CAs and end-user Subscribers are the property of DigiCert and end-user Subscribers that are the respective subjects of the Certificates, regardless of the physical medium within which they are stored and protected, and such persons retain all intellectual property rights in and to these key pairs. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, DigiCert's root Public Keys and the Root Certificates containing them, including all Public Keys and self-signed Certificates, are the property of DigiCert. DigiCert licenses software and hardware manufacturers to reproduce such Root Certificates to place copies in trustworthy hardware devices or software.

### **9.5.5. Violation of Property Rights**

Issuer CAs shall not knowingly violate the intellectual property rights of any third party.

## **9.6. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES**

### **9.6.1. CA Representations and Warranties**

Except as expressly stated in this CPS or in a separate agreement with a Subscriber, DigiCert does not make any representations regarding its products or services. DigiCert represents, to the extent specified in this CPS, that:

1. DigiCert complies, in all material aspects, with the CP, this CPS, and all applicable laws and regulations,
2. DigiCert publishes and updates CRLs and OCSP responses on a regular basis,
3. All Certificates issued under this CPS will be verified in accordance with this CPS and meet the minimum requirements found herein and in the Baseline Requirements and EV Guidelines<sup>24</sup>,and
4. DigiCert will maintain a repository of public information on its website.

To the extent allowed under EU law, DigiCert:

1. Does not warrant the accuracy, authenticity, completeness, or fitness of any unverified information, including name verification for (1) Certificates intended for email and intranet use, (2) Multi-SAN Certificates, and (3) other Certificates issued to individuals and intranets.
2. Is not responsible for information contained in a Certificate except as stated in this CPS,
3. Does not warrant the quality, function, or performance of any software or hardware device, and
4. Is not responsible for failing to comply with this CPS because of circumstances outside of DigiCert's control.

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<sup>24</sup> Should any practices be found to be illegal in a jurisdiction, DigiCert will follow the Baseline Requirements section 9.16.3 and E.V. Guidelines section 8.1 and notify the CA/Browser Forum of that change.

For EV Certificates, DigiCert represents to Subscribers, Subjects, Application Software Vendors that distribute DigiCert's root Certificates, and Relying Parties that use a DigiCert Certificate while the Certificate is valid that DigiCert followed the EV Guidelines when verifying information and issuing EV Certificates.

This representation is limited solely to DigiCert's compliance with the EV Guidelines (e.g., DigiCert may rely on erroneous information provided in an attorney's opinion or accountant's letter that is checked in accordance with the Guidelines).

Subscriber Agreements may include additional representations and warranties that do not contradict or supersede this CPS.

### **9.6.2. RA Representations and Warranties**

RAs represent that:

1. The RA's certificate issuance and management services conform to the DigiCert CP and this CPS,
2. Information provided by the RA does not contain any false or misleading information,
3. Translations performed by the RA are an accurate translation of the original information, and
4. All Certificates requested by the RA meet the requirements of this CPS.

DigiCert's agreement with the RA may contain additional representations.

Subscriber Agreements may include additional representations and warranties.

### **9.6.3. Subscriber Representations and Warranties**

Prior to being issued and receiving a Certificate, subscribers are solely responsible for any misrepresentations they make to third parties and for all transactions that use Subscriber's Private Key, regardless of whether such use was authorized. Subscribers are required to notify DigiCert and any applicable RA if a change occurs that could affect the status of the Certificate.

DigiCert requires, as part of the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use for TLS, that the Applicant make the commitments and warranties in this section for the benefit of DigiCert and the Certificate Beneficiaries.

Prior to the issuance of a Certificate, DigiCert will obtain, for the express benefit of DigiCert and the Certificate Beneficiaries, either:

1. The Applicant's agreement to the Subscriber Agreement with DigiCert, or
2. The Applicant's acknowledgement of the Terms of Use.

Subscribers represent to DigiCert, Application Software Vendors, and Relying Parties that, for each Certificate, the Subscriber will:

1. Securely generate its Private Keys and protect its Private Keys from compromise,
2. Provide accurate and complete information when communicating with DigiCert,
3. Confirm the accuracy of the certificate data prior to using the Certificate,
4. Promptly (i) request revocation of a Certificate, cease using it and its associated Private Key, and notify DigiCert if there is any actual or suspected misuse or compromise of the Private Key associated with the Public Key included in the certificate, and (ii) request revocation of the Certificate, and cease using it, if any information in the Certificate is or becomes incorrect or inaccurate,
5. Ensure that individuals using Certificates on behalf of an organization have received security training appropriate to the Certificate,
6. Use the Certificate only for authorized and legal purposes, consistent with the certificate purpose, this CPS, any applicable CP, and the relevant Subscriber Agreement, including only installing SSL/TLS Server Certificates on servers accessible at the domain listed in the Certificate and not using code signing Certificates to sign malicious code or any code that is downloaded without a user's consent, and
7. Promptly cease using the Certificate and related Private Key after the Certificate's expiration.

Subscriber Agreements may include additional representations and warranties.

#### **9.6.4. Relying Party Representations and Warranties**

Each Relying Party represents that, prior to relying on a DigiCert Certificate, it:

1. Obtained sufficient knowledge on the use of digital Certificates and PKI,
2. Studied the applicable limitations on the usage of Certificates and agrees to DigiCert's limitations on liability related to the use of Certificates,
3. Has read, understands, and agrees to the DigiCert Relying Party Agreement and this CPS,
4. Verified both the DigiCert Certificate and the Certificates in the certificate chain using the relevant CRL or OCSP,
5. Will not use a DigiCert Certificate if the Certificate has expired or been revoked and
6. Will take all reasonable steps to minimize the risk associated with relying on a digital signature, including only relying on a DigiCert Certificate after considering:
  - a) applicable law and the legal requirements for identification of a party, protection of the confidentiality or privacy of information, and enforceability of the transaction;
  - b) the intended use of the Certificate as listed in the certificate or this CPS,
  - c) the data listed in the Certificate,
  - d) the economic value of the transaction or communication,
  - e) the potential loss or damage that would be caused by an erroneous identification or a loss of confidentiality or privacy of information in the application, transaction, or communication,
  - f) the Relying Party's previous course of dealing with the Subscriber,
  - g) the Relying Party's understanding of trade, including experience with computer-based methods of trade, and
  - h) any other indicia of reliability or unreliability pertaining to the Subscriber and/or the application, communication, or transaction.

Any unauthorized reliance on a Certificate is at a party's own risk.

Relying Party Agreements may include additional representations and warranties.

#### **9.6.5. Representations and Warranties of Other Participants**

No stipulation.

#### **9.7. DISCLAIMERS OF WARRANTIES**

EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY STATED IN SECTION 9.6.1, ALL CERTIFICATES AND ANY RELATED SOFTWARE AND SERVICES ARE PROVIDED "AS IS" AND "AS AVAILABLE". TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, DIGICERT DISCLAIMS ALL EXPRESS AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING ALL WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. DIGICERT DOES NOT WARRANT THAT ANY SERVICE OR PRODUCT WILL MEET ANY EXPECTATIONS OR THAT ACCESS TO CERTIFICATES WILL BE TIMELY OR ERROR-FREE. DigiCert does not guarantee the availability of any products or services and may modify or discontinue any product or service offering at any time.

#### **9.8. LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY**

NOTHING HEREIN LIMITS LIABILITY RELATED TO (I) DEATH OR PERSONAL INJURY RESULTING FROM DIGICERT'S NEGLIGENCE OR (II) FRAUD COMMITTED BY DIGICERT. EXCEPT AS STATED ABOVE, ANY ENTITY USING A DIGICERT CERTIFICATE OR SERVICE WAIVES ALL LIABILITY OF DIGICERT RELATED TO SUCH USE, PROVIDED THAT DIGICERT HAS MATERIALLY COMPLIED WITH THIS CPS IN PROVIDING THE CERTIFICATE OR SERVICE. DIGICERT'S LIABILITY FOR CERTIFICATES AND SERVICES THAT DO NOT MATERIALLY COMPLY WITH THIS CPS IS LIMITED AS SET FORTH IN THE NETSURE EXTENDED WARRANTY PROTECTION PLAN AND THE DIGICERT RELYING PARTY AGREEMENT.

All liability is limited to actual and legally provable damages. DigiCert is not liable for:

1. Any indirect, consequential, special, or punitive damages or any loss of profit, revenue, data, or opportunity, even if DigiCert is aware of the possibility of such damages;
2. Liability related to fraud or willful misconduct of the Applicant;
3. Liability related to use of a Certificate that exceeds the limitations on use, value, or transactions as stated either in the Certificate or this CPS;

4. Liability related to the security, usability, or integrity of products not supplied by DigiCert, including the Subscriber's and Relying Party's hardware; or
5. Liability related to the compromise of a Subscriber's Private Key.

The limitations in this section apply to the maximum extent permitted by law and apply regardless of (i) the reason for or nature of the liability, including tort claims, (ii) the number of claims of liability, (iii) the extent or nature of the damages, (iv) whether DigiCert failed to follow any provision of this CPS, or (v) whether any provision of this CPS was proven ineffective.

The disclaimers and limitations on liabilities in this CPS are fundamental terms to the use of DigiCert's Certificates and services.

To the extent DigiCert has issued and managed the Certificate(s) at issue in compliance with this CPS and its CPS, DigiCert shall have no liability to the Subscriber, any Relying Party, or any other third parties for any damages or losses suffered as a result of the use or reliance on such Certificate(s). To the extent permitted by applicable law, Subscriber Agreements and Relying Party Agreements shall limit DigiCert's and the applicable Affiliates' liability outside the context of any extended warranty protection program. Limitations of liability shall include an exclusion of indirect, special, incidental, and consequential damages.

The liability (and/or limitation thereof) of Subscribers shall be as set forth in the applicable Subscriber Agreements.

The liability (and/or limitation thereof) of enterprise RAs and the applicable CA shall be set out in the agreement(s) between them.

The liability (and/or limitation thereof) of Relying Parties shall be as set forth in the applicable Relying Party Agreements.

## **9.9. INDEMNITIES**

### **9.9.1. Indemnification by DigiCert**

To the extent permitted by applicable law, DigiCert shall indemnify each Application Software Vendor against any claim, damage, or loss suffered by an Application Software Vendor related to an EV Certificate issued by DigiCert, regardless of the cause of action or legal theory involved, except where the claim, damage, or loss suffered by the Application Software Vendor was directly caused by the Application Software Vendor's software displaying either (1) a valid and trustworthy EV Certificate as not valid or trustworthy or (2) displaying as trustworthy (i) an EV Certificate that has expired or (ii) a revoked EV Certificate where the revocation status is available online but the Application Software Vendor's software failed to check or ignored the status.

### **9.9.2. Indemnification by Subscribers**

To the extent permitted by law, each Subscriber shall indemnify DigiCert, its partners, and any cross-signed entities, and their respective directors, officers, employees, agents, and contractors against any loss, damage, or expense, including reasonable attorney's fees, related to (i) any misrepresentation or omission of material fact by Subscriber, regardless of whether the misrepresentation or omission was intentional or unintentional; (ii) Subscriber's breach of the Subscriber Agreement, this CPS, or applicable law; (iii) the compromise or unauthorized use of a Certificate or Private Key caused by the Subscriber's negligence or intentional acts; or (iv) Subscriber's misuse of the Certificate or Private Key.

The applicable Subscriber Agreement may include additional indemnity obligations.

### **9.9.3. Indemnification by Relying Parties**

To the extent permitted by law, each Relying Party shall indemnify DigiCert, its partners, and any cross-signed entities, and their respective directors, officers, employees, agents, and contractors against any loss, damage, or expense, including reasonable attorney's fees, related to the Relying Party's (i) breach of the Relying Party Agreement, an End-User License Agreement, this CPS, or applicable law; (ii) unreasonable reliance on a Certificate; or (iii) failure to check the Certificate's status prior to use.

## **9.10. TERM AND TERMINATION**

### **9.10.1. Term**

This CPS and any amendments to the CPS are effective when published to DigiCert's online repository and remain in effect until replaced with a newer version.

### **9.10.2. Termination**

This CPS as amended from time to time, shall remain in effect until replaced by a newer version.

### **9.10.3. Effect of Termination and Survival**

DigiCert will communicate the conditions and effect of this CPS's termination via the DigiCert Repository. The communication will specify which provisions survive termination. At a minimum, all responsibilities related to protecting confidential information will survive termination. All Subscriber Agreements remain effective until the Certificate is revoked or expired, even if this CPS terminates.

## **9.11. INDIVIDUAL NOTICES AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH PARTICIPANTS**

DigiCert accepts notices related to this CPS at the locations specified in section 2.2. Notices are deemed effective after the sender receives a valid and digitally signed acknowledgment of receipt from DigiCert. If an acknowledgement of receipt is not received within five days, the sender must resend the notice in paper form to the street address specified in section 2.2 using either a courier service that confirms delivery or via certified or registered mail with postage prepaid and return receipt requested. DigiCert may allow other forms of notice in its Subscriber Agreements.

Notices to Application Software Vendors are sent out in accordance with the respective requirements.

## **9.12. AMENDMENTS**

### **9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment**

This CPS is reviewed annually. Amendments are made by posting an updated version of the CPS to the online repository. Updates supersede any designated or conflicting provisions of the referenced version of the CPS. Controls are in place to reasonably ensure that this CPS is not amended and published without the prior authorization of the DCPA.

### **9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period**

DigiCert posts CPS revisions to its website. DigiCert does not guarantee or set a notice-and-comment period and may make changes to this CPS without notice and without changing the version number. Major changes affecting accredited Certificates are announced and approved by the accrediting agency prior to becoming effective. The DCPA is responsible for determining what constitutes a material change of the CPS.

### **9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID Must Be Changed**

The DCPA is solely responsible for determining whether an amendment to the CPS requires an OID change.

## **9.13. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVISIONS**

To the extent permitted by applicable law, Subscriber Agreements and Relying Party Agreements shall contain a dispute resolution clause. Unless otherwise approved by DigiCert, the procedure to resolve disputes involving DigiCert require an initial negotiation period of sixty (60) days followed by litigation in the federal or state court encompassing Salt Lake County, Utah, in the case of claimants who are U.S. residents, or, in the case of all other claimants, arbitration administered by the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") in accordance with the ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration

Parties are required to notify DigiCert and attempt to resolve disputes directly with DigiCert before resorting to any dispute resolution mechanism, including adjudication or any type of alternative dispute resolution.

## **9.14. GOVERNING LAW**

The laws of the state of Utah govern the interpretation, construction, and enforcement of this CPS and all proceedings related to DigiCert's products and services, including tort claims, without regard to any conflicts of law principles. The state of Utah, and Salt Lake County, has non-exclusive venue and jurisdiction over any

proceedings related to the CPS or any DigiCert product or service.

### **9.15. COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAW**

This CPS is subject to all applicable laws and regulations, including United States restrictions on the export of software and cryptography products. Subject to section 9.4.5's Notice and Consent to Use Private Information contained in Certificates, DigiCert meets the requirements of the European data protection laws and has established appropriate technical and organization measures against unauthorized or unlawful processing of personal data and against the loss, damage, or destruction of personal data.

### **9.16. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS**

#### **9.16.1. Entire Agreement**

DigiCert contractually obligates each RA to comply with this CPS and applicable industry guidelines. DigiCert also requires each party using its products and services to enter into an agreement that delineates the terms associated with the product or service. If an agreement has provisions that differ from this CPS, then the agreement with that party controls, but solely with respect to that party. Third parties may not rely on or bring action to enforce such agreement.

#### **9.16.2. Assignment**

Any entities operating under this CPS may not assign their rights or obligations without the prior written consent of DigiCert. Unless specified otherwise in a contact with a party, DigiCert does not provide notice of assignment.

#### **9.16.3. Severability**

If any provision of this CPS is held invalid or unenforceable by a competent court or tribunal, the remainder of the CPS will remain valid and enforceable. Each provision of this CPS that provides for a limitation of liability, disclaimer of a warranty, or an exclusion of damages is severable and independent of any other provision.

#### **9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)**

DigiCert may seek indemnification and attorneys' fees from a party for damages, losses, and expenses related to that party's conduct. DigiCert's failure to enforce a provision of this CPS does not waive DigiCert's right to enforce the same provision later or right to enforce any other provision of this CPS. To be effective, waivers must be in writing and signed by DigiCert.

#### **9.16.5. Force Majeure**

DigiCert is not liable for any delay or failure to perform an obligation under this CPS to the extent that the delay or failure is caused by an occurrence beyond DigiCert's reasonable control. The operation of the Internet is beyond DigiCert's reasonable control.

To the extent permitted by applicable law, Subscriber Agreements and Relying Party Agreements shall include a force majeure clause protecting DigiCert.

### **9.17. OTHER PROVISIONS**

No stipulation.

## APPENDIX A: SAMPLE OPINION LETTER

[Date]

To: DigiCert, Inc.

2801 N. Thanksgiving Way  
Suite 500  
Lehi, UT 84043  
Email: support@digicert.com  
Fax: 801-705-0481

Re: Digital Certificate for [Exact company name of client – see footnote 1] (“Client”)

This firm represents Client, who asked that I, as its [accountant, lawyer, solicitors, barrister, advocate, etc.], attest to the following information solely as related to the Client’s application for a digital certificate.

After reviewing the Client’s records and based on my investigation, my professional opinion is that:

1. Client is a duly formed [corporation, LLC, etc.] under the laws of the [state/province] of [name of governing jurisdiction where Client is incorporated or registered]; is “active,” “valid,” “current,” or the equivalent; and is not under any known legal disability.
2. [If applicable] The Romanized transliteration of Client’s formal legal name is: [Romanized name].
3. [If applicable] Client conducts business under the [assumed/DBA/trade] name of [assumed name of Client]. Client has a currently valid registration of the name with the government agency that has jurisdiction over the place of business listed below.
4. The address where [Client, Client’s parent, or Client’s subsidiary – select one] conducts business operations is:  
[Insert place of business – this should match the address on the certificate application]
5. A main telephone number at Client’s place of business is:  
[Insert primary telephone number of business]
6. [Name of Client’s Representative – see footnote 2] is an individual (or are individuals) with the authority to act on behalf of Client to:
  - a) Provide information about the Client contained in the referenced application,
  - b) Request one or more digital certificates and designate other persons to request digital certificates, and
  - c) Agree to the contractual obligations contained in DigiCert’s agreements.
7. [Name and title of Client’s Representative], who is Client’s [Title of Client Representative], can be contacted at:  
Email: [Email address of Client Representative]  
Phone: [Phone number of Client Representative]
8. Client has either operated as a business for three or more years or has an active deposit account held at a bank or other financial institution where funds deposited are payable on demand.

Although we did not find any exceptions to the above identification procedures, these procedures do not constitute an audit or opinion of Client's application for a digital certificate. We are not expressing an opinion

on Client's digital certificate application and have provided this letter solely for the benefit of DigiCert in connection with Client's application for a digital certificate. No other person or entity may rely on this letter without my express written consent. This letter shall not be quoted in whole or in part, used, published or otherwise referred to or relied upon in any manner, including, without limitation, in any financial statement or other document.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_  
Print Accountant/Attorney Name: \_\_\_\_\_  
Phone Number: \_\_\_\_\_  
Email: \_\_\_\_\_  
Firm Name: \_\_\_\_\_  
Licensed in: \_\_\_\_\_  
License number, if any: \_\_\_\_\_  
Contact information for licensing agency where this accountant's/attorney's license information may be verified: \_\_\_\_\_

- Note 1: This must be the Client's exact corporate name as registered with the relevant Incorporating Agency in the Client's Jurisdiction of Incorporation.
- Note 2: A Power of Attorney from an officer of the Client who has the power to delegate authority is sufficient to establish the Client Representative's actual authority. Multiple representatives may be listed.
- Note 3: In-house counsel of the Client may submit this letter if permitted by the rules of your jurisdiction.
- Note 4: This letter may be submitted by mail, fax, or email.